Briefing by the Outgoing Chairs of the Security Council’s Subsidiary Bodies
Expected Council Action
As is customary in December, the outgoing chairs of the Council’s subsidiary bodies are expected to provide a briefing on their experiences. The representatives of the five members completing their two-year terms on the Council at the end of 2025 and the subsidiary bodies they each chaired are:
- Ambassador Amar Bendjama (Algeria): the 2745 Central African Republic (CAR) Sanctions Committee; the 1373 Counter-Terrorism Committee; and the 1566 Working Group on Counter-Terrorism.
- Ambassador Carolyn Rodrigues-Birkett (Guyana): the 2653 Haiti Sanctions Committee and the 2048 Guinea-Bissau Sanctions Committee.
- Ambassador Jihoon Cha (Republic of Korea [ROK]): the 2140 Yemen Sanctions Committee; the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee; and the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations.
- Ambassador Michael Imran Kanu (Sierra Leone): the 1533 Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) Sanctions Committee; the 2206 South Sudan Sanctions Committee; and the Informal Working Group on International Tribunals.
- Ambassador Samuel Žbogar (Slovenia): the 1518 Iraq Sanctions Committee and the 1636 Lebanon Sanctions Committee.
Background
The practice of briefings by the outgoing chairs of subsidiary bodies was established during the Colombian presidency of the Council in December 2002. It is considered an important aspect of promoting transparency in the work of the sanctions committees and working groups. Since not all subsidiary bodies produce an annual report, this December briefing has also served over the years as a means of creating a publicly accessible institutional memory of these bodies’ activities.
Key Recent Developments
At this briefing, the chairs will review developments within their committee or working group during their two-year term, assess their experience, suggest recommendations for improvements, and provide advice to their respective successors.
Briefing on the activities of the 2745 Sanctions Committee on armed groups operating in the Central African Republic (CAR), Ambassador Bendjama is likely to highlight the lifting of the arms embargo on the CAR government following the unanimous adoption of resolution 2745 on 30 July 2024, which extended and strengthened targeted sanctions measures against armed groups and associated individuals. He may also note that the Security Council adopted resolution 2789 on 29 July 2025, renewing those sanctions measures for another year.
As the outgoing chair of the 1373 Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), Bendjama is expected to mention the CTC’s adoption on 6 January of the “Nonbinding guiding principles on preventing, detecting and disrupting the use of new and emerging financial technologies for terrorist purposes”, also known as the “Algeria Guiding Principles”. This document was adopted in accordance with the “Delhi Declaration on countering the use of new and emerging technologies for terrorist purposes”, which was issued during a special session of the CTC held in India in October 2022. (Among other matters, the Delhi Declaration expressed an intention to develop, with support from the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate [CTED], a set of non-binding guiding principles to assist member states to counter the threat posed by the use of new and emerging technologies for terrorist purposes.) Additionally, Bendjama is likely to refer to meetings held by the CTC during his term, such as the 27 October briefing marking CTED’s 20th anniversary.
Bendjama was also the chair of the 1566 Working Group on Counter-Terrorism, which remained dormant in 2024 and 2025.
Ambassador Rodrigues-Birkett is expected to cover the activities of the 2653 Haiti Sanctions Committee during the past two years. Her briefing may include an overview of the Committee’s meetings, including briefings by the coordinator of the Panel of Experts (PoE), and by representatives of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). She could also highlight recent designations. In 2024, the 2653 Haiti Sanctions Committee added two individuals to its sanctions list. In 2025, the Committee designated two additional individuals through the unanimous adoption of resolution 2794, which renewed the sanctions regime. The Council also designated two entities this year: the Gran Grif and Viv Ansanm gangs.
Rodrigues-Birkett was also the chair of the 2048 Guinea-Bissau Sanctions Committee, which has been dormant in recent years.
As chair of the 2140 Yemen Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Cha may mention the adoption of resolution 2801 of 14 November, which renewed the Yemen sanctions regime and requested the PoE supporting the Committee to present two reports to the Council by 15 April 2026: one on the flow of dual-use components and precursor chemicals to Yemen, and one on improving information sharing and flag state capacity to prevent vessels suspected of violating the sanctions regime from entering Yemen. The resolution was adopted with 13 votes in favour and two abstentions (China and Russia). Cha may also detail presentations provided by the PoE supporting the Committee and note that the Committee additionally received two briefings by OCHA on 17 October 2024 and 31 October 2025, respectively. He may add that the Committee delisted two individuals on 30 July 2024, upon request from a member state.
Regarding the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee, Cha may note the Council’s unanimous adoption of resolution 2791 of 12 September, which extended and aligned the timeframes of the mandates of the sanctions regime and of the PoE assisting the Committee.
Speaking on the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations, Cha may elaborate on the efforts made last year to reactivate the Working Group by convening thematic discussions, including on transitions. He may also discuss the challenges that these efforts encountered this year, including difficulties in scheduling meetings due to the limited availability of timeslots resulting from the Council’s overloaded programme of work. He may express hope that the Working Group will, in the future, assume a more proactive role in regularly reviewing peacekeeping mandates and following up on the outcomes of the ongoing peace operations review, which the Secretary-General is expected to submit next year.
As chair of the 1533 DRC Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Kanu may refer to his visit to Angola, the DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda in December 2024, which he undertook as part of the Committee’s regular engagement with regional states to exchange views on the security situation in eastern DRC and to discuss implementation of the sanctions regime. He may also recall the adoption of resolution 2773 on 21 February, which expressed the Council’s readiness to consider additional measures against those contributing to the continuation of the conflict in eastern DRC.
In his capacity as chair of the 2206 South Sudan Sanctions Committee, Kanu may note the Council’s persistent divisions over this regime. Members’ diverging views were evident during the adoption of resolution 2781 of 30 May, which most recently renewed the sanctions measures. At that vote, six Council members—Algeria, China, Pakistan, Russia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia—abstained.
Regarding the Informal Working Group on International Tribunals, Kanu is likely to refer to the Working Group’s meetings with the president and prosecutor of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (IRMCT), which were held before their semi-annual briefings to the Council in June and December. Kanu is also expected to mention the adoption of resolution 2740 on 27 June 2024, which was drafted by Sierra Leone and extended Serge Brammertz’s term as IRMCT prosecutor until 30 June 2026.
Briefing on the activities of the 1518 Iraq Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Žbogar may refer to the Committee’s 18 August meeting with Dr. Ammar Ibrahim, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Iraq and Chairman of the Iraqi National Committee for Freezing Terrorist Assets. At that meeting, Ibrahim briefed on the work of the Iraqi National Committee and the challenges related to recovery of financial assets and delisting of individuals and entities from the 1518 Sanctions List. Žbogar may also note that the Committee amended one entry on its list on 5 August.
Žbogar is also chair of the 1636 Lebanon Sanctions Committee, which has remained dormant in recent years.
As a cross-cutting issue, the briefers are likely to note challenges arising from this year’s delay in the appointment of subsidiary body chairs. This impasse, which was the longest delay in appointing chairs in the Council’s history, was formally resolved on 29 May when Council members adopted a presidential note setting out the appointments for 2025.
Council Dynamics
The division among Council members over sanctions is particularly stark between the P3 (France, the UK, and the US) and others, on the one hand, and China, Russia, and African countries, on the other. The P3 often maintain that measures like arms embargoes and targeted sanctions, such as asset freezes and travel bans, are essential for mitigating violence and supporting the implementation of peace agreements. By contrast, China, Russia, and African members of the Council acknowledge sanctions as a useful tool but criticise cases where sanctions remain in place for years without adjustments to account for progress or allegedly serve to exacerbate tensions in volatile political contexts. Russia and others have also accused Western countries of downplaying the humanitarian and economic impacts of both Security Council sanctions and those imposed outside the UN context. This year’s non-unanimous votes extending the South Sudan and Yemen sanctions regimes illustrate these contrasting positions.
The Council’s discussions on sanctions have been particularly challenging when major powers have strategic interests at stake. This year, Council members have been sharply divided over the “snapback” of UN sanctions on Iran. China and Russia opposed the decision taken by the E3 (France, Germany, and the UK) and supported by the US to reactivate those sanctions prior to the October expiration of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran’s nuclear programme, which had suspended them. China and Russia contested the E3’s legal standing to invoke the snapback and portrayed the move as illegitimate, creating “two parallel realities” that have left the applicability of the Iran sanctions regime—including its compliance and reporting obligations—in dispute.
In recent years, the allocation of subsidiary bodies has also been contentious. In July 2016, Council members agreed on a presidential note concerning the preparation of newly elected members during the transitional period between the election and the beginning of their term, including the selection and preparation of chairs of subsidiary bodies. The note established a more consultative process for the chairs’ appointment, co-led by a permanent member and the chair of the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions (IWG), and stipulated that the appointments should be completed by 1 October.
This deadline has never been met, however. In some instances, the chairs were agreed to in early or mid-October, as happened following the elections in 2019 and 2022. Other times, such as in 2021 and 2023, prolonged negotiations over the allocation of chairs led to final decisions in January of the following years. For this year’s chairs, agreement was not reached until May—the longest period with no subsidiary body chairs and vice-chairs since this decision was first recorded in a presidential note in 1979. At the time of writing, consultations were ongoing on the allocation of chairs for the five incoming members in 2026: Bahrain, the DRC, Colombia, Latvia, and Liberia. (For more information on the dynamics surrounding the appointment of subsidiary body chairs, see the In Hindsight in our May 2025 Monthly Forecast.)
| Security Council Meeting Record | |
| 13 December 2024S/PV.9814 | This was the annual briefing of the outgoing chairs of the subsidiary bodies. |
