DPRK (North Korea)
Expected Council Action
In February, Council members are scheduled to discuss the 90-day report on the work of the 1718 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Sanctions Committee in closed consultations.
Ordinarily, the Chair of the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee briefs Council members on the report. At the time of writing, the Chair had not been appointed as Council members continue to negotiate this year’s allocation of subsidiary bodies. If the Chair is not appointed by the time the meeting is scheduled to take place, the UK, the president of the Council during February, is likely to brief members on the report in its capacity as president. Greece served as Chair of the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee last year after the appointments were finalised in May 2025.
Key Recent Developments
Tensions have continued to simmer on the Korean Peninsula. On 4 January, the DPRK fired several ballistic missiles towards the sea off its coast. On 27 January, the DPRK fired two short-range ballistic missiles into waters off its east coast. Several analysts have suggested that the tests may be linked to the upcoming DPRK Workers’ Party Congress, which is held every five years and is expected to begin in February.
The 4 January launches, which were the first ballistic missile tests conducted by the DPRK since early November 2025, took place hours before the Republic of Korea President Lee Jae-myung was scheduled to begin a state visit to China. During the visit, Lee asked Chinese President Xi Jinping to act as a mediator between the DPRK and the ROK. The move was part of Lee’s push to reopen dialogue with the DPRK, which he has pursued since taking office in June 2025.
Lee’s overtures appear to have been rejected by the DPRK. In a 13 January statement, Kim Yo-jong, DPRK leader Kim Jong-un’s sister, reportedly described the ROK’s push for improved relations as an illusion. The statement was a response to alleged incursions into DPRK airspace by drones flown from the ROK. The ROK government has denied responsibility for the incursions and has imposed travel bans on three ROK civilians as part of an investigation into the allegations.
On 21 December, officials working on nuclear issues from the ROK and Russia reportedly held closed-door talks in Moscow. The meeting was the first between nuclear officials from the two countries since October 2024, when relations deteriorated after reports of DPRK troops being deployed to fight against Ukraine first emerged.
On 4 November 2025, US Department of the Treasury announced that it had imposed sanctions on eight individuals and two entities for their role in laundering funds derived from a variety of schemes involving the DPRK, including cybercrime and information technology worker fraud. The announcement came shortly after US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth travelled to the ROK for the annual security consultative meeting between the two countries, where he was expected to push for a more flexible posture for US troops stationed in the ROK. Several weeks after the trip, the ROK and the US announced that they had reached an agreement on a deal for the ROK to build nuclear submarines in partnership with the US.
In early December 2025, the US released its 2025 National Security Strategy. For the first time since the DPRK withdrew from the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in 2003, the document did not refer to denuclearising the DPRK, fuelling speculation that the Trump administration may seek a diplomatic breakthrough with the DPRK in 2026. On 23 January, the US Department of War released its National Defence Strategy. Regarding the Korean Peninsula, the strategy document says that the ROK “is capable of taking primary responsibility for deterring the DPRK with critical but more limited US support”, describing the apparent change in US policy as a “shift in the balance of responsibility” that “is better aligned with [US] defence priorities”. The document also omitted references to the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.
On 27 January, US President Donald Trump announced an increase in tariffs on certain ROK exports. In a social media post, Trump accused the ROK of failing to deliver on a trade deal between the two countries.
Against this backdrop, the DPRK has continued to pursue better relations with China and Russia. According to media reports, trade between China and the DPRK reached pre-pandemic levels in 2025 for the first time since 2020. In a New Year’s greeting sent to Russian President Vladimir Putin, Kim Jong-un reportedly said that the relationship between the two countries had been strengthened through sharing “blood, life and death” in Ukraine and hailed their “invincible friendship”.
On 12 January, the participating states of the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT) held an open briefing on the MSMT’s second report, which was published on 22 October 2025. (The MSMT was established in October 2024 by Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the ROK, the UK, and the US after the mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee expired following a Russian veto. Its aim is to monitor and report on violations and evasion of the measures imposed by the 1718 DPRK sanctions regime.) In a 22 October press release, the MSMT’s participating states said that the report “details the deep connections between UN-designated DPRK entities and the DPRK’s malicious cyber activities, including cryptocurrency theft, fraudulent IT work, and cyber espionage”.
In a 19 November 2025 statement delivered to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors, IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi, in describing the DPRK’s ongoing nuclear enrichment activities, noted that the DPRK’s nuclear test site at Punggye-ri “remains prepared to support a nuclear test”, and labelled “the continuation and further development of the DPRK’s nuclear programme” as clear violations of Council resolutions.
On 17 November 2025, International Maritime Organization (IMO) staff visited the DPRK to conduct a technical audit. The visit marked the first occasion that international UN staff entered the DPRK since Director-General of the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) Qu Dongyu visited the DPRK in July 2024.
Human Rights-related Developments
On 18 December 2025, the General Assembly adopted resolution 80/220 on the situation of human rights in the DPRK. Among other matters, the resolution condemned the long-standing and ongoing systematic, widespread and gross violations of human rights in and by the DPRK and encouraged the Security Council to take appropriate action to ensure accountability.
Sanctions-related Developments
On 5 December 2025, the US submitted a listing proposal to the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee in relation to seven vessels accused of violating UN sanctions against the DPRK. It seems that China and Russia put a hold on the request until mid-June.
Key Issues and Options
The Council is dealing with several issues on the DPRK file. The DPRK’s ongoing development of its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, which violates numerous Council resolutions, is a major concern. Sanctions evasion is also a problem, as is the overall effectiveness of the sanctions regime, particularly given that the DPRK is widely believed to have increased its nuclear arsenal since the sanctions regime was first introduced. The DPRK’s continuing refusal to participate in denuclearisation dialogue and the humanitarian and human rights situations are also challenges for the Council.
In response, Council members could consider introducing a resolution that condemns the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, urges member states to comply with existing resolutions, and calls on the DPRK to return to dialogue. It could also consider updating and strengthening the 1718 DPRK sanctions regime, with a view to increasing pressure on the DPRK and actors involved in sanctions evasion.
The lack of a panel of experts assisting the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee is another major issue. Council members could consider using the MSMT to fill this gap, although some members appear to feel that the MSMT does not carry the same authority as an entity mandated by the Council. Given these concerns, Council members who are also part of the MSMT or who support its work could explore options for enhancing its credibility, such as expanding its membership and providing more information about the way in which it operates. These members could also hold an informal meeting to discuss how the MSMT’s reports can be used to assist the Council and the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee.
UN agencies with relevant expertise, such as the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), could also be asked to brief the Committee regarding the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes.
Council Dynamics
The Council is sharply divided over the DPRK, and this dynamic appears to have worsened as cooperation between the DPRK and Russia has grown. The P3 (France, the UK, and the US) and other like-minded Council members generally favour using sanctions to help manage the threat posed by the DPRK and regularly call on member states to comply with existing Council resolutions. Many of these members have urged the DPRK to engage in dialogue and abandon its nuclear weapons programme while emphasising that it is responsible for escalating tensions. Some have also called for the Council to show unity and respond to the DPRK’s weapons tests and argue that China and Russia have emboldened the DPRK by blocking Council action on the file. Several of these members have strongly criticised the growing cooperation between the DPRK and Russia, including by highlighting evidence of arms transfers from the DPRK to Russia and noting that these transfers violate Council resolutions. Some have also called for the reinstatement of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee.
China and Russia, on the other hand, blame the US and its allies for heightening tensions and have accused the US of not doing enough to incentivise the DPRK to participate in denuclearisation talks. These two members have previously argued that sanctions should be eased because of their impact on the humanitarian situation in the country and have also repeatedly blocked attempts to issue a Council product responding to missile launches carried out by the DPRK in recent years.
The US is the penholder on the DPRK.
| Sanctions Committee Document | |
| 7 March 2024S/2024/215 | This was the final report of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee. |