Lebanon
Expected Council Action
In November, Security Council members expect to receive a briefing in consultations on the Secretary-General’s report on the implementation of resolution 1701. Adopted in 2006, resolution 1701 called for a cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah. Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix and Special Coordinator for Lebanon Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert are the anticipated briefers.
Key Recent Developments
On 28 August, the Security Council adopted resolution 2790 extending the mandate of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for a final time until 31 December 2026 and directing the mission to begin an orderly drawdown and full withdrawal from that date, “and within one year”. The resolution requested the UN Secretary-General to explore, by 1 June 2026, “options for the future of the implementation of resolution 1701” following the withdrawal of UNIFIL, including regarding “assistance in respect of security and monitoring of the Blue Line and the ways to enhance the support” to the redeployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) south of the Litani River through the UN’s “tools”. It also urged the international community to intensify its support, “including equipment, material and finance” to the LAF in order to ensure their effective and sustainable deployment and enhance their capacities to implement resolution 1701. (For more information, see our 28 August What’s in Blue story on UNIFIL.)
The 26 November 2024 cessation-of-hostilities arrangement between Israel and Lebanon has continued to hold despite violations. Broadly based on the framework established by resolution 1701, the cessation-of-hostilities arrangement, which was brokered by the US and France, stated that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) would withdraw south of the Blue Line and, in parallel, the LAF would deploy to positions south of the Litani River. (The Blue Line is a withdrawal line set by the UN in 2000 to confirm Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon. While not an international border, the Blue Line acts in practice as a boundary between Lebanon and Israel in the absence of an agreed-upon border between the two states.)
The cessation-of-hostilities arrangement established that Israel would not carry out any offensive military operations against Lebanese targets in the territory of Lebanon and that the Lebanese government would prevent Hezbollah and all other armed groups from conducting operations against Israel. In addition, the LAF would dismantle unauthorised infrastructure and confiscate unauthorised arms, among other tasks. According to Israeli media reports, also cited by Lebanese news outlets, the US bilaterally provided additional guarantees to Israel with respect to the cessation-of-hostilities arrangement’s implementation, including recognising “Israel’s right to respond to Hezbollah threats”.
Since the arrangement, Israel has carried out near-daily airstrikes and shelling in Lebanese territory—particularly in southern Lebanon—saying that it is targeting members of Hezbollah and its facilities to prevent the group from rebuilding its capabilities. These include the 11 October airstrikes in southern Lebanon that killed one person and wounded seven. The most recent report of rocket launches from Lebanon towards Israel occurred in March.
On 30 October, the IDF carried out an armed incursion in the town of Blida in southern Lebanon, killing a person. In a statement issued on the same day, UNIFIL expressed deep concern at the incursion, stressing that it represented a “blatant violation” of resolution 1701 and Lebanon’s sovereignty. Following the incident, Lebanese President Michel Aoun instructed the LAF to “confront any Israeli incursion” in southern Lebanon.
In mid-February, Israel withdrew from most of southern Lebanon, but has since occupied five positions and two “buffer zones” in Lebanese territory near the Blue Line, with the IDF reportedly saying that it will remain there “until Israel is certain that Hezbollah will not return to the area south of the Litani River”.
UNIFIL has continued to observe IDF military activities in the mission’s area of operation and reported at least three incidents in which the IDF dropped grenades in proximity of peacekeepers during the month of October. One peacekeeper was lightly injured during one of these incidents. UNIFIL has also continued to detect unauthorised weapons and ammunition caches in its area of operations in southern Lebanon, a region where Hezbollah has historically maintained significant influence.
With the support of UNIFIL, the LAF has continued to redeploy throughout southern Lebanon. According to a 16 October statement issued by the US Central Command following a meeting of the mechanism established by the cessation-of-hostilities arrangement to monitor and support enforcement of the cessation of hostilities, the LAF had up to that point removed approximately 10,000 rockets, 400 missiles, and over 205,000 unexploded ordnance fragments. (The mechanism is a reformulated version of the tripartite mechanism, which consisted of representatives of UNIFIL, the IDF, and the LAF, and was chaired by UNIFIL. Under the terms of the cessation of hostilities, the revised mechanism also includes France and the US, which now chairs the mechanism.)
On 5 September, the Lebanese cabinet welcomed a plan formulated by the LAF that lays out phased stages for the state to achieve the monopoly of arms across the country, an indirect reference to the process of disarmament of non-state groups in Lebanon, including Hezbollah. Although the plan has not been made public, according to media reports, the LAF will initially continue to focus on the area south of the Litani River. It will then concentrate on the region between the Litani and the Awali River, followed by Beirut and its surrounding areas, the Bekaa region, and finally the entirety of Lebanese territory. The plan also reportedly notes the need for the LAF to be adequately resourced, the “cessation of Israeli aggressions”, and Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanese territory as essential conditions for the full deployment of the army throughout Lebanon.
While the cabinet welcomed the LAF’s plan, it gave no clear timetable for its implementation, except for the plan’s first phase which, according to 9 September remarks by Lebanese Minister of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants Youssef Rajji, is expected to be completed in three months. The timeline for the first phase of the plan was recently confirmed in a recent interview by Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, who stressed that Hezbollah must become “a normal political party without an armed wing”.
Five Shi’a ministers, including two from Hezbollah, walked out of the 5 September cabinet meeting in protest. Hezbollah representatives have stated several times that the group does not intend to disarm, arguing that Israeli strikes and occupied positions must be addressed first.
On 17 October, the members of the Security Council issued a press statement welcoming the efforts of the Lebanese government to exercise its sovereignty over the whole territory of Lebanon and urging the international community to intensify its support to the LAF. The statement called on all parties to comply with the cessation-of-hostilities arrangement and their obligations under international humanitarian law, including regarding the protection of civilians. It also expressed support for UNIFIL and stressed that “peacekeepers must never be targeted by attack”. Moreover, the statement welcomes Lebanon’s “willingness” to demarcate its border with Syria, a reference to recent rapprochement efforts between Lebanon and Syria, including regarding such issues as border control and the return of Syrian refugees.
Parliamentary elections are expected in May 2026. Recent political disputes over the electoral law, particularly regarding diaspora representation, have raised concerns about possible delays. Aoun has publicly emphasised that the vote must be held on schedule. Previous elections in Lebanon have been subject to delays due to political deadlock and other challenges.
Lebanon’s economy remains fragile following the 2019 collapse and conflict in the region. While steps have been taken by the Lebanese authorities to improve the country’s economic situation, recent missions by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to Lebanon have urged “ambitious and comprehensive reforms to tackle the structural weaknesses that have been hampering Lebanon’s potential for years”.
Human Rights-Related Developments
In a 17 October press release, UN experts expressed grave concern over the “devastating impact” of Israeli air and drone strikes on civilians in Lebanon, including “a mounting toll of civilian deaths and injuries” and the destruction of vital infrastructure and the environment. Since the cessation-of-hostilities arrangement, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) verified 108 civilian casualties in Lebanon, including 71 men, 21 women, and 16 children. In light of these reports, UN experts urged all parties to fully adhere to the cessation-of-hostilities arrangement and called for independent investigations and accountability for all violations of international law.
Key Issues and Options
Supporting the full implementation of resolution 1701 and the cessation-of-hostilities arrangement between Israel and Lebanon remain key priorities for the Security Council. Capitalising on what appears to be a narrow window for a peaceful transition in Lebanon, while avoiding destabilisation risks, is a key issue for the Council, the country and the broader region.
An option would be for the Council to undertake a visiting mission before the end of the year to Lebanon to support momentum towards the implementation of the cessation-of-hostilities arrangement and resolution 1701. A visiting mission would allow Council members to assess the situation on the ground in light of recent developments such as the LAF’s deployment plan, the expected reduction in UNIFIL’s personnel in the context of the UN80 initiative, and the Council’s August decision on UNIFIL’s drawdown. It could also expose Council members first-hand to the extent of the reconstruction needs in southern Lebanon.
Should the Council decide to go on a visiting mission to Lebanon, members could adopt a presidential statement (PRST) with key messages to all parties. The 17 October press statement, which called on all sides to comply with their commitments under the cessation-of-hostilities arrangement and urged the implementation of resolutions 1701 and 1559, could serve as a basis for the PRST. In addition to the messages contained in the press statement, the PRST could also:
- express deep concern at the continuing violations of the cessation-of-hostilities arrangement, including the 30 October armed incursion in Lebanese territory by the IDF as well as air and drone strikes, and call for all violations to stop;
- call on the Lebanese authorities to continue their efforts towards exercising full sovereignty over the whole of Lebanon’s territory;
- urge Israel to withdraw from the positions it occupies north of the Blue Line;
- call on the LAF, with UNIFIL’s support, to deploy to these positions.
Council Dynamics
Council members agree that the cessation-of-hostilities arrangement between Israel and Lebanon needs to hold. There is also broad consensus among Council members in support of Lebanon’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and security.
While Council members regularly express their support for UNIFIL—most recently through the 17 October press statement—during the negotiations of resolution 2790, the US demanded a clear date for the mission’s termination and signalled its readiness to veto the mandate renewal if it did not contain such a date. On the other hand, none of the other 14 members had approached the negotiations seeking the termination of UNIFIL. The result was a compromise that tempered US insistence on a set date for the mission’s exit, with a final, longer-than-usual mandate renewal (16 months) reflecting the other members’ concern that an accelerated drawdown could have undermined the process of Lebanon achieving full control over its territory.
Differences persist in Security Council members’ views of Hezbollah. Some members distinguish between Hezbollah’s political and military wings and have designated only its military wing as a terrorist organisation; other members, including the UK and the US, have listed Hezbollah in its entirety as a terrorist organisation. On the other hand, Russia sees Hezbollah as a legitimate sociopolitical force in Lebanon.
France is the penholder on Lebanon. At the same time, since the cessation-of-hostilities arrangement, the US has assumed a more active role in Lebanon, exerting pressure on Lebanese authorities for the timely implementation of commitments to disarm non-state actors, particularly Hezbollah.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 28 August 2025S/RES/2790 | This resolution extended the mandate of UNIFIL for a final time until 31 December 2026 and established several functions that UNIFIL is authorised to fulfil during the drawdown and withdrawal period. It also requested the UN Secretary-General to explore, by 1 June 2026, “options for the future of the implementation of resolution 1701” following the withdrawal of UNIFIL. |
| 11 August 2006S/RES/1701 | This resolution called for a cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah. It also expanded UNIFIL’s mandate. |
| 2 September 2004S/RES/1559 | This resolution urged withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, extension of the Lebanese government’s control over all Lebanese territory and free and fair presidential elections. |
