Afghanistan
Expected Council Action
In December, the Security Council will convene for its quarterly open briefing on Afghanistan. Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (Political) and Officer-in-Charge of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) Georgette Gagnon, a senior official from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and a representative of civil society are expected to brief. Closed consultations are scheduled to follow the open briefing.
UNAMA’s mandate expires on 17 March 2026.
Key Recent Developments
Tensions between Pakistan and the Taliban, which have been simmering since Therik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) announced the end of a ceasefire with Pakistan in November 2022, have led to clashes over the last month, a serious escalation that has the potential to destabilise the region. The crisis began in earnest on 10 October, when Taliban officials accused Pakistan of carrying out attacks in Kabul and Patika province in eastern Afghanistan the day prior. Although Pakistan has accused the Taliban of harbouring the TTP and failing to curb its activities on Afghan soil, it did not claim responsibility for the attacks, which followed a series of increasingly frequent clashes between the Pakistani military and militant groups near the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. When asked about the attacks during a 10 October press conference, Pakistani Army spokesperson Ahmad Sharif told reporters that “Afghanistan is being used as a base of operations against Pakistan, and there is proof and evidence of that”. The latest report of the Monitoring Team Assisting the 1267/1989/2253 ISIL/Da’esh and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, which was issued on 24 July, says that the TTP has “continued to receive substantial logisitical and operational support” from the Taliban.
Several days after the strikes inside Afghanistan, fighting between Taliban security forces and the Pakistani military erupted in various locations along the border between the two countries and, on 15 October, Pakistan reportedly conducted airstrikes in Kabul and Kandahar province. While each side provided differing casualty estimates, it appears that many combatants and civilians were killed or injured during the airstrikes and the skirmishes. In a 16 October statement, UNAMA announced that at least 17 civilians were killed and 346 injured in Spin Boldak in Kandahar province and said that it had documented at least 16 civilian casualties resulting from other clashes in Paktika, Patkya, Kunar, and Helmand provinces.
On 15 October, Pakistan and the Taliban announced that the two sides had agreed to a 48-hour ceasefire, which was later extended before being formalised on 19 October during negotiations in Doha mediated by Qatar and Türkiye. While the ceasefire has largely held, there have been sporadic violent incidents since it was first agreed, including a 17 October Pakistani airstrike in Patika province and an exchange of fire between the two sides near Spin Boldak on 6 November. There have also been several reports of clashes between the Pakistani military and militants in northwestern Pakistan, near the border with Afghanistan. On 25 November, the Taliban accused Pakistan of carrying out strikes in Khost, Kunar, and Patika provinces, and claimed that the attack in Khost province killed nine children and one woman. A spokesperson for Pakistan’s military subsequently denied the allegations. The alleged attacks came two days after suicide bombers struck the headquarters of Pakistani security forces in Peshawar, killing three people and wounding 11 others.
The negotiations mediated by Qatar and Türkiye seem to have ended without an agreement after several rounds of talks, although the ceasefire appears to remain in place. The main sticking point in the negotiations was Pakistan’s demand that the Taliban take decisive action to curb the activities of militant groups on Afghan territory, including the TTP. In remarks reported on 25 October, Pakistani Defence Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif raised the possibility of “open war” between the two sides if an agreement is not reached.
On 11 and 12 November, suicide bombers killed 15 people in two separate attacks in Pakistan, including an attack near a courthouse in Islamabad. On 13 November, Pakistani Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi told Pakistan’s parliament that the bombings were carried out by Afghan nationals and reiterated allegations that the Taliban is supporting militants that carry out attacks on Pakistani territory. On 12 November, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif offered to resume talks with the Taliban. In recent weeks, Iran has also offered to play a role in mediating the dispute between the two sides.
Against this backdrop, the Taliban has pursued closer ties with India. On 10 October, the same day that the Taliban accused Pakistan of carrying out attacks in Kabul and Patika province, India announced the reopening of its embassy in Kabul. The announcement came during Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi’s six-day visit to India, the first such trip since the Taliban seized power in August 2021. On 19 November, Taliban Minister of Commerce and Industry Alhaj Nooruddin Azizi arrived in New Delhi, where he met with Indian Minister of External Affairs Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, Union Minister of State Jitin Prasada, and Indian trade officials.
Meanwhile, Afghanistan continues to grapple with one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises. According to figures published by OCHA, 22.9 million Afghans, more than half of the country’s population, were expected to require humanitarian assistance in 2025. Efforts to provide humanitarian assistance have been complicated by the forced return of approximately 2 million Afghan nationals from Iran and Pakistan this year. In a recent update, OCHA noted that the flow of returnees has “placed immense pressure on humanitarian response systems” at both border crossing points and in areas of return. The 6.3 magnitude earthquake that struck northern Afghanistan on 3 November, which followed a series of devastating earthquakes that hit eastern Afghanistan in late August and early September, has placed additional strain on the humanitarian response.
It appears that Council members were negotiating a draft press statement authored by China, Pakistan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and the US on the earthquakes in eastern Afghanistan in late August and early September. During the negotiations, Russia apparently raised concerns regarding the penholdership dispute on the Afghanistan file and ultimately blocked the draft press statement. (For more information on this dispute, see our 15 March What’s in Blue story.)
The human rights situation in Afghanistan has also continued to deteriorate, particularly for women and girls. The Taliban has reportedly introduced several new restrictions on women and girls in recent months, including a prohibition on women entering hospitals in Herat if they are not wearing a burqa and a ban on books written by women in Afghan universities.
The two-day shutdown of internet and mobile phone service in Afghanistan that ended on 1 October and the subsequent restrictions on social media access have also had a significant impact on the human rights of Afghans. In a 10 October statement, a group of independent human rights experts appointed by the Human Rights Council noted that internet and telecommunications shutdowns “seriously impede” the rights to work, health and education and would “very likely” increase poverty, unemployment, and food insecurity. The statement also noted that women and girls are disproportionately affected by such shutdowns, particularly given many are “dependent on online platforms for learning, online work and business opportunities, and virtual social spaces”.
On 7 October, the seventh meeting of the Moscow Format of Consultations on Afghanistan, which was attended by officials from Belarus, China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and representatives of the Taliban, was held in Moscow. During the talks, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov reportedly said that Russia was looking forward to expanding business ties with Afghanistan and boosting anti-terrorism and anti-narcotics cooperation. On 23 September, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Ministerial Contact Group on Afghanistan held its first meeting on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly’s high-level week.
UNAMA, the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), and the participants in the Doha process are currently working on the roadmap for political engagement referred to in the report of the Afghanistan independent assessment requested by resolution 2679. Among other matters, the independent assessment outlined an “architecture for engagement” to guide political, humanitarian, and development activities in Afghanistan. (For background on the independent assessment and the Doha process, see our 27 November 2023, 8 December 2023, 28 December 2023, 25 February 2024, and 7 March 2025 What’s in Blue stories and our June 2024 and September 2024 Monthly Forecasts.) At the time of writing, UNAMA had apparently indicated that it would circulate a document concerning next steps shortly. Another meeting of the Doha process participants may be held after this document has been circulated.
The previous Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Roza Otunbayeva, finished her term in September. At the time of writing, discussions regarding her successor were still ongoing.
Human Rights-Related Developments
On 6 October, the Human Rights Council adopted a resolution on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan. Among other matters, the resolution decided to establish an independent investigative mechanism to collect and analyse evidence of international crimes and serious violations of international law in Afghanistan and prepare files for criminal proceedings.
In a 30 October press release, Richard Bennett, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, warned against normalising the Taliban. He stressed that the severity of the country’s human rights situation cannot be overstated, underscoring that Afghanistan is suffering the most extreme and systematic assault on gender equality of our time. He also highlighted the need for urgent, principled and sustained international attention and action aimed at dismantling the Taliban’s institutionalised system of gender persecution and addressing the country’s myriad human rights crises.
Following recent reports of public executions and other cruel punishments, Bennett also called on the Taliban to immediately halt all executions and establish a moratorium on the use of the death penalty. At least 11 people have been publicly executed since the Taliban seized control of Afghanistan in August 2021.
Sanctions Related Developments
It appears that the US has continued to block the majority of requests submitted to the 1988 Afghanistan Sanctions Committee for exemptions to the travel ban imposed by the 1988 Afghanistan sanctions regime. In correspondence sent to Committee members in August, the US indicated that it would scrutinise travel ban exemption requests more closely, on a case-by-case basis. The letter apparently also noted that the Taliban continues to use hostage diplomacy and accused the Taliban of failing to deliver on its counter-terrorism commitments. In response, it seems that some member states have resorted to notifying the Committee of travel by designated individuals rather than submitting exemption requests.
Women, Peace, and Security (WPS)
In an August update, UN Women described the women’s rights crisis in Afghanistan as “among the most extreme globally”. The update warned that four years of Taliban rule have seen restrictions on women and girls being tightened and codified. UN Women stressed that none of the restrictive edicts issued in the initial phase of the Taliban takeover has been repealed and that, while enforcement was inconsistent at first, a more “systematic enforcement model has taken hold”. This is compounded by a pattern of anticipatory compliance which has led families, NGOs and businesses to “pre-emptively restrict women’s freedoms” out of fear of punishment. The update reported that, in response to their exclusion from formal governance structures, some women have been able to informally engage with local and national representatives of the de-facto authorities. It stressed, however, that these interactions “are not indicative of institutional acceptance of women’s participation in public life” and remain circumscribed to a limited set of issues. The update also described how global reductions in foreign aid put the fragile entry points Afghan women have negotiated at risk, with many women-led organisations forced to close. Among other recommendations, UN Women called for women’s rights to remain central to the international community’s response. It also urged long-term flexible funding for Afghan women’s civil society organisations and thoughtful funding decisions to ensure that no action or funding inadvertently strengthens or normalises the discriminatory policies of the de-facto authorities.
On 31 October, Denmark and Sierra Leone, the co-chairs of the Informal Expert Group on WPS, together with the UK, the penholder on WPS, sent a letter to Secretary-General António Guterres regarding the independent assessment and the related Doha process. Among other matters, the letter urged that the rights of Afghan women and their full, equal, meaningful and safe participation be placed at the centre of the Doha process.
In a 25 November statement marking the International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women, UNAMA and UN Women urged the Taliban to end restrictions on women and girls and called on the international community to maintain all avenues for providing critical support. The statement also highlighted the impact of severe aid cuts, noting that they have forced the UN and its partners to close or reduce life-saving services.
Key Issues and Options
The clashes between Pakistan and the Taliban are an issue for the Council. Council members may wish to consider adopting a resolution that expresses concern regarding the recent escalation, urges both sides to refrain from further military action, and encourages them to return to dialogue with a view to resolving their dispute peacefully. Such a product could also demand that the Taliban adhere to its counter-terrorism commitments and call for the cessation of any support that is being provided to the TTP. Members could also choose to hold informal consultations to discuss the possibility of issuing such a product and to receive a briefing from UN officials regarding the dispute and its implications for the region.
The Taliban’s ongoing refusal to adhere to Afghanistan’s international obligations, especially those relating to women and girls, is a major issue for the Council, particularly because it directly contradicts the recommendations outlined in the independent assessment. Council members could ask for an informal meeting with representatives of DPPA and UNAMA to discuss options for responding to the Taliban’s actions and their implications for the independent assessment and the Doha process. Members could use this meeting to ask for an informal update on the roadmap for political engagement, next steps in the Doha process, and the activities of the working groups on counter-narcotics and the private sector that were established in mid-2024. They could also discuss possible options for revitalising the implementation of the independent assessment’s recommendations, which appears to have largely stalled in 2025.
The humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan is another significant issue. Following the briefing from OCHA during the open meeting in December, which is likely to highlight some of the issues faced by humanitarian actors in the country, members could hold an informal meeting to discuss possible steps the Council could take to help the UN manage these issues.
The Council could also consider undertaking a review of the 1988 Afghanistan sanctions regime. Apart from the humanitarian exception established by resolution 2615, the regime has not been updated since the Taliban seized power in August 2021. Such a review could analyse whether the regime is fit for purpose and whether it needs to be updated in light of current circumstances.
The threat of terrorism emanating from Afghanistan remains an issue. The latest report of the Monitoring Team assisting the 1267/1989/2253 ISIL/Da’esh and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee notes that ISIL-Khorasan, ISIL’s Afghan affiliate, represents the most serious threat regionally and internationally. Members could hold an informal meeting that specifically focuses on the terrorist threat, which would give them an opportunity to discuss possible Council action in this area.
Council Dynamics
Council members have generally been united in their desire to see a prosperous, peaceful Afghanistan ruled by an inclusive government, complying with its international obligations, and free from terrorism, but they are divided over how to achieve this goal. Some members, including the P3 (France, the UK, and the US) and other like-minded states, have previously argued that the Taliban must adhere to international norms in order to obtain international recognition and receive economic and development aid from the international community. Several of these members prefer maintaining pressure on the Taliban, particularly regarding its policies and practices that violate the rights of women and girls.
The US position appears to be changing, however. During the June open briefing, the US indicated that its Afghanistan policy is currently under review and said that its focus has narrowed, noting that protecting US citizens, mitigating the terrorist threat, and securing the release of US hostages are its top priorities. In the September open briefing, the US also appeared to signal a possible shift in its position on UNAMA, saying that the mission should refocus on its core tasks and be guided by clear performance benchmarks.
China and Russia, for their part, have contended that the international community should provide economic and development assistance to Afghanistan without linking it to other issues, such as the rights of women and girls, and favour engagement and dialogue without increased pressure. Both members have repeatedly called for the release of frozen assets belonging to Afghanistan’s central bank, the bulk of which were seized by the US after the Taliban seized power in August 2021, and have also pushed for the reinstatement of the standing exemption to the travel ban that expired in August 2022.
Pakistan has linked its dispute with the Taliban to its relationship with India by accusing India of supporting the Taliban and the TTP, a claim that India strenuously denies.
Earlier in 2025, a dispute regarding penholdership on the Afghanistan file emerged among members following the departure of Japan from the Council, which held the pen with the United Arab Emirates in 2023 and on its own in 2024. At the outset of this dispute, two pairs of Council members indicated that they were willing to work together as co-penholders: China and Pakistan on the one hand, and the ROK and the US on the other. (For more information, see our 15 March What’s in Blue story.) In late September, the US apparently indicated that it would withdraw its pursuit of the penholdership.
Pakistan is the chair of the 1988 Afghanistan Sanctions Committee.
| Security Council Resolution | |
| 17 March 2025S/RES/2777 | This resolution extended UNAMA’s mandate until 17 March 2026. |
