South Sudan
Expected Council Action
In February, the Security Council will hold a briefing, followed by consultations, on the situation in South Sudan. Council members are expected to receive the Secretary-General’s 90-day report on South Sudan and developments in the country by 2 February.
The mandate of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) expires on 30 April 2026.
Key Recent Developments
South Sudan continues to face a deteriorating security environment, amid ongoing hostilities across the country between the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army-in-Opposition (SPLA-IO), alongside other opposition and allied groups. According to the UN, direct military confrontations have been reported in eight of the country’s ten states, at a scale that has not been reported since the signing of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) in 2018. These developments have significantly undermined R-ARCSS, with persistent ceasefire violations, stalled security sector reform, and entrenched political deadlock rendering the peace framework increasingly untenable.
In Jonglei state, hostilities intensified in late December 2025, with clashes and airstrikes reported in Nyirol, Uror, Ayod, and Duk counties as the SSPDF and the SPLA-IO, and allied forces mobilised for major confrontation. The SPLA-IO seized Pajut in northern Jonglei, placing the state capital, Bor, within closer reach of opposition forces. On 19 January, the SPLA-IO called on its forces to mobilise and advance toward Juba. In parallel, SSPDF Assistant Chief of Defence Forces and Agwelek militia commander General Johnson Olony instructed forces deployed in northern Jonglei not to “spare any lives, including the elderly,” as they prepared to confront opposition forces, heightening concerns about risks to civilians. The government had earlier declared a no-fly zone, and on 26 January ordered the evacuation of civilians, as well as UNMISS and humanitarian personnel, from Nyirol, Uror, and Akobo counties.
According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the renewed fighting and airstrikes have triggered mass displacement and a worsening humanitarian crisis across Jonglei. More than 180,000 people have been displaced, with further displacement anticipated as insecurity persists. Civilians and aid workers face increasing risks amid severe disruptions to humanitarian operations, including reports of widespread looting of health facilities, the confiscation of humanitarian assets, and the relocation of aid personnel due to insecurity.
The political landscape in South Sudan has remained highly volatile, marked by President Salva Kiir Mayardit’s ongoing unilateral actions. Kiir has continued to reshuffle senior positions within his own party, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), and replaced opposition officials in the government with political loyalists. On 17 December 2025, he approved a series of amendments to the revitalised agreement that removed provisions linking elections to the completion of a permanent constitution. Kiir also dismissed 11 members of the Transitional National Legislature, all affiliated with the SPLM-IO and close to its leader, First Vice-President Riek Machar, and subsequently appointed new legislators aligned with a splinter faction of the SPLM-IO led by Peacebuilding Minister Stephen Par Kuol.
On 20 January, Kiir dismissed interior minister Angelina Teny, a senior opposition figure and Machar’s wife, and appointed Aleu Ayieny Aleu, a veteran loyalist and former interior minister, as her successor.
As political and security conditions continue to deteriorate, UNMISS is operating under increasing strain while implementing a contingency plan in response to the UN-wide financial crisis and the Secretary-General’s contingency measures requiring a 15 percent reduction in peacekeeping expenditures. In early December 2025, the UN Department of Peace Operations circulated a white note indicating that internal adjustments, including the downsizing of civilian staff, were proceeding as planned; however, measures requiring host-government facilitation, particularly troop rotations, repatriation, and the movement of heavy equipment, were facing significant blockages.
These challenges followed a November 2025 note verbale from the government calling for the closure of the Wau and Bentiu UNMISS bases. In December, the transitional government further indicated that future flight clearances would be contingent on UNMISS’ withdrawal from Tambura in Western Equatoria. These delays, the white note said, have contributed to rising monthly operational costs for the mission. Media reports indicate that UNMISS began closing its base in Tambura in early January.
On 20 January, Council members held closed consultations on the situation in South Sudan, with a briefing by UN Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix. The meeting was requested by the US to discuss recent political developments in the country and the government’s current posture toward UNMISS. During the consultations, Lacroix apparently indicated that implementation of the contingency plan was progressing and conveyed that the government had provided reassurances regarding the mission’s continued presence and cooperation. (For more information, see our 18 January What’s in Blue story.)
Human Rights-Related Developments
In an 18 January press release, the UN Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan expressed grave concern over South Sudan’s deteriorating political and security situation following reports of repeated airstrikes and intensified hostilities in multiple parts of Jonglei. The Commission warned that the deliberate undermining and continued erosion of the R-ARCSS are directly fuelling renewed conflict, with catastrophic consequences for civilians and for stability in South Sudan and the wider region. It urged all parties to immediately cease hostilities and halt military operations in civilian-populated areas.
On 9 January, the UNMISS Human Rights Division released its quarterly brief on violence affecting civilians, covering the period from July to September 2025. The report documented 295 incidents of conflict-related violence affecting 1,153 civilians, including 519 killed, 396 injured, 159 abducted, and 79 subjected to conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV). Compared with the previous quarter (April-June 2025), abductions increased by 20 percent and CRSV cases rose by seven percent, underscoring a significant deterioration in the protection of civilians across multiple regions of the country.
Key Issues and Options
A key issue for the Council is how to prevent South Sudan from sliding into a renewed cycle of large-scale conflict, while addressing the structural drivers of recurring violence and political instability. The current trajectory represents the most serious risk of relapse into civil war since the signing of the 2018 revitalised agreement.
A related issue is the fate of the peace agreement, which has been hollowed out by profound mistrust among political leaders, unilateral actions by the government (including the consolidation of power over state institutions, amendments to the peace agreement, and the weakening of opposition and allied groups), and recurring clashes between parties to the agreement.
Another matter of concern is the deteriorating protection and humanitarian situation, marked by mass displacement, restricted humanitarian access, and heightened risks to civilians and aid workers. As well, ensuring accountability for human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law, and breaking entrenched patterns of impunity, remains central to the Council’s consideration.
Council members may wish to consider adopting a resolution that expresses concern over the recent escalation, urges the parties to refrain from further military action, return to the permanent ceasefire, restore trust and resume dialogue in an inclusive manner involving all South Sudanese stakeholders to resolve differences by peaceful means.
Another important issue for the Council is how to preserve space for UNMISS to implement its mandate in an increasingly constrained operating environment, including amid host-government restrictions and significant financial pressures affecting peacekeeping operations. The mission’s continued presence remains critical to maintaining a degree of stability, protecting civilians, and mitigating violence across the country.
In this context, members may seek more regular briefings from OCHA and UNMISS on protection trends and humanitarian constraints. The Informal Expert Group on the Protection of Civilians could also consider convening a meeting to receive briefings from relevant UN entities on the impact of hostilities on civilian populations.
During the Council briefing in February, members could consider inviting a civil society representative to highlight ongoing challenges on the ground and the dire security and humanitarian situations.
Additionally, Council members could explore the possibility of undertaking a visiting mission to South Sudan to assess conditions first-hand and engage directly with parties to the R-ARCSS. (The last Council visiting mission to South Sudan took place in 2019.)
Council Dynamics
Council members share similar concerns regarding the significant challenges facing the revitalised agreement, the deteriorating security situation resulting from fighting among armed factions, ongoing sub-national and intercommunal violence, and the deepening economic and humanitarian crises.
However, Council members hold differing views on the overall assessment of the situation and the extent to which the Council should exert pressure on the parties to recommit to implementation of the revitalised agreement. The US has taken a more critical stance, characterising the crisis as “man-made” and pointing to what they view as a lack of political will by the South Sudanese authorities to advance the peace process. The US has also emphasised that the transitional government should prioritise the use of public revenues to fund essential services such as health and education, rather than “personal enrichment”, and has called for greater accountability of the host government. By contrast, members such as China and Russia have argued that the international community should exercise patience, prioritise support for regional mediation efforts, and avoid exerting excessive pressure, while backing the government’s efforts to strengthen state institutions.
In December 2025, the US, the penholder on South Sudan, apparently circulated a draft press statement in response to the South Sudanese government’s posture toward UNMISS amid the implementation of the contingency plan. While like-minded members were supportive of the initiative, China, Russia, and members of the A3 Plus grouping (Somalia and then-Council members Algeria, Guyana, and Sierra Leone) expressed reservations, pointing to the need to allow ongoing engagement between UN officials and the authorities in Juba to run its course. Following the 20 January closed consultations, the US reintroduced a new draft press statement, which, at the time of writing, remains under discussion among Council members.
The African members on the Council have generally shown understanding toward the concerns of the South Sudanese authorities and have highlighted what they view as positive steps taken by the government, while calling for continued and adequate support. While this approach is likely to continue with the current composition of the A3 members (the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, and Somalia), these members may be more receptive to concerns raised by some like-minded Council members regarding the deteriorating security and humanitarian situation, including the need for Council products in response to such developments. The A3 could be guided by a 27 January statement issued by the Chairperson of the African Union (AU) Commission, expressing serious concerns over the violations of the permanent ceasefire, and calling on the parties to de-escalate tensions and fully comply with their obligations under the peace agreement. The statement also urged strict adherence to the ceasefire and the power-sharing arrangement, calling for a return to inclusive, consensus-based decision-making. The A3 members may also await the outcome of the 23 January meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council, which discussed the situation in South Sudan. At the time of writing, the communiqué had not yet been published.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 8 May 2025S/RES/2779 | This resolution renewed UNMISS’ mandate until 30 April 2026. |