Yemen
Expected Council Action
In February, the Security Council will hold its monthly briefing, followed by closed consultations, on Yemen. UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg and an official from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) are expected to brief on political, security, and humanitarian developments in the country.
Key Recent Developments
Yemen has seen significant shifts in its political and security landscape in recent weeks. The efforts of the Southern Transitional Council’s (STC) —a separatist faction from south Yemen, which is reportedly backed by the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—to expand their control over southeastern governorates of Hadramout and Al-Mahra in early December were met with military pushback from Yemen’s government-aligned forces and Saudi Arabia.
Yemen’s internationally recognised government is run by the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), an eight-member executive body formed in 2022 with the support of a Saudi Arabia-led Coalition to Restore Legitimacy in Yemen (the Coalition), which includes the UAE, with the aim of uniting several Yemeni political factions and steering the country’s transition out of civil war. The STC is part of the PLC; its president and the leader of the December 2025 offensive, Aidarous al-Zubaidi, was one of the PLC’s vice presidents. Since its formation, the PLC has been mired by internal divisions, the most prominent being between those factions in favour of a united Republic of Yemen and those with secessionist aspirations, such as the STC, whose goal has been to re-establish an independent state in south Yemen. (South Yemen was an independent state prior to unification with the north in 1990.)
On 7 January, the PLC announced Zubaidi’s removal from the government for “committing high treason”. Members of the STC attending de-escalation talks in Riyadh reportedly announced the dissolution of the group on 9 January; however, other STC members rejected the announcement, indicating a split within the group.
In a 10 January speech, Rashad al-Alimi, the President of the PLC, said that the Yemeni government had regained full control of the governorates of Hadramout and Al-Mahra, as well as the interim capital Aden, which had been under STC control since at least 2019. He further stated that the “southern cause” will remain a priority for the PLC and called for the convening of a “comprehensive Southern Dialogue Conference”, which would be hosted by Saudi Arabia. The date for the conference is yet to be announced. Additionally, al-Alimi announced the formation of the Supreme Military Committee, which will function under the leadership of the Coalition and is tasked with unifying security forces and enhancing readiness for any future challenges.
Amid these developments, Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg has been engaging Yemeni and regional stakeholders to de-escalate tensions and promote political solutions. During his 8 January visit to Riyadh, he met with al-Alimi and other senior Yemeni government officials and emphasised that the southern dialogue conference will provide an opportunity for parties to address grievances through dialogue and move towards stabilisation. Grundberg also met with Yemen’s Prime Minister Salem Saleh bin Braik in Riyadh on 14 January, where they discussed the economic challenges faced by Yemenis, placing emphasis on the linkage between economic stability and the advancement of a political track and peace in Yemen.
Braik resigned from his role on 16 January and was replaced by the PLC’s foreign minister, Shaya Mohsen Zindani, who was tasked with forming a new government.
Briefing the Council on 14 January, the Special Envoy warned that without a “comprehensive approach”, destabilising developments will persist in undermining a lasting resolution to Yemen’s conflict. He stressed that the future of south Yemen “cannot be determined by any single actor or through force”, underlining the need for a “comprehensive, inclusive, nationwide political process”, which addresses questions regarding the nexus between the country’s political, economic and security challenges.
On 21 January, a convoy transporting Hamdi Shukri—commander of the pro-government Southern Giants Brigades—was reportedly targeted by a car bomb in Aden, killing five people and wounding Shukri and two others. The PLC characterised the attack as a “terrorist attack” and as an attempt to destabilise the security situation in Yemen, but did not attribute the attack to a particular group.
On 14 January, the Council adopted resolution 2812, extending until 15 July the monthly reporting requirement for the Secretary-General on attacks by the Houthis on vessels in the Red Sea, which was established by resolution 2722 of 10 January 2024. The resolution was adopted with 13 votes in favour and two abstentions (China and Russia). Since the 8 October 2025 announcement of the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, the Houthis have ceased their attacks on vessels in the Red Sea and against Israeli territory—a campaign they had initiated ostensibly to support Palestinians in Gaza.
On 15 January, following Israel’s 26 December 2025 recognition of Somaliland—a breakaway region in northern Somalia, which neighbours Yemen—as an independent state, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, the leader of the Houthis, escalated the group’s rhetoric when he said that the group is “serious about targeting any Israeli presence in Somaliland”.
The Houthis also continue to arbitrarily detain personnel from the UN, non-governmental and civil society organisations, and diplomatic missions. According to OCHA, 73 UN personnel are detained, three of whom have been referred to a special criminal court on charges related to their duties. Grundberg and Muin Shreim, the UN official leading on the issue of detentions, have continued efforts to negotiate their release, and on 13 January, they met with Houthi chief negotiator Mohammed Abdulsalam to discuss the issue. They also discussed “pathways to advance political dialogue”.
Houthi actions are restricting the UN’s ability to provide critical humanitarian support in territory under their control, which are the most populous regions of Yemen and require the most aid. In his 14 December briefing to the Council, the OCHA Director of the Humanitarian Sector Division, Ramesh Rajasingham, warned that Yemen’s dire humanitarian situation is worsening owing to obstruction of access and severe funding cuts. He highlighted food insecurity and the health system as sectors facing severe deterioration, with half the population (18 million people) projected to face food insecurity in February. More than 450 health facilities have been forced to close due to funding cuts, and 2,300 clinics are facing similar risks. Last year, the Yemen Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan was funded at only 27.8 percent, amounting to less than half the funding provided for 2024, which was also critically underfunded. Projections for 2026 estimate 23.1 million Yemenis in need of aid, an increase from 19.5 million in 2025.
On 27 January, the Council adopted resolution 2813, renewing the mandate of the UN Mission to Support the Hodeidah Agreement (UNMHA) for a final two-month period, until 31 March. The resolution was adopted with 13 votes in favour and two abstentions (China and Russia).
Key Issues and Options
A key issue for the Council is how to help mitigate the risk of an escalation of hostilities in Yemen, which could see a resumption of full-scale conflict. Volatile dynamics in southern Yemen, the potential resurgence of conflict between the Houthis and Yemen’s internationally recognised government, and the Houthis’ involvement in regional dynamics, all pose a risk to the security and stability of the country.
Amid shifting domestic and regional dynamics, Council members could consider convening an informal interactive dialogue (IID) with regional stakeholders, countries supporting the Yemen political process, and the Special Envoy, to discuss the implications of the latest developments on the UN’s efforts to facilitate an inclusive negotiated political settlement to end the Yemeni conflict. Commitments to a set of confidence-building measures were made by the parties in December 2023; however, discussions aimed at establishing a roadmap to peace, which would have seen the implementation of these commitments, stalled following the Houthis’ response to the Gaza war in October 2023.
As the Houthis continue to arbitrarily detain UN personnel and refer them to their special criminal court, Council members could consider adopting a resolution with a humanitarian focus that demands that the Houthis rescind the referrals to the court, immediately and unconditionally release all personnel detained, and cease further obstruction to the delivery of UN humanitarian assistance in Yemen.
Council and Wider Dynamics
Despite being critical of the Houthis, most Council members have maintained their support for an inclusive intra-Yemeni political process and continue to call for advancing mediation efforts between the conflict parties, including a resumption of dialogue and a peace process under UN auspices. In the wake of political developments in south Yemen between December 2025 and January, Council members have shown agreement in their support of the unity and legitimacy of the PLC and rejection of unilateral measures.
The developments in the south have sparked tensions among regional stakeholders, however. The apparent backing of Saudi Arabia and the UAE for opposing factions in the struggle for control over south Yemen seems to have put their partnership within the Coalition under strain. Saudi Arabia said in a 30 December 2025 statement that it views the STC’s offensive (and the UAE’s support for it) as a threat to its national security as well as Yemen’s. That same day, Saudi-led coalition forces struck what they said was a UAE-linked shipment of vehicles, weapons, and ammunition intended for the STC, and the PLC issued a decree calling on the UAE to withdraw all its forces from Yemen, with which the UAE complied. The UAE has strongly rejected claims that it is backing any individual Yemeni party, and during the 14 January Council meeting, it highlighted its contributions to Yemeni security and stability.
The Council’s five permanent members disagree on the Council’s approach towards the Houthis. France, the UK, and the US have argued that the Council needs to increase pressure on the group—which they believe is obstructing a political process and fostering instability in Yemen—including by strengthening the Yemen sanctions regime. The US has adopted a particularly hawkish position on the Houthis, unilaterally sanctioning the group and accusing Iran of supporting it. Conversely, China and Russia have argued that expanding the Yemen sanctions regime would escalate tensions and push the parties further away from a political settlement.
Similarly, China and Russia have been wary of other Council members’ efforts to retain the Red Sea crisis on the Council’s agenda. After its abstention on resolution 2812—which extended the Secretary-General’s reporting on the Red Sea—China indicated that its vote reflected its concern that, following the adoption of resolution 2722, military action in Yemen undertaken by some countries undermined the peace process and heightened insecurity in the Red Sea. Israel, the UK, and the US have all conducted strikes targeting the Houthis since the beginning of the Red Sea crisis. Russia, which also abstained on resolution 2722, said that the resolution has no added value and that the situation in the Red Sea has stabilised in recent months.
Council members have also diverged over the closure of UNMHA. Following their abstention on the adoption of resolution 2713, China and Russia said that UNMHA continues to play an important, stabilising role and that its closure could have political and security implications in Hodeidah and the surrounding region. Conversely, the US has strongly pushed for sunsetting the mission and said that “Houthi obstructionism” has prevented the mission from fulfilling its mandate.
The UK is the penholder on Yemen. Greece and the US are the co-penholders on the Red Sea crisis.
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| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 27 January 2026S/RES/2813 | This resolution renewed the mandate of UNMHA for a final two-month period, until 31 March 2026. |
| 14 January 2026S/RES/2812 | This resolution extends the Secretary-General’s monthly reporting requirement on Houthi attacks on merchant and commercial vessels in the Red Sea until 15 July 2026. |
| Security Council Press Statement | |
| 23 December 2025SC/16265 | This press statement called for de-escalation and underlined strong support towards a political settlement in Yemen and for the Presidential Leadership Council, while also reiterating condemnation of detentions by the Houthis and the demand for the immediate and unconditional release of all those detained. |
