West Africa and the Sahel
Expected Council Action
In August, the Security Council will hold a briefing, followed by closed consultations, on West Africa and the Sahel. It appears that Panama, the Council’s president for August, will encourage a focus on women, peace and security (WPS) issues at the meeting. The expected briefers are the Special Representative and Head of the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), Leonardo Santos Simão, and the UN Women Executive Director, Sima Sami Bahous, and a civil society representative.
Key Recent Developments
In recent months, there has been a marked increase in attacks by armed groups and terrorists on military bases and raids targeting civilian centres across the Central Sahel region—particularly in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger—raising concerns about the stability of these countries. In September 2023, the three countries established the Alliance of Sahel States (l’Alliance des États du Sahel, AES), a collective defence arrangement aimed at strengthening regional security cooperation. Nonetheless, they continue to face serious security threats.
Between May and July, militants from Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), an Al-Qaida affiliate, carried out a series of large-scale and coordinated attacks across Burkina Faso and Mali. On 11 May, militants overran a military base in Djibo town, in Burkina Faso, reportedly killing up to 200 soldiers, and launched assaults on eight other locations, including Sollé town—approximately 30 miles west of Djibo—where 60 soldiers were reportedly killed.
On 1 June, JNIM reportedly attacked Mali’s military base in Boulkessi, near the border with Burkina Faso, killing around 60 security personnel. The next day (2 June), they struck multiple military sites in Timbuktu, including a base hosting Russian personnel. On 1 July, coordinated attacks targeted security installations in Mali’s Kayes and Ségou regions, with authorities claiming 80 militants were killed in response.
The Islamic State-Sahel Province (ISSP), an Islamist militant group operating in central Sahel (including Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger), has also intensified its attacks. In early May, it claimed its first acknowledged attack in Niger’s Dosso region, near the Burkina Faso border, signalling an expansion into the country’s southern corridor. The attack targeted several military positions, resulting in numerous casualties. Between late May and mid-June, ISSP militants carried out major attacks in Eknewan and Banibangou in western Niger—killing at least 34 soldiers—and in Tessit, Mali, where 42 soldiers were reportedly killed.
This uptick in attacks by militant groups, including through the use of drones and improvised explosive devices, underscores the limited effectiveness of current security arrangements in the region and the growing capabilities of militant groups. Meanwhile, the terrorist threat has continued to spread southward toward coastal states, raising alarm about potential spillover into previously unaffected regions.
On 15 July, Council members held an informal interactive dialogue (IID) to exchange views with regional security actors on strengthening regional counter-terrorism responses in West Africa and the Sahel. (For more information, see our 14 July 2025 What’s in Blue story.)
On 22 June, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) convened its 67th Ordinary Session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government in Abuja. In a communiqué adopted following the meeting, the Authority endorsed the appointment of a Chief Negotiator to engage with the AES countries, which formally withdrew from ECOWAS in January. The communiqué called for urgent consultations to determine modalities for enhanced cooperation in counter-terrorism. It also raised concerns over delays in activating the ECOWAS Standby Force. Despite prior discussions on deploying a regional counter-terrorism force and mobilising resources, progress has been slow. Regional efforts continue to face major obstacles, including political instability, poor coordination, funding gaps, and shifting security partnerships—particularly growing ties with Russia following the withdrawal of Western military support.
At the same time, several West African countries are undergoing political transitions and holding elections in 2025. In Togo, protests erupted in June after constitutional amendments transitioned the country from a presidential to a parliamentary system, consolidating executive authority under President Faure Gnassingbé. These changes allow him to extend his rule indefinitely if his party retains parliamentary control. Media reports said security forces responded forcefully to demonstrations in Lomé and other cities, resulting in at least ten deaths and over 100 arrests. On 17 July, Togo held municipal elections, though turnout was reportedly low in the wake of the recent crackdown.
Guinea-Bissau’s presidential and legislative elections are scheduled for 30 November; however, the country has been embroiled in political turmoil.
Côte d’Ivoire is scheduled to hold presidential elections on 25 October. President Alassane Ouattara is currently serving a third term, which the opposition argues violates the constitutional two-term limit. On 4 June, the country’s electoral commission released the final voter list, excluding several prominent opposition figures. This sparked accusations of political exclusion and raised concerns about the potential for renewed tensions. (For more information, see the brief on UNOWAS in our April 2025 Monthly Forecast.)
In Burkina Faso, the military government dissolved the country’s electoral commission on 17 July, placing its functions under the interior ministry. In May 2024, participants in a national forum—which most political parties boycotted—had signed a charter extending the country’s transition by five years, far beyond the planned transition in 2024.
On 3-4 July, Mali’s transitional parliament approved a bill granting military leader Assimi Goïta a five-year renewable presidential term without requiring elections, allowing him to rule until at least 2030, despite earlier pledges of a return to civilian rule in March 2024.
On 26 March, Niger’s military leader Abdourahamane Tchiani was sworn in as president under a new charter extending military rule for five years, with no election timeline set.
The worsening security and political situations have deepened an already dire humanitarian situation in the sub-region. Nearly 28.7 million people across the Sahel require life-saving aid and humanitarian protection in 2025. Humanitarian funding remains critically low, with just eight percent of the required $4.3 billion having been received by May, forcing aid agencies to reduce assistance to 8.8 million of the most vulnerable individuals.
Women, Peace and Security
On 12 June, the Informal Expert Group (IEG) on WPS convened on the situation in the Sahel. Simão and UN Special Coordinator for development in the Sahel, Abdoulaye Mar Dieye, briefed. It seems that IEG members were briefed on the impact of the Sahel’s compounding challenges—including the effects of climate change and the proliferation of violent extremism and terrorism—on women and girls. Among other issues, the meeting apparently addressed the sharp decrease in development assistance to the region in recent years, and the disproportionate impact this has had on women’s education, health, and livelihood programmes, as well as women’s underrepresentation in peace processes, political positions, and security institutions. It seems that members were also briefed on patterns of conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) in the Sahel, and the difficulties faced by the UN in Mali in monitoring and reporting on CRSV, and in providing services to survivors following the drawdown of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).
With UNOWAS’ mandate up for renewal in January 2026, UN Women, as the IEG Secretariat, apparently stressed the importance of extending the mandate and ensuring the continued integration of WPS priorities. It seems that UN Women also recommended that the Council urge all relevant actors in the region to ensure women’s full, equal, meaningful, and safe participation in governments, transitional structures, and peace and security efforts—including through the full implementation of affirmative action laws—and to safeguard an enabling environment for women’s organisations and networks. UN Women apparently also called for strengthening the UN system’s capacity in all the countries in the Sahel to work on gender equality and women’s empowerment.
Key Issues and Options
The rise of terrorism in West Africa and the Sahel region, particularly in the AES countries, is a major concern for Council members. A key challenge is how to support regional counter-terrorism efforts effectively, following years of failures, and in the context of constrained financial resources.
One option for the Council could be to request a briefing from the Secretary-General on how the UN and the international community at large can better support regional efforts to enhance security and governance in the Sahel, while drawing lessons from past shortcomings and adapting to current realities.
Regional member states and Special Representative Simão have expressed support for leveraging resolution 2719, which authorises the use of UN-assessed contributions to finance AU-led peace support operations on a case-by-case basis. However, key questions remain regarding the practical implementation of this resolution, given that AES countries currently remain outside existing regional security cooperation frameworks.
Council members have been concerned about the resurgence of unconstitutional changes of government in the region and democratic backsliding in some countries. In this connection, addressing structural conflict drivers in the Sahel, such as poor governance, underdevelopment, and climate change, remains a major issue. One option for Council members would be to strengthen collaboration with the Peacebuilding Commission to support locally led initiatives that promote good governance and enhance regional and cross-border cooperation, including within the framework of the UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel.
In addition to the dire humanitarian situation, several Council members are troubled by ongoing restrictions on civic space and human rights abuses by state and non-state actors. They could use the briefing in August as an opportunity to underscore the need for countries in the region to uphold international humanitarian and human rights law. They could also invite a civil society representative to share insights in this regard.
While the Council remains engaged on developments in the region, its current meeting frequency does not reflect fast-changing dynamics. Members could consider convening closed consultations or a meeting under “any other business” to respond promptly and effectively to developments. Members might find value in organising informal briefings with expert analysts to examine emerging trends in the region. They could also adopt a presidential statement to reaffirm their commitment to addressing the evolving challenges in the region, underscoring the importance of a coordinated regional and international response.
Council and Wider Dynamics
While there is broad concern in the Council about the threat of terrorism and the dire humanitarian crises affecting West Africa and the Sahel, the US and European members are particularly worried about Russia’s growing influence in the region and its ties with the military juntas. The withdrawal of Western military assistance has created a security vacuum in the region, prompting several Sahelian countries to seek alternative partnerships, most notably with Russia. Moscow has expanded its footprint in the region through bilateral defence agreements and the deployment of personnel from the Africa Corps, a group that is the successor to the Wagner Group and reportedly operates under the direct oversight of the Russian Ministry of Defence.
Currently, regional and external actors appear to be recalibrating their strategies amid deteriorating security conditions and a surge in militant activity. Russian forces deployed in the region have increasingly come under attack, underscoring the volatility of the operating environment. In June, Russia announced the conclusion of the Wagner Group’s mission in Mali, while noting that the Africa Corps would continue operating in the country to support the military. On 9 July, the Principal Deputy Director for Counterterrorism at the US National Security Council, Rudy Atallah, visited Bamako and met with Mali’s Foreign Minister, Abdoulaye Diop, and Minister of Internal Security, Daoud Aly Mohammedine. This was the first high-level US visit to Mali since 2022.
In the Council, while Russia supports the views of the AES, several members are concerned about developments in these countries. Sierra Leone, a West African country, and several other members believe it is important for the Council to maintain attention on the region, including how it might support regional efforts to combat the threat of terrorism and violent extremism. Sierra Leone took over the rotating Chairmanship of ECOWAS from Nigeria at the June summit.
Denmark and Sierra Leone are co-penholders on UNOWAS.
| Security Council Meeting Records | |
| 3 April 2025S/PV.9890 | This was a meeting on “Peace Consolidation in West Africa”. |
