Bosnia and Herzegovina
Expected Council Action
In October, the Security Council will hold its semi-annual debate on Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). The Council is also expected to vote at the end of the month on the reauthorisation of the EU-led multinational stabilisation force (EUFOR ALTHEA) prior to its 1 November expiration.
Key Recent Developments
BiH continues to experience political instability. On 1 August, the Appellate Division of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) confirmed a verdict sentencing former Republika Srpska (RS) President Milorad Dodik to one year in prison and a six-year ban on holding office as RS president. Dodik was appealing a sentence handed to him in February for knowingly defying decisions issued by the High Representative, Christian Schmidt, in July 2023. (For background and earlier political developments, see the brief on BiH in our May 2025 Monthly Forecast.)
Following the court’s ruling, the Central Election Commission (CEC) of BiH on 6 August subsequently revoked Dodik’s mandate as RS President. Dodik reportedly dismissed the court and CEC’s decision and asserted that he would continue to fulfil his responsibilities as RS president notwithstanding the verdict. Dodik’s lawyer, Goran Bubić, also added that they intend to appeal the ruling to the Constitutional Court and seek a temporary measure to postpone the verdict’s implementation pending the appeal. Amidst these developments, the BiH state court accepted a proposal from Dodik’s defence team to commute his one-year prison sentence to a fine of 36,500 Bosnia-Herzegovina Convertible Marks (around 18,660 euros). The court, however, upheld the federal and appellate courts’ ruling to remove Dodik from the RS presidency and bar him from holding political office.
In light of these developments, Council members held close consultations on the situation in BiH on 7 August. Russia requested the meeting to discuss the 1 August appeals court verdict revoking Dodik’s presidential mandate. There was no briefer at the meeting. Following the consultations, Russia, at a press stakeout, maintained that the current situation in BiH, with Dodik’s prosecution, threatens the country’s stability. It also reiterated its previous concerns over Schmidt’s actions by accusing him of exacerbating tensions in BiH’s internal affairs, faulting him for the country’s instability.
Tensions escalated further when Dodik vowed to block elections in RS and to hold a series of referendums—the first of which would be the vote on the court ruling and another on independence for RS. On 22 August, the RS National Assembly (RSNA) rejected the CEC’s decision and voted in favour of calling a referendum to ask citizens whether they accept Dodik’s conviction and the High Representative’s authority. Srđan Mazalica, the head of Dodik’s Alliance of Independent Social Democrats party (SNSD), presented the referendum question for a vote that read: “Do you accept the decisions of the unelected foreigner Christian Schmidt and the unconstitutional verdict of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Court against the President of the RS, as well as the decision of the CEC to revoke the mandate of the president of the RS, Milorad Dodik?” Of the 65 representatives present, 50 voted in favour of the referendum. Opposition parliamentary members, however, refused to cast their votes on the measure. The decision was subsequently adopted, setting the referendum’s date for 25 October. On the same day, RSNA also passed votes dismissing Schmidt’s authority, demanding that Dodik continue as RS president, and rejecting elections to choose a successor.
The action was met with criticism from opposition leaders as well as international interlocutors. Nebojša Vukanović, President of Justice and Order List, reportedly warned Dodik and other parliamentary members that they were “walking on a minefield” with the decision to hold a referendum. The EU similarly underscored that the verdict issued by the Court of BiH must be respected, cautioning that “subjecting a court decision to a public vote runs counter to the rule of law and the independence of judicial authorities”. In light of such developments, the CEC called for early elections to choose Dodik’s successor. Speaking at a press conference in Sarajevo, the head of the CEC, Irena Hadžiabdić, announced that a presidential election for the RS entity would be held on 23 November.
In early September, the RSNA approved a government restructuring aimed at establishing a broader coalition parliament. Dodik apparently initiated the motion to form a government based on a wider coalition with increased decision-making power. Emphasising the need for changes within the RS government to address imminent challenges, he asked the entity’s Prime Minister, Radovan Višković, to resign and proposed former Agriculture Minister Savo Minić as his replacement. The reshuffled government, comprising only four new parliamentary members, was later approved by fifty deputies from the ruling coalition led by the SNSD. The move elicited considerable criticism from the opposition, with many not attending the vote. Prior to the government reshuffle, it appears that Dodik had invited the opposition to join his ruling coalition in a “new regional government”, but the main opposition parties dismissed his calls. The primary rationale for their abstention and dismissal of Dodik’s calls was the assertion that the government would be illegal, given that it was initiated by Dodik, after he had been prohibited from engaging in political activities.
Human Rights-Related Developments
Between 9 and 20 June, Mary Lawlor, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, conducted a country visit to Bosnia and Herzegovina. She began her visit in Sarajevo, and also went to Banja Luka, Bijeljina, and other parts of the country, meeting with relevant stakeholders to assess the environment for people seeking to exercise the right to defend human rights in the country, and the extent to which they can do so freely without fear. While acknowledging some positive practices, she emphasised that political will to support defenders remains totally absent, and that much of their protection comes from solidarity among themselves.
In a subsequent press release, Lawlor expressed concern about the deteriorating environment for human rights defenders, particularly in Republika Srpska, where defenders and independent journalists are often targeted in widespread smear campaigns and increasingly stigmatised, including by high-level political figures. She also noted that while the Constitutional Court annulled the Law on the Special Registry and Transparency of the Work of Non-profit Organisations, authorities in the RS are pursuing secondary legislation to establish a registry of groups receiving foreign funding. To this end, the Special Rapporteur called for this initiative to be abandoned. Lawlor also urged the BiH authorities to ensure accountability for attacks against human rights defenders and counter negative narratives surrounding their work.
Key Issues and Options
Addressing the divisions over the role of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) remains a key divisive issue for the Council. Neither China nor Russia recognise Schmidt’s authority as High Representative, and both have called for the closure of the OHR. Western Council members, including the P3 (France, the UK, and the US), have opposed imposing a time frame for the OHR’s closure without referencing the 5+2 Agenda, which is a set of five objectives and two conditions established by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) that need to be fulfilled before the OHR’s closure. (The Peace Implementation Council is an international body, established in December 1995, responsible for mobilising international support for the Agreement. For background on the PIC, see the brief on BiH in our November 2024 Monthly Forecast.)
Given the current divisions over the OHR, the Council could request the International Court of Justice to render an advisory opinion on the procedures and modalities for appointing High Representatives of BiH under the Dayton Peace Agreement.
A potential issue for the Council would be if RS institutions refuse to participate in, or recognise, the results of the presidential election on 23 November and demand that Dodik stay on as RS president. This could increase the risk of institutional fragmentation and contribute to further breakdown of cooperation between the state level (BiH) and RS organs. Council members may wish to start informal discussions on how to handle such a scenario.
An upcoming issue for the Council will be the renewal of EUFOR ALTHEA’s authorisation, which is set to expire on 1 November. The most likely option would be to reauthorise the mandate for an additional year without any significant changes.
Council Dynamics
Deep divisions related to BiH’s Euro-Atlantic integration and possible accession to NATO—particularly between Russia on the one hand and the US and Council members from Europe on the other—have long influenced Council dynamics on BiH. The European Council agreed to open accession talks with BiH on 21 March after unanimously voting to grant BiH candidate status in December 2022.
Overall, Council members have similar concerns about BiH’s divisive ethnic politics. Most members are also critical of Dodik’s rhetoric and threats of dissolution, which they regard as a challenge to BiH’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Russia, on the other hand, tends to be supportive of Dodik’s positions.
Council products on BiH are prepared by the BiH Coordination and Drafting Group (CDG), which comprises France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the UK, the US, and elected Council members Denmark, Greece, and Slovenia. Each member chairs the group for one month, rotating in alphabetical order. Greece is the CDG Chair in October.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 1 November 2024S/RES/2757 | This renewed the authorisation of the EU-led multinational stabilisation force (EUFOR ALTHEA) for an additional year, until 1 November 2025. |
| Security Council Meeting Records | |
| 6 May 2025S/PV.9911 | This was the semi-annual debate on Bosnia and Herzegovina. |
| Security Council Press Statements | |
| 28 March 2025SC/16033 | This was a press statement on BiH. |
