Syria
Expected Council Action
In February, the Security Council is expected to hold its monthly meeting on political and humanitarian developments in Syria. Deputy Special Envoy for Syria Claudio Cordone, a representative from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and a civil society representative are expected to brief.
Key Recent Developments
January witnessed major developments in northeastern Syria, as the Syrian interim government expanded control over vast swathes of territory previously controlled by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). On 10 March 2025, interim government authorities in Damascus and the SDF reached an agreement for the militia to integrate into the government’s armed forces and institutions by the end of the year. Implementation of the agreement stalled, however, as the SDF maintained demands for varying degrees of autonomy of its forces and decentralised rule of the northeastern governorates, which were sticking points for interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa and his government. Since leading the ouster of former president Bashar al-Assad, Sharaa has been steering the political transition towards unifying Syria and consolidating armed groups under government control.
On 6 January, fierce clashes broke out between the SDF and government forces in the northern city of Aleppo. By 11 January, the Syrian armed forces had assumed control of Ashrafiyeh and Sheikh Maqsood—two SDF-held neighbourhoods in Aleppo—and SDF fighters were reportedly disarmed and withdrew from the city. The clashes resulted in 23 deaths and over 120,000 residents displaced.
Subsequently, Syria’s government forces rapidly pushed their offensive eastward into SDF-controlled territory, and by 18 January had made significant advances into Raqqa, Al-Hasakah, and Deir Ezzor governorates, seizing control of critical infrastructure such as oilfields and the Euphrates Dam. Later that day, Sharaa announced that a ceasefire and integration agreement had been reached between the interim government and the SDF, which would see Damascus expand its control over the previously SDF-held governorates, and the full integration of the SDF into government institutions on an “individual basis”, rather than as full military units.
By 20 January, the ceasefire had reportedly been strained amid continued disagreements and clashes between the two parties. Later that day, the parties agreed to a truce in Al-Hasakah governorate, which Syria’s Permanent Representative to the UN Ibrahim Olabi said would serve as a consultation period to develop a joint plan to integrate the area into government control.
The fighting has raised concerns regarding detention centres and camps housing thousands of Islamic State in Syria and the Levant (ISIL/Da’esh) fighters, and the women and children associated with them, in territory previously held by the SDF. The SDF has historically played a pivotal role in combating ISIL, as a key partner in the Global Coalition Against Da’esh’s campaign against the terrorist movement, and has overseen the imprisonment of a large number of ISIL fighters across northeastern Syria, with the support of the US. Between 19 and 20 January, the SDF relinquished control of the Shaddadi prison and the Al-Hol camp in the Al-Hasakah governorate to government authorities. The two sides traded blame over the escape of around 200 prisoners from Shaddadi, many of whom were reportedly recaptured. In her briefing to the Council on 22 January, OCHA Director of the Crisis Response Division Edem Wosornu said that the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) had taken over management of Al-Hol camp and is coordinating with the interim government to resume humanitarian assistance to the detainees.
On 20 January, US Special Envoy for Syria Thomas Barrack said that, following Syria’s accession to the anti-ISIL coalition in 2025, and its willingness to take responsibility for security and control of ISIL detention facilities, the SDF’s role in that regard “has largely expired”. The next day, the US also announced that it would be launching a mission to transfer ISIL detainees from northeast Syria to Iraq, which started with 150 fighters being transported out of Al-Hasakah.
On 30 January, the parties announced a comprehensive agreement which included the phased integration of the SDF’s military and administration into the interim government’s institutions. If peacefully implemented, the agreement will achieve full integration in the territory east of the Euphrates River and significantly advance Sharaa’s aim to unify Syria.
On 16 January, Sharaa issued Presidential Decree No. 13, which—for the first time in Syria’s history—officially recognised Syrian Kurdish identity, recognised Kurdish as a national language, and granted citizenship rights for Syrian Kurds. Kurdish political leaders reportedly welcomed the decree, but demanded that such rights be enshrined in the constitution. In his briefing to the Council on 22 January, UN Assistant Secretary-General Khaled Khiari said the decree is an “encouraging initiative” which can be built on to advance an inclusive political process in Syria.
Khiari also said that the UN Secretariat is seeking to establish the Office of the Special Envoy for Syria “on the ground” to engage with the interim government in Damascus more effectively and efficiently over matters pertaining to the political transition.
Syria continues to pursue negotiations with Israel aimed at resolving the issue of Israel’s military presence in southern Syria, which expanded after the toppling of Assad in December 2024. On 6 January, Israel, Syria, and the US held discussions in Paris, following which they issued a joint statement affirming a commitment to achieving mutual security. The statement said that Israel and Syria agreed to establish a joint communication mechanism, which would be supervised by the US, to facilitate coordination on intelligence, military de-escalation, diplomacy, and commercial opportunities between the two sides.
The humanitarian situation in Syria continues to be challenging, and in recent weeks, Syrians have had to grapple with renewed hostilities and displacement amid a particularly harsh winter. In her 22 January briefing to the Council, Wosornu said that despite difficulties, Syria continues to experience a surge in displaced persons returning to their homes, and that the UN has observed limited but encouraging improvements in humanitarian indicators. Urging continued progress, she said that the international community needs to increase involvement in recovery and development; provide sufficient and sustained humanitarian funding in the short term; and pursue diplomacy to prevent further violence and instability. In 2025, the Syria Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan was funded at only 33.5 percent. Projections for 2026 estimate 16.5 million Syrians in need and $3.2 billion in funding requirements.
Key Issues and Options
A key issue for the Council is to ensure that Syria’s interim government pursues a credible, transparent, and inclusive political process, while navigating a fraught security context compounded by intercommunal tensions, terrorism, and external interference. Central to this issue are Damascus’ efforts in pursuing disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) efforts, and in fostering social cohesion and transitional justice, including accountability and reconciliation.
Council members will continue monitoring the situation in the northeast of Syria, including the implementation of the 30 January SDF-integration agreement, and the threat of ISIL activity in the region. Depending on developments, members could consider adopting a presidential statement demanding that the parties adhere to the ceasefire and fully implement the agreement.
The UN’s future role in Syria is another key issue for the Council. Based on an integrated strategic assessment internal report prepared by the UN Secretariat, the Secretary-General has considered what types of UN presence in Syria would be most suitable to meet the country’s current needs.
Following up on their recent mission to Damascus and in order to obtain a better idea of the Secretary-General’s thinking on this matter, Council members could convene an Informal Interactive Dialogue (IID) with the participation of Syria and relevant UN entities to discuss the most viable options for future UN and Council engagement in Syria and appropriate support for Syria’s transition.
Another issue is the need to start reducing the country’s reliance on humanitarian aid through support and investment in recovery and development. Council members could consider holding a public briefing focused on the country’s need for support in reconstruction and economic rehabilitation, featuring briefings from representatives of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank.
Council and Wider Dynamics
Council members are aligned on the need for the Syrian authorities to advance an inclusive, Syrian-owned and Syrian-led political process based on the key principles of resolution 2254. They broadly agree that the threat of intercommunal violence cannot be addressed without advancing inclusive accountability measures, DDR and security sector reform (SSR) efforts, together with a credible political process in the country.
The Council’s December visit to Damascus represented an important signal of unified support to Syria’s transition, following years of division on the Syria file. Earlier in 2025, the US and Russia worked together on the 14 March presidential statement following violence perpetrated in Latakia and Tartous, while Denmark authored the 10 August presidential statement in response to violence in Suweida.
Sharaa has made apparent headway in garnering regional and international support. The Council’s decision to delist him and his interior minister from the 1267/1989/2253 ISIL and Al-Qaida sanctions list was a significant step in this regard. According to SANA—Syria’s state-owned news agency—on 19 January, Sharaa had a phone call with US President Donald Trump about the SDF developments, in which both affirmed “a shared aspiration to see a strong and unified Syria”. The US’ support for Damascus to integrate the SDF—a longstanding US ally—into a unified Syrian state further signifies their increased backing of Sharaa’s government. Similarly, Türkiye—which considers the SDF a threat to its border security due to its ties with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)—has strongly supported a unified Syrian state and has celebrated Syria’s advances into SDF territory. Sharaa seems to have also garnered the support of Russian President Vladimir Putin on this issue, and in a 28 January meeting between the two in Moscow, Putin congratulated the interim president on advances made to restore Syria’s full territorial integrity.
Israel’s presence and military activities in Syria remain a contentious issue for Council members. Most members believe Israel’s actions are fostering instability in Syria and that it must comply with the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement between the countries. In contrast, the US has predominantly characterised Israel’s actions as defensive in nature or tied to ensuring its national security and has pushed back against attempts by other members to introduce language criticising Israeli actions in Syria in recent Council products. The Permanent Representatives of Israel and Syria to the UN have more than once used the Council’s monthly meeting on Syria to air their respective grievances regarding control and security in southern Syria.
Many Council members also agree on the need for the Syrian interim government to take decisive measures to address the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) and ISIL/Da’esh. China has been particularly vocal in calling on Damascus to take a stronger stance on FTFs in the country, some of whom have reportedly been integrated into the Syrian armed forces. Several FTFs constitute part of the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement, which China considers a terrorist organisation and is also listed under the 1267/1989/2253 ISIL/Da’esh and Al-Qaida sanctions regime.
| Security Council Resolution | |
| 6 November 2025S/RES/2799 | This resolution removed interim Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and interim Syrian Interior Minister Anas Khattab from the 1267/1989/2253 Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions list |
| Security Council Presidential Statements | |
| 10 August 2025S/PRST/2025/6 | This was a presidential statement condemning violence against civilians in Suweida in July 2025, calling for unhindered humanitarian access to the region, and calling on the Syrian interim authorities to ensure accountability. |
| 14 March 2025S/PRST/2025/4 | This was a presidential statement condemning sectarian violence perpetrated in Latakia and Tartous and calling for accountability and the protection of all Syrians, regardless of ethnicity or religion. |
