Syria
Expected Council Action
In January, the Security Council is expected to hold two meetings on Syria: one on political and humanitarian issues, and another on the chemical weapons track.
Background and Key Recent Developments
8 December marked Syria’s one-year anniversary since rebel forces—led by now interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa—ousted the Bashar al-Assad government. Mass celebrations occurred in some of Syria’s most populous cities, including Damascus, Aleppo, and Homs. In a speech to the nation, Sharaa vowed to build a better future for Syria, highlighting progress made on regional and international reintegration, economic recovery, and security sector reform (SSR), while reaffirming the interim government’s commitment to transitional justice, accountability, and the search for missing persons.
Celebrations for the 8 December anniversary were reportedly banned by the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES) in areas under their control in northeast Syria due to security concerns. On 7 December, Mazloum Abdi—the General Commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the armed wing of the DAANES—reaffirmed his commitment to the 10 March Agreement between the interim government and the SDF, which aims to see the SDF integrate into the new government’s state institutions by the end of the year. Implementation of the agreement has been difficult, however, as the SDF has called for a secular, decentralised state—sticking points for Damascus. In a 7 December statement, the DAANES criticised the interim government’s actions in the past year for lacking inclusivity and undermining national unity, and called for a comprehensive national dialogue.
From 2 to 7 December, the Council held a visiting mission to Lebanon and Syria. The Council spent one day (4 December) in Damascus, Syria (the first time the Council had visited the country) and then travelled to Lebanon, where members spent two days (5 and 6 December).
On 18 December, the Council held a briefing on the visit, in which Permanent Representative of Slovenia to the UN Samuel Žbogar, president of the Council in December, delivered a statement on behalf of the co-leads of the mission, Algeria, Denmark, and Slovenia. Žbogar said that the mission had a “clear objective” of building trust among the international community, the Council and the Syrian interim government. Despite being in Damascus for only a day, Council members had a busy agenda, meeting multiple relevant interlocutors and stakeholders, including high-level government officials, UN country team officials, and representatives from civil society, transitional justice and accountability mechanisms, and local and religious leaders. (For more information, see our 17 December What’s in Blue story.)
On 1 December, US President Donald Trump expressed the US’ satisfaction with, and support for, steps being taken by the Syrian interim government and Sharaa. He stressed the importance of Israel engaging in dialogue with Syria and that there are no actions that “interfere” with Syria’s transition. The following day (2 December), Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that a deal with Syria was possible but reiterated Israel’s demand that Syria establish a demilitarised area from Damascus to the current buffer zone, which was established by the Israeli-Syrian 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement. Following Assad’s ouster, Israeli forces took control of the buffer zone and expanded into territory in Golan, southern Syria, in violation of the 1974 agreement. Sharaa has sharply criticised Israeli actions, warning that such demands could lead to “a dangerous place”, and has called for Israel to withdraw its forces and respect the 1974 agreement. US-brokered discussions for a security pact between the two countries have reportedly faced challenges due to these conflicting positions.
On 28 November, an Israeli incursion into the town of Beit Jinn in southern Syria reportedly killed at least 13 people, including women and children, and wounded 25. That same day, the Syrian Permanent Representative to the UN Ibrahim Olabi sent identical letters to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, condemning the attack as a “fully-fledged war crime”. In the Council’s 18 December briefing on Syria, the Permanent Representative of Israel Danny Danon said that the operation targeted terrorists from the Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya group—the Lebanese branch of the Muslim Brotherhood—which were planning attacks against Israeli civilians. He also claimed that there is growing proof that Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) are trying to “build up” in Syria. Danon underlined that Israel will not allow Syria to become a haven for terrorists and that it is Syria’s responsibility to prevent these activities. Speaking in the same meeting, Olabi called into question the facts presented by Danon, and argued that it is Israel which is preventing Syrian authorities from exerting full control and responsibility over Syrian territory through their demands.
US and Syrian authorities have continued their nascent cooperation on counterterrorism operations. On 5 December, US Central Command Commander (CENTCOM) Admiral Brad Cooper issued a statement praising Syrian forces for interdicting “multiple weapons shipments” intended for Lebanese Hezbollah, affirming “a shared interest” in ensuring its disarmament and the Middle East’s peace and stability. Additionally, according to a 30 November CENTCOM statement, between 24 and 27 November, forces from CENTCOM and the Syrian Ministry of Interior “located and destroyed more than 15 sites containing [Islamic State in Syria and the Levant (ISIL/Da’esh)] weapons caches in southern Syria”.
On 13 December, CENTCOM said that an ambush by an ISIL gunman killed two US military personnel and one US civilian interpreter, and injured three other US military personnel and two Syrian security personnel. The attack took place in Palmyra in central Syria, and the next day the Syrian Interior Ministry and a US official reportedly said that the gunman—who was killed during the attack—was a member of the government’s security forces, who was slated for dismissal for his extremist views. Trump vowed “serious retaliation” against the group, and on 19 December, US forces carried out strikes on more than 70 ISIL targets across central Syria.
Terrorism is also fuelling intercommunal tensions in Syria. On 26 December an explosion in an Alawite mosque in the city of Homs reportedly killed at least eight people and injured 20 more. Ansar al-Sunna—an apparent splinter group of ISIL—claimed responsibility for the attack. On 28 December, protests took place in coastal areas, including in Latakia and Tartous, in which Alawite demonstrators demanded security and political guarantees for their minority. Clashes then reportedly broke out between the protestors and interim-government supporters and security forces, in which at least four people were killed and more than 100 injured.
On 17 December, the US Congress repealed the 2019 Caesar Civilian Protection Act, legislation which had imposed heavy sanctions on Syria to penalise the Assad government and has continued to undermine the country’s economic recovery following his ouster. Trump is expected to sign it into law soon.
The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)’s 24 November 2024 report on the implementation of resolution 2118 of 27 September 2013 (which required the verification and destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons stockpiles) says that on 23 October, the OPCW Secretariat “re-established a continuous presence of the OPCW Mission in [Syria]”. The Secretariat also deployed an Office of Special Missions (OSM) team. Established on 1 June, the OSM was set up to coordinate all the Secretariat’s activities and implement the OPCW’s mandate in Syria—with the aim of establishing a “long-term presence of the OPCW” in Syria. The report also details an increase in visits to chemical weapons-related locations by the Secretariat since March 2025, facilitated and supported by the Syrian authorities.
In her briefing at the 18 December meeting on Syria, Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Joyce Msuya, had three requests for the Council and the international community: diplomacy to de-escalate and resolve ongoing flashpoints and prevent fighting; mobilising investment into development, so that Syria can transition from relying on humanitarian aid to recovery and reconstruction efforts; and support for humanitarian assistance in the near term. Msuya pointed out that the Syria humanitarian appeal for 2025 remained only 30 percent funded, a shortfall which, unless reversed, will cause reduction or disruptions to aid and hinder future recovery efforts.
Briefing at the same meeting, Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo said that the UN seeks to establish the Special Envoy’s office in Syria to support Syria’s transition “with greater impact”.
On 29 December, the Council adopted resolution 2811, extending for six months the mandate of the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) until 30 June 2026. (For more information, see the brief on UNDOF [Golan] in our December 2025 Monthly Forecast.)
Human Rights-Related Developments
On 7 December, the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (COI) delivered a press statement on the first anniversary of the fall of the Assad regime. In the press statement, the COI commended the interim authorities for their efforts to address the crimes, violations, and abuses inflicted during previous decades. At the same time, it highlighted that many challenges lie ahead in Syria’s transition, amid the continuing insecurity and violence still afflicting many communities, alongside unresolved conflicts, including repeated Israeli military operations.
In a 5 December press briefing note, Thameen Al-Kheetan, the Spokesperson for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, stressed the need for more concrete steps to stop human rights violations and abuses in the country.
Key Issues and Options
A key issue for the Council is to ensure that Syria’s interim government pursues a credible, transparent, and inclusive political process, while navigating a fraught security context compounded by intercommunal tensions, terrorism, and external interference. Central to this issue are Damascus’ efforts in pursuing disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) efforts, and in fostering social cohesion and transitional justice, including accountability and reconciliation.
The UN’s future role in Syria is another key issue for the Council. Based on an integrated strategic assessment internal report prepared by the UN Secretariat, the Secretary-General has considered what types of UN presence in Syria would be most suitable to meet the country’s current needs.
Following up on their recent mission to Damascus, Council members could convene an Informal Interactive Dialogue (IID) with the participation of Syria and relevant UN entities to discuss the most viable options for future UN and Council engagement in Syria and appropriate support for Syria’s transition.
Another issue is the need to start minimising the country’s reliance on humanitarian aid through support and investment in recovery and development. Council members could consider holding a public briefing focused on the country’s need for support on reconstruction and economic rehabilitation, featuring briefings from representatives of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank.
Council Dynamics
Council members are aligned on the need for the Syrian authorities to advance an inclusive, Syrian-owned and Syrian-led political process based on the key principles of resolution 2254. They broadly agree that the threat of intercommunal violence cannot be addressed without advancing inclusive accountability measures, DDR and SSR efforts, together with a credible political process in the country.
The Council’s December visit to Damascus represented an important signal of unified support to Syria’s transition, following years of division on the Syria file. Earlier in 2025, the US and Russia worked together on the 14 March presidential statement following violence perpetrated in Latakia and Tartous, while Denmark authored the 10 August presidential statement in response to violence in Suweida.
There is broad agreement among Council members that the new Syrian government requires international support to rebuild the country and its crippled economy, including through the easing of unilateral sanctions, with several Council members already having taken steps to ease unilateral sanctions on Syria. The Council lifted some of its sanctions impacting the Syrian interim government, through the adoption of resolution 2799 of 6 November, which removed Sharaa and Syrian Interior Minister Anas Hassan Khattab from the 1267/1989/2253 Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions list.
Israel’s presence and military activities in Syria remain a contentious issue for Council members. Most members believe Israel’s actions are fostering instability in Syria and that it must comply with the 1974 Agreement. In contrast, the US has predominantly characterised Israel’s actions as defensive in nature or tied to ensuring its national security and has pushed back against attempts by other members to introduce language criticising Israeli actions in Syria in recent Council products.
Many Council members also agree on the need for the Syrian interim government to take decisive measures to address the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) and ISIL/Da’esh. China has been particularly vocal in calling on Damascus to take a stronger stance on FTFs in the country, some of whom have reportedly been integrated into the Syrian armed forces. Several FTFs constitute part of the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement, which China considers a terrorist organisation and is also listed under the 1267/1989/2253 ISIL/Da’esh and Al-Qaida sanctions regime.
| Security Council Resolution | |
| 6 November 2025S/RES/2799 | This resolution removed interim Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and interim Syrian Interior Minister Anas Khattab from the 1267/1989/2253 Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions list |
| Security Council Presidential Statements | |
| 10 August 2025S/PRST/2025/6 | This was a presidential statement condemning violence against civilians in Suweida in July 2025, calling for unhindered humanitarian access to the region, and calling on the Syrian interim authorities to ensure accountability. |
| 14 March 2025S/PRST/2025/4 | This was a presidential statement condemning sectarian violence perpetrated in Latakia and Tartous and calling for accountability and the protection of all Syrians, regardless of ethnicity or religion. |