West Africa and the Sahel
Expected Council Action
In November, the Security Council will hold an open briefing under the agenda item “Peace Consolidation in West Africa”. Julius Maada Bio, Sierra Leone’s President and Chairperson of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), is expected to chair the meeting, which is likely to focus on countering terrorism in the region.
Key Recent Developments
The West Africa and Sahel region remains a hotspot for extremist groups, which tend to exploit weak governance, intercommunal tensions, and economic hardships to expand their influence and destabilise local communities. There has been a sharp increase in the terrorist threat in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, which formed the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) in 2023, a collective defence arrangement. These countries, which are led by military juntas that came to power through coups d’état, concluded a year-long withdrawal process from ECOWAS on 29 January. At its 22 June summit in Abuja, ECOWAS endorsed the appointment of a Chief Negotiator to engage with AES members and called for urgent consultations for enhanced cooperation on counter-terrorism. The summit also raised concerns over delays in activating the ECOWAS Standby Force. Despite prior discussions on deploying a regional counter-terrorism force and mobilising resources, progress has been slow. On 15 September, at a meeting of ECOWAS Ministers of Finance and Defence in Abuja, Nigeria, the ECOWAS Commissioner of Political Affairs, Peace and Security, Abdel Fatau Musah, announced that 1,650 personnel would be deployed in 2026 as a Rapid Deployment Force.
The latest report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team assisting the 1267/1989/2253 ISIL/Da’esh Sanctions Committee noted an overall expansion of the operational area of Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), and a resurgence of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), particularly along the Niger-Nigeria border, where the group is seeking to consolidate its presence. ISGS’ continued existence has been facilitated by an implicit truce with JNIM, underpinned by their shared objective of targeting Sahelian security forces.
The report also highlighted that the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) remains active in the Lake Chad Basin, with its operational capacity growing as the number of its fighters increases. It further noted that Boko Haram factions operating in Nigeria have been unable to expand their activities beyond their established areas of control.
The report stated that JNIM has reached a new level of operational capability, enabling it to conduct complex attacks involving drones, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and large numbers of fighters against well-defended military installations. The group has adjusted its strategy towards greater political entrenchment, increasingly positioning itself as a governing actor by seeking to control territory, establish rudimentary governance structures, and cultivate local support. While the report highlighted JNIM’s operations in the AES countries, it noted that the group is poised to expand into northern Togo, Benin, and Nigeria’s Sokoto region, which have witnessed deadly attacks in recent years. (For more information, see the brief on West Africa and the Sahel in our April 2025 Monthly Forecast.)
Reports indicate that JNIM has increased operations in western and southern Mali over the past year, despite its traditional focus on the north and centre. This is being seen as a strategy to cut off the main transportation and economic supply lines to urban centres elsewhere in the country. In early September, the group declared a blockade on the towns of Kayes and Nioro in the south-west and banned fuel imports from Senegal, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, and Mauritania, which have contributed to fuel shortages, rising prices, and wider economic disruption. JNIM has intensified attacks on fuel tankers and foreign-run mining and industrial facilities, alongside kidnappings. Media reports indicate that local leaders in the Mopti region have established contact with JNIM to negotiate lifting of the blockade, under the auspices of the Malian intelligence services. (For more information, see the brief on West Africa and the Sahel in our August 2025 Monthly Forecast.)
On 15 July, Council members held an informal interactive dialogue (IID), with participation from AES countries, to exchange views on strengthening regional counter-terrorism responses in West Africa and the Sahel. On 7 August, the Council convened for an open briefing, followed by closed consultations, to discuss the latest developments in the sub-region and the activities of UNOWAS. (For more information, see our 14 July 2025 What’s in Blue story.)
On 30 September, the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) held a ministerial-level meeting on the situation in the Sahel. In a communiqué issued following the meeting, AUPSC members called for enhanced collective security approaches among stakeholders in the region, including intelligence sharing, joint operations, and strengthened border management, to effectively combat terrorism in West Africa and the Sahel. They decided to establish a “Task Force” to support Sahelian countries in countering terrorism and addressing broader security, socio-economic, and humanitarian challenges.
At the 10th informal joint seminar held on 16 October between members of the UN Security Council and the AUPSC, participants discussed AU–UN joint efforts to address terrorism and violent extremism in Africa. The following day (17 October), at the joint consultative meeting, members exchanged views on the situations in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin, including providing technical assistance to Gulf of Guinea countries in countering maritime security challenges.
Key Issues and Options
The expanding threat of terrorism in West Africa and the Sahel region, particularly in the AES countries, is a major concern for Council members. The uptick in attacks by militant groups, including through the use of drones and IEDs, underscores the limited effectiveness of current security arrangements in the region and the growing capabilities of militant groups. Meanwhile, the terrorist threat has continued to spread southward toward coastal states, raising alarm about potential spillover into previously unaffected regions.
A related security concern is the deepening nexus between terrorism and organised crime in the Sahel, with criminal networks financing terrorist groups through money laundering; arms, drug, and human trafficking; and the illicit trade in gold and other natural resources. Members could consider inviting the Executive Director of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Ghada Fathi Waly, to brief the Council in this regard.
Addressing underlying structural problems in the Sahel—such as weak governance, underdevelopment, climate change, and limited economic opportunities—remains a key challenge in promoting regional security and sustainable economic development. One option would be for the Council to strengthen its collaboration with the Peacebuilding Commission to support locally led initiatives that promote good governance and enhance regional and cross-border cooperation, including within the framework of the UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel.
Another key issue for the Council is how to support regional counter-terrorism efforts effectively in the context of constrained financial resources. Regional mechanisms grapple with formidable challenges, including political instability, fragmented security coordination, and persistent funding challenges. The AES countries’ withdrawal from ECOWAS has strained their relations with other West African countries. Given the rising terrorist threat, the Council could encourage greater dialogue among the Sahelian countries in order to discuss possible counter-terrorism cooperation.
Regional member states and Special Representative Simão have expressed support for the use of resolution 2719 of 21 December 2023 to enable a regional force to access UN-assessed contributions in line with the framework for financing AU-led peace support operations. However, key questions remain regarding the practical implementation of this resolution, given that AES countries currently remain outside existing regional security cooperation frameworks.
One option for the Council could be to request a briefing from the Secretary-General on how the UN and the international community at large can better support regional efforts to enhance security and governance in the Sahel, while drawing lessons from past shortcomings and adapting to current realities. In addition, members may choose to organise informal briefings with experts on the Sahel to discuss emerging trends in the region.
Members could also consider convening an informal interactive dialogue with regional member states, ECOWAS, and relevant interlocutors to continue deliberations on harmonising approaches and strategies to address the growing threat of terrorism.
Council and Wider Dynamics
There is broad concern in the Council about the growing terrorist threat, including its expansion into previously unaffected areas, the use of increasingly sophisticated weaponry by some groups, and the dire humanitarian situation in West Africa and the Sahel. Members have underscored the importance of a coordinated regional response strategy to combat terrorism and address its underlying drivers. Sierra Leone, along with several other members, has emphasised the need for the Council to pay close attention to the region, including by exploring ways to support regional efforts to counter terrorism and violent extremism.
However, differences among Council members persist regarding the broader security context, their strategies for engaging with the region, and their respective interests. The US and European members have voiced concern over Russia’s expanding influence and its engagement with military juntas, while Russia has argued that the current security challenges are rooted in Western interference in the region and has called for collective international support to the AES countries.
Moscow has expanded its footprint in the region through bilateral defence agreements and the deployment of personnel from the Africa Corps, a group that is the successor to the Wagner Group and reportedly operates under the direct oversight of the Russian Ministry of Defence. However, Russian forces deployed in the region have increasingly come under attack, underscoring the volatility of the operating environment.
The US seems to be re-engaging with the military governments in the sub-region after a period of strained relations, seeking to re-establish security cooperation and maintain its strategic presence in the Sahel. In July, the Principal Deputy Director for Counterterrorism at the US National Security Council, Rudy Atallah, visited Bamako, which was the first high-level US visit to Mali since 2022. Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs at the US State Department, William Stevens, has also visited the AES countries recently. A 15 September Washington Post article reported that the US has, in recent months, ramped up intelligence sharing with Mali’s government, which has been useful in repelling Islamist extremists. Analysts have suggested that this reset in US relations with these countries is partly driven by strategic interests in accessing critical minerals and expanding economic engagement.
Meanwhile, relations between France and Mali have further deteriorated. Both sides have suspended counter-terrorism cooperation and declared certain embassy staff persona non grata in their respective capitals. Tensions escalated after Malian authorities arrested French national Yann Vezilier on espionage charges; France has rejected the allegation, noting that Vezilier is a member of its embassy in Bamako.
| Security Council Meeting Records | |
| 7 August 2025S/PV.9974 | This was a meeting on “Peace Consolidation in West Africa”. |
| Sanctions Committee Document | |
| 21 July 2025S/2025/482 | This document transmitted the 36th report of the 1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team. |
