In Hindsight: The Security Council’s Muted Response to the Venezuela Crisis
On 3 January, the US conducted a military operation in Venezuela that removed President Nicolás Maduro Moros and his wife, Cilia Flores, from the country. These actions are widely regarded by analysts as a violation of international law, including the UN Charter. Many observers have noted that the action undermines the rules-based global order and sets a dangerous precedent, arguing that international law is clearly violated if countries unilaterally take military action to remove leaders of other countries that they deem illegitimate. It also served as another stark example of the Security Council’s inability to respond to threats to international peace and security when one of its permanent members is directly involved.
Maduro’s ouster was the culmination of months of rising tensions surrounding Venezuela. Since mid-August 2025, the US has increased its military presence in the southern Caribbean, off the coast of Venezuela, citing the need to curtail the flow of drugs into its territory. As part of this campaign, the US has been attacking boats in the Caribbean Sea and the eastern Pacific Ocean that Washington alleges are smuggling drugs.
The Security Council’s response to events surrounding Venezuela has so far been limited to the holding of three open briefings. At Venezuela’s request, the Council met twice to discuss the escalation around the country, on 10 October 2025 and 23 December 2025. It also held an emergency meeting to discuss Maduro’s ouster on 5 January, its first official meeting of the year, at the request of new Council member Colombia. After Colombia requested the meeting, Venezuela also sent a letter requesting an emergency Council meeting, and China and Russia supported the meeting request. (For background, see our 23 December 2025 and 5 January What’s in Blue stories.)
About a month has passed since the US operation, which many describe as a seismic event, yet there have been no proposals for a Council product or a meeting to follow up on developments in the country. There have also been no initiatives to discuss the matter at the General Assembly. This contrasts with past occasions, where attempts were made to respond to violations of the UN Charter through a Council product, even if the scope for action was limited due to the involvement of a veto-wielding permanent Council member.
Reactions to Recent Developments in Venezuela
As the US was massing forces in the southern Caribbean and carrying out strikes on boats allegedly involved in drug trafficking—which UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk said violates international human rights law and described as “extrajudicial killing”—Council members’ statements revealed divergent positions on the matter. In both the 10 October 2025 and 23 December 2025 meetings, the US alleged that Maduro was involved in “narco-terrorist” activities that pose a threat to US security. The US also reiterated that it does not view Maduro as the legitimate leader of Venezuela, as Washington does not recognise him as the winner of the country’s 28 July 2024 presidential election. (The results of these elections have been strongly disputed by several national and international actors.) The US repeated these accusations after the 3 January operation as reasons for Maduro’s removal.
All other Council members couched their interventions in the language of the UN Charter, but with significant variations. China and Russia—which have close ties with Venezuela, with China being the biggest buyer of Venezuelan oil—strongly criticised the US, accusing it of violating the UN Charter and of heightening tensions and threatening regional and international peace and security. At the 23 December 2025 meeting, Russia said that the US actions “violate all key norms of international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea [UNCLOS], Security Council resolutions and the Charter of the United Nations itself”.
The remaining Council members—including the African and European members—were reluctant to directly criticise the US. Instead, they made general statements on the need to de-escalate the situation in the Caribbean region through dialogue and to uphold international law, including the principles of the UN Charter. Among other things, these members emphasised the importance of combatting transnational organised crime and illicit drug trafficking, while stressing that this should be done in compliance with international law and relevant international frameworks such as UNCLOS.
In the lead-up to the 3 January operation, there was one attempt to have the Council pronounce itself on developments relating to Venezuela. In late October 2025, Russia circulated a draft presidential statement that expressed concern about the escalation in the Caribbean region. The draft text apparently did not explicitly mention Venezuela or the US and incorporated general messages that were conveyed by most Council members at the 10 October 2025 Council meeting, including the need for states to exercise maximum restraint and resort to dialogue, diplomacy, and multilateral mechanisms. The draft text also underscored the inadmissibility of the use of the Caribbean Sea for illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs, while emphasising that actions to address this issue should conform with international law and the UN Charter. It seems that while many members could agree with the messages contained in the text, the US opposed having a product on the issue, leading Russia to withdraw the draft from consideration.
After the 3 January operation, Secretary-General António Guterres issued a statement expressing deep concern “that the rules of international law have not been respected”. China and Russia, as well as outside observers, were more equivocal in calling the US military incursion an act that breaches international law.
While messaging from the US on the one hand, and China and Russia on the other, remained similar to those made in the run-up to the operation, there was a change in tone from some members.
Among the US’ traditional allies on the Council, France was perhaps the most critical at the 5 January meeting, underscoring that “[t]he military operation that led to the capture of Nicolás Maduro contravenes the principles of peaceful settlement of disputes and non-use of force”. It added that “[t]he proliferation of violations of the United Nations Charter and international law by States vested with the responsibility of permanent members of this Council undermines the very foundations of the international order”.
Denmark, for instance, also made a stronger statement compared with its previous interventions on developments in Venezuela. Among other things, it echoed Guterres’ 3 January statement, which noted that “[i]ndependently of the situation in Venezuela, these developments constitute a dangerous precedent”. However, as did other European and African members, it conveyed general messages on the need to uphold international law, without directly stating that the US military action violated these principles.
How to respond to the developments in Venezuela was a first major test for Colombia, which had just started its 2026-2027 Security Council term representing the Group of Latin America and Caribbean Countries (GRULAC). Colombia was the first Council member to request the 5 January meeting (later supported by China and Russia). Its statement at the meeting took a strong and principled position, calling the events that occurred on 3 January “grave violations of Venezuela’s sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integrity, as well as of international law and the Charter of the United Nations”. It also warned of the serious implications of a situation where a permanent Council member uses force with the aim of taking another country’s natural resources, adding that if such a Council member “disregards international law, what is the role of this Council and what are the foundations for international peace and security”.
Reactions to the 3 January operation need to be viewed in the light of some of the US’ threats to other countries in the region, such as Colombia, and concerns that the US could continue pursuing a strategy whereby it uses its military strength to seize territory and resources. Trump has referenced such aspirations in the past, promising to annex Greenland and take back the Panama Canal. Although these are issues that directly concern three current Council members, they were not directly raised at the 5 January Council meeting.
Historical Precedent
Historical analysis offers some examples of possible avenues for action in the face of violations of international law involving a permanent member of the Security Council. The recent development in Venezuela bears some parallels to the US’ 1989 incursion into Panama, during which it removed General Manuel Noriega, the de facto ruler of the country at the time. Following that operation, seven Council members who belonged to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)—Algeria, Colombia, Ethiopia, Malaysia, Nepal, Senegal, and Yugoslavia—put forward a draft resolution condemning the American invasion of Panama. The draft text called the US intervention in the country a “flagrant violation of international law and of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of States” and requested the Secretary-General to monitor developments in Panama and to report to the Council within 24 hours. The draft resolution was vetoed by France, the UK, and the US, marking the last instance in which France and the UK used their veto.
The UN General Assembly subsequently adopted a text similar to that proposed at the Security Council by a vote of 75 in favour and 20 against, with 40 abstentions. The General Assembly meeting to adopt a resolution provided a platform for the wider UN membership to express their position on the US action, with many criticising it as a violation of the principle of non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs.
Before the US invasion of Panama, which started on 20 December 1989, the Security Council held two meetings at Panama’s request to discuss the heightened tensions in the country, in April and August of that year. At the last meeting before the invasion, held on 11 August 1989, then-Panamanian Foreign Minister Jorge Eduardo Ritter urged the Council to take action to avert armed conflict, stressing that if Panama became a precedent, “it would trample underfoot all the guarantees in the Charter for countries lacking military power, because the interpretation, scope and applicability of the principles and provisions of the text establishing the Organization would be subject to the unilateral whims of a nation having the force to impose its will”. Among other things, Ritter urged the Council to deploy military observers and asked the Secretary-General to dispatch a good offices mission to observe the situation on the ground and promote de-escalation. These requests were not taken up by the Council or the Secretary-General.
A similar case study can be found in the response to the October 1983 invasion of the island of Grenada by the US and a coalition of Caribbean countries. Council members Guyana, Nicaragua, and Zimbabwe—also NAM members—proposed a draft resolution that deplored the armed intervention in Grenada, describing it as “a flagrant violation of international law and of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of that State”, and calling for the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from the country. The resolution was not adopted owing to a veto cast by the US. The General Assembly subsequently adopted a similar resolution by a vote of 108 in favour and nine against, with 27 abstentions.
Although significantly different in terms of scope and effects, the case of Ukraine can serve as a more recent example of a response to a violation of the UN Charter by a permanent Council member. Russia’s invasion of the country in February 2022 galvanised the Security Council’s attention, prompting the holding of 50 Council meetings in that year alone. In 2022, the Council voted on four draft resolutions on Ukraine: two proposed by Albania and the US, which were vetoed by Russia, and two proposed by Russia that failed to be adopted due to insufficient votes.
The gridlock over Ukraine at the Council brought a renewed focus on possible avenues for greater cooperation and accountability through the General Assembly. In February 2022, following its own failure to adopt a draft resolution deploring Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the Council adopted a “Uniting for Peace” resolution, referring to the General Assembly a situation on which its permanent members are deadlocked for the first time in 40 years. This initiative established the ongoing 11th emergency special session (ESS), during which the General Assembly adopted eight resolutions on Ukraine since 2022. (For more information, see our 31 January 2023 In Hindsight: “The Security Council, One Year after Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine”.)
More broadly, analysts have suggested that a more proactive stance by the broader UN membership can help address situations where the Council is gridlocked, noting that the General Assembly mandated the first armed peacekeeping mission and that the body has the ability to dispatch fact-finding missions.
Future Outlook
As some Council members stated after the US military incursion into Venezuela, inaction by the Council following acts that clearly violate the UN Charter undermines its credibility as the organ entrusted with the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. Despite this, it does not appear that any action on Venezuela is expected either at the Security Council or the General Assembly in the near future, unless another major escalation occurs in the country.
It may be difficult in the current climate to find a member state or a group that would champion a response to the developments in Venezuela. Although NAM countries were active in the Cold War era in joining together to propose products at the Security Council to denounce violations of international law, they have been less active in doing so since. The bloc has pronounced itself on the matter, however, with the NAM Coordinating Bureau issuing a communiqué on 5 January that categorically condemned the US military action in Venezuela as an “act of aggression”. Uganda, as chair of the NAM, delivered a statement on behalf of the bloc at the 5 January Council meeting, which demanded full respect for Venezuela’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, and right to self-determination. Other member states participated in that Council meeting, many of which condemned the US’ actions. For instance, the Group of Friends in Defense of the Charter of the United Nations—which includes Venezuela among its members—stressed at the meeting that the US action constitutes a violation of the Charter and a threat to multilateralism.[1]
In the case of Venezuela, the need to strike a balance between principles and geopolitical considerations appears to be a decisive factor that tempers members’ appetite for action. The restraint shown by some members, including the Europeans—who have been vocal on violations of international law in the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza, has led to accusations of double standards. Analysts have noted that some European member states are worried that a stronger stance could alienate the US, risking the loss of its support for Ukraine.
Colombia is in a similarly sensitive position, as it is currently working on diffusing its bilateral tensions with Washington. In an unexpected about-face after a year of heated rhetoric between Trump and Colombian President Gustavo Petro Urrego, the two leaders held a telephone call on 8 January that resulted in an invitation for Petro to meet Trump at the White House on 3 February.
Both China and Russia are not likely to propose any Council action without a request from Venezuela, which may be more cautious as it navigates its relationship with the US under the new circumstances. While Russia has condemned US actions in Venezuela as a violation of international law, its own conduct, especially with respect to Ukraine, leaves it vulnerable to criticism for hypocrisy and double standards.
The crisis in Venezuela has underscored a fundamental tension in an increasingly divided world between strategic interests and multilateral principles. The interplay between these two factors has led to a reluctance among member states to take strong action in response to US actions in Venezuela. It is worth considering at what point a failure to defend the norms and values codified in international law, including the UN Charter, threatens the long-term peace and security of UN member states that have long benefited from them.
____________________________________________________________________________________
[1] The other members of the Group of Friends, which was formed in 2021, are: Algeria, Belarus, Bolivia, China, Cuba, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Mali, Nicaragua, the State of Palestine, the Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Syria, and Zimbabwe.
