In Hindsight: The Rise of the African Members of the Security Council
Introduction
The three African members of the UN Security Council, known as the A3, have come of age as a cohesive and influential group, shaping both country-specific and thematic discussions within the UN Security Council. Over the years, they have steadily enhanced their coordination in pursuit of a common African position on the various items on the Council’s agenda. While differences remain on some issues, their views coalesce on most files. This growing unity is most visibly reflected in their increasingly consistent practice of speaking with one voice—delivering joint statements and presenting unified positions during Council meetings. In addition, the A3 have in recent years organised themselves as a cohesive negotiating bloc with the ability to significantly shape Council outcomes. Both individually and collectively, the A3 have also played an increasingly active role in spearheading Council products on key African priorities, thus enhancing their influence in the Council.
This month’s In Hindsight provides a preview of our upcoming research report on the burgeoning role of the A3 in the Security Council.
The Origins of the African Trio in the Security Council
The 2011 Libyan crisis led to serious reflection in Africa about the role of the African members on the Security Council. The African Union (AU) had developed a roadmap that called for an immediate ceasefire and the launching of inclusive dialogue leading to a consensual transition as a means of resolving the conflict in Libya. However, the Security Council adopted resolution 1973 of 17 March 2011 authorising a no-fly zone and “all necessary measures” to protect civilians, carried out by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries and other member states, which ultimately toppled the Libyan regime. This situation revealed a significant divergence between the approach of the Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) to this conflict.
The AU was deeply disappointed that its views were not taken seriously, despite its active diplomatic efforts to promote a negotiated solution.[1] It came to the conclusion that the situation might have been different had Africa presented a stronger, more unified position within the Council in support of its position. This experience underscored the critical need for the A3 to coordinate more effectively to amplify Africa’s voice in the Security Council’s decision-making. It also strengthened the AU’s belief that a unified A3 group could serve as a crucial bridge between the Security Council and the AUPSC, promoting greater recognition of AU mechanisms and the central role of African-led diplomatic solutions to conflicts and crises on the continent.[2] Subsequent discussions at the AUPSC in 2012 and 2013 played a pivotal role in the formation of the A3 as a caucus within the Security Council.[3] In 2013, a High-Level Seminar on Peace and Security in Africa, hosted by Algeria in collaboration with the AU Commission, laid the groundwork by generating several ideas which became instrumental in the formation of the A3 as a group. This Seminar eventually became institutionalised as an annual meeting known as the Oran process and continues to be an important forum for discussing the A3.
The “A3 Plus” Mechanism
The story of the A3’s evolution includes the emergence of the “A3 Plus” mechanism, which has facilitated collaboration between A3 members and Caribbean countries in the Security Council. The first instance of this new grouping was when Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (SVG), a like-minded member of the UN Security Council from Latin America and the Caribbean region, joined the A3 group—then composed of Niger, South Africa, and Tunisia—as a “plus” member during its 2020–2021 term. Guyana’s decision to join the A3 in 2024-2025 provided continuity to the A3 Plus mechanism, which has come to symbolise the stronger ties between Africa and the Caribbean, reinforcing the relationship between the AU and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). It has enabled the group to play an active role in the Security Council, not only on African files but also on other files such as Haiti and Colombia.[4]
The A3 has been exploring how this mechanism could be institutionalised going forward, including by securing the support of future Caribbean members of the Security Council.[5] With Guyana set to conclude its two-year term at the end of 2025, the next potential opportunity to implement the A3 Plus mechanism will arise when Trinidad and Tobago runs for a Council seat in 2027-2028. The A3 seems intent on limiting the “A3 Plus” mechanism only to Caribbean states, given the region’s historic ties to the African continent. Nonetheless, the goal is to move beyond symbolism and build a partnership grounded in mutual interest and shared priorities. The second Africa–Caribbean Summit, which took place in Addis Ababa on 6-7 September 2025, resolved to further consolidate the cooperation between the A3 and their Caribbean counterparts towards the realisation of common objectives regarding the maintenance of international peace and security.[6]
Speaking with One Voice
While the A3 initially delivered joint statements mainly during formal wrap-up sessions, this practice began to expand in 2018 as members increasingly adopted joint positions on specific country and regional situations, and thematic issues. By 2019, the approach had become more structured, with the A3 delivering 16 joint statements in formal Council meetings that year. From 2020 onward, the delivery of joint statements became much more frequent, regular, and institutionalised, reflecting the group’s deepening commitment to acting as a cohesive and coordinated voice within the Security Council.
In 2020, the A3 issued 35 joint statements covering both country- and region-specific matters as well as thematic topics. That year, the inclusion of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines as a “Plus” member broadened the group’s focus to include non-African issues, such as the situations in Haiti and Colombia. The “A3 Plus” further strengthened its unified voice, delivering 53 joint statements in 2021 and 63 in 2022—demonstrating growing coordination and engagement. This trend continued in 2023 and 2024, with the group delivering 93 and 105 joint statements, respectively. During this period, the scope of statements on non-African issues expanded considerably, accompanied by a notable increase in joint explanations of vote.
This unified approach has reinforced common African positions consistent with AU decisions, while enhancing the A3’s visibility and credibility as a collective voice within the Security Council. The practice of delivering joint statements has now been institutionalised under the framework of the Guiding Principles for the A3 Plus Mechanism, a set of principles adopted by the group in November 2023, to help guide its joint work.[7]
Negotiating as a Bloc
In recent years, the A3 has also evolved into a cohesive negotiating bloc, driven by more structured coordination and closer engagement among their political coordinators and experts. The introduction of a rotating lead negotiator further formalised this process, marking a key milestone in the A3’s development as a unified force in Council negotiations.
In response, the P3 members (France, the UK, and the US), who traditionally serve as penholders on most country-specific files, have begun to actively seek A3 support and engage more closely with the group ahead of negotiations on Africa-related products. This emerging practice reflects a growing recognition of the importance of building consensus and ensuring A3 backing for Council outcomes on African matters. Whereas P3 penholders previously shared zero drafts only with the P2 members (China and Russia) before broader circulation, they now share these drafts with the A3 as well, allowing African perspectives to be incorporated earlier in the drafting process. Although the P2 members do not hold the pen on African files, they also coordinate with the A3 based on shared positions across a range of issues.
Reflecting its growing influence, the A3 is now actively pursuing penholding or co-penholding responsibilities for all African dossiers—and other issues of strategic importance to the continent—on the Council’s agenda. To date, A3 members have primarily held such roles on files related to West Africa, the Sahel, and Central Africa. Expanding these responsibilities would significantly enhance the group’s influence and position it as a more assertive and central actor in the Council’s decision-making process.
The A3 has also strengthened its role in driving the adoption of Council outcomes on key African priorities, both individually and collectively, thereby raising its profile within the Council. The AU has increasingly called upon the A3 to champion specific African issues at the Security Council, and the group has responded by jointly proposing Council products—a clear sign of institutional maturity. The adoption of resolution 2457 on Silencing the Guns in Africa (27 February 2019) and resolution 2719 (21 December 2023) underscores the A3’s emergence as a cohesive bloc effectively advancing African priorities.
Observations
Despite its enhanced status within the Council, the A3 continues to face significant challenges in realising its full potential. These challenges stem from internal dynamics within the group, the inconsistent support and guidance provided by the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, and persistent external pressures. The group’s effectiveness depends on members’ commitment to uphold their obligations to the AU and advance collective African priorities, as well as on sustained political support and strategic guidance from the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa. Key AU bodies—including its policy organs, the AU Commission, and the Permanent Observer Mission in New York—play distinct roles in supporting and backstopping the A3. While coordination between the AU and the A3 has improved, further strengthening this partnership remains necessary. The A3 also faces external pressures from powerful states, which at times complicate efforts to balance national interests with common African positions.
Notwithstanding these challenges, the A3 has the potential to play a unique role in building bridges and easing geopolitical tensions on African issues—provided it operates as a coherent unit. In an increasingly divided Council, the A3 bears a particular responsibility to act as a bridge-builder and foster consensus—a necessity, given that when the Council is paralysed by great power rivalry, Africa often bears the highest cost through delayed or inadequate responses to crises.
Strengthening the capacity of individual A3 members should therefore be a priority. Members can contribute meaningfully only if they possess the requisite knowledge and skills to carry out their responsibilities effectively. The AU may need to develop its own training capacity for aspiring Council members from the continent—potentially in partnership with others—to provide a programme tailored to the specific needs of A3 Council members.
Sustaining African priorities in the Council also requires continuity beyond the two-year terms of individual members. This depends on building institutional memory by documenting the work and achievements of former A3 members. The AU Permanent Observer Mission, which serves as the A3’s secretariat and repository of institutional knowledge, is developing a database for this purpose but requires further support. Greater use should also be made of the experience of outgoing members.
Looking ahead, the A3 could evolve into an agenda-setter by shaping the Council’s discourse on Africa, provided it engages strategically and constructively on continental crises. This will require leveraging its influence and building consensus to advance practical, action-oriented outcomes. Such leadership would be especially valuable as the Council continues to struggle with timely and effective responses to African conflicts. This challenge is compounded by the UN’s deepening liquidity crisis, which threatens its field presence in Africa, and by funding shortfalls that have forced humanitarian actors to scale back life-saving operations. These circumstances underscore the need for a more proactive A3 in driving Council discussions and promoting durable solutions.
However, the A3’s impact will remain limited without strong political backing and strategic guidance from the AU and its regional economic communities and mechanisms (RECs/RMs). Both appear to be losing some agency, as the once-powerful mantra of “African solutions to African problems” wanes amid internal challenges and shifting geopolitical dynamics. Ongoing discussions on the future of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) are therefore critical to reinvigorating Africa’s leadership in crisis response. Experience shows that when the AU and RECs/RMs act swiftly and coherently, they help generate aligned and constructive international support—including from the Security Council. Finally, while the A3 has come a long way in just over a decade—emerging as a unified African voice within the Security Council—sustained efforts to address its remaining challenges will be essential to fully realise its potential.
[1] AU Political Affairs, Peace and Security, “The Oran Process and Africa’s Global Peace Agenda”, 18 June 2024 https://youtu.be/sbiwIK03iRo?si=H8VrLt0MGnvPf-gl
[2] African Union, AU-UN Partnership: Advancing Peace and Security in Africa, 9 January 2012 https://archives.au.int/bitstream/handle/123456789/8415/Par%20AU%20UN_E.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
[3] Peace and Security Council of the African Union, Communiqué of the 309th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council (PSC/PR/COMM.(CCCIX)), held 25 January 2012, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/communique-of-the-309th-meeting-of-the-peace-and-security-council. peaceau.org+1
African Union Peace and Security Council, “Communiqué of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU), at its 397ᵗʰ Meeting on the Partnership between the African Union and the United Nations in the Area of Peace and Security,” PSC/AHG/COMM/1.(CCCXCVII), New York, 23 September 2013, https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/communique-of-the-peace-and-security-council-of-the-african-union-au-at-its-397th-meeting-on-the-partnership-between-the-african-union-and-the-united-nations-in-the-area-of-peace-and-security
[4] The A3 Plus delivered joint statements regularly on Haiti and Colombia.
[5] African Union Commission, Conclusions of the 11th High-Level Seminar on Peace and Security in Africa, December 1–2, 2024, Oran, Algeria, PSC/HLS/11 (2024), Peace and Security Council, African Union Commission, https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/conclusions-for-the-11th-annual-hls-on-promotion-of-peace-and-security-on-africa-en.pdf
[6] Communique of the Second Africa-Caribbean Summit.
[7] African Union, Guiding Principles for the A3+ Mechanism, accessed June 5, 2025, https://fr.africanunion-un.org/_files/ugd/d682ab_1ea52873ef8946b59fd5284d4aedf109.pdf.
