Syria
Expected Council Action
In October, the Security Council is expected to hold its monthly meeting on political and humanitarian developments in Syria. An official from the Office of the Special Envoy for Syria and a representative from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) are expected to brief.
Key Recent Developments
The 18 July ceasefire in Suweida—a southern governorate in Syria, which saw deadly clashes between Druze militias and Bedouin tribes erupt on 13 July—has largely held. Following a 16 September trilateral meeting in Damascus among Syrian interim foreign minister Assad al-Shibani, Jordanian foreign minister Ayman Safadi, and US Special Envoy for Syria Thomas Barrack, the three parties announced plans for a roadmap aimed at restoring security in the region. The roadmap includes, among other provisions:
- plans for accountability, including through investigations by the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry;
- the delivery of humanitarian and medical aid to Suweida and the restoration of all basic services;
- reconstruction efforts;
- the deployment of an inclusive local police force;
- the return of those displaced and the release of detainees, and
- efforts to identify missing persons; and
- planning for meetings on reconciliation efforts.
In his 18 September briefing to the Security Council, Special Envoy for Syria Geir O. Pedersen welcomed the roadmap. He said, however, that a Druze committee in Suweida had rejected it, amid ongoing calls for “self-administration or secession”. He added that any solution must include reassurances for the Druze community that the Syrian interim government will not pose a threat to their safety and rights.
External interference continues to pose a challenge for the Syrian interim government. Since the ouster of former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad in December 2024, Israel has expanded its occupation of the Golan and conducted hundreds of airstrikes and incursions into Syrian territory, ostensibly aimed at ensuring its national security and—in the wake of the clashes in Suweida—to protect the Druze community from sectarian violence. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has demanded the demilitarisation of the area south of Damascus. Reportedly, on 9 September, Israel conducted several air strikes on military sites in and around the cities of Homs and Latakia, and on 14 September, Israeli soldiers conducted a ground incursion into the southeastern Deraa governorate.
Amid these interventions into Syrian territory, Damascus has not retaliated militarily against Israel and has instead sought to negotiate a security pact with the country, mediated by the US. On 17 September, Syrian interim president Ahmed al-Sharaa reportedly said that these negotiations could achieve results “in the coming days”, adding that Israeli actions were “very dangerous” and contradicted the US’ stated aim of stabilising Syria. (For more information, see the UNDOF brief in our October Monthly Forecast.)
Meanwhile, the 10 March agreement between the Syrian interim government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)—a Kurdish-led group which controls most of Syria’s de facto autonomous northeastern territory—has yet to be implemented. The agreement envisages the integration of the SDF into interim government-run institutions by the end of the year, in line with Damascus’ priority to pursue disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) efforts and centralise authority. Türkiye—which backs Damascus and views the SDF as a terrorist organisation—has expressed increased frustration at the lack of progress on the March agreement. Clashes between the SDF and the Syrian interim authorities’ forces have reportedly continued to take place during September.
On 21 September, Syria’s Higher Committee for People’s Assembly Elections announced that the elections for the new People’s Assembly will take place on 5 October across all electoral districts. Initially, the committee had said that the vote would take place in September and that polling in the provinces of Suweida, Hasakah, and Raqqa would be delayed because of security concerns, drawing criticism from communities in those areas. In his 18 September Council briefing, Pedersen acknowledged “major challenges in areas where disputes remain between the central authorities and areas outside their control”, counselled caution and noted the need for more time for engagement. He also highlighted that transparency and broad inclusion, including the meaningful participation of women, “will be essential [for the elections] to confer legitimacy”.
In September, Sharaa attended the 80th session of the UN’s high-level General Assembly debate in New York, the first time a Syrian president had attended the event in nearly 60 years. On 24 September, in his General Debate speech, he described the interim government’s “clear strategic policy built upon three pillars: balanced diplomacy; security stability; and economic development.” He also highlighted Syria’s efforts to restore its international relations and called for the complete lifting of all remaining sanctions.
The humanitarian situation in Syria remains one of the world’s most dire, with more than 70 percent of the population needing humanitarian aid. In his 18 September briefing to the Council, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Tom Fletcher highlighted the plight of displaced Syrians, noting that “some 7 million are displaced internally and more than 4 million are refugees in neighbouring countries.” He added that, since December 2024, over 900,000 refugees and 1.9 million internally displaced persons have returned to their homes, with the UN working to help them reintegrate and rebuild, and that, according to the UN Refugee Agency, around 18 percent of refugees in the region plan to return within a year. Fletcher warned, however, that a severe lack of funding is constraining the UN’s efforts to support the urgent needs of returnees and the overall population, highlighting that this year’s humanitarian appeal is only 18 percent funded. He also stressed the need to enable a Syrian-led recovery through investment and support for “large-scale recovery, reconstruction and development programmes”.
On 11 September, the new Permanent Representative of Syria to the United Nations in New York Ibrahim Olabi presented his credentials to the Secretary-General António Guterres.
On 18 September, Pedersen announced his intention to step down from his role of Special Envoy for Syria, following over six and a half years in this post.
Key Issues and Options
A key issue for the Council is to ensure that Syria’s interim government pursues a credible, transparent, and inclusive political process, while navigating a fraught security context compounded by intercommunal tensions, terrorism, and external interference. Central to this issue are Damascus’ efforts in fostering social cohesion and transitional justice, including accountability and reconciliation. Council members will closely monitor developments on these issues and could hold consultations to determine how these challenges and priorities could inform a re-evaluation of Security Council resolution 2254, which could lead to a new resolution that reflects the current context. (Adopted in December 2015, resolution 2254 focused on a political solution to the Syrian crisis, and several of its principles are still viewed by the international community as benchmarks required for a successful Syrian political transition.)
The future of the UN’s role in Syria is another key issue for the Council. Under instructions from the Secretary-General, the UN Secretariat has conducted an integrated strategic assessment of the changing situation in the country, which has been finalised in an internal report. Based on this report, the Secretary-General will consider what type of UN presence in Syria would be most suitable to meet the country’s current needs.
Council members could request an informal briefing on the results of the integrated strategic assessment. They could also consider convening an Informal Interactive Dialogue (IID) with the participation of Syria and relevant UN entities to discuss the most viable options for future Council engagement with Syria.
Another issue is that UN sanctions on Ha’yat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)—a terrorist group formerly affiliated with Al-Qaida and ISIL, which led to the ouster of Assad under Sharaa’s leadership—are impacting the interim government’s functions. HTS, Sharaa, and Syria’s interim interior minister Anas Khattab are all listed under the 1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, which imposes an asset freeze, travel ban and arms embargo on listed individuals and entities. One option the Council could consider is delisting members of the interim government and applying a carve-out to facilitate economic engagement with the interim government. Various Council member states have taken steps to lift unilateral sanctions on Syria.
Council Dynamics
Council members are aligned on the need for the Syrian authorities to advance an inclusive, Syrian-owned and Syrian-led political process based on the key principles of resolution 2254. They broadly agree that the threat of intercommunal violence cannot be addressed without advancing inclusive accountability measures, DDR and security sector reform (SSR) efforts, together with a credible political process in the country. The US and Russia have worked together on the 14 March presidential statement following violence perpetrated in Latakia and Tartous, while Denmark authored the 10 August presidential statement in response to violence in Suweida.
Many Council members also agree on the need for the Syrian interim government to take decisive measures to address the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) and ISIL (Da’esh), in line with the Council’s 10 August presidential statement. The US has said it is prioritising working with Syria to prevent the resurgence of ISIL. Several FTFs constitute part of the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement, which China considers a terrorist organisation and is also listed under UN sanctions. China has expressed concern about the reported integration of FTFs into the Syrian armed forces and has emphasised that the Council should carefully consider the implications of any adjustments to UN sanctions related to Syria.
There is broad agreement among Council members that the new Syrian government requires international support to rebuild the country and its crippled economy, including through the easing of unilateral sanctions. On 18 September, during a visit by Shibani to Washington DC, where discussions on permanently repealing sanctions prescribed by Congress are underway, the US Treasury Department said it is working to “reconnect [Syria’s] economy to the global financial system while combating the financing of terrorism”. During the 18 September Council meeting, the US said it is also pursuing efforts to ease UN sanctions on Syria, while the UK stressed the importance of the Council taking measures to support Syria’s economy, including through reforming UN sanctions.
Israel’s presence and military activities in Syria remain a point of contention for Council members. Most members believe Israel’s actions are fostering instability in Syria and that it must comply with the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement. In contrast, the US has predominantly seen Israel’s actions as defensive in nature or tied to ensuring its national security.
| Security Council Resolution | |
| 18 December 2015S/RES/2254 | This was the first resolution focused exclusively on a political solution to the Syrian crisis. It was adopted unanimously. |
| Security Council Presidential Statements | |
| 10 August 2025S/PRST/2025/6 | This was a presidential statement condemning violence against civilians in Suweida in July 2025, calling for unhindered humanitarian access to the region, and calling on the Syrian interim authorities to ensure accountability. |
| 14 March 2025S/PRST/2025/4 | This was a presidential statement condemning sectarian violence perpetrated in Latakia and Tartous and calling for accountability and the protection of all Syrians, regardless of ethnicity or religion. |
