Working Methods
Expected Council Action
In November, the Council will hold its annual open debate on working methods. Ambassador Christina Markus Lassen (Denmark) will brief as co-chair of the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions (IWG). Shamala Kandiah Thompson, Executive Director of Security Council Report, and Loraine Sievers, co-author of “The Procedure of the UN Security Council” (4th Edition), are also expected to brief. Ahead of the open debate, Denmark and Pakistan, the co-chairs of the IWG, are expected to circulate a concept note.
The open debate will be held under the agenda item “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2024/507)”, referring to the most recent version of the comprehensive compendium of Council working methods. Denmark and Pakistan do not plan on having a formal outcome but will produce an analytical summary of the proposals made at the open debate.
Key Recent Developments
The Council held its last open debate on working methods on 11 and 14 March 2024, during Japan’s Council presidency. Then-Chair of the IWG Ambassador Kazuyuki Yamazaki (Japan) and former Executive Director of Security Council Report Karin Landgren briefed. In addition to Council members, 38 member states delivered statements. Among the areas covered were working methods relating to conflict prevention, penholderships, the veto, the balance between public and private meetings, reform, civil society briefers, the full equal, and meaningful participation of women, interaction between the Council and regional organisations, the use of sanctions, and the work of the Council’s subsidiary bodies.
On 13 December 2024, a presidential note (S/2024/507) containing the latest compendium of measures and practices of the Council’s working methods, which is referred to as “Note 507”, was issued. Japan, which led on previous updates to Note 507 in 2010 and 2017, was responsible for leading negotiations. The updated Note 507 incorporates and further develops 15 presidential notes that were adopted since the last update in 2017. It includes new provisions on arrangements for penholders and co-penholders; the value of briefers under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure and the need to ensure their full, safe and meaningful participation; the principle of full access to Council documentation for all Council members and the procedure for requesting access; collaboration between the Council and the Peacebuilding Commission, and the inclusion of special reports on the use of the veto in the Council’s annual report to the General Assembly.
The IWG held four meetings during 2024, as well as eight informal meetings. The informal meetings focused on the update to Note 507 led by Japan. Apart from the update to Note 507, there were no new presidential notes on working methods issued in 2024. The IWG issued its third annual report on 31 December 2024, summarising its activities and presenting indicators that track the implementation of Note 507. The indicators, which cover data related to the efficiency, effectiveness, and transparency of the Council, provide an overview of how the Council is performing in relation to its working methods.
On 30 May, the Council adopted its annual report to the General Assembly. Russia, which was the President of the Council in July 2024, drafted the introduction to the report. (The introductory portion of the report, which presents a factual overview of the Council’s work, is prepared under the coordination of the Council’s July presidency of the previous year. The body of the annual report, which lists the outcomes under different agenda items discussed, is prepared by the Secretariat.) Prior to the adoption, Sierra Leone disassociated from the section of the report concerning Western Sahara, saying that it should be revised due to “factual inaccuracy”. (For more information, see here.)
This year, the work of the IWG has been held up as a result of the delay in appointing chairs of the Council’s subsidiary bodies. (For more information on the delay, see the In Hindsight in our May Monthly Forecast.) This impasse, which was the longest delay in appointing subsidiary body chairs in the Council’s history, was formally resolved on 29 May when Council members adopted a presidential note setting out the appointments for 2025. At that time, Denmark and Pakistan became co-chairs of the IWG. This is the first time that two members have been appointed as co-chairs since the IWG was established in 2006.
Since Denmark and Pakistan were appointed, the IWG has held three meetings in July, September, and October. It appears that the IWG’s standing agenda item, “Strengthening and advancing the implementation of the Note by the President of 13 December 2024”, which allows members to brief on the implementation of their working methods commitments during their presidencies and gives penholders the opportunity to brief on their experiences in drafting and negotiating, was discussed during these meetings. The IWG also discussed its current programme of work, which apparently focuses on the selection of subsidiary body chairs and the application of rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure, in addition to its usual activities.
Prior to the appointment of the co-chairs, China convened a meeting of the IWG in February in its capacity as President of the Council. This meeting apparently focused on the delay in appointing subsidiary body chairs and on penholdership. The focus on penholdership seems to be a consequence of a dispute among Council members regarding penholdership on the Afghanistan file. (For more information on this dispute, see our 15 March What’s in Blue story.)
Since the introduction of the “veto initiative” in April 2022, which calls for the General Assembly to meet within ten days whenever a veto is cast and for the Council to submit a special report on the use of the veto to the General Assembly on each occasion, 23 vetoes have been cast on 17 resolutions and 3 amendments. Each of these vetoes has been discussed by the General Assembly.
Regarding visiting missions, an important working method of the Council, only one formal visiting mission was conducted in 2024: to Colombia in February. In addition, Switzerland organised an informal visit of 14 Council members to Geneva in August 2024 to mark the 75th anniversary of the Geneva Conventions. The Council has conducted one formal visiting mission so far in 2025: to Addis Ababa for the annual UN Security Council-AU Peace and Security Council meeting in October. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Council regularly went on three to five visiting missions each year.
At the time of writing, Council members were negotiating the joint letter from the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Council regarding the appointment of the next Secretary-General, which was called for by General Assembly resolution 79/327. Although there are some areas that may be contentious, most members appear keen to issue the joint letter, which is expected to provide guidelines for the nomination of candidates and will mark the formal start of the selection process before the end of the year.
Key Issues and Options
The implementation of Note 507 remains an overarching issue. The IWG may wish to consider identifying particular aspects of Note 507 that are not implemented regularly and encourage members to include these issues in their working methods commitments during their presidencies.
The delay in appointing subsidiary body chairs was a major issue for the Council that significantly hampered its work. Council members could therefore consider options for avoiding a similar situation in the future.
One option is to cease treating the allocation of subsidiary bodies as a package deal in circumstances where the Council has been unable to reach agreement by January in a given year, which would allow those bodies that are not contentious to continue their work, including those with chairs continuing from the year before. Although this could lead to fewer options for achieving compromise and might create the impression that some files are more important than others, it seems preferable to the situation that prevailed this year, which saw the work of the Council’s subsidiary bodies largely grind to a halt.
Members could also consider allocating the chairs by adopting a resolution rather than issuing a presidential note when there is a delay in deciding on the appointments. However, it is unclear if such a resolution would be considered procedural and therefore not subject to the use of the veto. As such, this is likely to be a controversial option, but members may still wish to consider it in situations where there are long delays in appointing the chairs.
Another option is to have the penholders for country-specific issues, which are mostly permanent members, chair the subsidiary bodies of those files until an agreement is reached. Permanent members may resist this option, as they have been clear that they prefer elected members to chair subsidiary bodies. A more ambitious option might be to agree that the appointment of subsidiary body chairs should be left to the elected members without the need for sign-off from the permanent members, although this is likely to be strongly opposed by the P5.
Members may also wish to develop informal guidelines for the process of becoming a penholder or co-penholder, particularly following the dispute over the Afghanistan penholdership, which appears to have impeded the Council’s work on that file. At present, there is no common understanding of the process or criteria that govern which members can act as a penholder. Note 507 recognises that members with expertise in particular files, regional perspectives, experience in chairing relevant subsidiary bodies, and specific interests can add value as a penholder. It also notes that Council members agree to make enhanced use of the particular expertise and interests of Council members when determining who should serve as a penholder. A clearer process could help the implementation of this commitment.
A broader issue is that working methods have sometimes become politicised and served as an impediment to the smooth functioning of the Council, rather than improving its transparency and efficiency. Members often spend considerable time addressing working methods issues, such as which member states outside the Council should participate under rule 37, invitations to briefers under rule 39, and the timeframe for convening meetings. Informal guidelines on some of the more controversial issues may allow members to save time and focus on more substantive matters.
The use of the veto remains a major impediment to the Council’s ability to take effective action on some of the most urgent issues on its agenda. Members could therefore choose to discuss ways of promoting greater accountability for the use of the veto. One such initiative is the ‘Political Declaration on Suspension of Veto Powers in Cases of Mass Atrocity’, which was launched by France with the support of Mexico in August 2015. The initiative aims to have the permanent members voluntarily pledge not to use the veto in cases of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes on a large scale. As of 31 March, 107 member states had signed the declaration.
A long-standing issue is achieving an adequate balance between public and private meetings and between transparency and confidentiality. Since 2001, Council meetings have predominantly been held in public, including in 2024 when 285 public meetings were held compared to 20 private meetings and 124 closed consultations. Three-quarters into 2025, the number of formal meetings is lower than they were for the same period in 2024, while informal consultations are at about the same number. Consultations are most useful where there is a willingness to cooperate and have a free-flowing discussion, and, in this context, identifying issues that may benefit from such a discussion may be helpful.
With only two formal visiting missions since the beginning of 2024, Council members have mostly missed the opportunity to witness field settings first-hand and communicate with key stakeholders. Council members may wish to consider which situations would benefit from a visiting mission during the remainder of the year and in early 2026. Given current budgetary constraints, mini-missions that comprise a smaller group of Council members might be an option.
Council Dynamics
The deep divisions among Council members have significantly hampered the Council’s ability to manage many of the pressing crises on its agenda. In this context, working methods have sometimes been used by members as a means to further their political objectives.
The elected members, who have largely remained united on working methods and continue to have a strong interest in how they are utilised, have delivered a joint statement during the last seven working methods debates. In keeping with this practice, Pakistan, as the E10 coordinator in November, is expected to deliver an E10 joint statement at the open debate. Members of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group (ACT), a cross-regional group of 27 small and mid-sized states that aims to improve the work of the Council, are also expected to deliver a joint statement as they have in the past.
The need for a more equitable distribution of work and greater burden sharing, including regarding the chairing of subsidiary bodies and penholderships, has continued to be a common objective shared by elected members. The P3 appears to have accepted that it cannot maintain a quasi-monopoly over penholdership and has shown greater willingness to work with elected members as co-penholders. China and Russia have publicly supported expanding the penholder system, while rarely opting to be penholders themselves. The African members (A3) are also showing more interest in being penholders on African issues, which could lead to some tensions with current African penholders.
Several members see working methods as a way of reforming the Council from within without amending the UN Charter. In this context, these members may be interested in exploring options for using working methods to make the Council more effective.
| Notes by the President of the Security Council | |
| 13 December 2024S/2024/507 | This was a presidential note containing the latest compendium of the Security Council’s working methods. |
