Yemen
Expected Council Action
In November, the Security Council is expected to renew the Yemen financial and travel ban sanctions measures, which expire on 15 November, and the mandate of the Yemen Panel of Experts (PoE), which expires on 15 December. (The targeted arms embargo on the Houthi rebel group established by resolution 2216 in April 2015 is open-ended.)
The Council will also hold its monthly meeting on Yemen and receive a briefing from the chair of the 2140 Yemen Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Sangjin Kim (Republic of Korea).
Background and Key Recent Developments
Yemen continues to suffer from pervasive insecurity, a deepening humanitarian crisis, and a stalled political settlement to the decade-long civil war. Intra-Yemeni tensions remain high between the Houthis—a Yemeni rebel group that has de facto control of the northwest of the country, including the capital Sana’a, which they seized in 2014—and the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC)—the internationally recognised government of Yemen.
Following the start of the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza in October 2023, the Houthis maintained a campaign of attacks using drones and ballistic missiles against Israel and against shipping in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, in what they said was a show of solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza. Israel retaliated with several airstrikes on Houthi assets and members. On 1 October, the Houthis claimed responsibility for the attack on the Dutch-flagged MV Minervagracht, which resulted in the killing of one crew member and the wounding of another. On 7 October—the second anniversary of Hamas’ attack on Israel, which started the Gaza war—the Houthis reportedly launched four drones at Israel, which were all successfully intercepted by the Israeli military.
Since the 8 October announcement of the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, the group has not conducted any further attacks against Israel or vessels in the Red Sea. During the previous Gaza ceasefire, which lasted from January until March, the Houthis held back from such attacks. Some analysts have postulated, however, that the tenuous nature of the Gaza ceasefire and any violations of the agreement could lead the Houthis to resume attacks in the region, given their support of Iran.
On 15 October, during a visit to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, the UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg told ambassadors from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the five permanent members of the Security Council (China, France, Russia, the UK, and the US), that the Gaza ceasefire presents an opportunity to “reinforce regional stability, renew momentum toward peace in Yemen and create conditions that support sustained de-escalation and advance an inclusive political process”, through a coordinated approach. Grundberg also raised the issue of the Houthis’ continued detention of UN, diplomatic and NGO personnel, calling for their immediate and unconditional release.
The Houthis have continued to arbitrarily detain UN personnel. On 6 October, the Office of the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General issued a statement condemning the detention of nine UN personnel. On 16 October, Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi accused UN staff and humanitarian agencies of spying for Israel and the US, an accusation which was categorically denied by the Secretary-General. On 18 October, the Houthis conducted a raid on a UN compound in Sana’a, detaining 20 staff and seizing UN assets. According to the UN, the staff were released on 20 October, after the Houthis vacated the compound. As at 30 October, the UN said that 59 UN personnel remain detained by the Houthis, a situation that, according to the Spokesperson, has prompted the UN to “reassess the way in which [it] work[s] in areas controlled by the Houthis”.
On 27 October, Grundberg and the newly appointed UN official tasked with leading the file on detainees Muin Shreim visited Muscat, Oman, to hold discussions with Omani officials and representatives of the Houthis on securing the release of UN detainees. They also discussed “ways to reach a negotiated political settlement to end the conflict in Yemen.”
The PLC is maintaining efforts to prevent shipments of weapons and military components to the Houthis, which they accuse Iran of supplying. On 23 October, a joint campaign led by PLC-aligned forces reportedly interdicted an Iranian vessel carrying a shipment of weapons, military and drone components bound for Houthi-controlled regions. The Houthis are also reportedly increasingly smuggling weapons through Sudan to avoid such interdictions targeting smuggling routes in the Gulf of Aden.
Key Issues and Options
A key issue for the Council is how to help mitigate the risk of an escalation of hostilities in Yemen and the Red Sea while advancing efforts to relaunch the stalled intra-Yemeni political process amid broader regional tensions. A serious concern is that regional tensions in the Middle East, including the Israeli-Houthi cycle of violence, are drawing attention away from finding a peaceful resolution to the Yemeni civil war. Following the Gaza ceasefire, Council members may choose to concentrate on mobilising pressure for a resumption of Yemeni peace talks and advancing an inclusive political process.
An option for the Council would be to issue a presidential statement encouraging the Yemeni parties to revive concrete discussions towards establishing a political roadmap under UN auspices—commitments to this end were made by the parties in December 2023, but discussions fell through following the Houthis’ escalatory reaction to the Gaza war. Council members could stress the need for the UN roadmap to include regional security guarantees—including regarding the Red Sea—to reflect the changed reality since 2023. Given the degradation of economic conditions in Yemen, members could also demand enhanced economic and humanitarian support for the country, such as assistance in implementing the agreement to reduce economic tensions between the Houthis and the Yemeni government on 23 July 2024.
A key priority for the Council in November is renewing the Yemen sanctions regime and the mandate of the Panel of Experts supporting the 2140 Yemen Sanctions Committee. One option would be to pursue a straightforward renewal. Another would be to consider whether adjustments are needed, including any based on recommendations contained in the PoE’s 2025 report to the Security Council, which was due on 15 October.
Another issue on the Council’s agenda is the upcoming expiration of the mandate of the UN Mission to support the Hodeidah Agreement’s (UNMHA). Resolution 2786, adopted on 14 July, decided to extend UNMHA’s mandate until 28 January 2026. It also requested the Secretary-General to present to the Council, before 28 November, a review of UNMHA aimed at improving “efficiencies and structural coherence and coordination across United Nations Missions in Yemen and bearing in mind challenges that have directly impeded UNMHA’s capacity to deliver on its mandate.” The review may guide Council members’ discussions on potential options regarding the future of the mission.
Council Dynamics
Despite being critical of the Houthis, most Council members have maintained their support for an inclusive intra-Yemeni political process and continue to call for advancing mediation efforts between the conflict parties towards a resumption of dialogue and a peace process under UN auspices. The US, however, has adopted a hawkish position on the Houthis, sanctioning the group and accusing it of continuing to threaten—with the support of Iran—regional stability, maritime security, and the welfare of the Yemeni people.
Members have divergent views on the reasons for the protracted political stalemate and insecurity in Yemen. The “A3 plus one” members (Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Guyana), China, Pakistan, and Russia have all stressed that the situation in Yemen and the Red Sea cannot be discussed in isolation from the war in Gaza. China and Russia have also criticised foreign military action in Yemen—claiming that such actions degrade the country’s already dire humanitarian situation, exacerbate the situation in the Red Sea, and negatively impact the political process. In this regard, Israel, the UK, and the US have all conducted strikes targeting Houthi infrastructure since the beginning of the Red Sea crisis.
The P3 members (France, the UK, and the US) have accused Iran of financially and militarily supporting the Houthis, fostering further regional tensions. The US has repeatedly called for the Security Council to respond to Iranian defiance of the Council-mandated arms embargo, and has underscored its support for Israel’s right to defend itself against the Houthis.
The divergent views among Council members on Yemen have obstructed, or made difficult, the Security Council’s attempts at producing Council products on this file, including on issues which are not contentious, such as the Houthis’ crackdown on UN personnel.
Nonetheless, there is broad agreement among Council members on the need to improve economic and humanitarian conditions in the country, and the need to restore freedom of navigation and security in the Red Sea. At least three of the Council’s elected members—Denmark, Greece, and Panama—have suffered Houthi attacks on their commercial vessels.
Several Council members have also called for the strengthening of the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM), which inspects ships travelling to Houthi-controlled ports to promote compliance with the arms embargo on the group.
The UK is the penholder on Yemen. Greece and the US are the co-penholders on the Red Sea crisis.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 15 July 2025S/RES/2787 | This resolution extends the Secretary-General’s monthly reporting requirement on Houthi attacks on merchant and commercial vessels in the Red Sea until 15 January 2026. |
| 14 July 2025S/RES/2786 | This resolution renewed the mandate of UNMHA until 28 January 2026 and requested the Secretary-General to present to the Council, before 28 November 2025, a further review of UNMHA with a view to delivering further efficiencies and structural coherence and coordination across UN missions in Yemen. |
| 13 November 2024S/RES/2758 | This resolution renewed the 2140 Yemen sanctions regime—comprising targeted financial and travel ban measures—for another year, until 15 November 2025. It also extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts (PoE) supporting the 2140 Yemen Sanctions Committee until 15 December 2025. |
| 26 February 2014S/RES/2140 | This resolution expressed the Council’s strong support for the next steps of the political transition and established sanctions against those threatening the peace, security or stability of Yemen. |
| Security Council Press Statements | |
| 12 September 2025SC/16166 | This was a press statement condemning the detention of at least 21 UN personnel, forced entry into UN premises, and seizure of UN property by the Houthis, while demanding the immediate and unconditional release of all those detained. |
| 5 June 2025SC/16079 | This was a press statement marking one year since the June 2024 wave of arbitrary detentions of UN and NGO personnel by the Houthis. |
| 13 February 2025SC/15995 | This was a press statement on Houthi Detention of United Nations, International Non-governmental Organization Workers. |
