Conflict and Food Insecurity
Expected Council Action
In November, the Security Council will hold a high-level open debate on conflict-related food insecurity. This is a signature event of Sierra Leone’s Council presidency and will be chaired by Sierra Leone’s President Julius Maada Bio. The expected briefers are UN Deputy Secretary-General Amina J. Mohammed, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Tom Fletcher, African Union (AU) Special Envoy for Food Systems Ibrahim Assane Mayaki, and a civil society representative.
Key Recent Developments
According to the World Food Programme’s (WFP) 2025 Global Report on Food Crises, published in July and updated in September, more than 280 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity across 53 countries and territories in 2024—13.7 million more than in 2023 and the sixth consecutive annual increase. Conflict was the primary driver of acute food insecurity in 20 countries and territories, affecting nearly 140 million people, including in Colombia, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Haiti, Lebanon, Myanmar, Nigeria, the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT), South Sudan, and Sudan. In several of these contexts, hunger was compounded by interlinkages between conflict and other drivers of food insecurity, such as climate change and economic shocks.
Among situations of particular concern is Gaza, where food insecurity rose to devastating levels amidst the Israel-Hamas war and Israel’s restrictions on the entry of humanitarian aid into the enclave. In August, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) confirmed that famine was occurring in Gaza governorate—the metropolitan area that includes Gaza City—and was projected to spread to Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis governorates by the end of September. Since then, increased levels of humanitarian aid have started to enter the territory under the current ceasefire, but the situation remains dire.
Acute food insecurity also persists in Sudan as a result of the ongoing civil war, which has led to mass displacement and severely curtailed humanitarian access. In August 2024, the IPC confirmed famine conditions in parts of North Darfur, including the Zamzam displacement camp in El Fasher, which the monitoring group later said had expanded to Al Salam and Abu Shouk camps and the Western Nuba Mountains in South Kordofan state. Escalating hostilities in El Fasher in late October may further exacerbate the situation.
The Security Council has convened regularly to discuss conflict-related food insecurity in recent years. During its February 2024 presidency, Guyana organised a high-level open debate on the impact of climate change and food insecurity on the maintenance of international peace and security. During its May 2023 presidency, then-member Switzerland held the annual open debate on the protection of civilians as a ministerial-level meeting on the intertwined challenges of conflict-induced food insecurity and the protection of critical civilian infrastructure and essential services in conflict. During the administration of former US President Joe Biden, the US convened high-level open debates on conflict-induced food insecurity during its March 2021, May 2022, and August 2023 presidencies. In connection with the latter meeting, the Security Council adopted a US-proposed presidential statement on the issue.
Additionally, Council members have convened on numerous occasions to discuss conflict-related food insecurity in relation to country-specific situations. These include meetings on Gaza in June 2025, November 2024, and February 2024; on Sudan in January 2025 and March 2024; and an interactive informal dialogue (IID) on Burkina Faso, the DRC, and Haiti in July 2023. Several of these sessions were in response to white notes that the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) submitted in accordance with resolution 2417 of 24 May 2018, which condemned the starvation of civilians as a method of warfare and requested the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council when “the risk of conflict-induced famine and wide-spread food insecurity” occurs.
Key Issues and Options
November’s open debate will spotlight the current scale of conflict-driven food insecurity worldwide. A key issue for the Security Council is the persistent gap between early warning and early action in responding to this issue. Although resolution 2417 requires the Secretary-General to report “swiftly” on situations of conflict-induced famine, recent crises such as those in Gaza, Sudan, and Ethiopia illustrate that alerts often reach the Council after acute food insecurity has already emerged. Weak institutional follow-up mechanisms and the absence of a standing focal point within the UN system for implementing resolution 2417 continue to limit timely and coordinated responses.
Another challenge is achieving accountability for the war crime of starvation. While international humanitarian law (IHL) prohibits the starvation of civilians and the destruction of objects indispensable to survival, investigations and prosecutions remain rare. Recent charges brought by the International Criminal Court (ICC) concerning Israel’s prosecution of the war in Gaza may strengthen accountability norms in this regard, but the Security Council’s own mechanisms for addressing deliberate obstruction of humanitarian aid remain underused. In numerous conflict situations, bureaucratic and security constraints continue to hinder humanitarian access and evidence collection, underscoring the need for consistent Council follow-up on white notes submitted under resolution 2417.
Council members could consider several options. One would be to request OCHA to submit white notes on a periodic rather than ad hoc basis, or the Secretary-General to include a separate section on food insecurity in relevant country-specific reporting, which could improve the flow of information to the Council. Another would be to request the Secretary-General to establish a dedicated focal point on conflict-induced hunger to consolidate early-warning data, coordinate with regional organisations, and track compliance with resolution 2417. The Council could also request periodic briefings from this focal point and relevant agencies, such as OCHA, WFP, and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), to ensure systematic use of existing white notes and early-warning mechanisms. Another option is to strengthen accountability by referring cases of deliberate starvation to appropriate international judicial bodies or more consistently applying targeted sanctions against individuals or entities obstructing humanitarian access. The Council could further promote early action by encouraging coordination between humanitarian, development, and climate-adaptation initiatives to address the structural drivers of food insecurity in conflict settings.
Council Dynamics
Most Council members agree that conflict remains a primary driver of acute food insecurity and that compliance with IHL—particularly the prohibition of starvation as a method of warfare—is essential to addressing the problem. France, Guyana, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, the UK, and the US are members of the Group of Friends of Action on Conflict and Hunger.
Divisions persist, however, regarding the Council’s role in addressing conflict-induced hunger and in pursuing accountability for starvation crimes. For instance, the Council’s African members have expressed concern that the issue could create a pretext to bring to the Council’s attention countries that are not on its formal agenda. In 2023, African members were opposed to holding a Council meeting on OCHA’s white note on Burkina Faso, the DRC, and Haiti because Burkina Faso was not a formal Council agenda item; eventually, an IID was held instead. In 2021, African members objected to convening a formal meeting on OCHA’s white note about the Tigray region of Ethiopia.
Broader geopolitical tensions have also impacted the Council’s consideration of the issue. The US, for instance, convened two of its signature events on food insecurity in the aftermath of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, when global food prices rose in response to the conflict, as both Russia and Ukraine are major producers of agricultural commodities. The price increases posed a challenge for low-income countries—including conflict-affected ones—which are highly dependent on imports of Ukrainian and Russian foodstuffs. The US and its allies on the Council blamed the rising food prices on Russia’s invasion, which destroyed farmland in Ukraine and deprived the country of export access through the Black Sea, while Russia faulted Western sanctions for the trend.
Those dynamics appear to have shifted during the current administration of US President Donald Trump. At recent Council meetings on Gaza, the US—which is Israel’s closest ally—has disputed the IPC’s confirmation of famine and claimed that Hamas was responsible for food insecurity in the enclave by diverting aid. Notably, although the US is a member of the Group of Friends of Action on Conflict and Hunger, it seems that the country has not joined the group’s recent joint statements at Council meetings.
Views also diverge on the link between food insecurity and climate change. While many Council members believe that the body should pay more attention to climate change as a risk multiplier in situations of conflict-induced food insecurity, the current US administration has routinely opposed references to climate change in Council products, and Russia has blamed the transition to green energy for rising energy prices, which it in turn claims have raised food prices.
Guyana and Slovenia are the Council’s focal points on conflict and food security. Since the creation of this informal role in 2019, the focal points have organised Council meetings on OCHA’s white notes as well as convened members to consider the periodic reports on “hunger hotspots” issued by FAO and WFP.
| Security Council Resolution | |
| 24 May 2018S/RES/2417 | This was a resolution on the link between armed conflict and food insecurity. It strongly condemned the use of starvation of civilians as a method of warfare, as well as the unlawful denial of humanitarian access. |
| Security Council Presidential Statement | |
| 3 August 2023S/PRST/2023/4 | This presidential statement on conflict and hunger included highlighting the role of regional and subregional organisations in preventing famine and conflict-induced food insecurity and malnutrition. |
| Secretary-General’s Report | |
| 15 May 2025S/2025/271 | This was the Secretary-General’s annual report on the protection of civilians in armed conflict. It included a section on food insecurity. |
