Libya
Expected Council Action
In February, the Security Council will hold its 60-day briefing on the situation in Libya. Special Representative and Head of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) Hanna Serwaa Tetteh will brief the Council on recent political, security, and humanitarian developments in the country.
Background and Key Recent Developments
The political impasse in Libya continues between the UN-recognised Government of National Unity (GNU), based in Tripoli and led by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Mohammed Dbeibah, with advisory support from the High State Council (HSC), and the eastern-based Government of National Stability (GNS), led by Prime Minister Osama Hamad and backed by the House of Representatives (HoR) and the self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA) under the command of General Khalifa Haftar. The parties remain deadlocked over proposed legislation to hold national elections that would reconcile the country’s divided government. A key point of contention is over the formation of a unified interim government to organise the elections—a move favoured by the GNS and HoR but opposed by the GNU and some segments of the HSC. The prolonged stalemate between the rival governments has persisted since the indefinite postponement of the 2021 elections.
During the Security Council’s most recent briefing on Libya, held on 19 December 2025, Tetteh noted that there remains a lack of progress in implementing the political roadmap to lead Libya to national elections and unified institutions. (The roadmap announced by UNSMIL in August 2025 consists of three core pillars: adopting a viable electoral framework for presidential and legislative polls; unifying institutions under a new government; and launching a structured dialogue on governance, economic, security, and reconciliation issues to pave the way for these elections and address long-term conflict drivers.) Tetteh specifically highlighted the lack of progress on an agreement regarding the reconstitution of the High National Election Commission and the passage of a constitutional amendment establishing the legal framework for elections. She emphasised that achieving these two tasks is essential for credible elections in Libya. Tetteh reiterated that, in the absence of an agreement on the first two milestones of the political roadmap, she would be prepared to pursue a different course and present an alternative mechanism to the Council at the February meeting for the Council’s support.
On 14-15 December 2025, UNSMIL facilitated the first session of the Structured Dialogue in Tripoli. The Structured Dialogue, which is one of the three core pillars of UNSMIL’s political roadmap, aims to create political conditions, consensus, and technical proposals required to advance the other two pillars: an electoral framework and a unified government. It is envisioned as an inclusive, countrywide consultative mechanism to inform decisions on the design of elections, the mandate of the interim executive, and institutional unification. UNSMIL has indicated that the Structured Dialogue is not a decision-making body for selecting a new government; rather, its purpose is to develop concrete recommendations to support an enabling environment for elections and address immediate governance, economic, and security challenges.
The Structured Dialogue consists of several tracks, each focused on a specific issue: governance, the economy, security, national reconciliation, and human rights. In January, the Structured Dialogue began its substantive work, with the governance track holding its first session in Tripoli, where it identified key issues related to a pre-election political agreement, the mandate of the government overseeing elections, state and local government structure, and electoral integrity. Other tracks of the dialogue also held substantive discussions on relevant issues. Tetteh noted that, as the dialogue moves into the next phase, the stakeholders have the responsibility to translate this momentum into “focused and substantive discussions with pragmatic and implementable recommendations, that can address the current challenges facing the country”.
In other developments, General Mohammed Ali Ahmed al-Haddad, Chief of the General Staff of the Libyan Army, along with four other Libyan military officials, died in a plane crash near Ankara, Türkiye, on 23 December 2025. The Libyan delegation was in Ankara holding official talks with Turkish counterparts. The plane crashed soon after taking off en route to Tripoli. Dbeibah called the tragedy a great loss for Libya and its military institution. Turkish authorities are currently investigating the causes of the crash. At the time of writing, they indicated that they had not identified any terrorist links.
On 1 December 2025, the German authorities surrendered Khaled Mohamed Ali El Hishri to the custody of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The authorities in Germany arrested El Hishri on 16 July 2025 pursuant to an arrest warrant issued by the ICC. El Hishri was a senior official in the Special Deterrence Forces (SDF), an armed group in Tripoli, and one of the top officials at Mitiga Prison. The ICC Prosecutor’s Office alleges that he is responsible for crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in and around Mitiga Prison in Tripoli between February 2015 and early 2020.
Key Issues and Options
A key issue for the Council is how best to support the roadmap for a Libyan-led and Libyan-owned political process that Tetteh presented in August 2025.
Council members have been focused on how to help foster common political ground between the country’s rival governments, but given the lack of progress in implementing the roadmap, one option might be to adopt a presidential statement, to signal the Council’s continued strong support for UNSMIL’s efforts and urge the Libyan stakeholders to engage in good faith and make the necessary compromises to advance the implementation of the roadmap.
A core issue is UNSMIL’s ability to implement the various recommendations of the most recent strategic review of the mission in light of the UN’s financial crisis and the UN80 initiative. The review recommended streamlining all the mission’s workstreams to prioritise its core task of supporting a political solution. It also recommended that UNSMIL maintain a consistent presence in eastern and southern Libya, with targeted expansions in Benghazi and Sabha.
Council members could seek a closed briefing specifically on whether UNSMIL has been able to implement the recommendations from the strategic review, as recommended by the latest mandate renewal resolution. Members may be particularly interested in whether the mission has been able to offset the costs through reallocation of resources, realigned staffing, and improved efficiency through cost-saving measures and external support services.
Council Dynamics
Council members remain united on the need for a Libyan-led, inclusive political process resulting in elections that will help to restore political, security, and economic stability to the country. They also remain broadly supportive of the UN’s mediation role towards this end. Council members also share concerns about the volatile security situation in the country.
Council members are generally supportive of the political roadmap presented by Tetteh. During the most recent meeting on Libya in December 2025, most members emphasised the importance of the process being Libyan-led and Libyan-owned and fully inclusive of all political actors to ensure success. While many members welcomed the launch of the Structured Dialogue, Russia questioned whether such formats could serve as a “solid foundation for long-term agreements”, while noting the lack of sufficient representation of the eastern and southern parts of Libya.
| Security Council Resolution | |
| 31 October 2025S/RES/2796 | This resolution extended UNSMIL’s mandate for twelve months and encouraged the mission to implement the recommendations from the strategic review. |
| Secretary-General’s Report | |
| 5 December 2025S/2025/792 | This was the Secretary-General’s report on the situation in Libya. |
