West Africa and the Sahel
Expected Council Action
In December, the Security Council will hold an open briefing, followed by closed consultations, on West Africa and the Sahel. The Special Representative and Head of the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), Leonardo Santos Simão, is expected to brief. A civil society representative may also brief.
Key Recent Developments
The security situation of several countries in West Africa and the Sahel region continues to deteriorate significantly as terrorist groups continue to expand their influence and secure a greater stronghold across the region. In recent months, there has been a marked increase in attacks by armed groups and terrorists in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, which formed the collective defence arrangement, Alliance of Sahel States (AES) in 2023. UN reports from the region observe that entire communities have been emptied in Burkina Faso, northern Mali, and western Niger as violence between armed groups, intercommunal clashes and military activity spreads.
In Mali, Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), an Al-Qaida affiliate, has attacked more than 100 fuel tankers and abducted fuel truck drivers near the capital, Bamako, and other parts of the country. The group’s months-long siege has disrupted access to essential supplies and exacerbated the country’s acute humanitarian conditions. Some analysts have warned that the blockade is an indication of JNIM’s growing hold over Mali and a step towards the group’s efforts to force the government into a defensive position. However, Malian officials, such as Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop, insist that the situation is under control and have dismissed the notion that jihadists could soon take over the capital.
Such developments have sparked alarm from several international interlocutors—including the AU, as well as France, the UK, and the US, who have urged their citizens to leave the country immediately. Expressing deep concern over Mali’s rapidly deteriorating security situation, AU Commission Chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf has stressed the need for a robust, coordinated international response to counter terrorism and violent extremism in the Sahel.
On 18 November, Sierra Leone, serving as Security Council president for November and current ECOWAS Chair, convened an open briefing under the agenda item “Peace Consolidation in West Africa” on enhancing regional counter-terrorism cooperation in West Africa and the Sahel. (For more information, see our 17 November What’s in Blue story.)
Meanwhile, in early November, fighting reportedly broke out between Boko Haram and rival militants from the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) in the village of Dogon Chiku, which lies on the shores of Lake Chad, an area located at the junction of Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. The development was the latest in hostilities between the groups as more non-state armed actors stake a claim for dominance in the Lake Chad Basin. At least 200 terrorists were reportedly killed in the clashes, with most of the deceased believed to be ISWAP members. In December, members of the Informal Expert Group of members of the Security Council on Climate, Peace and Security (IEG) intend to conduct an informal field mission to Chad to assess localised impacts of climate change on peace and security in the region.
Several countries in West Africa are undergoing political transitions and preparing for key elections in 2025. Côte d’Ivoire held presidential elections on 25 October, with President Alassane Ouattara securing a fourth term. In the lead-up to the elections, sporadic protests erupted in different parts of the country after Ouattara announced his bid for another term, and opposition candidates, former President Laurent Gbagbo and ex-CEO of Credit Suisse Tidjane Thiam, were barred from running. The country’s National Security Council dispatched 44,000 personnel from its Defence and Security Forces to deter public demonstrations in the lead-up to the election. Groups of young people attempting to assemble peacefully were also reportedly dispersed with tear gas, with 255 protesters arrested.
Guinea-Bissau’s presidential and legislative elections were held on 23 November, with incumbent President Umaro Sissoco Embaló running for re-election despite earlier vows to step down. Embaló has been at odds with the political opposition regarding his legitimacy as president due to disputes over the timing of the end of his current five-year term. Opposition groups assert that his electoral mandate officially expired in February, while the country’s Supreme Court of Justice ruled it concluded in September. Embaló has nonetheless continued to remain in office.
At the time of writing, the official results had not been announced, but Embaló and Fernando Dias da Costa, his main contender, had both reportedly declared victory. However, on 26 November, a day before the planned announcement of the election’s result, Guinea-Bissau military officers claimed that they had seized “total control” of the country. Referring to themselves as the “High Military Command for the Restoration of Order”, the officers reportedly read out a statement on television, declaring that they had ordered the immediate suspension of the electoral process “until further notice”, the activities of media outlets, as well as the closure of all borders. Shortly before the announcement, there were reports of heavy gunfire near the Guinea-Bissau presidential palace, the Election Commission headquarters and the Ministry of Interior, where men in military uniform were reportedly seen taking over the main road leading to the building.
Since gaining independence in 1974, Guinea-Bissau has been beset by political turmoil and has experienced several coup d’états as well as multiple coup attempts. A previous coup attempt against Embaló also took place in December 2023, in addition to an alleged coup attempt in late October ahead of the November elections.
On 3 November, Guinea’s military leader General Mamadi Doumbouya submitted his candidacy for the 28 December presidential elections, breaking an earlier promise not to run for office and to hand power to a civilian government. Two of Guinea’s largest opposition parties, the Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea (UFDG) and the Rally of the Guinean People (RPG Arc en Ciel), have reportedly been suspended from participating in political activities, raising concerns over the election’s credibility.
The worsening security and political situations have exacerbated an already dire humanitarian crisis in West Africa and the Sahel region. The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) has stressed that humanitarian access and funding have reached a breaking point, noting that its 2025 appeal for $409.7 million to cover needs in the Sahel has only been 32 percent funded, which has prompted significant cuts in critical services related to education and health care, among other areas.
Key Issues and Options
The expanding threat of terrorism across West Africa and the Sahel region is a key concern among Council members, as the region remains a hotspot for extremist groups. The escalation of attacks by armed and terrorist organisations, coupled with their deployment of advanced weaponry, demonstrates the growing sophistication of these groups and the limited effectiveness of existing security arrangements in the region.
Compounding the terrorist threat is the deepening nexus between terrorism and organised crime in the Sahel. Terrorist activities are becoming increasingly intersected with transnational crimes as criminal networks are financing terrorist groups through money laundering, drug economies, arms and human trafficking, and the illicit trade of natural resources. These dynamics have exacerbated the precariousness of the environment, raising serious alarm about potential spillover into previously unaffected regions. In this respect, one option for members would be to consider inviting Ghada Fathi Waly, the Executive Director of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, to brief the Council.
The latest political developments in Guinea-Bissau are an issue of concern for Council members to watch. The indefinite suspension of electoral processes could risk greater political turmoil in the country, exacerbating the country’s instability and potentially inducing an institutional crisis. Before the December briefing and consultations, Council members may wish to closely monitor the political situation and initiate informal discussions on how to handle the changed scenario.
Supporting regional counter-terrorism efforts effectively in the context of constrained financial resources remains another key issue for Council members. Regional mechanisms—such as the Accra Initiative, ECOWAS through the ECOWAS Standby Force, and the Multinational Joint Task Force in the Lake Chad Basin—grapple with formidable challenges, including political instability, fragmented security coordination, and persistent funding challenges. Additionally, the AES countries’ withdrawal from ECOWAS has strained their relations with other West African countries. Given the rising terrorist threat, the Council could encourage greater dialogue among the Sahelian countries in order to discuss possible counter-terrorism cooperation.
An option would be for Council members to hold an informal interactive dialogue with the AU, ECOWAS, and regional member states to discuss the outcome of the assessment by the Independent High-level Panel on Security, Governance and Development in the Sahel (that is, the Issoufou Panel). The Panel was jointly launched by the UN, the African Union, ECOWAS, and the Group of Five for the Sahel Joint Force (FC-G5S) in September 2022 under the leadership of the former president of Niger, Mahamadou Issoufou, to undertake a strategic assessment of “the underlying challenges in the Sahel, including the surge in violent extremism, growing fragility of the economies of the region due to the impact of climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as complex political transitions”. The Panel’s report was discussed at the 8th UN-AU annual conference in October 2024, but Council members have yet to be briefed about the report. The IID would allow the interlocutors to discuss strategies for harmonising approaches to address the growing threat of terrorism in West Africa and the Sahel.
Regional member states and Special Representative Simão have expressed support for leveraging resolution 2719, which authorises the use of UN-assessed contributions to finance AU-led peace support operations on a case-by-case basis, to support a peace operation in West Africa and the Sahel. However, key questions remain regarding the practical implementation of the resolution, given that AES countries currently remain outside existing regional security cooperation frameworks. Moreover, attempts to operationalise the resolution in Somalia as a potential case faced considerable setbacks this year, which seems to have dampened discussions on resolution 2719’s implementation.
An underlying key issue is the structural conflict drivers in the Sahel, such as poor governance, underdevelopment, severe humanitarian conditions, and climate change, which remain key challenges in promoting regional security and sustainable economic development. One option for Council members would be to strengthen collaboration with the Peacebuilding Commission to support locally-led initiatives that promote good governance and enhance regional and cross-border cooperation, including within the framework of the UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel.
Council and Wider Dynamics
There is broad concern in the Council about the threat of terrorism and the dire security and humanitarian crises affecting West Africa and the Sahel. Sierra Leone and several other Council members have emphasised the need for the Council to pay close attention to the region, including by exploring avenues to support regional efforts to counter terrorism and violent extremism.
At the same time, differences persist among Council members regarding the broader security context, their strategies for engaging with the region, and their respective interests. The US and European members have expressed concern over Russia’s growing influence and its engagement with military juntas. The withdrawal of Western military assistance has also created a security vacuum in the region, inducing several Sahelian countries to pursue alternative partnerships, most notably with Russia.
Russia, in contrast, has maintained that the current security challenges are rooted in Western interference in the region and has called for collective international support for the AES countries. Moscow has also expanded its footprint in the region through bilateral defence agreements and the deployment of personnel from the Africa Corps, which is the successor to the Wagner Group and reportedly operates under the direct oversight of the Russian Ministry of Defence. However, Russian forces deployed in the region have increasingly come under attack, demonstrating the precariousness of the operating environment.
The current US administration under President Donald Trump seems to be re-engaging with the military governments in the sub-region after a period of strained relations, seeking to re-establish security cooperation and maintain its strategic presence in the Sahel. Analysts have suggested that this reset in US relations with these countries is partly driven by strategic interests in accessing critical minerals and expanding economic engagement. Meanwhile, in late October, the US redesignated Nigeria as a “Country of Particular Concern”, based on claims that Christians in the country are being persecuted. Trump has reportedly threatened military action in Nigeria if the country fails to crack down on the killings and protect Christian communities.
France’s relations with Mali have deteriorated further. Both sides have suspended counter-terrorism cooperation and declared certain embassy staff persona non grata in their respective capitals. Tensions escalated after Malian authorities arrested French national Yann Vezilier on espionage charges. France rejected the allegations, noting that Vezilier is a member of its embassy in Bamako. Additionally, Mali’s media regulator, the High Authority for Communication, had suspended French broadcasters LCI and TF1 until further notice, reportedly claiming that both television services had broadcast “unverified information and falsehoods” concerning the JNIM-imposed fuel blockade in the country.
Denmark and Sierra Leone are co-penholders on UNOWAS.
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| 21 July 2025S/2025/482 | This document transmitted the 36th report of the 1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team. |
