In Hindsight: UN Peace Operations at a Crossroads
Introduction
UN peace operations have traditionally been among the most important tools available to the Security Council for the promotion and maintenance of international peace and security. They are perhaps the most visible aspect of the UN’s work. Most importantly, as the 2015 High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations demonstrated, UN peace operations have played an important role in saving lives and resolving conflicts.[1]
Today, however, they face mounting challenges in an increasingly fractured multilateral environment. Geopolitical tensions among Council members, coupled with severe budgetary constraints, have weakened political consensus and eroded financial and operational support for these missions. Additionally, host governments are questioning the continued presence of UN peace operations, with several of them calling for the drawdown and exit of these missions from their countries. This has resulted in the departure of three UN peace operations from Mali, Sudan, and Iraq, respectively, over the past three years, while one Special Political Mission (SPM), the UN Transitional Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNTMIS), is going through a transition process as it winds down its operation and handover responsibilities to the Somali authorities and the UN Country Team (UNCT).
Against this backdrop, this month’s In Hindsight examines Security Council deliberations on UN peace operations in 2025 and highlights emerging trends. It also considers what lies ahead for UN peace operations this year at a time of great uncertainty.
2025: A Challenging Year
As the UN marked its 80th anniversary, UN peace operations experienced a particularly difficult year. While the Council renewed the mandate of eight peacekeeping missions and five SPMs last year, the mandates of four peacekeeping missions and one SPM were adopted non-unanimously. This reflects a broader trend of lack of consensus within the Council and the flagging political support for UN peace operations.
Last year, the UN’s liquidity crisis hindered the operational capacity and effectiveness of peace operations. The crisis is the result of member states being unwilling or unable to pay their annual contributions to the UN’s regular and peacekeeping budgets in full and on time. At the end of the year, the UN was facing significant arrears for its peacekeeping and regular budgets, largely due to the US, which contributes roughly 22 percent of the regular budget and 27 percent of the peacekeeping budget. To mitigate the impact of the liquidity crisis, UN peace operations were forced to implement contingency measures, including a 15 percent cut in expenditures and the repatriation of 25 percent of uniformed personnel.
Since President Donald Trump returned to office in January 2025, the US has sought to overhaul UN peace operations as part of a “go back to basics” strategy designed to cut costs and to focus the UN on what it believes is its core peace and security mandate. It has pushed for some missions that it believes are ineffective to wind down their operations and withdraw. During several mandate renewal negotiations of missions as discussed below, the US has also called for strategic reviews and benchmarks to assess mission progress and performance, as well as for the Secretary-General to present options for determining the future of specific missions. The US position influenced the decisions adopted by the Council last year regarding several missions, despite concerns expressed by some members about a hasty drawdown and the implementation of benchmarks that may not be in sync with realities on the ground, among others.
These positions have had a significant impact on peace operations in Lebanon, Yemen, and Western Sahara. In August 2025, the Council renewed the mandate of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for a final time until 31 December, requesting the mission to begin an orderly and safe drawdown and withdrawal. During the negotiations, the US signalled its readiness to veto the mandate renewal if it did not contain a clear date for the end of the mission, while the other members did not apparently seek the termination of UNIFIL and seemed to favour prioritising conditions on the ground rather than a specific end date for the mission. The result was a compromise that tempered US insistence on a set date for the mission’s exit, with a final, longer-than-usual mandate renewal of 16 months. During negotiations in July 2025 on the UN Mission to Support the Hodeidah Agreement (UNMHA), the US expressed the view that it should be shuttered, and as noted below, the Council renewed the mandate at the start of the year for one last time until 31 March. In resolution 2797, which was drafted by the US and adopted on 27 January, the Council requested a strategic review to determine the future of MINURSO. The US also asked the Secretary-General to provide a report by 15 September on the feasibility of an eventual handover of tasks from the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) to the host country authorities or the UNCT.
In terms of partnerships for peacekeeping, the adoption of resolution 2719 of 21 December 2023 on the financing of African Union (AU)-led Peace Support Operations (AUPSOs) had rekindled a sense of hope and optimism for enhanced cooperation between the UN and the AU. Through this resolution, the Security Council determined that AUPSOs authorised by the Security Council should receive up to 75 percent of their annual budgets through UN-assessed contributions. However, efforts to trigger the implementation of this landmark resolution in the case of Somalia, which hosts the AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), failed last year due to strong opposition from the US. (For more, see our 10 May 2025 What’s in Blue story.)
On the other hand, the Council authorised support for the deployment of a Gang Suppression Force in Haiti in September 2025 through the establishment of a support office—a model also envisaged under resolution 2719 to assist AUPSOs. In November 2025, the Council also authorised the establishment of a temporary International Stabilization Force (ISF) in Gaza. These developments appear to have prompted discussion about the future direction of UN peace operations, particularly in the context of a perceived shift towards non-UN-authorised missions.
Comprehensive Review of UN Peace Operations
Last year, the Secretary-General launched a comprehensive review of UN peace operations as requested by UN member states in the 2024 Pact for the Future amid enormous difficulties facing UN peace operations. This review is being conducted internally by the UN Secretariat, with the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) and the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) leading the process.
The two departments have conducted a series of consultations with the various intergovernmental bodies and received written input from member states, regional organisations, civil society, and academia. The review is expected to be submitted to the General Assembly and the Security Council later this year in the form of a Secretary-General’s report. In 2025, the Security Council held three open debates organised by the “peacekeeping trio”—Denmark, Pakistan, and the Republic of Korea (RoK)—which allowed Council members and the wider UN membership to share their views and perspectives on the future of UN peace operations. With RoK having completed its Council term at the end of 2025, Denmark and Pakistan are expected to continue to work together on peacekeeping issues, particularly with respect to the review.
While the aim of this review was to help shape the future of UN peace operations, expectations among member states regarding its outcome appear to be quite modest. Based on the informal consultations held so far and the key pillars of the review shared with member states last December, there is a sense that the review may not produce any groundbreaking recommendations. A theme that has emerged in discussions about the future of peace operations—and one that may also feature prominently in the outcome of the review—is how to implement a networked approach that continues to capitalise on the UN’s comparative advantages while also leveraging partnerships with regional organisations, host countries, and the broader UN system.
Additionally, given that member states will need to review the recommendations, and that Secretary-General António Guterres’ term will end on 31 December, the responsibility of implementing the review’s recommendations will most likely fall on the next Secretary-General. The future of peace operations is likely to be one of the key questions asked of candidates during the informal interactive dialogue sessions in the General Assembly, which will begin on 20 April. At this stage, it is unclear how the next Secretary-General will approach this issue and whether or not it will be a priority.
Most importantly, it seems that the discussions about reforming UN peace operations have been overshadowed by the urgent need to mitigate the impact of the ongoing liquidity crisis, which is forcing drastic cuts to field operations. At the same time, there are ongoing discussions on the UN80 Initiative, launched by the Secretary-General last year and aimed at overhauling the UN system to make it more effective, cost-efficient, and responsive.
In his 24 March 2025 briefing to the Security Council on peace operations, Guterres expressed the hope that the comprehensive review of UN peace operations would help inform efforts under the UN80 Initiative by finding efficiencies and improvements. Member states also appear curious to know how the two processes could mutually reinforce each other. Apparently, this is quite a delicate issue at a time when the organisation is being forced to scale back its operations and cut costs. It seems that the issue was raised but not fully explored during informal consultations on the review.
What Lies Ahead?
The year started with the Council requesting the Secretary-General to prepare a transition and liquidation plan for another SPM, UNMHA, which is expected to transfer its tasks and responsibilities to the Special Envoy for Yemen. The US’ explanation of vote could be an indication of its approach in upcoming negotiations on peace operations mandates. Its Deputy Permanent Representative Tammy Bruce stated: “The Security Council has a responsibility to look at all special political missions with the same critical eye with which it has examined UNMHA. The Council must adapt or end missions if conditions on the ground are not tolerable.”[2]
Looking ahead, Council members will negotiate the mandate renewal of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) this month. The US has already argued that the mission needs to adapt to changing conditions on the ground, underscoring the importance of realigning its mandate through clear and achievable benchmarks. In March, the Council is also expected to consider further adjustments to the mandate of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), based on the Secretary-General’s report and recommendations to be submitted by 1 March.
In April, the mandate renewal of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) is anticipated. The mission has had to implement austerity measures at a time when South Sudan is relapsing into yet another cycle of conflict and violence. Last year, the mission had apparently faced difficulties with the host country in implementing these measures. Recently, the South Sudanese government reportedly ordered the mission to evacuate its personnel from three counties in Jonglei State ahead of its planned military operations against opposition forces in the region. In a 10 February Security Council meeting on South Sudan, the US, the penholder on South Sudan, warned that “any further non-cooperation by South Sudan will constitute a threat to the mission’s viability”, adding that this will inform future decisions regarding the mission’s future.[3] However, other Council members appeared cautious, mindful of the potential ramifications of such signals at a time when the country is sliding back into violence.
In November, the Council is expected to renew the mandate of the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), although both the renewal and the mission’s future will depend on progress by both Sudan and South Sudan in implementing the benchmarks set out in resolution 2802 of 14 November 2025. Against this backdrop, South Sudan requested the AU to place the issue of Abyei on the agenda of its Summit on 14-15 February. However, with the war in Sudan showing no sign of abating and South Sudan itself on the brink of another cycle of conflict and violence, prospects for meaningful progress on the benchmarks appear bleak.
In October 2024, the Council approved a two-phase transition for the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), subsequently renamed UNTMIS, expressing its intention to complete the transition by 31 October. This decision aligned with the host government’s request for the mission to hand over responsibilities to the Somali authorities and the UNCT. The UK, the penholder on Somalia, apparently explored the possibility of a Council outcome to address the second phase of UNTMIS’ transition. It was also keen to test options for a successor UN presence in recognition of Somalia’s continuing needs. However, in the absence of host-country support, it did not appear that a product would be possible. As a result, it appears that it will be very difficult for the UK and other like-minded members to try to revive the discussion of a possible successor mission to UNTMIS in October.
Furthermore, the Council is expected to consider proposals for a possible drawdown of MINUSCA, informed by the Secretary-General’s report due in September. Any drawdown is likely to begin with the closure of the mission’s electoral division following the conclusion of national electoral processes.
Lastly, the Council is scheduled to review the implementation of resolution 2719 three years after its adoption, in December of this year. Over the past three years, the UN and the AU have undertaken joint efforts to lay the groundwork for the resolution’s implementation. These efforts were outlined in the Secretary-General’s most recent annual report submitted pursuant to the resolution. Although there is currently a sense that the review may be largely procedural—and resolution 2719 has yet to be applied in practice—it is too early to predict how Council dynamics could shape the process.
Observations
UN peace operations expanded significantly after the end of the Cold War. Today, however, as the world enters another turbulent period, the utility of UN peace operations is increasingly being called into question, especially by the US, a permanent member of the Security Council and the world’s most powerful country, and by host countries themselves. While last year was challenging for UN peace operations, this year could be even more difficult. Several UN peace operations are slated to wind down their operations and leave. Others could be forced to initiate drawdown processes.
In light of these developments, transitions have become central to Council discussions on UN peace operations. The implementation of resolution 2594—a landmark text spearheaded by Ireland in September 2021 on peace operations—is therefore all the more critical to ensuring the gradual, orderly, and responsible withdrawal of UN peace operations. However, its application has been uneven, particularly in the face of a strong push over the past five years for accelerated drawdown and exit of UN peace operations.
There is no doubt that this issue warrants particular attention in the ongoing review of peace operations. While all missions are expected to engage in early and integrated transition planning, some may be reluctant to do so in the absence of a clear mandate from the Security Council or a formal request from the host government. The Secretariat may be similarly hesitant, aware that initiating discussions on transitions could send the wrong signal regarding the drawdown and exit of UN peace operations.
A related issue concerns the utility of strategic reviews, assessments, benchmarks, and options in informing Council decisions on the drawdown, reconfiguration, or exit of UN peace operations. It is important to look at how these tools are effectively utilised to facilitate smooth and successful transitions. In some cases, these tools have informed the Council’s decisions. In others, however, they have fallen short of expectations, or Council members proceeded to make decisions based on political considerations.
The more pressing issue remains the liquidity crisis, which does not show any sign of a sustainable solution. What this means is that UN peace operations will continue facing significant operational limitations in effectively carrying out their mandated tasks. The UN is expected to run out of cash in July if member states do not pay their dues. The Secretary-General has said that the organisation faces a major risk of “imminent financial collapse”.
In this context, the US’ 2006 contribution is a critical factor. There was a bipartisan effort in the US Congress to approve a budget that would cover US contributions to both the regular and peacekeeping budgets. The key question is whether the US administration will be willing to disburse the funds approved by Congress. Last year, the administration rescinded some of the approved budget, citing ongoing “mission failures”. In a 6 February interview with Reuters, the US Permanent Representative to the UN, Mike Waltz, was quoted as saying that the UN would receive “an initial tranche of money very shortly,” while noting that the specific figures had not yet been decided.
In an increasingly resource-constrained environment, there are growing calls within the Council—particularly from permanent members, including but not limited to the US—for UN peace operations to focus on core tasks. In practice, this would entail scaling back the multidimensional nature of some peace operations by narrowing mandates that encompass a broad range of peacebuilding activities and refocusing them on key security and political objectives.
Taken together, all these developments underscore the daunting challenge facing UN peace operations as they seek to preserve their role and relevance in a time of geopolitical uncertainty and financial austerity.
[1] United Nations, Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on Uniting Our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People, A/70/95–S/2015/446 (17 June 2015).
[2] U.S. Mission to the United Nations, “Remarks at a UN Security Council Briefing on the UN Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement,” January 27, 2026, https://usun.usmission.gov/remarks-at-a-un-security-council-briefing-on-the-un-mission-to-support-the-hudaydah-agreement/.
[3] U.S. Mission to the United Nations, “Remarks at a UN Security Council Briefing on UNMISS,” U.S. Mission to the United Nations, 10 February 2026, https://usun.usmission.gov/remarks-at-a-un-security-council-briefing-on-unmiss/