In Hindsight: The Security Council in 2025 and the Year Ahead
In 2025, divisions in the Security Council continued to constrain the body’s ability to address some of the more dire security crises confronting the world. Dynamics in the Council shifted over the year as the new US administration’s policy positions became clearer. Key resolutions were adopted on Gaza and Haiti, although their implementation poses significant challenges. The Council adopted a resolution on Ukraine that had little impact on the worsening situation in the country, and it likewise struggled to gain traction on other entrenched crises in Sudan and Myanmar. An unusually high number of unexpected crisis situations—ranging from conflicts between Cambodia and Thailand and between India and Pakistan to a coup in Guinea-Bissau and tensions between the US and Venezuela—were the focus of some attention. Syria is one issue where the Council demonstrated considerable unity in 2025, and the country now has an opportunity to build a brighter future after years of civil war.
In 2026, the Council will have to address several critical issues. Among these are the future of peace operations, the implementation of resolutions on Gaza and Haiti, and the impact of the UN’s liquidity crisis on its work. It will also need to make a crucial recommendation to the General Assembly on who should lead the UN as its next Secretary-General. These and other issues with important bearing on international peace and security point to a year ahead with both challenges and opportunities.
Declining Outcomes and Voting Patterns Demonstrate Deep Divisions
The 44 resolutions adopted in 2025 continue a downward trend in output for the fifth straight year—compared to 46 in 2024, 50 in 2023, 54 in 2022, and 57 in 2021. It also marks the lowest number of resolutions since 1991 (42). In addition, only 61.4 percent of the resolutions adopted in 2025 had the support of all 15 Council members. This is less than the 65.2 percent adopted unanimously in 2024, and it represents a low level of unanimity for the post-Cold War period, including in the prior decade. For example, between 2014 and 2023, the Council adopted 83.9 percent of its resolutions (494 of 589) unanimously.[1]
In 2025, the Council adopted eight presidential statements, one more than 2024 (seven) and two more than 2023 (six). Presidential statements, which require the support of all 15 Council members to be adopted, focused on the following issues in 2025: political developments in Lebanon, as well as the cessation of hostilities between Israel and Lebanon; counter-terrorism, especially in Africa; the 2025 review of the UN’s peacebuilding architecture; violence against civilians in Latakia and Tartus, Syria; conflict prevention and the peaceful settlement of disputes; violence against civilians in Suweida, Syria; the importance of the purposes and principles of the UN Charter; and the 30th anniversary of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH).
Notwithstanding the slight uptick in the number of presidential statements over the past two years, the eight adopted in 2025 are still very low in comparison with the average annual output of presidential statements in recent decades. For example, in the decade from 2011-2020, the Council adopted a total of 220 presidential statements (an average of 22 per year), and the six adopted in 2023 were the lowest number since the Council began using its current documentation for presidential statements in 1994.
Council members issued 34 press statements in 2025. Unlike resolutions and presidential statements, press statements are not formal documents of the Security Council. Nonetheless, they reflect the collective will of Council members, and like presidential statements, require unanimity to be adopted. The number of press statements has declined considerably in recent years. Last year there were 43, and in 2023 there were 34, the same as in 2025. However, in the decade from 2013-2022, the Council issued a total of 879 press statements, or an average of 87.9 per year.
The low number of outcomes (resolutions, presidential statements, and press statements) reflects the difficulty that the Council has had in reaching agreement. On some of the most violent conflicts, for example, the Council’s output has been limited, its voice largely muted by difficult dynamics. There was only one product on the war in Ukraine in 2025: resolution 2774 of 24 February, a short text imploring a swift end to the conflict between Ukraine and Russia. Similarly, only one formal outcome was adopted on the war in Gaza, resolution 2803 of 17 November, which endorsed the “Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict”, welcomed the establishment of a Board of Peace (BoP) as a “transitional administration with international legal personality”, and authorised the BoP to establish a temporary International Stabilization Force (ISF) in Gaza. Both these resolutions were adopted non-unanimously: all five of the Council’s European members (Denmark, France, Greece, Slovenia, and the UK) abstained on resolution 2774, while China and Russia abstained on resolution 2803. While it is notable that Council members agreed to six press statements on Sudan in 2025, the Council has not been able to adopt a formal outcome in response to the dire security and humanitarian situation in Darfur and other parts of the country in 2025. The only formal outcome on Sudan in 2025 was the renewal of the Panel of Experts of the 1591 Sanctions Committee. Similarly, efforts to pursue a resolution or presidential statement for several months in 2025 on the civil war in Myanmar were stymied, largely due to resistance from China and Russia; Council members were only able to muster one press statement in response to this conflict during the year.
Besides the two vetoes on the war in Gaza, two other vetoes were cast in 2025: both on amendments on draft resolutions on the war in Ukraine. This is a decrease from the eight vetoes on seven draft resolutions in 2024, which were the highest number of vetoes and vetoed draft resolutions in any year since 1986.
The 2025 vetoes reveal interesting trends in Council dynamics. The US vetoed the two draft resolutions on Gaza, which is not surprising, but both were penned by all ten elected members (E10) of the Security Council. This reflects the growing sense of identity among the E10 members, who, in recent years, have demonstrated the ability to collaborate to try to break impasses on difficult issues. In this regard, their collective effort to pen draft resolutions on Gaza in June and September, while unsuccessful, was the continuation of a working method developed in 2024, when the E10 collectively drafted resolution 2728, which demanded an immediate ceasefire in Gaza for the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. Notwithstanding the US vetoes, both draft resolutions had the support of the other 14 members of the Council.
In February, Russia vetoed two amendments on US-authored resolution 2774, which implored a swift end to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The European members (Denmark, France, Greece, Slovenia, and the UK), collectively known as the E5, were disappointed that the text omitted any reference to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. One of the vetoed amendments, which was proposed by the E5, reaffirmed the Council’s commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders. The second, also proposed by the E5, urged a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in Ukraine in line with the UN Charter and the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity of states. The US also introduced its draft resolution in the General Assembly, where it was adopted earlier that day with amendments that were not in the Council’s resolution, including a reference to Russia’s “full-scale invasion” of Ukraine and “the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders, extending to its territorial waters”.
The Role of the US
A new US administration brought significant changes in US policy to the Security Council. On some thematic files, the US now shares positions closer to China and Russia than its traditional P5 allies, France and the UK. The US has opposed the Council’s work on climate change, peace and security and certain aspects of the women, peace and security (WPS) agenda—seeking (often successfully) to remove references to “climate change” and “gender” in negotiations on Council outcomes. In many cases, it has also successfully advocated for caveating references to international humanitarian law with the qualifier “as applicable” in outcomes.
The US played a decisive role in some of the key decisions the Council made in 2025. It co-penned resolution 2793 on Haiti with Panama. Adopted on 30 September, this resolution authorised UN member states to transition the Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission in Haiti into a “Gang Suppression Force” (GSF) for an initial period of 12 months and requested that the Secretary-General establish a UN Support Office in Haiti (UNSOH). In addition, on 17 November, the Council adopted the US-authored resolution 2803, which endorsed the Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict, welcomed the establishment of a Board of Peace (BoP), and authorised the BoP to establish a temporary International Stabilization Force (ISF) in Gaza.
These resolutions were not without controversy, however. Resolution 2793 was adopted with three abstentions (China, Pakistan, and Russia), while there were two abstentions (China and Russia) on resolution 2803. These members expressed significant misgivings about both resolutions; some other members who supported them nonetheless had concerns, including about how they would be implemented. With regard to Haiti, Council members noted the support of countries in the region for resolution 2793. However, some raised questions about the composition of the Gang Suppression Force (GSF), its financing, its rules of engagement, and its concept of operations—while emphasising the importance of its strict adherence to international law. With regard to Gaza, some Council members welcomed the US’s “20-point plan” and noted the support of the Palestinian Authority and Arab countries for resolution 2803 in their explanations of vote on this resolution. However, concerns were expressed by a number of members about issues such as the composition of the ISF in Gaza, its terms of reference, and what they perceived as insufficient attention accorded to the Palestinian role in the future of Gaza.
Whither Peace Operations?
The UN’s liquidity crisis has resulted in significant austerity measures that have affected much of the UN’s work in 2025, including the peacekeeping operations that the Council mandates and oversees. A major factor contributing to the resource-constrained environment for peacekeeping is the significant arrears in assessed contributions. Notable in this regard are the significant arrears of three permanent members: the US, China, and Russia, who are assessed to contribute 26.1584 percent, 23.7851 percent, and 2.4898 percent of the UN peacekeeping budget, respectively. As at 15 November, the US owed $2.370 billion, China $697 million, and Russia $193 million. Contingency measures are starting to be carried out, including a 15 percent cut in expenditures for peacekeeping operations and the repatriation of 25 percent of uniformed personnel that Secretary-General António Guterres announced in a 10 October letter to UN staff.
The US, in particular, exercised significant influence on the mandates of UN peace operations in 2025. It often pushed for shorter-term extensions of missions than had previously been the norm, as with the UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) and the UN Mission to Support the Hodeidah Agreement (UMMHA) in July. At times, it requested reporting on the potential transition of peace operations. This was the case, for example, in the negotiations on the mandate renewals of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) in November. In one instance, the US advocated for the outright closure of a mission, the UN Interim Force for Lebanon (UNIFIL), whose mandate was extended for a final time until 31 December 2026 through the adoption of resolution 2790 on 28 August 2025. In the case of the UN Verification Mission in Colombia, the US position led to a considerable reduction of the mission’s tasks. When the Council renewed the verification mission through resolution 2798 of 31 October 2025, it removed two of the mission’s tasks—verifying compliance with the restorative sentences handed by the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (SJP) and monitoring implementation of the 2016 peace agreement’s ethnic chapter—at the request of the US.
In 2025, in contrast to most Council members, the US was unwilling to co-finance the AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) through UN-assessed contributions as outlined in resolution 2719 of 21 December 2023, a position also held by the previous US administration.[2] This has generated concerns about the future financial viability of the mission, as reflected in the 15 December 2025 communiqué of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC).
A positive development in 2025 was the “Peacekeeping Trio Initiative” spearheaded by three elected members—Denmark, Pakistan, and the Republic of Korea (ROK)—who sought to highlight this issue as a key priority of their Security Council terms. The three countries organised a series of informal roundtables to facilitate discussions on various aspects of peacekeeping, most importantly the ongoing review of peace operations, which is being conducted by the UN Secretariat and is expected to be completed in the first quarter of 2026. Denmark, Pakistan, and the ROK also coordinated among themselves in organising formal meetings in the Council during their monthly presidencies in March, July, and September, respectively, to discuss issues around the future of peacekeeping at a time when peacekeeping is facing significant challenges.
Other Thematic Initiatives
Several other important thematic initiatives affected the Council’s work in 2025. On 22 July, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2788 on strengthening mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes. The resolution reaffirms the Council’s commitment to making frequent use of the UN Charter’s pacific settlement tools and requests the Secretary-General to report on its implementation by July 2026.
On 26 November, the Security Council and the General Assembly adopted substantively identical resolutions on the 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review (PBAR). The twin draft resolutions, unanimously adopted in the Security Council as resolution 2805, affirm that the latest PBAR aims to enhance the implementation and impact of UN peacebuilding activities at the field level. They also restate the UN’s long-standing commitment to conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and sustaining peace, emphasising that these efforts rely on the mutually reinforcing contributions of development, human rights, and peace and security initiatives.
Another notable thematic development in 2025 was the Security Council’s unanimous adoption of resolution 2807 on Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) on 12 December. The resolution, which was co-authored by Guyana and Sierra Leone, aims to promote engagement by member states, the Security Council, and other UN entities on the YPS agenda. Among other things, it decides to continue the consideration of the YPS agenda in the Council’s work, including through open debates to discuss the Secretary-General’s biennial reports on YPS submitted pursuant to resolution 2535 of 14 July 2020.
Council members supportive of the body’s work on women, peace and security and climate, peace and security continued to promote these issues, notwithstanding difficult political headwinds. In 2025, nine Council members—Denmark, France, Greece, Guyana, Panama, the ROK, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, and the UK—sought to give continuity to some aspect of the Shared Commitments on the WPS initiative, which was started in 2021 by Ireland, Kenya, and Mexico. In 2025, participants in this initiative held regular WPS-focused press stakeouts, which are designed to enhance the visibility of the Council’s discussions on WPS.[3]
In 2025, nine Council members (Denmark, France, Greece, Guyana, Panama, the ROK, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, and the UK) were climate, peace and security “pledgers”, striving to address the effects of climate change on international peace and security in the Council. The pledgers held seven stakeouts prior to formal Council meetings in 2025, delivering joint statements highlighting the relevance of climate change to the topic of the meeting.[4]
The Informal Expert Group of members of the Security Council on Climate, Peace and Security conducted a visiting mission to the Chadian part of the Lake Chad Basin from 7-12 December. During the visit, the delegation—consisting of Slovenia, Guyana, the ROK, Denmark, France, Greece, Sierra Leone, and the UK—met with relevant stakeholders to discuss localised impacts of climate change on peace and security across Chad and the broader region.
The Impact of the Delay in the Appointment of Subsidiary Body Chairs
In 2025, agreement on the appointment of the chairs of subsidiary bodies was not reached until 29 May—the longest period with no subsidiary body chairs and vice-chairs since this decision was first recorded in a presidential note in 1979. As a result of the delay, contingency measures had to be developed whereby Council presidents handled urgent responsibilities of subsidiary body chairs during their presidencies until chair appointments were finalised, unless another member objected. In rare instances, Council presidents were able to process requests for exemptions to measures imposed by sanctions regimes, brief the Council on the work of subsidiary bodies, and facilitate the publication of reports of experts assisting sanctions committees. (For more on the impact of the delay in appointing subsidiary body chairs, please see our May 2025 In Hindsight.)
Following the appointment of the chairs, the Council had to play catch-up at the subsidiary body level for the remainder of the year. This challenge was highlighted during the briefings of the outgoing chairs of subsidiary bodies on 17 December 2025. In this regard, Ambassador Amar Bendjama (Algeria), who chaired the 2745 Central African Republic (CAR) Sanctions Committee and the 1373 Counter-Terrorism Committee, observed that operating in a condensed timeframe created significant “operational consequences”, hindering strategic planning and engagement with member states and creating scheduling conflicts between subsidiary body meetings and Security Council activities. At the time of writing, agreement on the subsidiary body chairs for 2026 had yet to be finalised.
The Year Ahead
Several major crises will continue to confront the Council in 2026. There are more conflicts confronting the world now than at any point since the end of World War II. This raises significant questions regarding how a divided Council will be able to muster the political will needed to mitigate violence and support political solutions in Myanmar, South Sudan, Sudan, Yemen, and West Africa, among other items on its agenda. Unanticipated crises will surely arise as well, as they did, for example, with respect to India and Pakistan and Thailand and Cambodia in 2025.
In 2026, a host of complex challenges are likely to be linked to the implementation of resolutions 2793 and 2803 on Haiti and Gaza, respectively. An important issue to consider in the coming year is how robustly the Council will be able to exercise its oversight role with respect to the implementation of these resolutions. Reporting requirements to the Council are outlined in both texts, which could provide the Council with useful information to facilitate this oversight role.[5]
In 2026, the Security Council’s role on Ukraine will depend on whether a peace agreement is reached. If that happens, it is possible that the Council could have a role in monitoring its implementation. If there is no agreement, the Council is likely to continue to be hamstrung on this issue by the involvement of one of its permanent members (that is, Russia).
Council members are likely to maintain their unity in 2026 around the need to support the political transition in Syria, the site of a Council visiting mission in December. One issue that they will continue to watch closely is the threat of intercommunal violence in the country, which was a source of considerable concern to the Council in 2025.
Another pressing issue for the Council in 2026 will be its engagement with peace operations, considering the austerity crisis facing the UN and the US administration’s highly critical view of UN peace operations. The recommendations from the Secretariat’s review of UN peace operations, expected to be finalised early this year, may inform Council members’ deliberations on the future of peace operations.
One open question in 2026 is how the Council will engage on the “Non-Proliferation” file with respect to the implementation of resolution 2231 of 20 July 2015, which endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran’s nuclear programme. In September 2025, the “E3” parties to the JCPOA—France, Germany, and the UK—triggered the “snapback” mechanism to reimpose UN sanctions on Iran that the JCPOA and resolution 2231 had suspended. China and Russia have contested the E3’s legal and procedural standing to activate the mechanism and argued that all sanctions were permanently lifted on 18 October 2025, when the JCPOA and resolution 2231 were originally set to expire. Several Council members maintain that UN sanctions measures on Iran have been reactivated and that the Security Council’s 1737 Sanctions Committee and its supporting Panel of Experts (PoE) have been restored.
Council members are also expected to devote considerable time and effort in 2026 to engaging with candidates and conducting straw polls for a new Secretary-General, especially in the second half of the year. The Council’s recommendation to the General Assembly for the appointment of the next Secretary-General will be one of the most important decisions it makes in 2026.
As international peace and security difficulties mount, criticisms of the UN system, including the Security Council, abound, some justified, others less so. In this context, multilateral institutions need to work with member states to solve political, security, and economic crises that transcend borders and strike at the most vulnerable. It is precisely at these moments that the world needs a more effective Security Council. Security Council Report looks forward to continuing to report on the efforts of Council members striving to rise to the challenge of maintaining international peace and security in an increasingly troubled world.
[1] United Nations, “Highlights of Security Council Practice in 2023 – Voting,” (https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/highlights-2023-D10)
[2] Resolution 2719 determines that AU-led peace support operations authorised by the Council (such as AUSSOM) should have access to UN-assessed contributions up to 75 percent of their annual budgets.
[3] These were held in relation to formal Council meetings on Afghanistan (10 March), Haiti (21 April), South Sudan (16 April), Yemen (14 May), the DRC (27 June), West Africa (7 August), conflict-related sexual violence (19 August), Afghanistan (17 September), WPS (6 October) and South Sudan (11 November).
[4] Stake outs were held prior to meetings on Yemen (6 March), the Great Lakes region (16 April), the protection of civilians (22 May), Libya (24 June), South Sudan (18 August), UN peace operations (9 September) and West Africa and the Sahel (18 December).
[5] Resolution 2793 requests the UN Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of the resolution as part of his regular reports on Haiti. It also requests the GSF Special Representative, in coordination with the Haitian government and the UN, to develop a “strategy and metrics for measuring success of the mission and concrete timebound objectives, with benchmarks towards an end-state”, to be presented to the Council within nine months of the resolution’s adoption. Resolution 2803 specified that the BoP would operate in a manner consistent with relevant international legal principles and requested it to submit a written report to the Security Council every six months.
