Yemen
Expected Council Action
In September, the Security Council will hold its monthly briefing, followed by closed consultations, on Yemen. UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg and an official from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) are expected to brief on political, security, and humanitarian developments in the country.
Key Recent Developments
Yemen continues to face deepening humanitarian and economic crises amid a stalled political process. Regional factors compound the country’s fragility.
In August, no further attacks by the Houthis—a Yemeni rebel group also known as Ansar Allah—on commercial vessels were reported in the Red Sea. In July, the group resumed targeting commercial vessels in the area for the first time since late 2024. These attacks are part of their offensive against Israel, which they claim is in solidarity with Palestinians, and have threatened to continue until Israel ends its military campaign in Gaza that followed the 7 October 2023 Hamas-led attacks. The Houthis have reportedly said that ships linked to Israel are a legitimate target.
In line with this campaign, the Houthis have continued to directly target Israel through ballistic missile and drone attacks, provoking retaliatory strikes from the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). Following reported Houthi ballistic missile and drone attacks on Israel on 5, 12, and 14 August—all of which fell short of their targets or were intercepted—the Israeli Navy launched strikes on a power plant outside Sanaa, the Houthi-controlled capital of Yemen, on 17 August, claiming that it was energy infrastructure being used by the Houthis. The rebel group retaliated with a ballistic missile attack targeting Israel’s Ben Gurion airport on the same day, which was intercepted by the Israeli military. On 22 August, the Houthis launched attacks involving a drone and a missile, which, according to the Israeli military, was the first time a cluster bomb warhead was used by the group. On 24 August, the IDF launched heavy strikes on Sanaa, including on a military compound which contains the presidential palace, a fuel depot, and two power stations, which the Houthi-run Ministry of Health said killed at least ten people and wounded 92. The IDF struck Sanaa again on 28 August, reportedly to target senior Houthi officials. The Houthis have denied that senior leaders were targeted. According to the Israeli media, since Israel resumed its campaign in Gaza on 18 March, the Houthis have launched 72 ballistic missiles and at least 23 drones at Israel, most of which have fallen short or been intercepted.
The Houthis continue to hold several crew members from the MV Eternity C, a Liberian-flagged, Greek-operated ship, which they attacked and sank on 7 July, killing at least five other crew members. They also continue to arbitrarily detain UN, NGO, and diplomatic staff, who have been held for over a year.
In his 12 August briefing to the Security Council, Grundberg warned that while the frontlines continue to be stable, a 25 July assault on the Aleb front, which resulted in several fatalities and injuries on both sides, and signs that the Houthis are fortifying positions, including around Hodeidah city, are concerning.
Grundberg reiterated three priorities to create a foundation for a lasting solution to the conflict in Yemen: de-escalation on the frontlines and working with the parties on the principles of a ceasefire; establishing a path for the parties to return to talks in line with commitments made in the December 2023 roadmap; and regional and international cooperation to stabilise and support Yemen, including through achieving security guarantees for the Red Sea.
On 20 August, during a visit to Riyadh, the Special Envoy held a meeting with the President of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), Rashad Al-Alimi, and discussed the need to improve living conditions for Yemenis and advance a political agreement that leads to sustainable peace in Yemen.
Throughout August, in response to the worsening economic crisis, the Central Bank of Yemen in Aden and the internationally recognised government took steps to address currency depreciation and to stabilise the prices of essential goods. Due to the reforms, the Yemeni rial reportedly appreciated by over 44 percent as of late July. In his Council briefing, Grundberg welcomed these steps and said he hoped that they “mark the start of a sustained recovery”.
The humanitarian crisis in Yemen is worsening as needs are soaring. In his briefing to the Council on 12 August, the OCHA Director of the Coordination Division, Ramesh Rajasingham, warned that “Yemen is now one of the most food insecure countries in the world”, with more than 17 million people going hungry and with half of Yemeni children under the age of five suffering from acute malnutrition. He added that in internally displaced persons camps in the Abs District of Hajjah governorate, children are dying from starvation. Rajasingham called for urgent funding to scale up emergency food and nutrition support and for financial support for the Yemen Humanitarian Fund. As of 31 July, OCHA’s 2025 Yemen Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan was only 13.6 per cent funded, with $2.14 billion in unmet requirements.
Women, Peace and Security
A 15 July update from the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) highlighted the devastating consequences of funding cuts for women and girls in Yemen, where one woman dies of childbirth or pregnancy-related causes every two hours. The alert says that essential reproductive health services and protection for survivors of gender-based violence (GBV) “are being dismantled due to funding cuts”. UNFPA reports that lack of funding has already forced it to suspend support to nearly 50 health facilities and to close 16 safe spaces and a specialised mental health centre, leaving GBV survivors without essential support. Funding cuts have also led UNFPA to withdraw support from 14 mobile teams, which reached women, girls and midwives in some of the remotest parts of the country. The update stresses that approximately 1.5 million women and girls have already lost access to life-saving services and that broader reductions could result in “nearly 7 million people denied access to life-saving care”. It also notes that UNFPA’s 2025 $70 million appeal for Yemen is only 36 percent funded.
Key Issues and Options
A key issue for the Council is how to help mitigate the risk of an escalation of hostilities in Yemen and the Red Sea while advancing efforts to relaunch the stalled intra-Yemeni political process amid broader regional tensions. Houthi attacks against commercial vessels and global maritime supply chains in the Red Sea further complicate efforts to secure the UN’s roadmap for peace in Yemen.
One option for the Council would be to issue a presidential statement calling for de-escalation, stressing that there is no military solution to the conflict in Yemen, and demanding that the Yemeni parties resume concrete discussions on establishing a roadmap under UN auspices for inclusive peace in the country. Given the degradation of economic conditions in the country, members could also demand renewed economic and humanitarian initiatives, such as the implementation of the economic de-escalation agreement reached on 23 July 2024 between the Houthis and the Yemeni government.
The statement could also reiterate provisions from relevant resolutions on the situation in Yemen and the Red Sea, including demanding that the Houthis immediately cease all attacks against merchant and commercial vessels, underscoring the need to address the root causes of the attacks in the Red Sea, and calling on all member states to adhere to the arms embargo imposed by resolution 2216.
Given the increasingly fraught humanitarian context, Council members could also consider holding a public briefing, or a high level side-event during the UN’s annual General Assembly High-Level Week, focused specifically on Yemen’s humanitarian crisis—which could include a briefing from the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) or the World Food Programme (WFP) on the country’s rapidly worsening food security—providing member states the opportunity to highlight the urgent need for bolstering funding pledges.
Council Dynamics
Council members are largely aligned in support of an inclusive intra-Yemeni political process, the need to improve economic and humanitarian conditions in the country, and the need to restore freedom of navigation and security in the Red Sea. Three of the Council’s elected members—Denmark, Greece, and Panama—have suffered Houthi attacks on their commercial vessels. Advancing mediation efforts towards a resumption of dialogue and a peace process under UN auspices remains an overarching priority for members.
Nevertheless, members have divergent views on the reasons for the protracted political stalemate and insecurity in Yemen. The “A3 plus one” members (Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Guyana), China, Pakistan, and Russia have all stressed that the situation in Yemen and the Red Sea cannot be discussed in isolation from the situation in Gaza. Russia and China have also criticised foreign military action in Yemen—Israel, the UK, and the US have all conducted strikes targeting Houthi infrastructure since the beginning of the Red Sea crisis—claiming that it only serves to degrade the country’s already dire humanitarian situation, exacerbate the situation in the Red Sea, and negatively impact the peace process.
On the other hand, the P3 members (France, the UK, and the US) have accused Iran of financially and militarily supporting the Houthis, fostering further regional tensions. The US has repeatedly called for the Security Council to respond to Iranian defiance of the Council-mandated arms embargo and has underscored its support for Israel’s right to defend itself against the Houthis.
Several Council members have also called for the strengthening of the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM), which inspects ships travelling to Houthi-controlled ports to ensure compliance with the arms embargo against the group.
The UK is the penholder on Yemen. Greece and the US are the co-penholders on the Red Sea crisis.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 15 July 2025S/RES/2787 | This resolution extends the Secretary-General’s monthly reporting requirement on Houthi attacks on merchant and commercial vessels in the Red Sea until 15 January 2026. |
| 14 July 2025S/RES/2786 | This resolution renewed the mandate of UNMHA until 28 January 2026 and requested the Secretary-General to present to the Council, before 28 November 2025, a further review of UNMHA with a view to delivering further efficiencies and structural coherence and coordination across UN missions in Yemen. |
| Security Council Press Statements | |
| 5 June 2025SC/16079 | This was a press statement marking one year since the June 2024 wave of arbitrary detentions of UN and NGO personnel by the Houthis. |
| 13 February 2025SC/15995 | This was a press statement on Houthi Detention of United Nations, International Non-governmental Organization Workers. |
