Syria
Expected Council Action
In September, the Security Council is expected to hold two meetings on Syria: one on political and humanitarian issues, and another on the chemical weapons track.
Key Recent Developments
Following the escalation of violence in Suweida governorate in July, the security situation in Syria has been relatively calm. This sectarian violence, however, demonstrated the fragility of Syria’s transition.
A ceasefire in Suweida, announced by the Syrian interim government on 19 July, has largely continued to hold, despite heightened tensions and sporadic clashes in the region. On 12 August, high-level officials from Syria, Jordan, and the US agreed to form a working group to support the ceasefire and to resolve the crisis in the governorate.
On 10 August, the Security Council adopted a presidential statement expressing concern over the violence in Suweida and condemning attacks on civilians. It called for adherence to the ceasefire and urged the Syrian interim authorities to ensure accountability and inclusive justice efforts. (For more information, see our 9 August What’s in Blue story.)
On 26 August, an Israeli drone strike targeting a Syrian army unit in the Damascus countryside killed six soldiers and was strongly condemned by the Syrian interim government. Israel has also continued to carry out ground incursions into the southwest of the country, ostensibly aimed at ensuring its national security and supporting the Druze community. A 25 August Israeli incursion into rural Damascus prompted condemnation from Syrian foreign minister Asaad al-Shabani, who reportedly accused Israel of “expansionist and partition plans”. On 19 August, the US reportedly brokered a high-level meeting between Israeli officials and Shaibani to further reduce tensions between the two countries, and on 25 August, Sharaa revealed that Syria is in advanced stages of security talks with Israel.
Syrian interim authorities continue to face challenges in fostering Syrian unity and in incorporating armed groups into the Ministry of Defence’s forces. Secessionist and anti-government sentiment among the Druze community has apparently increased since July, with protests calling for independence reportedly taking place in Suweida city. Meanwhile, tensions are mounting between the Syrian interim authorities and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a Kurdish-led group which controls most of Syria’s de facto autonomous northeastern territory. On 9 August, Syria’s state news agency reported that, in reaction to an SDF-held conference calling for decentralisation, the interim authorities backed out of planned talks in Paris between the two parties, demonstrating that challenges remain in the implementation of the 10 March agreement to integrate the SDF and its associated civil and military structures into Syria’s state institutions by the end of 2025. On 17 August, following a number of clashes between the interim government forces and the SDF, the Syrian interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, said that he hoped for a peaceful resolution to the issue within “a few months”, with the support of the US and Türkiye.
Terrorism remains a significant threat to Syria’s security. The 24 July report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team of the 1267/1989/2253 Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, covering the period from 14 December 2024 to 22 June, says that ISIL “remained determined to exploit the situation” in Syria, including divisions in the country. The report says that during the reporting period, ISIL carried out over 90 attacks in Syria, and further notes that it “also tried to incite sectarian tensions” and discredit Sharaa. According to media reports, on 20 August, the US-led coalition against ISIL conducted an operation west of Aleppo in which it captured a senior member of the terrorist group.
The interim government continues to take steps to advance Syria’s political transition. On 20 August, Sharaa signed a decree which approved a temporary electoral system for the People’s Assembly, stipulating that the parliament will have 210 seats, with two-thirds elected by electoral colleges formed in Syria’s separate governorates and one-third to be appointed directly by the interim president. In July, the chairman of the Higher Committee for People’s Assembly Elections reportedly said that the indirect elections would take place between 15 and 20 September, which would mark the first parliamentary elections to be held following the ouster of former president Bashar al-Assad. On 23 August, the Committee reportedly announced that it would be delaying the elections in Suweida governorate and in the partially Kurdish-controlled Hasaka and Raqqa governorates due to security concerns, drawing criticism from Kurdish authorities.
Efforts also continue to advance Syria’s postwar reconstruction and economic rehabilitation. On 6 August, the interim government signed 12 investment deals—including with Qatari and UAE-based corporations—worth a total of $14 billion, which involve infrastructure, transportation, and real estate projects such as a new airport and subway system in Damascus.
In his 21 August briefing to the Security Council, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Tom Fletcher stressed that investment in longer-term support for development and reconstruction was crucial to ensure that the “humanitarian mission” in Syria transitions to Syrian-led recovery and rebuilding. He emphasised that this is particularly important as the country grapples with a dire humanitarian crisis impacting over 16 million Syrians who need humanitarian support, and as severe funding shortages are curtailing efforts to sustain and expand aid delivery.
On 25 August, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) published its monthly report on the implementation of resolution 2118 of 27 September 2013, which required the verification and destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons stockpiles. At an 11 July meeting of the OPCW, Damascus announced that it will launch internationally led working groups to “bring closure” to the legacy of Assad’s chemical weapons programme.
Human Rights-Related Developments
On 14 August, the UN Syria Commission of Inquiry (COI) published a report on the outbreak of sectarian violence in Syria’s coastal areas. The violence, which primarily targeted Alawite communities and culminated in massacres in early March, included murder and inhumane acts related to the treatment of the dead, among other human rights abuses that were perpetrated by the interim government’s forces and individuals operating alongside them, as well as fighters associated with the deposed Assad government. Drawing from extensive investigations and over 200 interviews with witnesses and victims, the report found that such violations included acts that “likely amounted to war crimes” from both sides on the basis that “members of certain factions extrajudicially executed, tortured and ill-treated civilians in multiple Alawite majority villages and neighbourhoods in a manner that was both widespread and systematic”. In this regard, the Commission urged all parties to de-escalate tensions, engage in dialogue, and uphold the human rights of all individuals. Among other recommendations, the COI called on the interim authorities to continue to pursue accountability for all perpetrators, regardless of affiliation or rank.
Women, Peace and Security
In a 23 July statement, several UN independent experts expressed grave concern over reports of targeted abductions, disappearances, and gender-based violence against women and girls in Syria, particularly targeting the Alawite community. The independent experts referenced the reported abductions of 38 Alawite women and girls across various governorates since early March, including Latakia, Tartous, Hama, Homs, Damascus, and Aleppo. The statement stressed that the pattern of violations, involving gender-based violence, forced marriage of minors, and a “glaring lack of effective response” by the Syrian interim government, suggests a targeted campaign against Alawite women and girls based on intersecting grounds”. The statement also noted that these incidents “reflect a broader pattern of violence against different groups of women and girls”.
Noting that several cases reportedly involved actors affiliated with the interim government, the independent experts underscored that “[a]uthorities have an obligation under international law to protect all women and girls from violence, provide effective remedies, and ensure access to justice, protection and assistance, including psychosocial support”. They called on the interim government to carry out prompt, thorough, and impartial investigations; prosecute perpetrators; ensure the safety and rehabilitation of survivors; and establish measures such as instituting safe, gender-sensitive reporting channels.
Key Issues and Options
A key issue for the Council is to ensure that Syria’s interim government pursues a credible, transparent, and inclusive political process while navigating an increasingly fraught security context compounded by sectarian violence, terrorism, and violations of Syria’s sovereignty. Council members will be closely monitoring the process and results of the upcoming parliamentary elections to consider whether it meets their calls for inclusivity, transparency, and aligns with the principles set out in resolution 2254 of 18 December 2025, which focused on a political solution to the crisis in Syria. Announced delays in holding elections in Suweida, Hasaka, and Raqqa governorates may have some Council members questioning the comprehensiveness and inclusivity of the process.
A related key issue is how the interim government advances transitional justice efforts, including accountability and reconciliation. Council members will be keen to learn more about the findings of the fact-finding committee tasked with investigating the violence in Latakia and Tartous in early March, which presented its findings to Sharaa on 22 July, although they have not been published. Members may also be interested in more information about the fact-finding committee established in August to investigate the violence in Suweida. Council members will be closely monitoring steps taken by the interim government to ensure accountability for crimes, regardless of the fighters’ affiliation, in line with the Council’s 10 August presidential statement.
Another issue is that UN sanctions on Ha’yat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)—a terrorist group formerly affiliated with Al-Qaida and ISIL, which led to the ouster of Assad under Sharaa’s leadership—are impacting the interim government’s functions. HTS, Sharaa, and Syria’s interim interior minister Anas Khattab are all listed under the 1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, which imposes an asset freeze, travel ban and arms embargo on listed individuals and entities. One option the Council could consider is delisting members of the interim government and applying a carve-out to facilitate economic engagement with the interim government. Various Council member states have taken steps to lift unilateral sanctions on Syria.
The future of the UN’s role in Syria is another key issue for the Council. Under instructions from the Secretary-General, the UN Secretariat has conducted an integrated strategic assessment of the changing situation in the country, which has been finalised in an internal report. Based on this report, the Secretary-General will consider what type of UN presence in Syria would be most suitable to meet the country’s current needs.
Council members could request an informal briefing on the results of the integrated strategic assessment. They could also consider convening an Informal Interactive Dialogue (IID) with the participation of Syria and relevant UN departments to discuss the most viable options on future Council engagement with Syria.
Council Dynamics
Council members are aligned on the need for the Syrian authorities to advance an inclusive, Syrian-owned and Syrian-led political process based on the key principles of resolution 2254. They agree that the Syrian interim government needs to pursue disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) efforts towards comprehensive security sector reform (SSR). Several Council members have also stressed that recurring escalations of violence cannot be addressed without advancing inclusive accountability measures and a credible political process in the country.
There is broad agreement among Council members that the new Syrian government requires international support to rebuild the country and its crippled economy, including through the easing of sanctions. Following a 31 July meeting with Shaibani in Moscow, Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov reportedly said Russia was ready to provide Syria with “all possible assistance in post-conflict reconstruction”.
Many Council members also agree on the need for the Syrian interim government to take decisive measures to address the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), in line with the Council’s 10 August presidential statement. Many of the fighters in question are Uyghurs who constitute part of the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement—also known as the Turkistan Islamic Party—which China considers a terrorist organisation and is also listed under UN sanctions. China has repeatedly expressed concern about the reported integration of FTFs into the Syrian army.
Israel’s presence and military activities in Syria remain a point of contention for Council members. Most members believe Israel’s actions are fostering tensions and instability in Syria, but the US has predominantly seen its actions as defensive in nature or tied to ensuring its national security. The 10 August presidential statement fell short of condemning Israel’s strikes and incursions in Syria. Instead, it condemned “all forms of negative or destructive interference in Syria’s political, security and economic transition”, and called on all states to refrain from actions which may destabilise the country.
| Security Council Resolution | |
| 18 December 2015S/RES/2254 | This was the first resolution focused exclusively on a political solution to the Syrian crisis. It was adopted unanimously. |
| Security Council Presidential Statements | |
| 10 August 2025S/PRST/2025/6 | This was a presidential statement condemning violence against civilians in Suweida in July 2025, calling for unhindered humanitarian access to the region, and calling on the Syrian interim authorities to ensure accountability. |
| 14 March 2025S/PRST/2025/4 | This was a presidential statement condemning sectarian violence perpetrated in Latakia and Tartous and calling for accountability and the protection of all Syrians, regardless of ethnicity or religion. |