The Middle East, including the Palestinian Question
Expected Council Action
In October, the Security Council will hold its quarterly open debate on “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question” (MEPQ). The expected briefer is Ramiz Alakbarov, Deputy Special Coordinator and Resident Coordinator at the Office of the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO).
Council members may convene additional meetings during the month depending on developments on the ground.
Key Recent Developments
Recent weeks have seen renewed efforts by the international community to address the root causes of the Israel-Palestine conflict by mobilising support for a credible political process towards the realisation of the two-state solution. On 12 September, the General Assembly endorsed the New York Declaration—the outcome document of the high-level international conference on the two-state solution held at UN Headquarters in July—by a vote of 142 in favour, ten against, and 12 abstentions. The Declaration sets out a roadmap envisioning a ceasefire in Gaza that would entail the release of the remaining hostages held by Hamas, the group’s disarmament, and the deployment of a Security Council-mandated stabilisation mission, establishing conditions that would eventually lead to Palestinian statehood and normalisation between Israel and Arab states. Ten countries—Andorra, Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Portugal, and the UK—subsequently announced their formal recognition of the State of Palestine during the resumed session of the two-state solution conference held on 22 September or during the General Debate of the 80th session of the General Assembly that began the following day. In total, 157 countries now recognise Palestinian statehood.
In his 26 September statement at the General Debate, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu characterised the recent recognitions as a “reward” for the 7 October 2023 Hamas-led attack on Israel and seemed to reject the premise of the two-state solution, claiming that allowing the establishment of an independent Palestinian state would constitute “national suicide” for Israel. Some Israeli officials have also threatened to annex the West Bank in response to the recognitions—a move that the Israeli parliament already called for in a non-binding resolution that it adopted in July.
The US has similarly opposed the recognitions, as well as the New York Declaration, which it described as a performative gesture when voting against its endorsement by the General Assembly. In a 29 September joint press conference with Netanyahu in Washington DC, however, US President Donald Trump announced a separate proposal for ending the war in Gaza and for the enclave’s post-conflict governance that appears to share certain similarities with the New York Declaration, although it is more equivocal about the prospects for a future Palestinian state. Among other provisions, the so-called “20-point plan” calls for the immediate cessation of hostilities and full restoration of humanitarian access; the release of all remaining hostages; the disarmament and decommissioning of Hamas supervised by independent monitors; the deployment of an international stabilisation force that will progressively assume security responsibility from the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) while training Palestinian security forces; and the establishment of an interim technocratic government comprising Palestinian and international experts under the oversight of a transitional body chaired by Trump. This body is to eventually cede control of Gaza to a reformed Palestinian Authority (PA), at which point “the conditions may finally be in place for a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood”.
At the press conference announcing the plan, Trump said that Israel would have US backing to continue its war against Hamas if the group opposed the framework, which it was reportedly not consulted on and which contains elements that it has publicly rejected in the past. Netanyahu said that he supported the plan, and the PA, a group of Arab and Muslim countries, and UN Secretary-General António Guterres all issued statements largely welcoming it. At the time of writing, Hamas was reportedly still considering its response.
Meanwhile, conditions in Gaza have continued to deteriorate amid Israel’s escalating military campaign and the restrictions that the country has imposed on the entry of humanitarian aid into the territory. On 16 September, Israel launched the main stage of its operation to take over Gaza City, the enclave’s largest urban centre, leading to a sharp rise in attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure as well as in forced displacement, pushing the total death toll in the enclave since the beginning of the war in October 2023 past 65,000, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) citing local health authorities. In separate statements issued on 16 September and 23 September, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) decried Israeli military tactics associated with the ongoing offensive, which it said are “negating any prospect for the survival of civilians” and appear to be “focused on causing a permanent demographic shift, which is tantamount to ethnic cleansing”.
The expanded military campaign is expected to worsen the already catastrophic humanitarian situation in Gaza, which has deteriorated rapidly since the end of the previous ceasefire in March, when Israel imposed a total blockade on the entry of humanitarian aid and commercial goods into the territory. In late August, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) confirmed that famine is occurring in Gaza governorate—the metropolitan area that includes Gaza City—and was projected to spread to Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis governorates by the end of September. While Israel has since eased some of the restrictions it had previously imposed on the entry of humanitarian aid, remaining bureaucratic obstacles as well as looting and insecurity continue to impede aid delivery: as at 13 September, OCHA reported that less than 35 percent of the 2,000 metric tonnes of food supplies required daily to meet basic humanitarian needs has been able to enter the Gaza Strip since 20 July, when regular food cargo uplifts from Gaza’s crossings resumed.
Regional tensions have also escalated in recent weeks. On 9 September, Israel launched a strike against Hamas’ political leadership in Doha, Qatar, who were meeting to discuss their response to a previous ceasefire framework proposed by the US. Hamas claimed that the attack failed to kill senior officials, while confirming the deaths of five lower-level members, as well as a Qatari security official. On 11 September, the Security Council held an urgent briefing on the strike and members issued a press statement that condemned it, without attributing responsibility to Israel. The statement also expressed support for Qatar’s mediation role in the ceasefire negotiations and underscored the importance of releasing the hostages and ending the war. On 15 September, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the League of Arab States (LAS) held an emergency joint summit in Doha that resulted in a communiqué also condemning the strike and calling on states to “take all possible legal and effective measures to prevent Israel from continuing its actions against the Palestinian people”.
By contrast, although the US had supported the Security Council’s 10 September press statement, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio later signalled the US’ continued support for Israel’s actions when he declined to publicly denounce the country for the Qatar strike during a 15 September joint press conference with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Jerusalem. On 18 September, the US vetoed a draft resolution authored by the Council’s ten elected members (E10) that called for a ceasefire, the release of hostages, and the lifting of all restrictions on the entry of humanitarian aid into Gaza.
Violence has also intensified in the West Bank in parallel with the escalation in Gaza. According to OCHA, as at 15 September, 186 Palestinians and 16 Israelis have been killed in conflict-related incidents in the West Bank so far this year while Israeli settlements, demolitions of Palestinian structures, and access restrictions continue to expand. On 20 August, Israeli authorities issued final approval for the controversial “E1” settlement plan, which entails the construction of thousands of residential and commercial units in the E1 area that is located in the West Bank between East Jerusalem and the Ma’ale Adumim settlement. OCHA warned that the plan would effectively separate the northern and central West Bank from the south, as well as further disconnect East Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank, threatening the territorial contiguity of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT). The plan—which has been under consideration for decades but not implemented because of international pressure—was approved by far-right Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, who said that it was intended to “permanently bury the idea of a Palestinian state”.
Human Rights-Related Developments
On 16 September, the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry (COI) on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel concluded that Israeli authorities have committed genocide in Gaza, finding evidence of four of the five genocidal acts listed in the 1948 Genocide Convention: killing; causing serious bodily or mental harm; deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of the Palestinians in whole or in part; and imposing measures intended to prevent births. The Commission attributed genocidal intent and responsibility to senior Israeli political and military leaders and called on states to cease arms transfers to Israel and to pursue accountability through legal proceedings. Previously, the Commission had found Israel responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Gaza, and Palestinian armed groups responsible for war crimes in Israel.
In a separate report published on 23 September, the COI found Israeli authorities have demonstrated a clear intent to entrench permanent control over Gaza while ensuring a Jewish majority in the occupied West Bank and inside Israel. In Gaza, the COI reported extensive demolition and expansion of buffer zones and corridors, reaching some 75 percent of the Strip by July 2025, amounting to deliberate deprivation of indispensable resources and an underlying genocidal act. In the West Bank, the report documented policies and actions (including support to violent settlers, mass displacement, punitive demolitions, and large military operations in camps) aimed at forcible transfer, settlement expansion, and effective annexation. The COI identified six Israeli ministers as likely bearing principal responsibility for international crimes related to land and housing, and reiterated that Netanyahu bears ultimate responsibility, including for genocide. It recommended ending the genocide and occupation, removing settlements, reversing discriminatory land and housing policies, and complying with orders and opinions issued by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The report is scheduled for presentation to the General Assembly on 28 October.
Key Issues and Options
The Council’s continued failure to expedite an end to the war in Gaza and its inability to enforce its prior decisions endorsing the two-state solution remain fundamental issues undermining the Council’s credibility.
In the short term, the resumption of a ceasefire in Gaza, the return of hostages, and the restoration of full, safe, and unimpeded humanitarian access remain the Council’s most urgent priorities. Associated concerns are the spread of famine in the territory and the lack of accountability for apparent violations of international humanitarian law (IHL).
The US veto of the E10 draft resolution in September—just three months after the country vetoed a similar E10 draft in June—illustrates the polarised dynamics preventing the Council from fulfilling its responsibilities in this regard. As such, members are likely to struggle to agree on other measures that would require consensus or are subject to the veto, such as imposing sanctions against individuals involved in IHL violations, establishing an independent mechanism to investigate such violations, or imposing an arms embargo to prohibit the transfer of arms or munitions that have caused them.
In this context, Council members as well as the broader UN membership could instead focus efforts on advancing the New York Declaration, including by beginning informal consultations to develop a time-bound and politically realistic plan for its implementation. Among other issues, such consultations could seek to identify points of convergence between the Declaration and the “20-point plan” proposed by the US—including the parameters of an international stabilisation mission in Gaza—in order to ensure coherence in the international community’s efforts to end the conflict and work towards the two-state solution.
If these initiatives stall or fail, members could consider other actions outside of the Security Council to apply political pressure on the parties. These may include measures under the “Uniting for Peace” authority of the General Assembly’s Tenth Emergency Special Session on “The Question of Palestine”—which is expected to resume this month following the US veto of the E10’s draft resolution—or the imposition of national or regional sanctions or trading restrictions.
Council and Wider Dynamics
Intractable dynamics have characterised the Council’s response to the war in Gaza, which has been marked by contentious and prolonged negotiations with multiple failed adoptions. Attempts at Council products on this file have clearly shown that it is not possible for the Council to adopt an outcome that the US, Israel’s key ally at the Council, does not largely support.
In its 18 September explanation of vote on the E10’s draft resolution, the US described the text as “deeply flawed”, saying that it failed to condemn Hamas, guarantee Israel’s security, or support US-led ceasefire diplomacy. The US further argued that repeated attempts at Council resolutions had emboldened Hamas and undermined ongoing negotiations.
All 14 other Council members voted in favour of the draft. Denmark—which coordinated the negotiations on behalf of the E10—emphasised that the draft reflected the Council’s shared priorities of halting hostilities, returning hostages, and restoring humanitarian access. France and the UK referenced the omission of a condemnation of Hamas as a shortcoming in the text but argued that it was nevertheless necessary as a humanitarian measure. Other members, including Russia, China, and Algeria, criticised the US veto as obstructive and contended that continued Council inaction undermines its credibility.
More broadly, during the General Debate of the 80th session of the UN General Debate, many member states welcomed the New York Declaration’s call for a just, peaceful, and lasting settlement based on the two-state solution, while also highlighting the pressing need for humanitarian aid access, cessation of hostilities, and greater accountability for violations of international law. Several states endorsed implementation steps such as financial and institutional support for Palestinian governance and urged targeted measures against actors undermining peace efforts, including those responsible for illegal settlements and violence. Across statements, there remained concern that rhetoric alone is insufficient, with calls for concrete action, reforms to the Security Council for equitable decision-making, and a collective commitment to the principles of the UN Charter to ensure relevance and legitimacy of the organisation moving forward.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 10 June 2024S/RES/2735 | This resolution on the war between Israel and Hamas welcomes the ceasefire proposal announced by US President Joe Biden on 31 May 2024. The resolution was adopted with 14 votes in favour and one abstention (Russia). |
| 25 March 2024S/RES/2728 | This resolution demanded an immediate ceasefire for the month of Ramadan leading to a lasting sustainable ceasefire. It also demanded the immediate and unconditional release of all hostages. It was adopted with 14 votes in favour and one abstention (US). |
| 22 December 2023S/RES/2720 | This resolution requested the Secretary-General to appoint a Senior Humanitarian and Reconstruction Coordinator tasked with establishing a UN mechanism for accelerating humanitarian consignments to Gaza. It was adopted with 13 votes in favour and two abstentions (Russia and the US). |
| 23 December 2016S/RES/2334 | This resolution condemned Israeli settlements and called for immediate steps to prevent violence against civilians, including acts of terror. It was adopted with 14 votes in favour and a US abstention. |
| Security Council Press Statement | |
| 11 September 2025SC/16163 | This press statement was about Israel’s 9 September 2025 strike on Hamas’ political leadership in Doha, Qatar. The text condemned the strike—without attributing responsibility to Israel—and expressed solidarity with Qatar, underscoring the importance of releasing the hostages and ending the war. |
| Other | |
| 18 September 2025S/2025/583 | This was a draft resolution on the war between Israel and Hamas that was initiated by the Council’s ten elected members (E10). The draft demanded that Israel immediately and unconditionally lift all restrictions on the entry of humanitarian aid into Gaza and ensure its safe and unhindered distribution to the population in need of such assistance. It also called for an immediate, unconditional, and permanent ceasefire and for the unconditional, dignified, and immediate release of all hostages held by Hamas and other armed groups. The draft failed to be adopted owing to a veto by the US. The remaining 14 members voted in favour. |
