Haiti
Expected Council Action
In September, the US and Panama, the co-penholders on Haiti, may seek authorisation from the Security Council for a reconfigured multinational mission to combat armed gangs in Haiti, as well as a related UN Support Office to provide logistical and operational support to the mission. This force may succeed the Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission in Haiti, the authorisation of which expires on 2 October.
Background and Key Recent Developments
After the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021, Haiti descended into a multidimensional crisis characterised by political deadlock, extreme violence, and dire humanitarian conditions. Armed gangs have overrun an estimated 85 percent of Port-au-Prince, the capital, employing tactics including murder, kidnapping, and sexual violence on the civilian population amid widespread impunity. In recent months, the gangs have expanded their reach beyond the capital, including to parts of the Artibonite and Centre departments.
The Haitian National Police (HNP) and the MSS mission have struggled to make significant headway against the gangs, while repelling some attacks and re-establishing access to some areas.
In October 2022, the Haitian government appealed for the immediate deployment of an “international specialised force” to temporarily reinforce the efforts of the HNP to combat gangs. UN Secretary-General António Guterres endorsed the request, recommending that “[o]ne or several Member States, acting bilaterally at the invitation of and in cooperation with the Government of Haiti, could deploy, as a matter of urgency, a rapid action force” to support the HNP. Nine months later, in July 2023, Kenya agreed to lead a multinational force in the country.
Although the UN would not administer the proposed mission, Kenya, Haiti, and other stakeholders sought Security Council authorisation for the deployment. On 2 October 2023, the Council adopted resolution 2699 authorising member states to form and deploy the MSS mission to Haiti for an initial period of 12 months. The resolution mandated the mission to help Haitian authorities re-establish security in the country and build conditions conducive to holding free and fair elections. It specified that the cost of the operation would be borne by voluntary contributions and support from individual countries and regional organisations. Subsequent assessments envisaged the deployment of 2,500 officers in phases, at an annual cost of approximately $600 million.
The mission was initially scheduled to deploy in February 2024, but that timeline was repeatedly postponed for a number of reasons, including lack of funding, with the first contingent arriving in Haiti in June 2024.
In September 2024, the Council extended the authorisation of the MSS mission until 2 October 2025 through resolution 2751. Although this resolution encouraged the mission to accelerate its deployment and the international community to provide additional voluntary contributions, the mission has consistently faced funding uncertainty and a lack of adequate equipment. Deployment levels have remained far short of the 2,500 officers initially envisaged, with close to only 1,000 personnel on the ground at the time of writing.
Responding to a request of the Security Council, in February, the Secretary-General issued a letter containing recommendations on options for UN support for Haiti. The Secretary-General recommended, among other things, the establishment of a UN Support Office to provide logistic and operational support to the MSS mission, including accommodation, medical capability, and support for mobility and information technology.
After holding several inconclusive meetings on the letter, members of the Security Council have recently begun negotiations on a draft resolution that apparently provides options for security support for Haiti. During the 28 August Security Council open briefing on Haiti, the US announced that, together with Panama, it would share with Council members a draft resolution “to help address the growing violence by establishing a Gang Suppression Force and creating a UN Support Office to provide logistical support to efforts on the ground”.
On 14 July, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2785, renewing the mandate of the UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) for another six and a half months, until 31 January 2026. The resolution expressed the Council’s intention to consider the Secretary-General’s recommendations “without delay”. (For background, see our 11 July What’s in Blue story.)
The humanitarian situation remains dire. At the 28 August Council briefing on Haiti, which focused on children and humanitarian issues, Guterres said that the “humanitarian toll is staggering”, with 1.3 million people–half of whom are children–internally displaced, six million people in need of humanitarian assistance, growing levels of acute food insecurity, and humanitarian workers facing threats of violence, extortion and kidnapping. (For background, see our 27 August What’s in Blue story.)
On the political front, the future of the transition—including the holding of a constitutional referendum as well as legislative and presidential elections—remains unclear. On 7 August, Laurent Saint-Cyr replaced Fritz Alphonse Jean in the Transitional Presidential Council (TPC) rotating presidency. He is expected to lead the TPC until the end of this body’s mandate in February 2026. (The TPC was created pursuant to a March 2024 agreement facilitated by the Caribbean Community and the US following a dramatic surge in gang violence in February 2024. According to the 10 April 2024 Decree, which established the TPC, this transitional body will exercise presidential powers until a new president is elected by 7 February 2026. As established by a May 2024 Decree, the TPC’s mandate cannot be extended.)
According to media reports, Haitian authorities have been in negotiations to give foreign contractors expanded roles in combating the gangs and tax collection. US private military contractors are already engaged in Haiti to support a task force operating drones targeted at gang members. The deployment of drones to curb violence in Haiti has raised concerns about the legality and effectiveness of their use.
On 27 June, the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS) adopted a resolution requesting the OAS Secretary-General to develop an action plan on the OAS’ support to Haitian authorities on issues including security, humanitarian assistance, and elections. During a 20 August meeting of the OAS Permanent Council, the OAS Secretary-General presented a document titled “Towards a Haitian-led Roadmap for Stability and Peace”. The roadmap details a set of actions to address Haiti’s urgent needs and long-term challenges that are organised thematically around five pillars: “Security Stabilization and Peace Restoration”, “Political Consensus and Governance Support”, “Electoral Process and Institutional Legitimacy”, “Humanitarian Response” and “Sustainable Development and Economic Progress”. It estimates that $2.6 billion would be needed for the implementation of all the proposed actions, with the largest portion of this budget ($1.336 billion) to be allocated to “Security Stabilization and Peace Restoration”.
Human Rights-Related Developments
In an apparent response to recent announcements and measures on deportations of Haitian nationals from the US and the Dominican Republic, in a 4 July press statement, the UN Designated Expert on Human Rights in Haiti, William O’Neill, voiced alarm over the country’s human rights situation, characterising it as “catastrophic by any measure”. O’Neill recalled that the principle of non-refoulement entails an obligation on states not to return anyone from their territory or under their jurisdiction to a place where there are substantial grounds for believing that they would be at risk of persecution, torture, ill-treatment, enforced disappearance or other irreparable harm. He echoed the calls by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to all states “not to forcibly return anyone to Haiti” and to consider legal stay arrangements with appropriate safeguards.
Women, Peace and Security
According to the annual report of the Secretary-General on conflict-related sexual violence, attacks by gangs in 2024 “generally involved the use of widespread sexual violence”. Women and girls were “overwhelmingly affected”, including in informal displacement sites. BINUH verified 708 cases of sexual violence in 2024 (affecting 523 girls, 142 women, and 43 boys), while humanitarian service providers recorded 3,598 cases of gender-based violence. At the same time, the report notes that sexual violence in Haiti remains “chronically underreported”. The Secretary-General urged the international community to increase support for the Haitian authorities’ humanitarian and security efforts, prioritise protection, enable the MSS mission to assist the HNP to “enhance the protection of civilians”, and to support the authorities in delivering comprehensive assistance and justice for survivors.
Sanctions-Related Developments
On 8 July, the 2653 Haiti Sanctions Committee approved the addition of the Viv Ansanm and Gran Grif gangs to its list of sanctioned entities. While the committee had previously designated the leaders of Viv Ansanm and Gran Grif, this was the first time that gangs in their entirety were listed under the Haiti sanctions regime.
On 15 July, the Council of the EU sanctioned three gang leaders for actions that threaten the peace, stability and security of Haiti.
Key Issues and Options
The tasks for the Security Council in September are to decide on how to respond to the proposal advanced by the US and Panama for a reconfigured multinational mission to combat gangs in Haiti and on authorising a UN Support Office for the mission. Members’ deliberations on these issues will determine the future of the MSS mission ahead of the expiration of its authorisation on 2 October.
In considering the reshaped multinational mission, members may consider including provisions on compliance with international law. Resolution 2699, for instance, reaffirmed that the MSS mission rules of engagement and directives on the use of force should be “in strict compliance with international law, including, international human rights law”. That resolution also called on the MSS mission to “establish an oversight mechanism to prevent human rights violations or abuses, in particular sexual exploitation and abuse”. Additionally, it recognised the importance of “dedicated expertise” within the mission on children and women’s protection.
Members could also stress the importance of full compliance with the UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) for any support provided by the UN Support Office to the reconfigured mission.
More generally, members may consider strengthening the human rights oversight capabilities of the UN in Haiti to report on compliance with international human rights law of all operations tasked to re-establish security in Haiti, including the principle that lethal force should only be used when strictly necessary to protect life or prevent serious injury from an imminent threat.
An additional issue for the Security Council is how it should exercise oversight of the reshaped multinational mission, which while not being a UN operation, would potentially receive authorisation from the Security Council. One option would be for the Force Commander of the mission to regularly brief the Council, providing updates on the mission’s activities. The Council could also consider independent oversight of the mission to closely monitor developments.
According to the Secretary-General’s 24 February letter, the Support Office is to be funded by peacekeeping assessed contributions. Regarding the multinational mission, it appears unlikely that the Council will move away from the mission’s voluntary funding model.
Against the backdrop of the MSS mission’s persistent funding shortfall, the UN liquidity crisis, and the potential elimination of US funding for peacekeeping in 2026—a key issue for the Council, as well as for the wider UN membership—is to determine how both the mission and the Support Office are to be reliably funded.
Council Dynamics
Council members are united in their concern about Haiti’s multidimensional crisis and generally agree on the need to tackle escalating gang violence and its impact on civilians. Views also converge on the importance of a Haitian-led political solution that addresses both security and socioeconomic challenges.
At the same time, positions have varied among Council members on how to appropriately respond to the security situation in Haiti. The E10, as well as France and the UK, have expressed support for a timely response from the Council to the Secretary-General’s recommendations. Until recently, the US, which remains the principal provider of financial support to the MSS mission, did not have a clear position on the Secretary-General’s proposal, and it has only very recently announced that, together with Panama, it would seek the Council’s authorisation for the establishment of the UN Support Office and a reshaped multinational mission.
In 2024, China and Russia strongly opposed transforming the MSS mission into a peacekeeping operation, an option that the US and then-Council member and co-penholder Ecuador strongly supported. It seems that, during closed consultations on Haiti on 28 May, China expressed reservations on some aspects of the Secretary-General’s recommendations.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 14 July 2025S/RES/2785 | This resolution renewed BINUH’s mandate for six and a half months, until 31 January 2026. |
| 18 October 2024S/RES/2752 | This resolution renewed the sanctions regime on Haiti imposed by resolution 2653 of 21 October 2022. |
| 30 September 2024S/RES/2751 | This resolution renewed for one year the authorisation for member states to deploy a Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission to Haiti to help re-establish security in the country and build conditions conducive to holding free and fair elections. |
