DPRK (North Korea)
Expected Council Action
In November, the Chair of the 1718 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Aglaia Balta (Greece), is scheduled to brief Council members in closed consultations on the 90-day report regarding the Committee’s work.
Key Recent Developments
Tensions on the Korean peninsula have continued to simmer in recent months. Republic of Korea (ROK) President Lee Jae-myung, who was inaugurated in early June and is considered more open to engagement with the DPRK than his predecessor, has made several overtures to try and improve relations. In early August, ROK authorities removed loudspeakers broadcasting anti-DPRK messages across the border, describing the move as a “practical measure to help ease tensions between the [ROK] and the [DPRK]”. On 15 August, Lee announced that the ROK intends to take “proactive, gradual steps” to restore the Comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA), a September 2018 pact designed to reduce tensions and build confidence between the DPRK and the ROK, including by suspending some military activity along the border. Previous ROK President Yoon Suk-yeol, who was impeached after attempting to declare martial law, suspended the CMA in June 2024, a move that followed the DPRK announcing its own suspension of the agreement in November 2023.
The DPRK has shown little willingness to reciprocate. In remarks reported by state media on 20 August, Kim Yo-jong, DPRK leader Kim Jong-un’s sister, strongly criticised Lee and described the ROK’s overtures as “fancy and a pipe dream”, while accusing the ROK of continuing “to speak rambling pretence about peace and improving relations in order to lay the blame on us for inter-Korean relations never returning again”.
The DPRK has also continued to ramp up its rhetoric regarding its nuclear programme. On 27 September, state media reported that Kim Jong-un had directed DPRK officials to use all resources to “sharpen the nuclear shield and sword” and described the development of a nuclear response posture as “an essential top priority” for the country. Days later, DPRK Vice Foreign Minister Kim Son-gyong told the General Assembly that the DPRK would never give up its nuclear weapons programme, saying that calls for denuclearisation are tantamount to demanding that the DPRK surrender both its sovereignty and its right to exist. Kim Son-gyong’s speech was the first delivered to the General Assembly by a DPRK official during high-level week since 2018.
Against this backdrop, US officials reportedly discussed the possibility of a meeting between US President Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un during Trump’s recent visit to Asia. The meeting was suggested by Lee in late August when he met Trump at the White House. ROK Foreign Minister Cho Hyun has since said that Lee asked Trump to “become a peacemaker” and noted that the ROK wants Trump to “exercise his leadership to pull [the DPRK] to [the] dialogue table”. In late September, Kim Jong-un indicated that he would be willing to meet Trump if the US drops its demand for denuclearisation. At various junctures during his trip to Asia, Trump indicated that he would be willing to meet with Kim Jong-un, including during a 29 October meeting with Lee. Despite Trump’s interest in the meeting, it did not take place.
On 22 October, three days before Trump was scheduled to arrive in Asia, the DPRK conducted its first ballistic missile tests in five months. ROK military officials said that the DPRK fired multiple short-range ballistic missiles towards the northeast from an area just south of Pyongyang. The DPRK later claimed that it had tested a new hypersonic system and said that the missiles struck a target on land in the northern part of the country. On 28 October, the day before Trump arrived in the ROK, the DRPK conducted cruise missile tests. According to state media, the missiles were sea-to-surface weapons designed to carry nuclear warheads.
Following his 29 October meeting with Lee, Trump announced that the US would share nuclear submarine technology with the ROK.
Meanwhile, the DPRK has continued to seek improved ties with China and Russia. On 4 September, Kim Jong-un met with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing on the sidelines of a military parade held to commemorate the end of the Second World War. According to media reports, Xi called for closer coordination between China and the DPRK and noted that China’s position on developing ties with the DPRK would remain the same “no matter how the international situation evolves”. Kim Jong-un also met with Russian President Vladimir Putin while in Beijing and reportedly pledged to provide further assistance to Moscow, while Putin praised the DPRK for deploying troops to Russia’s Kursk region to assist with fighting the counter-offensive launched by Ukraine in August 2024. The DPRK has also held other meetings with Chinese and Russian officials in recent months, including a meeting between DPRK Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui and Chinese Premier Li Qiang. Choe also met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Moscow on 27 October, and DPRK state media later reported that the pair had pledged to “accelerate the multifaceted development of bilateral relations”.
In addition, the DPRK appears to be seeking closer ties with member states in Southeast Asia. In mid-October, Kim Jong-un held separate meetings with General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam Tô Lâm, Laotian President Thongloun Sisoulith, and Indonesian Foreign Minister Sugiono in Pyongyang. Following the meeting with Lâm, state media announced that the DPRK and Vietnam had signed agreements in several fields, including defence and health. Indonesia and the DPRK also signed a memorandum of understanding during Sugiono’s visit.
These meetings were held on the sidelines of a 10 October military parade in Pyongyang marking the 80th anniversary of the founding of the Workers’ Party of Korea. State media reported that the parade featured a new intercontinental ballistic missile known as the “Hwasong-20”, describing it as the DPRK’s “most powerful nuclear strategic weapon system”. During a 14 October parliamentary hearing, an ROK official said that Russian technology may have contributed to the development of the new missile. ROK officials have also noted that the DPRK is likely to have received assistance from Russia with submarine development.
On 22 October, the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT) released a report titled “The DPRK’s Violation and Evasion of UN Sanctions through Cyber and Information Technology Worker Activities”. (The MSMT was established in October 2024 by Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the ROK, the UK, and the US after the mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee expired following a Russian veto. Its aim is to monitor and report on violations and evasion of the measures imposed by the 1718 DPRK sanctions regime.) In a 22 October press release, the MSMT’s participating states said that the report “details the deep connections between UN-designated DPRK entities and the DPRK’s malicious cyber activities, including cryptocurrency theft, fraudulent IT work, and cyber espionage”.
Human Rights-Related Developments
On 4 September, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk issued a report on the situation of human rights in the DPRK. The report covers the period from 1 January 2014 to 31 May 2025 and provides an update on human rights in the DPRK since the landmark Commission of Inquiry established by the UN Human Rights Council issued its final report. Among other matters, the report concludes that the human rights situation in the DPRK has become markedly worse in several areas and notes that the majority of the 19 recommendations made by the Commission have not been implemented.
Sanctions-Related Developments
Since February, the US has apparently put a hold on all requests from UN agencies for humanitarian exemptions to the 1718 DPRK sanctions regime. It seems that this represents a departure from the US’ approach during the Biden administration. The US apparently indicated that it has blocked the requests because it is reviewing its policy on the DPRK.
Key Issues and Options
The Council is grappling with several issues related to the DPRK. The DPRK’s ongoing development of its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, which violates many Council resolutions, is a major concern for the Council. Sanctions evasion is another key issue, as is the overall effectiveness of the sanctions regime, particularly given that the DPRK is widely believed to have increased its nuclear arsenal since the sanctions regime was first introduced. The DPRK’s ongoing refusal to participate in denuclearisation dialogue without conditions and the humanitarian and human rights situations are also challenges for the Council.
In light of these issues, Council members could consider introducing a resolution that condemns the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, urges member states to comply with existing resolutions, and calls on the DPRK to return to the negotiating table. It could also update and strengthen the 1718 DPRK sanctions regime with a view to exerting greater pressure on the DPRK and other actors involved in sanctions evasion.
The lack of a panel of experts assisting the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee is another major issue. Council members may wish to explore how the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT), which was first established in October 2024, might be able to fill this gap. Given that several members feel that the MSMT lacks the perceived legitimacy of a Council-mandated entity, members who are also part of the MSMT may wish to consider options for enhancing its credibility, such as expanding its membership and providing more information about its working methods. Members could also hold an informal meeting to discuss how the MSMT could work with the Council and the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee.
Members could also consider requesting an open briefing from the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights regarding the human rights situation in the DPRK. Such meetings were held in 2024 and 2023. (For more information, see our 11 June 2024 What’s in Blue story.)
Council Dynamics
The Council has been sharply divided over the DPRK for some time, and this dynamic has worsened notably as the DPRK and Russia have grown closer. The P3 (France, the UK, and the US) and other like-minded Council members, including the ROK, generally favour using sanctions to help manage the threat posed by the DPRK and regularly call on Council members to comply with existing Council resolutions. Many of these members have urged the country to engage in dialogue and abandon its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes while emphasising that it is responsible for escalating tensions. Some have also called for the Council to show unity and respond to the DPRK’s weapons tests and argue that China and Russia have emboldened the DPRK by blocking Council action on the file. Several of these members have strongly criticised the growing cooperation between the DPRK and Russia, including by highlighting evidence of arms transfers from the DPRK to Russia and noting that these transfers violate Council resolutions.
China and Russia, on the other hand, blame the US and its allies for heightening tensions, including by holding joint military exercises in the region, and have accused the US of not doing enough to incentivise the DPRK to participate in denuclearisation talks. Both have also argued that sanctions should be eased because of their impact on the humanitarian situation in the country and have repeatedly blocked attempts to issue a Council product responding to missile launches carried out by the DPRK in recent years.
The US is the penholder on the DPRK.
| Sanctions Committee Document | |
| 7 March 2024S/2024/215 | This was the final report of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee. |
