Kosovo
Expected Council Action
In October, the Security Council is expected to hold its second briefing of the year on the Secretary-General’s latest report on the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the situation in Kosovo. Deputy Special Representative of UNMIK Milbert Dongjoon Shin is the anticipated briefer.
Key Developments
There has been no meaningful progress in the EU-facilitated dialogue on normalisation between Belgrade and Pristina. In late July, Belgrade reportedly ruled out the possibility of dialogue with Pristina following the 18 July arrest and pre-trial detention of Igor Popović, the Assistant Director of Serbia’s Office for Kosovo and Metohija and a member of the Serbian Government’s negotiation team in the EU-facilitated dialogue. Kosovo authorities accused Popović of “inciting ethnic hatred and division” after referring to the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) as a terrorist organisation during a public event in Rahovec earlier this month. Belgrade condemned the arrest as politically motivated, arguing that it represents an “unacceptable violation of fundamental human rights and democratic norms”. Serbian officials, including President Aleksandar Vučić, Minister of Foreign Affairs Marko Đurić and Serbia’s chief negotiator, Petar Petković, demanded Popović’s immediate release, with Đurić asserting that “there can be no dialogue with Pristina while arrests and pressures on Serbian officials and the Serbian people are taking place”.
Efforts to implement prior agreements have also stalled. To revive the normalisation talks, Peter Sørensen, the EU Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue, met separately with Kosovo President Vjosa Osmani and Prime Minister Albin Kurti on 6 August in Pristina, during which he underscored the criticality of the Ohrid Agreement’s implementation and stressed that it was “time to move forward” with the EU-led normalisation process with Belgrade. In early September, Sørensen also hosted talks in Brussels with Kosovo and Serbian chief negotiators on implementing the Ohrid Agreement and the 2023 Declaration for Missing Persons. (For background information on the Ohrid Agreement, see the brief on Kosovo in our April 2023 Monthly Forecast.) However, a meeting of the Joint Commission on Missing Persons did not take place as scheduled, owing to disagreements between both parties on what issues should be prioritised in implementing prior agreements.
Amidst these discussions, on 5 August, Popović accepted a guilty plea with the prosecution and was subsequently sentenced on 8 August to six months in prison by the Pristina Basic Court. The sentence was later commuted to a €3,000 fine. The court also ordered his deportation and banned him from re-entering Kosovo for two years.
The Central Election Commission of Kosovo (CEC) voted not to certify two Kosovo Serb political parties, Srpska Lista (Serbian List) and Srpska Demokratija (Serbian Democracy), for participation in the 12 October local elections. According to media reports, the CEC’s 21 August decision was predicated on the determination that some candidates did not meet the required legal standards to participate in the electoral race. Commission members from the Lëvizja Vetevendosje party (LVV), Sami Kurteshi and Alban Krasniqi, opposed Srpska Lista’s certification, citing “alleged links with Serbia-run parallel institutions operating outside central government control”. (Parallel institutions refer to a network of administrative, educational, and healthcare structures in Kosovo administered and funded by Serbia that operate alongside structures affiliated with Pristina, often in areas with a significant ethnic Serbian population.)
The move sparked significant concern and criticism from several international actors. The embassies of the Quint countries—France, Germany, Italy, the UK, and the US—and the EU issued a statement that stressed that “all procedures must be carried out strictly in line with the rules and mandate of the CEC and encouraged the affected parties to make full use of the Election Complaints and Appeals Panel (ECAP) to seek redress”. The UN also issued a statement warning that any decision regarding certification needed to be taken in full accordance with the law.
Following appeals from both Srpska Lista and Srpska Demokratija, the ECAP annulled the CEC’s decision and ordered the commission to certify the candidates nominated by Srpska Lista. Kurteshi and Krasniqi apparently filed a complaint with the Supreme Court of Kosovo against the ECAP’s decision. However, the court reportedly rejected the appeal on the basis that the legal criteria for disqualification were not met, affirming the ECAP’s decision and allowing Srpska Lista to remain in the race.
Meanwhile, the situation in northern Kosovo remains tense. In early May, local authorities, assisted by Kosovo police, took control over Serbian-run facilities in North Mitrovica, including the town’s Sports Center and regional Water Supply Companies in North Mitrovica and Zubin Potok. Belgrade strongly condemned the closures, maintaining that it is a “brazen attack on the fundamental human rights of Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija”. The closures were also met with international criticism. Special Representative and head of UNMIK Caroline Ziadeh reiterated her call for all parties “to avoid unilateral actions that risk escalating tensions or further erode trust between communities and the Kosovo authorities”.
On 27 May, local authorities in Leposavić, with the assistance of Kosovo police, seized control of the city’s sports hall, which was previously operating under Serbia’s institutional framework. International interlocutors again criticised the move. Ziadeh stressed the need to address all outstanding issues within the framework of the EU-facilitated dialogue. The latest wave of closures of institutions operating under the Serbian system in northern Kosovo includes the Pension and Disability Insurance Fund and the Republic Health Insurance Fund.
Towards the end of August, Ziadeh concluded her tenure as the Special Representative and head of UNMIK. At the time of writing, no one has yet been appointed to take over the position. Shin is currently leading the mission.
Key Issues and Options
Maintaining stability in Kosovo and promoting the de-escalation of tensions in the north remains a key priority for the Council. It will continue to monitor diplomatic efforts to advance the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue and any efforts to achieve the normalisation of relations between the two parties. To this end, the Council could consider pursuing a presidential statement calling for all parties to refrain from unilateral actions and reiterating support for the EU-facilitated dialogue as the primary framework for resolving outstanding issues. The Council could also affirm its support for the EU Special Representative and urge both Belgrade and Pristina to engage in good faith toward the resumption of normalisation talks.
Another underlying issue facing the Council is promoting constructive dialogue on this politically charged issue during Council meetings. Belgrade and Pristina generally advance contrasting narratives regarding the drivers of regional instability during the Council’s open briefings on the subject. These briefings often devolve into political theatre for both parties, where public posturing takes precedence over substantive discussion, as was observed during the 8 April Council’s meeting on the situation in Kosovo. This dynamic can overshadow any positive momentum and redirect focus on mutual blame. Council members may wish to consider changing the format of the meeting from an open briefing to closed consultations, potentially enabling a more candid discussion of the challenges to implementing commitments made under the EU-facilitated dialogue and resuming efforts towards the normalisation of relations. A closed setting could also allow for discussion of UNMIK’s future, given divisions among Council members on the future of the mission.
Council and Wider Dynamics
Most Council members are generally supportive of the EU-facilitated dialogue to establish conditions for normalising relations between Belgrade and Pristina. However, deep divisions persist among permanent members and continue to shape the Council’s approach to the issue.
Among the five permanent Council members, France, the UK, and the US recognise Kosovo’s independence and tend to be supportive of its government. China and Russia, on the other hand, do not recognise its independence and strongly support Serbia’s position and its claim to territorial integrity. Six elected members—Denmark, Guyana, Pakistan, Panama, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and Slovenia—recognise Kosovo’s independence, while two (Algeria and Greece) do not.
Regarding the other two elected members, Kosovo maintains that Sierra Leone officially recognised its independence in June 2008. According to media reports, however, Serbia claimed in March 2020 that Sierra Leone had withdrawn its recognition, citing a note verbale on the matter from Sierra Leone’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Kosovo contests the validity of the withdrawal. Somalia recognised Kosovo on 19 May 2010. However, on 4 January 2023, Vučić reportedly claimed that Somalia—along with eight other countries—had rescinded recognition. Kosovar authorities have also disputed these claims.
The modification of UNMIK’s mandate, with a view to its possible drawdown, is another matter of contention among Council members. The US has been the most forthcoming advocate for reviewing UNMIK’s operations and ultimately phasing out the mission. Several other Council members, including Denmark, the ROK and the UK, have expressed support for a strategic review and potential modification of UNMIK’s mandate, contending that the situation on the ground has changed considerably since the mission was first established in 1999. Russia continues to oppose any changes to UNMIK’s mandate or budget reduction, maintaining that the mission continues to play a critical role.
| Security Council Meeting Records | |
| 8 April 2025S/PV.9894 | This was was the first regular briefing of the year on the situation in Kosovo. |
| Secretary-General’s Reports | |
| 1 April 2025S/2025/200 | This was the Secretary-General’s report on UNMIK. |
