Somalia
Expected Council Action
In December, the Security Council is expected to reauthorise the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), whose mandate expires by the end of the month.
The Security Council is also expected to renew the 2713 Al-Shabaab sanctions regime, including the provision for maritime interdiction, which expires on 13 December. In addition, the Council will decide on the mandate of the Panel of Experts supporting the 2713 Al-Shabaab Sanctions Committee, which expires on 13 January 2026.
Key Recent Developments
Somalia’s domestic political landscape continues to be dominated by debates over the electoral model for the 2026 national elections, a persistent source of tension between the federal government and the federal member states. The federal government has been advocating for a “one person, one vote” system, while the member states hold divergent positions—some supporting the proposal and others opposing it. The Chairperson of the National Electoral and Boundaries Commission had recently announced that voting in the Banadir region—which includes Mogadishu and its surrounding districts—will proceed on 30 November under the “one person, one vote” model, with over one million people registered to participate. However, media reports indicate that these elections are now rescheduled for 25 December.
Opponents of the model have raised concerns about the country’s preparedness to conduct these elections and questioned the federal government’s capacity to implement them effectively. Puntland and Jubaland, both of which have suspended relations with Mogadishu, openly oppose the initiative and accuse President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud of attempting to centralise power. Other federal member states and opposition leaders favour retaining the traditional clan-based formula, which they argue ensures equitable power-sharing among major clans. Mahmoud visited Kismayo in October to ease tensions with Jubaland, but it seems that the visit did not yield anything concrete in thawing the tense relations.
A new political alliance known as the Somali Future Council—which includes the leaders of Puntland and Jubaland, as well as other opposition figures from the Somalia Salvation Forum, a coalition established in May that includes former President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, and former prime ministers Hassan Ali Khaire, Mohamed Hussein Roble, and Abdi Farah Shirdon—met in Nairobi in November and rejected the federal government’s plan for a one person, one vote elections in 2026 without first achieving the necessary national consensus. The Somali Future Council expressed its intention to convene a national conference in Somalia. Meanwhile, on 10 November, a new political party known as the Union of National Pride has named Shirdon as their candidate for the 2026 presidential elections. Fahad Yasin, an influential former national intelligence and security chief, was allegedly behind the formation of this party.
The political tensions in the country have also contributed to deterioration in security, with Al-Shabaab significantly expanding its control of territory in Central Somalia. However, the government appears to have succeeded in targeting senior leaders of the group in a series of recent operations. In a 9 November press release, the Somali National Armed Forces (SNAF) said they had killed senior Al-Shabaab leaders, including Mohamed Abdi Mohamed Nur (Goofoow), in military operations conducted in the Bay and Bakool region. Additionally, the US Africa Command stated that it had conducted an airstrike targeting Al-Shabaab on 26 October, in coordination with the Somali federal government. SNAF confirmed the information in a 27 October press release, indicating that the strike killed senior Al-Shabaab leader Mahmoud Abdi Hamud, known as Jaafar Gurey, in Bu’aale, Middle Juba region.
Puntland Security Forces, with support from the US, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and regional countries, have been conducting operations against an Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) offshoot that has established a foothold in the Bari region of Puntland. The forces have reported recent successes, including the capture and killing of ISIL members (including foreign terrorist fighters among them) during operations targeting the group’s hideouts. On 19 November, the US Africa Command announced that it had conducted a series of air strikes against ISIL-Somalia in coordination with the Somali federal government.
In a 3 July meeting, the African Union Peace and Security Council AUPSC) underscored the need to intensify efforts to secure funding for the AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) and instructed the AU Commission to engage the UN, as well as bilateral and multilateral partners, to convene a resource mobilisation conference. In line with this directive, a high-level meeting on AUSSOM financing was held in New York on 25 September on the sidelines of the General Debate of the 80th session of the UN General Assembly. However, the total amount pledged remains significantly below the $196 million required to cover troop allowances.
Sanctions-Related Developments
On 3 March, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2776, extending the 2713 Al-Shabaab sanctions regime until 13 December and renewing the mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the 2713 Al-Shabaab Sanctions Committee until 13 January 2026. The resolution, among other things, requested the Secretary-General to submit a technical assessment regarding the arms embargo targeting Al-Shabaab by 1 November. It also expresses the Security Council’s intention to make any necessary adjustments following receipt of the technical assessment. It seems that the report has already been circulated to Council members.
Pursuant to resolution 2776, the Panel of Experts was expected to submit its final report on 13 November. The report, which has already been circulated to members, apparently describes the significant threats posed by Al-Shabaab to the peace and security of Somalia and the region. It seems that the report expresses concerns about the group’s expanding influence in central and southern Somalia; its continued attacks against the government, including the assassination attempt against the president; its sophisticated extortion efforts to generate revenue to fund its operations; and its smuggling of weapons and military equipment. Additionally, it seems that the report provides details of the panel’s investigative work on ISIL-Somalia and the foreign terrorist fighters being recruited by the group.
Key Issues and Options
One of the key issues for Council members in December is reauthorising the AUSSOM mandate. Pursuant to resolution 2767, the UN, jointly with the AU and the FGS, was tasked to undertake regular joint technical assessments of progress made, including against the benchmarks outlined in the AU-UN joint report of 26 November 2024, to inform the Council’s decision on the authorisation of AUSSOM’s subsequent phases. This report was expected to be submitted by 30 September, but, in a 2 October letter, the Secretary-General noted that additional time would be required to finalise the report and requested an extension until 30 October, which was subsequently granted by the Council. The upcoming negotiations are expected to be informed by this report, which, at the time of writing, had not been published. A possible option is for Council members to meet informally for a briefing from the Secretariat on the key findings of the report. This would allow members to decide whether to reauthorise the mission for another year with no change or to make adjustments to the mandate based on the joint technical assessment and its recommendations.
A related issue is the lack of sustainable funding for AUSSOM financing, which could affect its ability to carry out its mandate. The mission’s personnel have been operating without allowances for more than a year. Ultimately, this could lead to personnel having to leave the mission. Early this year, an attempt to trigger resolution 2719 of 21 December 2023 on the financing of AU-led Peace Support Operations through UN-assessed contributions failed owing to strong opposition by the US. (For more, see our 10 May What’s in Blue story.) Following the 7th African Union-European Union Summit held in Luanda on 24-25 November, Council members could hold an Informal Interactive Dialogue with representatives from the AU and the EU to discuss the financial situation ahead of the reauthorisation of AUSSOM’s mandate.
The financial situation of the UN Support Office for Somalia (UNSOS) is another issue for Council members in December. UNSOS is mandated to provide logistical and other support to AUSSOM, but it is being forced to reduce its expenditures by 25 percent as part of the contingency measures being implemented by UN peacekeeping missions funded by the peacekeeping budget to address the UN’s liquidity crisis, resulting from member states’ failure to pay their assessed contributions in full and on time.
The extension of the 2713 Al-Shabaab sanctions regime and the mandate renewal of the Panel of Experts supporting the committee are other key issues in December. Members may draw on the findings of the report and recommendations contained in the panel’s final report, as well as the Secretary-General’s technical assessment. The most likely option for Council members is to renew the measures outlined in resolution 2713 with no change and extend the mandate of the Panel of Experts for another year.
Council and Wider Dynamics
The majority of Council members support addressing AUSSOM’s funding challenges. However, the US remains strongly opposed to considering the issue within the framework of resolution 2719. While some members may try to raise the financing issue during the negotiations in December, it may not get any traction, given the strong opposition by the US. The European Union is expected to announce funding for AUSSOM in early 2026.
The financing issue was a topic of discussion during the annual consultations between Council members and the AUPSC on 18 October, in which the latter strongly pushed for the need to find a solution to the funding challenges. The meeting concluded without adopting a joint communiqué because Council members and the AUPSC could not reach the necessary consensus, including on language related to financing.
In October, the UK—the penholder on Somalia—had apparently sought to develop a Council product or letter, given that the mandate of the UN Transition Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNTMIS) is set to expire at the end of October 2026. The mission is currently implementing a two-year phased transition of its functions to the UN Country Team (UNCT) in Somalia. However, it seems that Somalia was not supportive of the penholder’s proposal, which now appears to have been abandoned.
Council members support the Somali government’s priorities and recognise the many challenges the country faces, including the persistent insecurity caused by the terrorist activities of Al-Shabaab. They also support ongoing efforts to fight the group, including the implementation of sanctions to degrade Al-Shabaab. During the negotiations on resolution 2776, however, Somalia expressed its desire for the Security Council to seriously consider the utility and effectiveness of the sanctions regime. Its position was supported by the “A3 Plus” Grouping (Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Guyana) as well as China, Pakistan, and Russia. This issue is likely to be raised again in the upcoming negotiations on the extension of the sanctions regime.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 27 December 2024S/RES/2767 | This resolution endorsed the decision of the AU Peace and Security Council to replace the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) with the AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), beginning 1 January 2025. |
| 3 March 2025S/RES/2776 | This resolution extended the 2713 Al-Shabaab sanctions regime until 13 December and renewed the mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the 2713 Al-Shabaab Sanctions Committee until 13 January 2026. |
