Syria
Expected Council Action
In December, the Security Council is expected to hold its monthly meeting on political and humanitarian developments in Syria. Deputy Special Envoy for Syria Najat Rochdi, a representative from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and a civil society representative, are expected to brief.
Background and Key Recent Developments
On 8 December, it will be one year since rebel groups—led by Syria’s now interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa—overthrew the government of then-president Bashar al-Assad. Since then, Sharaa and his interim government have focused efforts on: restructuring governance frameworks; consolidating the armed forces; advancing transitional justice and reconciliation efforts; rehabilitating Syria’s devastated economy; and reintegrating the country into the international community. Despite these efforts, the interim government is still facing many challenges in rebuilding a stable Syria, following over 13 years of civil war.
On 10 November, Sharaa—a former Al-Qaida-affiliated militant, whom the US government had once imprisoned and, until recently, listed as a terrorist—held a historic meeting with US President Donald Trump in Washington DC, marking the first visit of a Syrian head of state to the White House since the country gained independence from France in 1946.
The meeting reportedly included discussions on several topics. These included economic cooperation with Syria and the further easing of sanctions on the country; the fight against terrorist threats in the country; and efforts to ensure Syria’s security, unity, and territorial integrity. Following the meeting, Trump praised Sharaa and said that the US wants to “see Syria become a country that’s very successful”.
On the same day, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced the suspension, for another 180 days, of sanctions under the “Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act” of 2019, replacing an identical waiver which had been in place since 23 May. The US House of Representatives is currently deliberating on fully repealing the act, after the Senate voted in favour of this on 10 October.
Furthermore, the US has succeeded in convincing the Council to lift UN sanctions on Sharaa and Syrian Interior Minister Anas Hassan Khattab. On 6 November, the Council adopted resolution 2799, which removed both individuals from the 1267/1989/2253 Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions list. The resolution was authored by the US and was adopted with 14 votes in favour and one abstention (China). (For more information, see our 5 November What’s in Blue story.) The next day, Sharaa and Khattab were also removed from the US Specially Designated Global Terrorist List and the UK Sanctions List.
The US and Syria also appear to be increasing cooperation on security issues in Syria, including on counter-terrorism. Following the meeting between Sharaa and Trump, Syrian Information Minister Hamza al-Mustafa announced that the country had signed up to join the US-led Global Coalition against ISIL/Da’esh. He added that “[t]he agreement is political and until now contains no military components”. A 12 November US Central Command (CENTCOM) press release said that CENTCOM forces, in coordination with “partners in Syria”, conducted more than 22 operations against ISIL from 1 October to 6 November, resulting in five ISIL members killed and 19 captured, and said that it will continue to “aggressively pursue” the terrorist group’s “remnants in Syria”.
Syria’s accession to the Global Coalition also seems to have given impetus to discussions between the interim government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)—a Kurdish-led group which controls most of Syria’s de facto autonomous northeast territory and has been a key US partner in the fight against ISIL. In an 11 November post on X, the SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi praised the move and said that he held a phone call with US Special Envoy for Syria Thomas Barrack, in which he conveyed a commitment to “accelerate the integration of the SDF into the Syrian state”. This was a key element of the 10 March agreement between the two parties, which aimed to have the SDF integrated by the end of the year. Despite such rhetoric, clashes between the two sides have continued to take place, including reported deadly fighting in Raqqa and Deir Ezzor governorates, between 19 and 22 November.
Following the 18 July ceasefire in Suweida—a southern governorate in Syria, which saw deadly clashes between Druze militias and Bedouin tribes erupt on 13 July—tensions between Syrian interim forces and Druze militias have continued to simmer. On 13 November, violent clashes reportedly broke out between the two, leading to several injuries on both sides, illustrating the fragility of the US-brokered ceasefire. At a 16 July press conference, Syria’s National Committee investigating July’s violence in Suweida provided an update on its inquiry, and said that it has “requested the arrest of several army, security, and civilian personnel suspected of involvement in abuses”.
On 19 November, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited an outpost in Israeli-held territory in southern Syria. Netanyahu told troops that Israel’s presence there is of “immense importance” both for safeguarding the country’s security and the Druze population. That same day, at a Security Council meeting on Syria, Syrian Permanent Representative to the UN Ibrahim Olabi said that his government “strongly condemns this provocative tour” and called on the UN and the Council to take action to halt such violations by Israel. The UN Deputy Special Envoy for Syria, Najat Rochdi, condemned the visit and called for an end to Israeli violations of the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement. On 28 November, Israeli forces conducted a raid and airstrikes on the town of Beit Jinn in southern Syria, which reportedly killed at least 13 people, including two children, and wounded 25. (For more information, see the brief on UNDOF [Golan] in our December 2025 Monthly Forecast.)
On 14 November, the UN said that, despite major funding cuts, it continued to provide humanitarian aid in southern Syria, including Suweida. OCHA warned, however, that humanitarian assistance is reaching nearly 70 percent fewer people in southern governorates, due to “limited funding and access challenges”. The $3.2 billion Syria Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan for 2025 is only a quarter funded.
Human Rights-Related Developments
In a 7 November press briefing note, the Spokesperson for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Thameen Al-Keetan, expressed concern over ongoing reports of dozens of abductions and enforced disappearances, in addition to the more than 100,000 people who went missing under the former government. Al-Keetan stressed that the fate and whereabouts of those who have gone missing, both before and after the fall of the former government, must be urgently clarified.
In a 30 October press release, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (COI) warned that repeated massacres and human rights violations, including those allegedly committed by members of the interim government’s security forces, risk plunging the country back into conflict. The COI continued to receive reports of extra-judicial killings, torture, forced displacement, and other human rights abuses against Alawite civilians in Damascus and western governorates. It also cited multiple reports of women and girls being abducted by unknown armed actors, with some reportedly subjected to sexual violence and forced marriage. Underscoring the need for swift, concrete action in the country, the Commission called on the interim authorities and member states to urgently address the underlying causes of the recent violence and prevent the recurrence of violations. It likewise urged them to work to build trust between the state and impacted communities, including by holding those responsible accountable.
Key Issues and Options
A key issue for the Council is to ensure that Syria’s interim government pursues a credible, transparent, and inclusive political process, while navigating a fraught security context compounded by intercommunal tensions, terrorism, and external interference. Central to this issue are Damascus’s efforts in pursuing disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) efforts, and in fostering social cohesion and transitional justice, including accountability and reconciliation.
The UN’s future role in Syria is another key issue for the Council. Under instructions from the Secretary-General, the UN Secretariat has conducted an integrated strategic assessment of the changing situation in the country, which has been finalised in an internal report. Based on this report, the Secretary-General has considered what type of UN presence in Syria would be most suitable to meet the country’s current needs.
Council members could request an informal briefing on the results of the integrated strategic assessment. They could also consider convening an Informal Interactive Dialogue (IID) with the participation of Syria and relevant UN entities to discuss the most viable options for future Council engagement with Syria.
The Council is expected to undertake a visiting mission to Syria in December. Council members could use the mission to gain a better picture of the security and humanitarian situation in the country. They could hold discussions with Syrian officials on steps being taken by the interim government in the political transition, including in pursuing justice, reconciliation, and national unity efforts. It could also serve as an opportunity for members to engage with Syrian civil society and with UN representatives on the ground to gain insights on present challenges for Syrians and how the Security Council can assist them. Members could issue a presidential statement following their visit, conveying key messages to the interim government based on their findings from the visiting mission.
Council Dynamics
Council members are aligned on the need for the Syrian authorities to advance an inclusive, Syrian-owned and Syrian-led political process based on the key principles of resolution 2254. They broadly agree that the threat of intercommunal violence cannot be addressed without advancing inclusive accountability measures, DDR and security sector reform (SSR) efforts, together with a credible political process in the country. The US and Russia worked together on the 14 March presidential statement following violence perpetrated in Latakia and Tartous, while Denmark authored the 10 August presidential statement in response to violence in Suweida.
There is broad agreement among Council members that the new Syrian government requires international support to rebuild the country and its devastated economy, including through the easing of unilateral sanctions. Some Council members are taking steps to build relations with the authorities in Damascus and to facilitate a smooth transitional period. In addition to the 10 November meeting with Trump, Sharaa has been hosted by the presidents of France and Russia. On 13 November, during a visit to the UK, Syrian Foreign Minister Assad al-Shibani presided over a ceremony reopening the Syrian Embassy in London, more than a decade following its closure.
Under the Trump administration, the US has been engaged in efforts to stabilise the situation in the country. US mediation has played a key role in brokering the ceasefires with the Kurdish SDF in the northeast and the Druze in the south. It is also mediating discussions to establish a security pact between the Syrian interim government and Israel. In an 11 November interview with The Washington Post, Sharaa criticised Israel’s “expansionist ambitions” and reiterated Damascus’ position that it must withdraw to positions it held before 8 December, in line with the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement, underlining that Trump supports this position.
Israel’s presence and military activities in Syria remain a point of contention for Council members. Most members believe Israel’s actions are fostering instability in Syria and that it must comply with the 1974 Agreement. In contrast, the US has predominantly seen Israel’s actions as defensive in nature or tied to ensuring its national security.
Many Council members also agree on the need for the Syrian interim government to take decisive measures to address the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) and ISIL/Da’esh. China has been particularly vocal in calling on Damascus to take a stronger stance on FTFs in the country, some of whom have reportedly been integrated into the Syrian armed forces. Several FTFs constitute part of the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement, which China considers a terrorist organisation and is also listed under the 1267/1989/2253 ISIL/Da’esh and Al-Qaida sanctions regime. During negotiations on resolution 2799, China apparently pushed to include language calling on Syria to address the threat posed by FTFs, some of which was included by the US (the penholder). On 6 November, China ultimately abstained from voting on the resolution, and in its explanation of vote said that the draft had failed to “take into full account the counter-terrorism and security situation in Syria” and how the adjustments made would impact the situation.
| Security Council Resolution | |
| 18 December 2015S/RES/2254 | This was the first resolution focused exclusively on a political solution to the Syrian crisis. It was adopted unanimously. |
| Security Council Presidential Statements | |
| 10 August 2025S/PRST/2025/6 | This was a presidential statement condemning violence against civilians in Suweida in July 2025, calling for unhindered humanitarian access to the region, and calling on the Syrian interim authorities to ensure accountability. |
| 14 March 2025S/PRST/2025/4 | This was a presidential statement condemning sectarian violence perpetrated in Latakia and Tartous and calling for accountability and the protection of all Syrians, regardless of ethnicity or religion. |
