The Middle East, including the Palestinian Question
Expected Council Action
In January, the Security Council will hold its quarterly open debate on “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question” (MEPQ). Somalia—the Council president for January—intends to convene the meeting at ministerial level.
Key Recent Developments
The war in Gaza entered a pivotal new phase on 8 October, when Israel and Hamas agreed to a ceasefire as the first stage of the US-proposed peace framework known as the “Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict”. The ceasefire agreement called for Hamas to release the remaining hostages that it was holding in exchange for the release of Palestinian detainees, a partial withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) from Gaza, and an increase in humanitarian aid into the territory. At the time of writing, Hamas had released all living hostages and the remains of all but one of the deceased hostages, while Israel had released Palestinian detainees at the agreed ratio and redeployed to an initial withdrawal line. According to the Secretary-General’s latest quarterly report on the implementation of resolution 2334 of 23 December 2016, which covers the period from 20 September to 2 December, the partial withdrawal leaves the IDF in control of an estimated 53 to 58 percent of Gaza’s territory.
The ceasefire remains fragile and has been interrupted by intermittent violence, with each side accusing the other of violating the agreement. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), citing local health authorities as at 18 December, 394 Palestinians have been killed by the IDF since the ceasefire came into effect, as the total Palestinian death toll since 7 October 2023 passed 70,000. On 13 December, Israel assassinated a high-level Hamas commander in a missile strike, reportedly prompting a rebuke from the US, which deemed the strike a ceasefire violation. On its part, Israel has accused Hamas of deliberately delaying the return of hostages.
According to the Secretary-General’s report on the implementation of resolution 2334, humanitarian conditions in Gaza have improved during the ceasefire but remain “catastrophic”, marked by widespread destruction, forced displacement, and collapsed essential services and critical infrastructure. In a situation update dated 11 December, OCHA reported that the volume of aid collected at border crossings by the UN and its partners in the two months since the ceasefire went into effect had increased by 67 percent compared with the preceding two months. OCHA stressed, however, that humanitarian access in Gaza—which has faced frigid winter conditions and life-threatening rainstorms in recent weeks—remains constrained by insecurity, customs clearance challenges, the limited number of partners authorised by Israeli authorities to deliver cargo, delays and denials of cargo at operational crossings, and limited routes available for transporting humanitarian supplies. In its latest assessment published on 19 December, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) found that improved humanitarian access had offset the famine conditions previously declared in parts of Gaza but that the food security situation remains severe, with over 500,000 people facing “emergency” conditions (IPC Phase 4) and more than 100,000 still experiencing “catastrophe/famine” (IPC Phase 5).
On 8 December, the UN launched a $4.06 billion flash appeal for the OPT, allocating 92 percent of the required funds for the humanitarian response in the Gaza Strip. On 17 December, the OPT Humanitarian Country Team issued a statement expressing serious concern about the new registration process for international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) that Israel introduced in March. According to the statement, the process “fundamentally jeopardizes the continuation of humanitarian operations throughout the OPT”, relying on “vague, arbitrary, and highly politicized criteria” that impose requirements that humanitarian organisations cannot meet without violating international legal obligations or compromising core humanitarian principles. The statement said that “dozens” of INGOs face deregistration under the framework by 31 December 2025, followed by the forced closure of operations within 60 days, which would have a “catastrophic impact” on access to essential and basic services in Gaza.
The second stage of the Comprehensive Plan calls for the decommissioning of Hamas’ weapons; the further withdrawal of the IDF, which will progressively hand over security responsibility for Gaza to an International Stabilization Force (ISF); and the establishment of an interim technocratic government in Gaza comprising Palestinian and international experts under the oversight of a Board of Peace (BoP), which will be chaired by US President Donald Trump. This body is to eventually cede control of Gaza to a reformed Palestinian Authority (PA), at which point “the conditions may finally be in place for a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood”. On 17 November, the Security Council adopted resolution 2803, welcoming the establishment of the BoP for a two-year period, authorising the body to establish the ISF, and requesting it to submit a written biannual report to the Council on its progress. The resolution, which was penned by the US, received 13 votes in favour and two abstentions (China and Russia).
On 10 December, Trump said that the BoP will consist of heads of state who will be named “early next year”. Media reports have indicated that the US aims to deploy the ISF after the establishment of the BoP and will appoint a two-star general to lead the force, although it will not participate with its own troops. Countries such as Azerbaijan, Indonesia, and Türkiye have previously signalled an interest in contributing to the force, but these talks have reportedly been complicated by uncertainty surrounding its mandate and whether it will be expected to militarily engage Hamas, which has continued to express opposition to “total disarmament”. Meanwhile, Hamas and the PA have reportedly agreed on a shortlist of candidates to serve on the technocratic governance committee envisioned by the Comprehensive Plan.
In the occupied West Bank, settlement expansion, settler violence, and Israeli military operations have continued to accelerate. According to the Secretary-General’s quarterly report on resolution 2334, Israeli authorities advanced or approved over 6,310 housing units during the reporting period, while settlement activity in 2025 reached its highest levels since the UN began systematically tracking it in 2017. Notably, on 21 December, Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich announced the approval of 19 new settlements—a move that he said was intended to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state and which was subsequently condemned by numerous countries. The Secretary-General’s report also states that settler violence reached “its highest levels recorded in recent years”, averaging five incidents per day in 2025—many in the context of the annual olive harvest, which is a key source of income and livelihood for Palestinians in the West Bank. Additionally, Israeli security forces killed 38 Palestinians during the reporting period while continuing the large-scale military operation that began in January and has involved extensive demolitions of Palestinian homes and civilian infrastructure in refugee camps, displacing tens of thousands of people. Two Israelis were killed by Palestinians during the reporting period, according to the Secretary-General’s report.
Recent weeks have also seen notable developments regarding the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Israel has accused UNRWA of complicity with Hamas, a charge that the Agency strongly denies and which the International Court of Justice (ICJ) rejected in a 22 October advisory opinion that found that Israel, as an occupying power, is obligated to allow UN agencies, including UNRWA, to provide humanitarian aid in Gaza. On 5 December, the General Assembly adopted a resolution that commended UNRWA for its provision of vital assistance to the Palestinian refugees and renewed its mandate until 30 June 2029. On 8 December, Israel raided UNRWA’s East Jerusalem compound, reportedly replacing its UN flag with an Israeli flag and seizing Agency property. On 12 December, the General Assembly adopted a resolution welcoming the ICJ’s 22 October advisory opinion. During the Security Council’s most recent meeting on MEPQ, held on 16 December, several Council members welcomed that resolution while condemning Israel’s 8 December raid, which some described as a violation of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the UN.
Human Rights-Related Developments
On 27 November, the President of the Human Rights Council, Ambassador Jürg Lauber (Switzerland), announced the appointment of Srinivasan Muralidhar (India), Florence Mumba (Zambia), and Chris Sidoti (Australia) as members of the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT), including East Jerusalem, and Israel.
At the 80th session of the UN General Assembly Fourth Committee, Jayantha Jayasuriya, the Chair of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories, presented the Special Committee’s latest report on the human rights and humanitarian situation in the OPT and the occupied Syrian Golan. Highlighting the report’s findings, Jayasuriya said that Israel is pursuing a “systematic policy of territorial expansion through settlement, military occupation, and eventual annexation”. Settlers, often acting alongside Israeli security forces, have attacked Palestinian civilians, leading to widespread deaths, injuries, home demolitions, and land confiscations. Underscoring the need for decisive action from the international community, Jayasuriya urged member states to consider imposing political and economic sanctions and a full arms embargo until Israel “ceases violating the Palestinian and other peoples’ human rights” and withdraws fully from all occupied territories in the region.
Women, Peace and Security
In a 17 October update on the situation of women and girls in Gaza, UN Women highlighted that the “ceasefire may have paused the fighting, but it has not ended the crisis”. The update noted that for two years, “women and girls in Gaza were killed at a rate of roughly two every hour”, and that their needs remain at an all-time high. Among other things, the update noted that one in seven families in Gaza is led by a woman and highlighted the need for nutrition and shelter support, including in the context of the winter season. UN Women also stressed the importance for Gaza’s future of centring the needs of women and girls and including women’s organisations in the humanitarian response and reconstruction efforts. UN Women urged member states to scale up funding and called on all parties to uphold the ceasefire “fully and without delay”.
Key Issues and Options
After two years of devastating war in Gaza and the collapse of two previous ceasefires, the adoption of resolution 2803 represents the Security Council’s most assertive engagement with the conflict so far.
An immediate issue for the Council is to ensure that both parties fully abide by their ceasefire obligations under phase one of the Comprehensive Plan that resolution 2803 endorsed. This includes sustaining the cessation of hostilities, lifting remaining restrictions on the flow of humanitarian aid into Gaza, and securing the return of the last remaining hostage.
In the medium term, another key issue is to support efforts to advance to the second stage of the Comprehensive Plan in a manner consistent with international law. Important questions in this regard concern the objective, timeline, and sequencing of the transitional framework established by resolution 2803, including the composition and terms of reference of the BoP and technocratic governance committee; the mandate of the ISF; and the benchmarks for PA reform, none of which have been clearly defined. To receive more information about these issues, Council members could request briefings by representatives of the BoP, ISF, or other actors involved in preparations at January’s open debate. They could also consider conducting a visiting mission to Israel and the OPT, including to the Civil-Military Coordination Centre that the US has established in Israel to support implementation of the Comprehensive Plan.
Longer-term issues include supporting Gaza’s reconstruction and development, promoting accountability for international crimes committed during the war, and reviving a credible political process toward the realisation of the two-state solution. To this end, Council members could contribute to the dedicated reconstruction trust fund that resolution 2803 requested the World Bank and other international financial institutions to establish. They could also consider measures to facilitate transitional justice processes, including by requesting the Secretary-General to provide strategic recommendations for post-conflict accountability and reconciliation mechanisms. Additionally, Council members could consult with the broader UN membership to ensure that efforts to implement the Comprehensive Plan align with other international frameworks to solve the Israel-Palestine conflict, including the New York Declaration that the General Assembly endorsed in September.
Council and Wider Dynamics
The adoption of resolution 2803 marked a rare moment of convergence in the international community’s engagement on Gaza, driven by regional backing for the US-brokered Comprehensive Plan and the priority that many Council members placed on consolidating the ceasefire and easing the humanitarian catastrophe in the enclave. In their explanations of vote, several members that voted in favour emphasised that their decision had been influenced by the support that the PA and key Arab and Muslim states had expressed for the resolution, as well as their expectation that the transitional framework that it established would lead to unified Palestinian governance in the OPT and ultimately to a two-state outcome.
At the same time, the debate revealed significant underlying fault lines that are likely to shape Council dynamics moving forward. Explaining their abstentions, China and Russia cited concerns over insufficient clarity on the mandate, oversight, and legal basis of the BoP and the ISF, as well as the absence of an explicit reaffirmation of the two-state solution. Despite their favourable vote, several other members—including Algeria, Denmark, Pakistan, Slovenia, and Somalia—also signalled unease over ambiguities in the resolution, particularly regarding timelines for Israeli withdrawal, the role of the UN and the PA during the transition, and safeguards against fragmentation of the OPT.
At January’s open debate, many members are expected to press for closer Council oversight of implementation of the resolution, and long-standing divisions will likely persist over how assertively the Council should engage on accountability and final status issues beyond Gaza’s stabilisation.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 17 November 2025S/RES/2803 | This resolution endorsed the “Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict”, welcoming the establishment of a Board of Peace (BoP) and authorising the BoP to establish a temporary International Stabilization Force (ISF) in Gaza. The resolution received 13 votes in favour and two abstentions (China and Russia). |
| 23 December 2016S/RES/2334 | This resolution condemned Israeli settlements and called for immediate steps to prevent violence against civilians, including acts of terror. It was adopted with 14 votes in favour and a US abstention. |
| Secretary-General’s Report | |
| 11 December 2025S/2025/807 | This was the latest Secretary-General’s report on the implementation of resolution 2334. |
