Afghanistan
Expected Council Action
In February, the Council is expected to vote on a draft resolution extending the mandate of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team assisting the 1988 Afghanistan Sanctions Committee. The Monitoring Team’s mandate expires on 17 February.
Background
The 1988 Afghanistan sanctions regime imposes an assets freeze, a travel ban, and an arms embargo on individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities associated with the Taliban. The listing criteria for these sanctions include participating in the acts of, supplying arms to, recruiting for, or otherwise supporting the activities of those associated with the Taliban in constituting a threat to the peace, security, and stability of Afghanistan. Apart from the humanitarian exception established by resolution 2615 in December 2021, the regime has not been substantively updated since the Taliban seized power in August 2021.
The 1988 Afghanistan Sanctions Committee is a subsidiary organ of the Council created to oversee the regime. Its tasks include designating individuals and entities who meet the listing criteria, deciding upon requests for exemptions from the measures, and reporting periodically to the Council. The Monitoring Team supports the Committee by, among other things, submitting periodic reports on the implementation of the sanctions measures, making recommendations intended to assist member states with implementation, and reviewing the sanctions list.
The same monitoring team also supports the 1267/1989/2253 Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee. Resolution 2734 of 10 June 2024 extended the team’s mandate to support that Committee until June 2027. (For more information, see our 10 June What’s in Blue story.)
Council members received the Monitoring Team’s latest report on 17 November 2025. The report says that while the Taliban have brought a measure of peace and security to Afghanistan since seizing power, some groups have not benefited from the increase in stability, including women, girls, and minority groups. It says that the situation is particularly dire for women and girls, noting that Afghan women face barriers in access to healthcare, high levels of unemployment, and the second-widest gender gap in the world.
The report also analyses internal dynamics within the Taliban. It describes rifts between Taliban leader Hibatullah Akhundzada’s Kandahar base and the Haqqani Network, including in relation to girls’ education, while noting that the Taliban leadership has been able to manage these disagreements and remain unified and obedient to Akhundzada.
The governance challenges faced by the Taliban are another focus of the report. It notes that Afghanistan’s economy is recovering at a slow pace but remains weak, with an uncertain outlook overall due to fiscal pressures, a widening trade deficit, and persistent poverty and food insecurity. It also refers to several “exogenous shocks” that have affected the economy, including a reduction in foreign aid, natural disasters, and geopolitical tensions that have disrupted trade and deterred investment, and says that the situation has been exacerbated by the forced return of more than 4.5 million Afghan citizens from neighbouring states since October 2023.
According to the report, terrorism is the most serious challenge for the Taliban. It says that the Taliban’s assertions that terrorist groups have no footprint in Afghanistan and do not operate from the country are not credible, and notes that a wide range of member states have consistently reported that Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan (ISIL-K), Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Al-Qaida, the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement, and other groups are present in the country. It also says that attacks conducted by the TTP against Pakistan from Afghan soil are a particularly significant challenge that have led to cross-border military confrontation, loss of life, and economic consequences arising from the closure of border crossings between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and says that this issue is “the greatest short-term threat” to the Taliban’s stability.
The report outlines several recommendations for the 1988 Afghanistan Sanctions Committee. It recommends that the Committee revisit its guidelines for the conduct of its work in order to clarify and facilitate member states’ compliance with the travel ban and asset freeze measures. It also says that the Monitoring Team would welcome the Committee’s support in requesting assistance from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in Central Asia and strengthening engagement with the countering terrorist travel programme of the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT). The report further highlights the increased use of cryptocurrencies by terrorist groups, particularly ISIL-K, and recommends that the Committee write to member states asking them to share relevant information and analysis.
In other developments, it appears that the US blocked the majority of requests submitted to the Committee for exemptions to the travel ban in 2025. In correspondence sent to Committee members in August, the US indicated that it would scrutinise travel ban exemption requests more closely, on a case-by-case basis. The letter apparently also noted that the Taliban continues to use hostage diplomacy and accused the Taliban of failing to deliver on its counter-terrorism commitments. In response, it seems that some member states have resorted to notifying the Committee of travel by designated individuals rather than submitting exemption requests.
Key Issues and Options
The renewal of the Monitoring Team’s mandate is a key issue for the Council in February. The Council could choose to extend the mandate for another year without making any substantive changes, as it has generally done in recent years.
Council members may also wish to consider reviewing the 1988 Afghanistan sanctions regime more broadly. Such a review could analyse whether the regime is fit for purpose and how it could be updated following the Taliban’s seizure of power in August 2021. To assist with this review, members could choose to request a report from the Monitoring Team outlining possible options for updating the regime in light of the changed situation on the ground.
Council Dynamics
In general, the Monitoring Team appears to enjoy broad support among Council members. During the last round of negotiations regarding its mandate in December 2024, Council members agreed from the outset that it should be extended without making any substantive changes. The negotiations instead focused on preambular language, including text relating to the ratification of the “Law on the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice”, the Taliban’s directive banning women and girls from attending classes at private medical institutions, the adverse effects of climate change, the indispensable role of women in Afghan society, and access to humanitarian assistance and basic services for women and girls. (For more information, see our 12 December 2024 What’s in Blue story.)
China and Russia have previously pushed for the reinstatement of the standing exemption to the travel ban that expired in August 2022 after the 1988 Afghanistan Sanctions Committee failed to reach consensus regarding its renewal. (First introduced by the Committee in April 2019, the exemption authorised specified Taliban officials to travel abroad to attend peace and stability discussions in a range of countries. The exemption was renewed by the Committee at regular intervals until August 2022.) During negotiations regarding the Monitoring Team’s mandate in December 2023, China proposed adding operative language reintroducing the standing exemption to the travel ban and a related exemption to the assets freeze. While this was supported by Russia, it was opposed by a majority of other members, some of whom apparently argued that the resolution renewing the Monitoring Team’s mandate was not an appropriate instrument for reintroducing the travel ban exemption, and the proposal was not incorporated into the final resolution. (For more information, see our 13 December 2023 What’s in Blue story.)
The US is the penholder on Afghanistan sanctions issues. At the time of writing, the appointment of the chair of the Committee for 2026 had not been finalised. Pakistan was appointed as chair of the Committee in 2025.
| Security Council Resolution | |
| 13 December 2024S/RES/2763 | This resolution extended the mandate of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team assisting the 1988 Afghanistan Sanctions Committee until 17 February 2026. |
| Sanctions Committee Document | |
| 8 December 2025S/2025/796 | This was a letter transmitting the sixteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team assisting the 1988 Afghanistan Sanctions Committee. |