Democratic Republic of the Congo
Expected Council Action
In March, the Security Council will hold a briefing and consultations on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). During the month, the Council is expected to consider a draft resolution adjusting the mandate of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) in light of recent developments, including efforts to implement the ceasefire between the DRC government and the Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23) rebel group.
Key Recent Developments
On 19 December 2025, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2808, renewing the mandate of MONUSCO for one year, until 20 December 2026. The resolution requested the Secretary-General to provide, by 1 March, an assessment of progress towards establishing the ceasefire oversight and verification mechanism agreed within the framework of the Doha process, a Qatari-led mediation effort to facilitate talks between the Congolese government and the M23 rebel group. The resolution also requested the Secretary-General to provide proposals on the scope of MONUSCO’s engagement to support the implementation of a permanent ceasefire, with a particular focus on hotspot areas in North Kivu and South Kivu provinces of eastern DRC. Furthermore, it expressed the Council’s intention to consider further changes to MONUSCO’s mandate, taking into account the Secretary-General’s proposals and the evolving security situation on the ground.
In February, Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix visited Kinshasa to engage with the Congolese authorities on the implementation of MONUSCO’s mandate, including its support for a permanent ceasefire pursuant to resolution 2808. While in Kinshasa, he met with President Félix Tshisekedi, Prime Minister Judith Suminwa Tuluka, and other senior government officials and relevant stakeholders. He also travelled to Beni, in North Kivu province, to assess the situation on the ground and meet with provincial authorities and peacekeepers deployed in the area. Lacroix’s discussions during this visit are expected to inform the Secretary-General’s 1 March report to the Security Council.
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Interim Head of MONUSCO, Vivian van de Perre, visited Goma, the capital of North Kivu, to lay the groundwork for the mission’s role in ceasefire monitoring and verification. It marked the first time that a MONUSCO helicopter had landed at Goma airport since it was shut down in January 2025, when the M23 captured the city. This appears to have rekindled some hope for a gradual reopening of the airport, which is considered critical by humanitarian actors for the delivery of assistance. During her stay in Goma, van de Perre met with delegations from the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism (EJVM) of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) headquartered in the city as well as with the leadership of the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC), of which the M23 is a principal component.
Despite the ceasefire agreed in Doha, the Congolese government and the M23 have continued to trade accusations of violations. On 2 February, the Congolese authorities accused the M23 of launching a drone attack against Kisangani airport in northeastern DRC. The next day, the group claimed responsibility for the attack, alleging that the Congolese government had been using the airport as a staging ground for aerial operations against its positions.
On 2 February, the Congolese government and the M23 signed in Doha a terms of reference for implementing the ceasefire. MONUSCO was also requested to dispatch the first field mission to the city of Uvira, in South Kivu, to monitor the ceasefire. The M23 captured this city located on the northern shore of Lake Tanganyika in December 2025 but has since withdrawn. MONUSCO is expected, pursuant to resolution 2808, to notify the Council in writing when it is required to carry out activities in South Kivu in support of ceasefire monitoring and verification because its area of operation is limited to North Kivu and Ituri provinces. It seems that the mission has sent notifications to the Security Council accordingly, through a white note circulated to members in February.
On 17 January, the President of Togo, Faure Essozimna Gnassingbé, in his capacity as AU Mediator, convened a high-level meeting in Lomé attended by the five co-facilitators appointed by the East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), as well as representatives of Angola, Burundi, France, Qatar, Rwanda, Uganda, the US, the AU, EAC, SADC, and ICGLR, among others. (For more information on the co-facilitators, see our 11 April 2025 What’s in Blue story.) In the communiqué adopted at the conclusion of the meeting, participants emphasised the need to enhance harmonisation, coherence, and coordination among all peace initiatives, with a view to leveraging existing synergies and avoiding the fragmentation of mediation efforts. Following the meeting, Gnassingbé and the co-facilitators travelled to Angola, Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda in late January and early February to meet with regional leaders as part of their efforts to finding a lasting solution to the conflict in eastern DRC.
Meanwhile, Tshisekedi has travelled to Angola multiple times this year to meet with his Angolan counterpart, João Lourenço, in an apparent effort to revive Angola’s role in the ongoing mediation efforts. Angola had previously facilitated the Luanda Process, an African-led initiative aimed at supporting talks between the Congolese government and M23, which was later overtaken by the Doha process. Amid mounting pressure internally and the M23 consolidating its position in territories it controls, Kinshasa appears to be seeking Angola’s support in advancing an inclusive national dialogue, an initiative spearheaded by Congolese church leaders, which so far has struggled to gain traction.
On 11 February, Lourenço announced a ceasefire between the Congolese government and the M23, to take effect on 18 February, following its acceptance by both parties. The Congolese government accepted the call for a ceasefire and noted that it did so within the framework of the ceasefire mechanism agreed in Doha. The M23 likewise reaffirmed its commitment to implementing the Doha agreement, while condemning what it described as Kinshasa’s “diplomatic fragmentation strategy.”
Key Issues and Options
A key issue for the Council in March will be to make the necessary adjustments to MONUSCO’s mandate based on the Secretary-General’s report and recommendations. In this regard, France, the penholder on DRC, is expected to circulate a draft resolution to Council members following the report’s submission. The draft resolution could clearly articulate MONUSCO’s role in support of ceasefire monitoring and verification based on the terms of reference agreed by the parties in Doha and encourage the mission to work closely with the EJVM.
The challenges facing MONUSCO in effectively discharging its mandated tasks will be another key issue for Council members in March. They will be receiving the Secretary-General’s regular report which, among other things, is expected to provide updates on MONUSCO’s activities and mandate implementation in areas occupied by the M23 in North Kivu, including its protection of civilians functions based on lessons learned since January 2025, when M23 significantly expanded its control of territory in North Kivu.
How to harmonise and consolidate the various mediation initiatives on the DRC remains an ongoing concern for Council members. This issue has become even more critical in light of the revival of the Luanda process and its implications for the ongoing Doha process. The AU mediator, together with the five EAC/SADC co-facilitators, has also become active lately in an apparent attempt to reassert the AU’s lead role in mediation. While there is recognition of the complementarity among the various processes, enhancing greater harmonisation to avoid forum shopping and ensuring a focus on implementing existing commitments remains a challenge. A possible option for Council members is to hold an informal interactive dialogue to facilitate a discussion on this issue with all the actors involved in mediation efforts.
Another issue that continues to preoccupy Council members is the UN’s liquidity crisis and its impact on MONUSCO. Although the Trump administration may continue to provide funding for MONUSCO, given its strategic interest in the DRC and the US involvement in ongoing mediation efforts, it also wants the mission to become more effective by eliminating unnecessary expenses and redundancies. The US dispatched a delegation to Kinshasa recently to discuss this matter with the mission’s leadership.
Council and Wider Dynamics
The unanimous adoption of resolution 2808 demonstrated Council members’ support for MONUSCO and the ongoing mediation efforts to address the conflict in eastern DRC. This year, Council dynamics are likely to be influenced by the DRC’s membership for the 2026–2027 term. The country is expected to advocate strongly for punitive measures against M23 and Rwanda, which it accuses of supporting the rebel group. In a 4 February letter (S/2026/62) to the President of the Security Council, the DRC called for such measures, citing remarks made by Ambassador Mathilde Mukantabana, Rwanda’s ambassador to the United States, before the US House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee on 22 January. In her remarks, Mukantabana noted that “Rwanda does engage in security coordination with AFC/M23.” Rwanda’s support for M23 and DRC’s support to the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) has been corroborated by past reports of the Group of Experts assisting the 1533 DRC Sanctions Committee. It seems the DRC may face challenges in securing the necessary backing within the Council for such measures.
Outside the Council, this issue appears to be gaining traction. In particular, in the US—which has been spearheading the Washington process to facilitate talks between the DRC and Rwanda—lawmakers have threatened sanctions against Rwanda over its support for M23 and its alleged “failure” to uphold the Washington Accords signed by the DRC and Rwanda in December 2025 under US auspices. In a 16 February interview, US Senior Advisor for Arab and African Affairs Massad Boulos did not rule out the possibility of such measures.
The US seems particularly keen to advance its strategic interests in DRC, as demonstrated in a meeting between Tshisekedi and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in early February. The DRC has included Rubaya, a mining site in North Kivu estimated to supply over 15 percent of global tantalum production and currently under M23’s control, in the list of strategic assets to be offered to the US as part of a bilateral minerals cooperation framework, according to an 18 February media report.
Recently, the AU has become more active in addressing the situation in eastern DRC. AU Commission Chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf visited Kinshasa in December 2025 and met with Tshisekedi. On 6 February, he also issued a statement condemning the M23 drone attack that targeted Kisangani airport, endangering civilian populations. This elicited a reaction from the rebel group, which denied targeting civilians and accused the AU of bias.
In another development, South Africa notified MONUSCO in early February of its decision to withdraw its peacekeepers. The decision was reportedly prompted by the South African government’s desire to consolidate and realign the resources of its national defence force. The South African contingent was a key part of MONUSCO’s Force Intervention Brigade that also includes Malawian and Tanzanian forces.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 19 December 2025S/RES/2808 | This resolution renewed the mandate of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) for one year, until 20 December 2026. |
| 21 February 2025S/RES/2773 | This resolution, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, strongly condemns the ongoing offensive and advances of the M23 in the North Kivu and South Kivu provinces of the DRC–calling on the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) to cease support to M23 and immediately withdraw from DRC territory without preconditions. The resolution also reiterates an urgent call for all parties to conclude an immediate and unconditional ceasefire. |
| Security Council Meeting Records | |
| 12 December 2025S/PV.10063 | This was an open briefing on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. |
