Haiti
Expected Council Action
In January, the Security Council is expected to vote on a draft resolution renewing the mandate of the UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) prior to its expiration on 31 January. The Council is also expected to hold its 90-day briefing on the situation in Haiti. Special Representative and Head of BINUH Carlos Ruiz Massieu is expected to brief the Council on recent developments in the country and on the Secretary-General’s latest report on BINUH. Closed consultations are expected to follow the briefing.
Background and Key Recent Developments
After the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021, Haiti descended into a multidimensional crisis characterised by political deadlock, extreme violence, and dire humanitarian conditions. Armed gangs have overrun an estimated 90 percent of Port-au-Prince, the capital, employing tactics including murder, kidnapping, and sexual violence amid widespread impunity.
In recent months, the gangs have expanded their reach beyond the capital, including to parts of the Artibonite and Centre departments. Armed attacks in late November and early December 2025 resulted in several casualties and triggered large-scale displacement in the Lower Artibonite. The Secretary-General’s latest BINUH report, issued in October 2025, indicates that intentional homicides in the Artibonite and Centre departments increased by 210 percent, totalling 1,303 victims between January and August 2025, compared to 419 during the same period in 2024.
In December 2025, a significant rift emerged within the Viv Ansanm gang coalition over a dispute about the continued use of kidnappings. According to media reports, clashes among gang members broke out in Port-au-Prince on 9 December 2025 following accusations from the leader of Viv Ansanm that one of the members of the coalition had ignored his order to halt kidnappings. The clashes reportedly resulted in multiple fatalities, including children, and raised concerns about further violence.
According to BINUH, between 1 July and 30 September 2025, at least 1,247 people were killed, and 710 were injured in Haiti. Security force operations were responsible for 61 percent of those killed or injured. Gang attacks accounted for approximately 30 percent of casualties, while nine percent resulted from actions by self-defence groups targeting alleged gang affiliates. Kidnapping and sexual violence figures remained high during the same period.
The high rate of casualties among people not involved in gang activities during anti-gang operations remains a source of concern. The most recent BINUH report notes that 22 percent of casualties during such operations “were residents struck by stray bullets at home or during daily activities”. It adds that some security officers have “continued to summarily execute individuals suspected of gang links”.
Since March 2025, a Haitian National Police (HNP) task force has been operating drones targeted at gang members with the support of US private military contractors. The BINUH report provides casualty figures related to drone operations in the country. Between 1 March and 20 September 2025, drone operations resulted in the deaths of at least 547 people, of whom 527 were suspected gang members and 20 members of the population, including 11 children. According to a recent update by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk, “most of these drone strikes are likely unlawful under international human rights law”.
On 30 September 2025, the Security Council adopted resolution 2793, authorising UN member states to transition the Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission in Haiti into a “Gang Suppression Force” (GSF) for an initial period of 12 months. Like the MSS, the GSF is not a UN mission. At the same time, the resolution requests that the Secretary-General establish a UN Support Office in Haiti (UNSOH) to provide support to the GSF, among other entities. While the transition to the GSF is authorised “on the understanding that the cost of personnel will be borne by voluntary contributions”, UNSOH will be funded through peacekeeping assessed contributions.
The GSF’s mandate represents a clear shift from the MSS mission’s model. While the MSS mission focused on supporting and training the HNP, the GSF has been mandated to conduct “counter-gang operations to neutralize, isolate, and deter gangs” independently or in cooperation with the HNP and Haitian armed forces. It also authorised a personnel ceiling of 5,550, compared to the 2,500 envisaged (but never achieved) under the MSS mission’s concept of operations.
In August 2025, the formation of a Standing Group of Partners for the GSF—comprising the Bahamas, Canada, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Kenya, and the US—was announced. On 2 December 2025, the group appointed Jack Christofides, who has held several leadership roles in the UN, as GSF Special Representative.
At a 9 December 2025 force generation conference for the GSF held at the Permanent Mission of Canada to the UN in New York on behalf of the Standing Group of Partners, several countries announced personnel and funding commitments, including Chad and Bangladesh, which committed 1,500 personnel each. According to reporting by the Miami Herald, prior to the meeting, several countries expressed concern about “making commitments without a clear agreement on how the mission would operate, and on a US directive that focused mainly on ‘killing’ gang members, many of whom are youth”. Similar concerns arose among Council members during the negotiations on resolution 2793 regarding the forceful posture of the GSF and the fact that, according to UN estimates, 30 to 50 percent of gang members are children.
On the political front, the future of the transition remains uncertain, with a potential political vacuum following the expiration of the mandate of the Transitional Presidential Council (TPC) on 7 February. On 1 December 2025, the TPC approved an electoral decree establishing the rules for the general elections, with the first round of legislative and presidential polling expected in August according to a draft calendar submitted by the Provisional Electoral Council to the TPC in November 2025. Under a May 2024 Decree, the TPC’s mandate cannot be extended. In October 2025, the Haitian transitional authorities scrapped plans for a previously announced constitutional referendum.
The humanitarian situation remains dire, with children being particularly affected. According to a 10 December 2025 UNICEF update, approximately 1.4 million people are internally displaced in Haiti, including over 741,000 children. Some 5.7 million people face high levels of acute food insecurity, including 1.2 million children under 5 years of age. Among other concerns—such as the disruption of the health and education systems, and the resurgence of cholera—UNICEF notes that “[h]undreds of thousands of Haitians, including unaccompanied and separated children, are being returned from the Dominican Republic, often without documentation or support, and face risks of homelessness, hunger, violence, exploitation and de facto statelessness”.
On 26 November 2025, the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced the end of Temporary Protected Status for Haitians, effective on 3 February. The decision, which is estimated to affect around 340,000 people, was taken following the DHS determination that there are “no extraordinary and temporary conditions in Haiti that prevent Haitian nationals” from safely returning to the country.
Human Rights-Related Developments
On 2 October 2025, Türk updated the UN Human Rights Council on the situation in Haiti. He emphasised that the rising violence and violations of human rights in Haiti have pushed the country to the breaking point. More than 16,000 people have been killed in armed violence since 1 January 2022, when the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights began monitoring incidents of gang-related violence in the country. Türk urged accountability for human rights violations and abuses and stressed the need to address impunity and corruption as well as poverty and inequality. He also called for supporting programmes to protect survivors of sexual violence and support the reintegration of children formerly associated with gangs.
Türk noted the importance of ensuring that efforts to restore security are rooted in human rights. He urged the Haitian authorities to “investigate all allegations of unnecessary and disproportionate use of force, and ensure perpetrators, regardless of affiliation, are brought to justice”. Türk underscored the importance of “robust human rights safeguards” underpinning the activities of the GSF and called on all member states to implement the Security Council’s arms embargo on Haiti.
Women, Peace and Security
In a 3 November 2025 statement, the UN Working Group on discrimination against women and girls warned that the systematic exclusion of women from leadership and decision-making in Haiti and the high incidence of sexual violence are deepening insecurity and obstructing pathways to peace. They stressed that, despite commitments to gender equality, women remain sidelined from key political bodies and processes that determine their “safety, rights, and future”. Regarding resolution 2793, the statement said that, while the resolution acknowledges the impact of violence on women and girls, it “does not include concrete measures to ensure their leadership or to integrate gender perspectives across the security and governance agenda”. The Working Group called on the Haitian authorities and international partners to take immediate steps to uphold the rights of Haitian women and girls, including ensuring women’s participation across political, security, transitional justice and recovery efforts.
Key Issues and Options
The central task for the Security Council in January is to renew BINUH’s mandate. Protecting the mandate’s integrity in the current climate of violence and uncertainty and ensuring that the mission has the resources to carry out its mandated tasks is an important issue for the Council.
One option is to extend BINUH’s mandate for one year retaining its functions as established in resolution 2476, which in 2019 established the mission, and in successive mandate renewals, including supporting a Haitian-led and Haitian-owned political process, good governance, human rights, child protection, community violence reduction, gender equality, protection from sexual and gender-based violence, and HNP capacity and institutional development.
As new leadership and personnel for the GSF are expected in the coming months, an additional issue for the Security Council will be how to ensure it receives comprehensive and timely information on the GSF’s deployment, oversight arrangements, and operational conduct. Resolution 2793 requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the implementation of the resolution as part of his regular reporting on Haiti. The resolution also requested the GSF Special Representative, “in coordination with the government of Haiti and the UN, to keep the Security Council abreast of relevant developments and inform on the concept of operations, indicative financial needs to be funded by voluntary contributions, and a force generation plan”. Should Council members wish to complement this information, one option would be to invite Christofides at an appropriate time to brief the Council on such issues as mission composition, funding arrangements, and measures to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse and the excessive use of force.
Council Dynamics
Council members are united in their concern about Haiti’s multidimensional crisis and generally agree on the need to tackle escalating gang violence and its impact on the Haitian population. Views also converge on the continuing need for a sanctions regime and the importance of a Haitian-led political solution that addresses both security and socioeconomic challenges. At the same time, positions have differed among Council members on how to appropriately respond to the security situation in Haiti.
The US was the main architect of the transition from the MSS mission to the GSF. China and Russia broke silence during the negotiation of resolution 2793 and, together with Pakistan, abstained in the vote, citing concerns about issues such as rules of engagement, sources of funding, troop composition, oversight and accountability. While these concerns were shared by many other members, the “A3 Plus” grouping (Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Guyana) and European members of the Council opted for negotiating the inclusion of language on human rights, child protection, and Haitian sovereignty into the text in an attempt to mitigate these concerns.
Differences among Council members also emerged during the negotiations on the renewal of the 2653 Haiti sanctions regime in October 2025. While the co-penholders (US and Panama) initially proposed to add four names to the sanctions list, Russia opposed the listing of political figures, leading to the final version of the resolution only adding two names to the sanctions list. China and the A3 Plus sought to strengthen language on the arms embargo. While the co-penholders accommodated several of these requests, proposed references to record “the type, quantity, and serial number of weapons and ammunition seized” and “photographing all items and relevant markings and headstamps” were not included. (The majority of weapons trafficked into Haiti come from the US.)
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 30 September 2025S/RES/2793 | This resolution authorised UN member states to transition the Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission in Haiti into a “Gang Suppression Force” (GSF) for an initial period of 12 months. The text also requested that the Secretary-General establish a UN Support Office in Haiti (UNSOH). The resolution received 12 votes in favour and three abstentions (China, Pakistan, and Russia). |
| 25 June 2019S/RES/2476 | This resolution established BINUH, an SPM that will continue the UN presence in Haiti following the conclusion of MINUJUSTH. |
| Secretary-General’s Reports | |
| 14 October 2025S/2025/641 | This was the Secretary-General’s 90-day report on Haiti. |
