Yemen
Expected Council Action
In December, the Security Council is expected to hold its monthly briefing, followed by closed consultations on Yemen. UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg and an official from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) are expected to brief on political, security, and humanitarian developments in the country.
Background and Key Recent Developments
Yemen continues to suffer from pervasive insecurity, a deepening humanitarian crisis, and a stalled political settlement to the decade-long civil war. Intra-Yemeni tensions remain high between the Houthis—a Yemeni rebel group that has de facto control of the northwest of the country, including the capital Sana’a, which they seized in 2014—and the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC)—the internationally recognised government of Yemen.
Since the 8 October announcement of the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, the Houthis have not conducted any further attacks against Israel or vessels in the Red Sea, after almost two years of tit-for-tat attacks between the Houthis and Israel following the start of the Gaza war. The parties, however, have continued to use inflammatory rhetoric—in November, the Houthis reportedly published an undated letter to Hamas in which they threatened to continue further attacks should the ceasefire collapse. In a 2 November speech, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that the group is a “very great threat” that his administration will do “everything necessary to eliminate”.
Grundberg has continued his extensive diplomatic efforts to bring about the immediate release of UN personnel arbitrarily detained by the Houthis. As at 19 November, the UN has said that about 59 UN personnel remain detained by the Houthis. During meetings with regional stakeholders on 10 November in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), on 12 November in Saudi Arabia, and on 19 November in Oman, the Special Envoy raised the arbitrary detentions, emphasising that they undermine UN efforts to deliver aid to Houthi-controlled territory and to carry out mediation.
Discussions in the meetings with regional stakeholders also focused on UN efforts to advance dialogue for an inclusive political solution that can address regional concerns and secure lasting peace and stability in Yemen, including through “strengthen[ing] regional consensus” and “ensuring a unified international approach in support of the UN’s mediation efforts.” In Oman, Grundberg also met with the Houthis’ Chief Negotiator, Abdel Salam, and held discussions which focused on the “need for a conducive environment” to advance the political process.
On 5 November, the Chair of the 2140 Yemen Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Sangjin Kim (Republic of Korea), provided a briefing to the Council on the Committee’s work since 5 November 2024.
The latest report of the Panel of Experts (PoE) supporting the 2140 Yemen Sanctions Committee, dated 15 October and covering the period from 1 August 2024 to 31 July, said that the sanctions regime has been largely ineffective. The report noted that the Houthis use smuggling to generate finances and circumvent the arms embargo, which the PoE determined had been “totally ineffective” and had failed to impact the Houthis’ ability to procure weapons, military materiel, and dual-use items. The report further noted that cooperation between the Houthis and Al-Shabaab (the Somali militant group aligned with Al-Qaida) “has intensified”, including through smuggling, training, and exchange of support. The PoE recommended that the Council “expand the scope of the provisions of resolution 2216 to include inspections of cargo conducted in Government of Yemen-controlled areas and on the high seas”.
On 13 November, Council members held the monthly meeting on Yemen only in closed consultations, forgoing the customary open briefing. This was apparently so that they could receive updates on the ongoing detentions of UN personnel in a confidential setting. The briefers were Grundberg and Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Joyce Msuya. (For more information, see our 12 November What’s in Blue story.)
On 14 November, the Security Council adopted resolution 2801, renewing the 2140 Yemen sanctions regime—comprising targeted financial and travel ban measures—for another year, until 14 November 2026, and the mandate of the PoE until 15 December 2026. The resolution also requests the PoE to present two reports and advice to the Council by 15 April 2026: one on the flow of dual-use components and precursor chemicals to Yemen and another on improving information sharing and flag State capacity to prevent vessels suspected of violating the sanctions regime from entering Yemen. The resolution was adopted with 13 votes in favour and two abstentions (China and Russia). (For more information, see our 13 November What’s in Blue story.)
According to the 12 November Hunger Hotspots joint report —a periodical early warnings report published by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP)—Yemen is one of six countries classified as of “highest concern” where populations are facing imminent risk of catastrophic hunger conditions over the period of November 2025 and May 2026. It says that acute food insecurity in Yemen is driven primarily by conflict induced food insecurity, economic deterioration and climate shocks, and that 18 million people (52 percent of the population) are in crisis levels (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification [IPC] Phase three) or above, with more than 41,000 people projected to face catastrophic levels (IPC Phase five) in Houthi-controlled territory.
Human Rights-Related Developments
On 9 October, the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) adopted resolution 60/31 on technical assistance and capacity-building for Yemen in the field of human rights. Among other recommendations, the resolution expresses deep concern over the commission of serious international human rights law abuses and violations of international humanitarian law by all parties to the conflict and calls on them to renew the truce and immediately implement all of its provisions.
On 10 September, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights presented his annual report to the HRC on the technical and capacity-building assistance that the UN Human Rights Office has provided to the National Commission of Inquiry to investigate allegations of violations and abuses committed by all parties to the conflict in the country. Covering the period from September 2024 to August 2025, the High Commissioner’s report noted that the human rights landscape in Yemen had deteriorated amid escalating military confrontations in the region, which risked derailing the progress made on peace talks since the 2022 ceasefire. Among other matters, the report concludes with the High Commissioner urging all parties to the conflict to cooperate fully with the National Commission of Inquiry and calling on the Yemeni government to consider strengthening the entity’s mandate to ensure that it can effectively fulfil its role as an independent, transparent mechanism.
Key Issues and Options
A key issue for the Council is how to help mitigate the risk of an escalation of hostilities in Yemen and the Red Sea while advancing efforts to relaunch the stalled intra-Yemeni political process amid broader regional tensions. A serious concern is that regional tensions in the Middle East, including the Israeli-Houthi cycle of violence, are drawing attention away from finding a peaceful resolution to the Yemeni civil war. Given that, following efforts to achieve a ceasefire in Gaza, the Houthis seem to have ceased their strikes on Israel and in the Red Sea, Council members may take the opportunity provided by the de-escalation to concentrate on mobilising pressure for a resumption of Yemeni peace talks and advancing an inclusive political process.
One option for the Council would be to request a briefing specifically on the regional spillover of the Yemen conflict, to better evaluate how the apparent reduction in regional escalations has impacted the situation in Yemen and what can be done to mitigate a resumption of hostilities, while also discussing ways to accelerate diplomatic efforts aimed at renewing the political process in the country. Grundberg or Mohamed Khaled Khiari, the Assistant Secretary-General for the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific, could brief. The briefing could be held in an informal closed setting, to allow space for more sensitive discussions.
A related option for the Council would be to adopt a presidential statement encouraging the Yemeni parties to revive concrete discussions towards establishing a political roadmap under UN auspices; commitments to this end were made by the parties in December 2023, but discussions fell through following the Houthis’ escalatory reaction to the Gaza war. Council members could stress the need for the UN roadmap to include regional security guarantees—including regarding the Red Sea—to reflect the changed reality since 2023. Given the degradation of socioeconomic conditions in Yemen, members could also call for enhanced economic and humanitarian support for the country. Members could also include a strong condemnation of the Houthis’ arbitrary detention of UN and aid personnel, and demand their immediate, unconditional release.
The conflict’s harmful effects on children in Yemen are another matter of concern. The PoE’s most recent report describes the Houthis’ “systematic” child recruitment practices as part of a “long-term plan” aimed at producing “a generation of loyal fighters who are uneducated and indoctrinated and with no viable alternatives”. It adds that independent official sources documented 214 cases of recruitment during the reporting period, of whom 140 were killed and 74 remain deployed.
An option for the Council would be to invite to its next Yemen meeting a briefer who can discuss ways to address violations committed against children, such as Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict Vanessa Frazier or UNICEF Executive Director Catherine Russell. This session could be held in closed consultations to allow for a frank exchange. The 2140 Yemen Sanctions Committee could also invite Frazier to brief the Committee. The last briefing of the 2140 Yemen Sanctions Committee by a Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict took place in June 2022.
Council Dynamics
Despite being critical of the Houthis, most Council members have maintained their support for an inclusive intra-Yemeni political process and continue to call for advancing mediation efforts between the conflict parties, including a resumption of dialogue and a peace process under UN auspices. There is also general agreement on the need to restore freedom of navigation and security in the Red Sea. At least three of the Council’s elected members—Denmark, Greece, and Panama—have suffered Houthi attacks on their commercial vessels.
Recent negotiations on the sanctions regime renewal, however, have highlighted long-standing differences among the five permanent Council members regarding the Houthis.
France, the UK, and the US have all argued that the Council needs to respond to the worsening situation in Yemen through increased pressure on the Houthis, whom they believe are obstructing a political process in Yemen. All three preferred a more ambitious renewal of the sanctions regime, which would have prohibited the flow of dual-use items to the Houthis, authorised member states to carry out maritime interdictions on vessels suspected of carrying sanctioned items to the group, and asked the panel to investigate increased coordination between the Houthis and Al-Shabaab and other regional terrorist groups.
The US has adopted a particularly hawkish position on the Houthis, unilaterally sanctioning the group and accusing Iran of supporting it. In its explanation of vote following the adoption of resolution 2801, the US lamented that the sanctions renewal did not include provisions to mandate an asset freeze on the Houthis—a request it had apparently made during the negotiations.
Conversely, in their explanation of vote following their abstentions, China and Russia expressed concerns that the resolution facilitates the potential for expanding the Yemen sanctions regime and establishing maritime interdictions in the future, arguing that this would escalate tensions and push the parties further away from a political settlement. During the negotiations, China and Russia had apparently requested a straightforward renewal of the sanctions regime.
China and Russia have also criticised foreign military action in Yemen, claiming that such actions further degrade the situation. In this regard, Israel, the UK, and the US have all conducted strikes targeting Houthi infrastructure since the beginning of the Red Sea crisis.
The UK is the penholder on Yemen. Greece and the US are the co-penholders on the Red Sea crisis.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 14 November 2025S/RES/2801 | This resolution renewed the 2140 Yemen sanctions regime—comprising targeted financial and travel ban measures—for another year, until 14 November 2026, and the mandate of the Panel of Experts supporting the 2140 Yemen Sanctions Committee until 15 December 2026. The resolution also requests the Panel of Experts to present two reports and advice to the Council by 15 April 2026: one on the flow of dual-use components and precursor chemicals to Yemen and another on improving information sharing and flag State capacity to prevent vessels suspected of violating the sanctions regime from entering Yemen. |
| 15 July 2025S/RES/2787 | This resolution extends the Secretary-General’s monthly reporting requirement on Houthi attacks on merchant and commercial vessels in the Red Sea until 15 January 2026. |
| 14 July 2025S/RES/2786 | This resolution renewed the mandate of UNMHA until 28 January 2026 and requested the Secretary-General to present to the Council, before 28 November 2025, a further review of UNMHA with a view to delivering further efficiencies and structural coherence and coordination across UN missions in Yemen. |
| 26 February 2014S/RES/2140 | This resolution expressed the Council’s strong support for the next steps of the political transition and established sanctions against those threatening the peace, security or stability of Yemen. |
| Security Council Press Statements | |
| 12 September 2025SC/16166 | This was a press statement condemning the detention of at least 21 UN personnel, forced entry into UN premises, and seizure of UN property by the Houthis, while demanding the immediate and unconditional release of all those detained. |
| 5 June 2025SC/16079 | This was a press statement marking one year since the June 2024 wave of arbitrary detentions of UN and NGO personnel by the Houthis. |
