Yemen
Expected Council Action
In October, Security Council members will hold their monthly closed consultations on Yemen. UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg and an official from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) are expected to brief on political, security, and humanitarian developments in the country.
Key Recent Developments
The situation in Yemen remains complex as wider dynamics and instability in the Middle East—including the war in Gaza—undermine progress in addressing the country’s civil war, political challenges, and socioeconomic risks. Briefing the Council on 15 September, Grundberg recognised that stability and progress in Yemen and the wider region are interconnected; however, he cautioned against addressing Yemen primarily through the lens of regional concerns and stressed the need to refocus on Yemen’s internal challenges.
The Houthis—a Yemeni rebel group which has de facto control of the northwest of the country, including the capital Sana’a—continue to launch multiple ballistic missiles and drone attacks against Israel and to threaten maritime security in the Red Sea, as part of a campaign started in October 2023, which they say is in solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza.
In September, the Houthis launched multiple drones and ballistic missiles at Israel. A drone attack on 7 September struck the Ramon International Airport in the south of the country, causing one injury, and another drone launched on 18 September struck a hotel in the Israeli town of Eilat. According to Israeli media, the Houthis have launched 87 ballistic missiles and at least 40 drones at Israel since the IDF relaunched operations in Gaza on 18 March, following the collapse of a ceasefire.
Recurrent Houthi attacks have provoked retaliatory strikes from the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), which in August included deadly strikes against Houthi political leadership in Sana’a. On 10 September, the IDF conducted strikes on targets in Sana’a and al-Jawf. On 16 September, the IDF also launched strikes on the Houthi-controlled Red Sea port of Hodeidah, which it justified by accusing the Houthis of using the port to transfer weapons, supplied by Iran, to execute attacks against Israel. On 25 September, in retaliation for a second Houthi drone attack on a hotel in Eilat, which injured over 20 Israelis a day earlier, the IDF conducted further strikes in Sana’a. Briefing the Council on 15 September, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Tom Fletcher expressed concern that since August, air strikes in Sana’a and al-Jawf had resulted in more than 300 casualties and damage to critical infrastructure.
On 31 August, 22 UN personnel were abducted and detained following Houthi raids on UN premises in Sana’a. On 12 September, Council members issued a press statement— proposed by the UK as the penholder on Yemen—that strongly condemned the detentions, forced entry into UN premises, and seizure of UN property, while demanding the immediate and unconditional release of all those detained by the Houthis. Council members also called on the Houthis to enable a safe and secure operating environment, while reiterating their support to the UN “in maintaining measures to optimise staff safety and security in light of the current security context”. According to Fletcher, the Houthis now hold a total of 44 UN staff, and as a result of the recurrent detentions, the UN is striving to find a balance between protecting its staff and delivering vital life-saving services in Yemen. On 16 September, the UN relocated the office of the Resident Coordinator for Yemen from Sana’a to Aden, the interim capital of the internationally recognised government of Yemen.
Such impediments to the UN’s aid work in the country come at a time when the population is suffering from a deepening humanitarian crisis. In his briefing, Fletcher stressed that Yemen is the third-most food-insecure country in the world and that the situation is getting worse, with nearly half the country suffering from severe food deprivation, an increase of 36 percent from last year. He added that funding cuts are costing lives and called for increased funding to address the country’s food insecurity and malnutrition crisis.
The situation in the Red Sea remains tense as the Houthis resumed their campaign in July of targeting vessels, which they say have links to Israel. The group continues to hold ten crew members whom they detained following their attack and sinking of the MV Eternity C on 7 July. On 1 September, the group claimed that it had fired a missile at the Israeli-owned, Liberia-flagged tanker MV Scarlet Ray in the northern Red Sea close to Saudi Arabia’s port city of Yanbu. There was no reported damage to the vessel. On 29 September, the Dutch-owned MV Minervagracht was reportedly hit by an explosive device in the Gulf of Aden, injuring two of its crew. It is suspected that the Houthis were behind the attack; however, at the time of writing the group had not claimed responsibility.
On 11 September, the US Treasury Department imposed its largest sanctions to date against the Houthis and their “illicit revenue and procurement networks”. It listed 32 individuals and entities—located in China, the Marshall Islands, the UAE, and Yemen—for financing and facilitating the Houthis’ acquisition of “advanced military-grade materials” used to attack US forces and allies, and commercial shipping in the Red Sea.
In his 15 September briefing, Grundberg said that “relative calm and stability” continue to hold on the frontlines between the Yemeni conflict parties, but he warned that military activity may lead to miscalculations that “could trigger a return to full-scale conflict”. On 3 and 4 September, Yemeni media reported clashes along the country’s southern front lines, in the Dhale and Shabwah governorates, resulting in casualties on both sides.
On 25 September, in his speech at the UN 80th General Assembly, Yemen’s President of the Presidential Leadership Council Rashad Al-Alimi declared that efforts to manage and contain the Houthis have failed. He urged the international community to reconsider its position on Yemen and take decisive action by forming an international coalition to restore peace, dismantle militias and terrorist groups, rebuild the state, and guarantee security for the region.
In an 18 September report of the Secretary-General titled “Shifting Paradigms: United to Deliver”, which is part of the UN80 Initiative and “sets out possible structural changes and programme realignments across the [UN] system”, one of the proposals listed with regard to the consolidation and reconfiguration of UN missions was to “[i]ntegrate UNMHA into the Office of the Special Envoy of Yemen, in line with Security Council resolution 2786”. Adopted on 14 July, resolution 2786 renewed the mandate of UNMHA until 28 January 2026, and further requested the Secretary-General to present a review of the mission aimed at delivering “efficiencies and structural coherence and coordination across [UN] missions in Yemen” by 28 November 2025.
Key Issues and Options
A key issue for the Council is how to help mitigate the risk of an escalation of hostilities in Yemen and the Red Sea while advancing efforts to relaunch the stalled intra-Yemeni political process amid broader regional tensions. A serious concern is that regional tensions in the Middle East, including the Israeli-Houthi cycle of violence, are drawing attention away from finding a peaceful resolution of the Yemeni civil war.
One option for the Council would be to issue a presidential statement calling for de-escalation, stressing that there is no military solution to the conflict in Yemen, and demanding that the Yemeni parties resume concrete discussions on re-engaging on commitments made towards establishing a roadmap under UN auspices for inclusive peace in the country. Given the degradation of economic conditions in Yemen, members could also demand enhanced economic and humanitarian initiatives, such as the implementation of the economic de-escalation agreement reached on 23 July 2024 between the Houthis and the Yemeni government.
The statement could also reiterate provisions from relevant resolutions on the situation in Yemen and the Red Sea, including demanding that the Houthis immediately cease all attacks against merchant and commercial vessels, underscoring the need to address the root causes of the attacks in the Red Sea, and calling on all member states to adhere to the arms embargo imposed by resolution 2216.
Given the increasingly fraught humanitarian context, Council members could also consider holding a public briefing focused specifically on Yemen’s humanitarian crisis—which could include a briefing from the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) or the World Food Programme (WFP) on the country’s rapidly worsening food insecurity—providing Council members the opportunity to highlight the urgent need for bolstering funding pledges.
Council Dynamics
Despite Council members being critical of the Houthis, most have maintained their support for an inclusive intra-Yemeni political process and continue to call for advancing mediation efforts between the conflict parties towards a resumption of dialogue and a peace process under UN auspices. The US, however, has adopted a hawkish position on the Houthis, through sanctioning the group and accusing it of continuing to threaten—with the support of Iran—regional stability, maritime security, and the welfare of the Yemeni people.
Members have divergent views on the reasons for the protracted political stalemate and insecurity in Yemen. The “A3 plus one” members (Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Guyana), China, Pakistan, and Russia have all stressed that the situation in Yemen and the Red Sea cannot be discussed in isolation from the war in Gaza. Russia and China have also criticised foreign military action in Yemen—Israel, the UK, and the US have all conducted strikes targeting Houthi infrastructure since the beginning of the Red Sea crisis—claiming that such actions degrade the country’s already dire humanitarian situation, exacerbate the situation in the Red Sea, and negatively impact the political process.
On the other hand, the P3 members (France, the UK, and the US) have accused Iran of financially and militarily supporting the Houthis, fostering further regional tensions. The US has repeatedly called for the Security Council to respond to Iranian defiance of the Council-mandated arms embargo and has underscored its support for Israel’s right to defend itself against the Houthis.
There is broad agreement among Council members on the need to improve economic and humanitarian conditions in the country, and the need to restore freedom of navigation and security in the Red Sea. At least three of the Council’s elected members—Denmark, Greece, and Panama—have suffered Houthi attacks on their commercial vessels.
Several Council members have also called for the strengthening of the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM), which inspects ships travelling to Houthi-controlled ports to ensure compliance with the arms embargo on the group.
The UK is the penholder on Yemen. Greece and the US are the co-penholders on the Red Sea crisis.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 15 July 2025S/RES/2787 | This resolution extends the Secretary-General’s monthly reporting requirement on Houthi attacks on merchant and commercial vessels in the Red Sea until 15 January 2026. |
| 14 July 2025S/RES/2786 | This resolution renewed the mandate of UNMHA until 28 January 2026 and requested the Secretary-General to present to the Council, before 28 November 2025, a further review of UNMHA with a view to delivering further efficiencies and structural coherence and coordination across UN missions in Yemen. |
| Security Council Press Statements | |
| 12 September 2025SC/16166 | This was a press statement condemning the detention of at least 21 UN personnel, forced entry into UN premises, and seizure of UN property by the Houthis, while demanding the immediate and unconditional release of all those detained. |
| 5 June 2025SC/16079 | This was a press statement marking one year since the June 2024 wave of arbitrary detentions of UN and NGO personnel by the Houthis. |
| 13 February 2025SC/15995 | This was a press statement on Houthi Detention of United Nations, International Non-governmental Organization Workers. |
