UNOCA (Central Africa)
Expected Council Action
In December, the Security Council will hold a briefing and consultations on the Secretary-General’s semi-annual report on the UN Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) and the implementation of the UN’s regional strategy to combat the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). Special Representative and Head of UNOCA Abdou Abarry is expected to brief. The mandate of UNOCA expires on 31 August 2027.
Key Recent Developments
On 7 June, an ordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) was held in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, with the theme of “consolidating the achievements of the ECCAS reform to accelerate regional integration and the construction of a community of destiny in Central Africa”. The summit also addressed the worsening security situation in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and expressed support for ongoing mediation efforts to address that situation.
During the summit, the presidency of Equatorial Guinea was extended for another year instead of having Rwanda take over the rotating ECCAS presidency, reportedly due to objections from Burundi and the DRC. This prompted Rwanda to announce its withdrawal from ECCAS, arguing that its rights as guaranteed by the organisation’s constitutive act were violated. On 7 September, ECCAS held an extraordinary summit in Malabo and appointed Ezéchiel Nibigira of Burundi as the new President of the ECCAS Commission.
On 12 October, Cameroon held its presidential election and President Paul Biya, who at 92 is Africa’s oldest leader, was declared the winner for an eighth term. In power since 1982, Biya is set to extend his rule until 2032. There were protests in Douala, the economic capital, against the results, which the opposition claimed were rigged. Several people were reportedly killed in post-election violence. In a 28 October statement, the African Union (AU) Chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf noted the final results of the presidential elections and congratulated Biya on his re-election, while expressing grave concerns about the reported violence, repression, and arrests of protesters and political actors in connection with the election results.
On 10 June, the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) received an update on the activities of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and reviewed the implementation of the Regional Strategy for Stabilisation, Recovery, and Resilience (RS-SRR) of the Boko Haram-affected areas of the Lake Chad Basin. MNJTF is a regional security coalition comprising forces from Cameroon, Chad, and Nigeria, mandated to combat Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) in the Lake Chad Basin. The RS-SRR was developed by the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) in 2018 to address the threat of terrorism, displacement, and underdevelopment in the region. The AUPSC endorsed the regional strategy and requested the AU Commission to continue to support the activities of MNJTF and LCBC.
The AUPSC reiterated their deep concern about the impact of Niger’s decision to withdraw from MNJTF. The country announced its decision in March. Its withdrawal has raised concerns about the weakening of the region’s counter-terrorism framework and the potential creation of a security vacuum that could be exploited by terrorist groups. The AUPSC encouraged the remaining members of the MNJTF to maintain their unity in the fight against Boko Haram and sustain the gains achieved thus far.
Despite recent operational successes by the MNJTF, Boko Haram and ISWAP continue to pose serious threats to peace and security in the Lake Chad Basin. Reports indicate that Boko Haram has intensified its attacks in Nigeria and Cameroon. In August, Nigeria announced that it had killed at least 35 armed fighters in airstrikes near the country’s border with Cameroon. Following an October 2024 attack that claimed the lives of 40 Chadian soldiers, President Mahamat Idriss Déby had reportedly threatened to withdraw from MNJTF, accusing the force of failing to eliminate the security threats posed by terrorist groups. Analysts attribute the resurgence of Boko Haram to Niger’s withdrawal from MNJTF and Chad’s declining support for the task force.
In early November, US President Donald Trump sparked controversy after he said he could deploy the US military in the country to combat Islamist militant groups, accusing the Nigerian government of failing to “protect Christians”. While Nigeria reportedly welcomed US assistance, it emphasised that any support must respect its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The AU Commission also issued a statement urging the US “to engage Nigeria through diplomatic dialogue, intelligence-sharing, and capacity-building partnerships, while respecting Nigerian sovereignty rather than resorting to unilateral threats of military intervention, which could undermine continental peace, regional stability, and AU norms for peaceful conflict management”.
Key Issues and Options
The political and security situations in several parts of Central Africa continue to be key concerns for the Council. In December, Council members are likely to be interested in hearing Abarry’s assessment of country-specific situations in the region. The recent election in Cameroon and the upcoming election in the Central African Republic (CAR) in December may be of particular interest to Council members. A possible option is for the new President of the ECCAS Commission to brief the Council in December.
The continued threat of terrorism in the Lake Chad Basin remains a matter of serious concern. This concern has been heightened by the fact that Boko Haram and ISWAP have begun employing drones and have become increasingly adept at using social media to spread extremist ideology and recruit youth. In this context, Council members may be keen to hear more about the impact of Niger’s decision to withdraw from the joint force.
A related issue is how to address the root causes of the conflicts in the region. Council members continue to support the RS-SRR of the Boko Haram-affected areas of the Lake Chad Basin developed by the Lake Chad Basin Commission and welcome its endorsement by the AUPSC. The Council’s informal expert group (IEG) on climate and security will be visiting the Lake Chad Basin in early December. Although this is an informal group, the co-chairs of the IEG could choose to brief interested Council members in an informal format following their visit.
The Council could consider adopting a presidential statement raising alarm at terrorist activity in the region and expressing support for the MNJTF in combating this challenge. The statement could also call for expedited implementation of the RS-SRR and appeal for international support in this regard.
Resource constraints remain a major concern for all UN peace operations, including Special Political Missions such as UNOCA. On 9 June, Abarry informed Council members that the mission is considering setting up a trust fund to complement its regular budget to be able to respond effectively to the need for UN good offices in the Central Africa region.
Council Dynamics
Council members support a holistic regional approach to addressing the peace and security challenges in Central Africa, based on cooperation between UNOCA and various regional mechanisms. Several members tend to underscore challenges in the region related to political transitions; humanitarian crises, including the rising number of refugees and internally displaced persons; the threats posed by terrorism and violent extremism; and the adverse effects of climate change. However, some members remain opposed to Council engagement on climate change and peace and security in general, including in the Central African region.
In the Council’s 9 June meeting, the spillover effect of the conflict in Sudan on neighbouring countries in the Central African region was a major concern for several members. The escalating situation in eastern DRC was also another preoccupation, which prompted Council members to reiterate the need for the full implementation of resolution 2773 of 21 February to address the situation. That resolution, among other things, demanded the cessation of further military advances by the Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23) rebel group in eastern DRC and called for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire.
Council members recognise the important role played by the MNJTF in fighting Boko Haram and ISWAP in the Lake Chad Basin. In this month’s meeting, many of them will likely condemn the recent attack in the region and underscore the need to continue supporting the MNJTF in neutralising these groups.
Some Council members tend to focus on the situation in northwest and southwest regions of Cameroon. These members may continue to draw particular attention to the country’s political and security challenges in light of the post-electoral violence.
The UK is the penholder on UNOCA.
| Security Council Presidential Statement | |
| 1 November 2024S/PRST/2024/7 | This statement expressed the Council’s full support for UNOCA. |
| Secretary-General’s Report | |
| 30 May 2025S/2025/342 | This was the semi-annual report on UNOCA. |
| Security Council Meeting Record | |
| 9 June 2025S/PV.9931 | This was a meeting on the situation in Central Africa. |
