Sudan
Expected Council Action
In February, the Security Council is expected to receive the regular 120-day briefing on the situation in Sudan. The UK, which holds the Council’s rotating presidency for the month of February, intends to elevate the briefing to ministerial level.
The Council was also scheduled to be briefed this month on the work of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee. At the time of writing, however, the Committee’s Chair had not yet been appointed, as Council members continued negotiations over the allocation of subsidiary bodies for the year. In this context, the UK proposed that the 1591 Committee meet its reporting requirements through a written statement.
Key Recent Developments
Conflict continues to escalate across multiple frontlines in Sudan as both the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) seek to consolidate territorial control and intensify efforts to seize and defend key strategic locations through ground operations, artillery shelling, heavy drone strikes and other aerial bombardments. The Kordofan region has emerged as a key epicentre of hostilities, while fighting persists in other parts of the country, including North Darfur and Sennar states. In South Kordofan state, the humanitarian situation in the towns of Dilling and Kadugli has continued to deteriorate.
Media reports indicate that on 26 January, SAF and allied forces entered Dilling, which had been under siege by the RSF for nearly two years, re-establishing access along the eastern road linking Dilling to North Kordofan state. The advance reopened supply routes into Dilling, allowing the SAF to resupply its garrison.
The security situation in Blue Nile State has also worsened as recent reports indicate renewed clashes and the risk of escalation as armed groups mobilise in southern and western parts of the state, heightening fears of broader instability in the border region with Ethiopia and South Sudan.
At the Council’s 22 December 2025 meeting, Sudan’s Transitional Prime Minister, Kamil El-Tayeb Idris, presented a proposal calling for an immediate ceasefire in Sudan, to be monitored by the UN, the African Union (AU) and the League of Arab States (LAS). The proposal included the RSF’s complete withdrawal from areas under its control and the reintegration into society of RSF fighters not accused of war crimes. Idris also committed to holding free elections following a transitional period. The RSF, which controls much of Darfur and parts of Kordofan, rejected the plan. While UN Secretary-General António Guterres took note of the initiative, the AU Commission Chairperson (AUCC) Mahmoud Ali Youssouf welcomed it, describing the proposal as a “comprehensive” and “forward-looking” framework.
On 11 January, Idris announced the official return of national institutions to the capital, Khartoum. The government had relocated to Port Sudan following the outbreak of the conflict in April 2023, when the RSF seized control of large parts of Khartoum. The SAF later recaptured the city in March 2025.
On 14 January, Egypt hosted the fifth consultative meeting on enhancing coordination among various peace initiatives on Sudan. Several regional and international interlocutors attended the meeting, including Personal Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for Sudan Ramtane Lamamra and representatives of the AU, the European Union (EU), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the LAS, Angola, China, Djibouti, France, Germany, Iraq, Norway, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the UK, and the US.
On the margins of the meeting, Lamamra held discussions with representatives of the LAS, Djibouti, Saudi Arabia, and the US. He also met with the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Badr Abdelatty, following which they held a joint press conference. According to media reports, Abdelatty said that Egypt would not hesitate to take necessary measures to preserve Sudan’s unity and territorial integrity, and that there was no room for recognising parallel entities or equating Sudanese state institutions, including the Sudanese army, with any other militias.
On 26 December 2025, a UN team led by the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan, Denise Brown, conducted an assessment mission to El Fasher. This marked the first UN mission since the city was besieged by the RSF in May 2024 and subsequently came under RSF control in late October. In an interview following the visit, Brown described El Fasher as a “crime scene”, estimating that thousands of people may have been killed. During the visit, the team spoke with civilians who remain trapped in the city and visited the Saudi Hospital, which was reportedly the site of a massacre when the RSF stormed the city in October 2025.
In a post on X (formerly Twitter), Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Tom Fletcher announced the delivery of humanitarian aid to El Fasher, marking the first such delivery since the city was besieged in May 2024. According to UNICEF’s 22 January flash update, an interagency mission led by the UN Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator visited El Fasher on 13 January, with UNICEF, World Food Programme, UN Refugee Agency, and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs participating.
Human Rights-Related Developments
In a statement issued on 18 January, following a five-day visit to Sudan, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk said that the war had plunged the country into an “abyss of unfathomable proportions”. During his visit to Port Sudan and Northern State, including Dongola, Ad Dabba, and Merowe, Türk met with national and local authorities, civil society actors, humanitarian organisations, journalists, lawyers, and civilians displaced from El Fasher. He called on the RSF and the SAF to cease attacks against civilian objects indispensable to the population, including markets, health facilities, schools and shelters. He urged all actors with influence, including regional arms suppliers, to act urgently to end the conflict.
Türk expressed grave concern that atrocity crimes committed during and after the takeover of El Fasher risk being repeated in Kordofan, citing reported advances by the RSF and Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North (SPLM-N) forces towards SAF-controlled Kadugli, continued mass displacement, and extreme food insecurity, with famine conditions confirmed in Kadugli and a risk of famine in other areas, including Dilling.
Women, Peace and Security
In an 11 November 2025 statement, the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Pramila Patten, expressed grave concern at the atrocities perpetrated against civilians in the conflict in Sudan, particularly those fleeing North Darfur and North Kordofan states. The statement said that, following the takeover of El Fasher on 26 October 2025, women and girls escaping the violence reported horrific abuses by the RSF, including gang rape and other forms of sexual violence. Patten called for an immediate cessation of hostilities, condemned the large-scale and systematic use of sexual violence by the RSF, and urged all parties and their allies to abide by their obligations under international humanitarian law. She called for coordinated international efforts to support investigations, preserve evidence, and ensure that survivors remain central to accountability processes. Patten also encouraged the Security Council to consider additional sanction measures under the 1591 sanctions regime “against those who command and perpetrate sexual violence”, and stressed the importance of comprehensive services for survivors, including medical and psychological support. She also recalled the commitment undertaken by the SAF to engage with her office in preventing and adequately responding to allegations of sexual violence perpetrated by some of its members.
Key Issues and Options
The overarching issue for the Council is how to bring an end to the ongoing fighting and support efforts towards a sustainable ceasefire across Sudan and a civilian-led political transition. The continued violence, insecurity, and targeted attacks against civilians, as well as civilian and humanitarian infrastructure, remain a major concern for Council members. Given the continuing hostilities, mediation efforts have consistently failed to achieve any meaningful breakthroughs. The conflict has shifted front lines across multiple regions, leaving the country fragmented and governance weakened. This fragmentation has exacerbated the widespread civilian suffering, mass displacement, and acute food insecurity.
An underlying issue for the Council remains how to effectively promote justice and accountability for the ongoing violations of international humanitarian and human rights law being perpetrated by Sudan’s warring parties across the country.
In February, Council members could consider adopting a presidential statement strongly condemning the ongoing violence across Sudan, including indiscriminate attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure, and demanding an immediate and permanent cessation of hostilities. If members agree on such a presidential statement, they may wish to have a high-level press stakeout following the meeting to reinforce the points in the presidential statement.
They could also request the Secretary-General to adjust the reporting and briefing cycle on Sudan by providing more frequent updates than the current 120-day schedule, such as every 60 days, given that the existing frequency does not reflect the scale, severity, and urgency of the crisis.
Another important issue is the regional implications of the conflict, including the risk of cross-border spillover of violence. Reports of cross-border alliances and support networks, including the provision of sanctuary to fighters and the use of neighbouring countries as transit routes for weapons and supplies, have raised concerns about wider regional destabilisation.
An option for the Council would be to invite AUCC Youssouf to provide a briefing on the key challenges facing peace efforts in Sudan, the AU’s role in revitalising these efforts, and the broader impact of the conflict on neighbouring countries and regional stability.
During the Council briefing in February, members could also consider inviting a civil society representative to brief on the human rights situation, including violence against women and girls in Sudan.
Another option for Council members would be to consider additional designations under the 1591 Sudan sanctions regime, targeting individuals responsible for sanctions violations.
Another option for Council members could be a visiting mission to Sudan to assess the situation on the ground and engage with relevant stakeholders. This mission could also provide an opportunity for Council members to visit the refugee camps in neighbouring countries, particularly Chad.
Council Dynamics
Most Council members share similar concerns about the dire political, security, and humanitarian situations in Sudan and have emphasised the need for a ceasefire, unfettered humanitarian access, respect for international humanitarian law, and the importance of protecting civilians in the conflict. However, critical divisions persist within the Council, shaped by differing priorities and approaches to key issues, including the protection of civilians, the implementation of ceasefire mechanisms, and addressing accountability for violations of international humanitarian law. Several Council members, such as China, Pakistan, and Russia, tend to be more sympathetic to the Burhan-led government, underscoring its sovereign authority and its efforts to protect civilians and coordinate the delivery of humanitarian aid. Other Council members, particularly the P3 (France, the UK, and the US), however, consider both the RSF and SAF to be responsible for the ongoing atrocities in Sudan and unfit to govern the country.
The US has sought to step up efforts to reinvigorate peace talks on Sudan aimed at delivering tangible outcomes; however, a near-term breakthrough appears unlikely. At the same time, the US and European Council members have supported the use of targeted restrictive measures against individuals and entities responsible for perpetrating insecurity and violence across Sudan. Most recently, the US imposed sanctions on a transnational network primarily composed of Colombian nationals and companies involved in recruiting former Colombian military personnel and training fighters, including children, to fight for the RSF. The EU imposed restrictive measures on Abdelrahim Hamdan Dagalo, the RSF’s second-in-command, over his role in serious violations linked to the fighting. He has also been subject to US sanctions since September 2023.
Next month’s meeting will mark the first time that newly elected Council members Bahrain, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Latvia, and Liberia deliver statements on the situation in Sudan since joining the Council in January. Latvia is expected to align closely with European members in emphasising international humanitarian law, protection of civilians, accountability, and support for diplomatic efforts. The DRC and Liberia, in line with African positions on Sudan, are likely to underscore the primacy of AU-led mediation and concerns about regional spillover. Bahrain is expected to stress the importance of intensifying efforts toward an immediate ceasefire and an urgent political solution, while expressing deep concern over the continued deterioration of the humanitarian situation. Colombia may draw on its conflict-resolution experience and, amid recent media reports highlighting the recruitment of Colombian nationals as mercenaries to participate in the fighting in Sudan, may highlight the conflict’s transnational dimensions.
| Security Council Meeting Records | |
| 22 December 2025S/PV.10077 | This was an open briefing on the situation in Sudan. |
| Security Council Press Statements | |
| 30 October 2025SC/16204 | The press statement condemned the assault by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on El Fasher and its devastating impact on the civilian population. |
