In Hindsight: A Council in Waiting
The Council appears to have been in a holding pattern on many issues during the first half of 2025. It was waiting to see how the positions of the new US administration would develop, for the subsidiary body chairs to be finalised, for ceasefires to materialise, and for greater clarity on how resource constraints would affect the Council’s work.
Understanding the Numbers: Continuing Divisions Hamper Active Deliberations
The Council’s statistics provide insight into the body’s level of activity and the continuing divisions among members. In the first half of 2025 (January to June), the Council adopted 16 resolutions. Last year in the same six-month period, the Council adopted 20 resolutions, and finished the year with 46 resolutions, the lowest number since 1991 (42). The fact that only 16 resolutions have been adopted in the first half of this year is consistent with the trend towards a declining number of resolutions in recent years.[1]
Another notable trend that has continued this year has been the high percentage of non-unanimous adoptions; in this regard, seven of the 16 resolutions or about 44 percent, through the end of June 2025, have been adopted without the support of all 15 Council members. These seven were on a range of country files, including Libya, South Sudan, Sudan, Ukraine, and Yemen. Four of them were sanctions-related resolutions; this is not surprising, as sanctions, which have traditionally been a source of tension in the Council, have become increasingly controversial in recent years.
The difficulty in obtaining consensus is also seen in the low number of presidential statements. In the first half of 2025, the Council adopted four presidential statements, the same number it adopted in the first half of 2024. The seven presidential statements adopted in 2024 were only one more than the six adopted in 2023, which was the lowest number since the Council began using its current documentation for presidential statements in 1994.
Vetoes were cast in the first half of 2025 on two politically charged topics: the war in Ukraine and the Israel-Hamas war. On 24 February, Russia vetoed two separate amendments related to a US-drafted resolution on Ukraine. Both amendments to the resolution were proposed by the Council’s five European members (Denmark, France, Greece, Slovenia, and the UK). The resolution passed with ten positive votes but with abstentions from the five European members. On 4 June, the US vetoed a draft resolution penned by all ten elected members of the Council that demanded a ceasefire in Gaza, recalled the Council’s demand for the release of all hostages in Gaza, and demanded the immediate and unconditional lifting of all restrictions on the entry of humanitarian aid into Gaza.
The Council held fewer meetings in the first half of this year (191) in comparison with the first half of last year (214), although it spent nearly as much time in meetings. From January to June, Council members spent a total of 355 hours in 122 formal (public and private) and 69 informal (consultations and informal interactive dialogues) meetings. Between January and June 2024, they spent 358.5 hours in 151 formal and 63 informal meetings.[2]
One notable factor in these statistics is the drop-off in the number of meetings so far this year on “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”. By the end of June, the Council held a total of 22 meetings on this file, in comparison to 34 between January and June 2024. This may be in part because of the fatigue from focusing intensively on the issue without meaningful positive results on the ground. The clear US position of not countenancing any decision that it perceives as critical of Israel may also have been a factor.
Major Shifts and Uncertainty in US Positions
The start of Donald J. Trump’s second term in the White House on 20 January heralded a significant change in US policy in the Security Council. While not unanticipated, the new administration has questioned the Council’s work on climate change; objected to certain aspects of the women, peace and security agenda; and sought to qualify the language of international humanitarian law in some Council outcomes.
The US position on Ukraine has also shifted since 20 January, perhaps more so than on any other country-specific file. The clearest indication of this was Washington’s introduction of what ultimately became resolution 2774. While the US proposal urged a lasting peace between Russia and Ukraine and implored a swift end to the conflict, it notably omitted references to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and avoided condemning Russia’s invasion in February 2022. Resolution 2774 was adopted with ten votes in favour and five abstentions, all of which were cast by the European members of the Council (France, Denmark, Greece, Slovenia, and the UK). (For more on the US position in the Council on Ukraine and developments on this issue in the General Assembly, please see our March 2025 In Hindsight.)
While Trump has taken a more critical tone of late towards Russia’s ongoing conflict in Ukraine, it is unclear how this will translate into US positions on the file in the Security Council for the remainder of the year.
Waiting to Formulate Positions
The Council also appears to have had difficulty in formulating a clear-cut approach to several country-specific issues. The reasons for this vary. Often it seems to be driven by the divisive dynamics among members—or, particularly in the case of Haiti, a lack of clarity over the US position—which makes it difficult for the Council to take decisive action. There is also uncertainty about the availability of resources to tackle key challenges in the context of the financial shortages at the UN, and the outcome of the Secretary-General’s UN80 initiative, whose reported intention is to make the world body more efficient and fit-for-purpose, but will also result in significant austerity measures.
What effect have the above factors had on the Council’s work in specific cases?
In Haiti, the Council renewed the mandate of the UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) in July for six and a half months—rather than the customary one-year period—because several elements of the prospective UN response to the crisis in the country remain unclear. One key area of uncertainty concerns the Security Council’s response to the recommendations contained in the Secretary-General’s 24 February letter on options for additional UN support to Haiti, notably regarding the establishment of a UN Support Office to provide logistical and operational support to the Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission. In this regard, before deciding on a response, Council members have been waiting for the US, which is a co-penholder on Haiti with Panama and the primary financial supporter of the MSS mission, to determine its approach to the security situation in the country, including whether it will continue to support the mission financially and at what level. Other factors that the Council will need to consider moving forward are the possible re-authorisation of the cash-strapped MSS mission, which ends on 2 October, and the finalisation of the internal review of BINUH’s mission concept.
In Yemen, the US questioned the future of the UN Mission for Support of the Hodeidah Agreement (UNMHA) during negotiations to renew its mandate in July. Like BINUH, the Council renewed UNMHA for six and a half months, rather than the typical one-year period. In renewing the mandate, the Council requested the Secretary-General to conduct a review on how to improve efficiencies, structural coherence, and coordination across UN missions in Yemen. It seems that the intention is for this review to inform the Council’s deliberations on UNMHA’s next mandate renewal. The resolution also expresses the Council’s intention to review the “full range of options” for the mandate, including “assessing the future viability and sunsetting of the Mission”. This language reflects the US position that the mission is no longer useful and should be terminated. Other Council members, such as Russia, do not agree with the US and have emphasised the importance of the mission’s work.
Regarding Somalia, the financial status of the AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) continued to be a significant concern to Council members. The mission has been grappling with substantial funding shortfalls in an evolving security environment where Al-Shabaab—a terrorist group affiliated with Al-Qaida—is a serious threat to Somalia and the region. The majority of Council members support co-financing AUSSOM through the framework of resolution 2719 of 21 December 2023, which determines that AU-led peace support operations authorised by the Council (such as AUSSOM) should have access to UN-assessed contributions up to 75 percent of their annual budgets. But the US has continued to be staunchly opposed to this approach; as a result, the Council was unable to make a decision to authorise the 2719 framework by 15 May, as had been called for by resolution 2719 of 21 December 2023.
There are many different views among members on who should foot the lion’s share of the bill for the mission, especially given the sense that the 2719 framework may be off the table. Amidst these divisions, it is unclear whether and when a clear funding mechanism will be established. This could jeopardise the future of the mission and imperil hard-earned security gains in Somalia.
Subsidiary Body Activity: Playing Catch-up
Council members were unable to agree on the allocation of subsidiary body chairs and vice-chairs for 2025 until 29 May, making it the longest period with no subsidiary body chairs and vice-chairs since this decision was first recorded in a presidential note in 1979. The protracted and difficult negotiations were marked by differences among the incoming members for 2025, between these incoming members and continuing elected members, and between the current E10 and the P5.
As a result of the delay, contingency measures had to be developed whereby Council presidents handled urgent responsibilities of subsidiary body chairs during their presidencies until chair appointments were finalised, unless another member objected. In rare instances, Council presidents were able to process requests for exemptions to measures imposed by sanctions regimes, brief the Council on the work of subsidiary bodies, and facilitate the publication of reports of experts assisting sanctions committees. (For more on the impact of the delay in appointing subsidiary body chairs, please see our May 2025 In Hindsight.)
Since the chairs of subsidiary bodies were agreed in late May, these bodies have begun to function normally again. Nonetheless, the Council will have to play catch-up at the subsidiary body level for the remainder of the year.
One additional challenge has been the holds placed on the Panels of Experts of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee and the 2713 Al-Shabaab Sanctions Committee, which have prevented them from functioning so far in 2025.[3] Panels of experts are generally considered a quality, independent source of reporting for Sanctions Committees. The Sudan and Al-Shabaab Sanctions Committees have been deprived of this analysis intended to inform their decision-making. Additionally, while the Panel of Experts of the Yemen Sanctions Committee is operational, a hold remains on its arms expert, which has handicapped the scope of its reporting.
Some Positives
Notwithstanding the difficulties facing the Council in early 2025, there were some positive developments. Despite the 4 June US veto on a resolution on the situation in Gaza, it was encouraging that elected members came together to try to break an impasse in the Council on an intractable issue. This built on the practice of all elected members collaborating as co-penholders in March 2024 on a resolution on Gaza, which demanded an immediate ceasefire to the war in Gaza during the month of Ramadan, leading to a “lasting sustainable ceasefire”.[4] Such E10 penholdership could serve as a model for future action on other difficult issues.
Another encouraging development this year has been the “peacekeeping trio” initiated by three elected members—Denmark, Pakistan, and the Republic of Korea (ROK)—to emphasise the importance of focusing on the future of peacekeeping. As part of this initiative, Denmark convened an open debate on 24 March during its Council presidency on “Advancing Adaptability in UN Peace Operations—Responding to New Realities”, during which Secretary-General António Guterres briefed Council members on plans to conduct extensive consultations as part of the comprehensive review of UN peace operations as requested by the September 2024 The Pact of the Future. On 29 July, Pakistan convened a briefing on “Adapting Peace operations for the pursuit of political solutions – priorities and challenges”. The ROK is also expected to convene a meeting on peacekeeping during its Council Presidency in September.
Aside from these meetings, the Trio have also been convening a series of informal discussions outside the Council, the latest of which was a policy forum held on 8 July at the International Peace Institute on the “Ten-Year Review of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) Report”. The Trio appears to be moving towards proposing a Council product before the end of the year. The last thematic resolution on UN peacekeeping was resolution 2668 of 21 December 2022, which focused on the “importance of mental health and psychosocial support to United Nations peace operations personnel”.
The unanimous adoption of resolution 2788 on 22 July was one notable early achievement in the second half of 2025. Initiated by Pakistan, it represents a recommitment by the Council to the peaceful settlement of disputes, highlighting some of the key Chapter VI tools available to the body in a complex and challenging multilateral environment and requesting the Secretary-General to provide concrete recommendations in a briefing to the Council on strengthening the mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes one year after the resolution’s adoption. The resolution builds on the commitment of world leaders and heads of state in Action 16 of The Pact for the Future—which outlines member states’ vision of the future of multilateralism—to “promote cooperation and understanding between member states, defuse tensions, seek to pacific settlement of disputes and resolve conflicts”.
Conclusion
There are several uncertainties facing the Security Council for the rest of 2025. Significant budget cuts to areas relevant to the Council’s work—such as peacekeeping and humanitarian operations—are most likely forthcoming as part of the UN80 initiative. There could be deeper cuts depending on the size of anticipated funding reductions to the UN in the US federal budget for fiscal year 2026 (1 October 2025 to 30 September 2026). Diminished resources–along with US concerns about the effectiveness of UN peace operations—could necessitate major adjustments to the size and scope of activities that the Council mandates and oversees and may have an impact on the review of UN peace operations that is expected to be finalised in 2026.
There is no shortage of crises to occupy the Council’s attention in the second half of 2025. The Council will likely continue to devote significant attention to Ukraine and Gaza, although any significant movement on these crises will likely take place as a result of negotiations outside the Council. Yemen and Lebanon will probably continue to be affected by the ripple effects of the war between Hamas and Israel. On Syria, the Council may be able to explore options for a UN presence in the country; in this respect, the findings of the recently completed integrated strategic assessment that the Secretariat has produced are likely to be shared with the Council. Its approach to Iran’s nuclear issues requires careful consideration, following the setbacks to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran’s nuclear programme, including US withdrawal in 2018 and Iran’s non-compliance, and the recent strikes on the country’s nuclear facilities by Israel and the US. Resolution 2231 of 20 July 2015, which endorsed the JCPOA on Iran’s nuclear programme, expires on 18 October. The Council will also need to develop a strategy for Haiti and Somalia, once there is more clarity on members’ positions and the availability of resources to promote peace and security. In addition to funding shortages for AUSSOM, members will be grappling with several other challenges in Africa. In this regard, terrorist activity in West Africa and the Sahel is on the rise, the peace agreement in South Sudan is on tenuous ground, and the civil war in Sudan continues to rage. On this last issue, other than the renewals of the 1591 Sudan sanctions regime, the Council has not taken a formal decision (resolution or presidential statement) in more than two years.
Facing these and other difficult issues, a divided Council will need to find ways to build trust and cooperate to maximise its effectiveness in difficult fiscal circumstances and a fluid international peace and security environment. If it does not, there is a danger that the Council will become increasingly sidelined, and some issues related to the maintenance of international peace and security will move outside of the Council.
[1] The Council adopted 50 resolutions in 2023, 54 in 2022, and 57 in 2021.
[2] For useful statistics on the Security Council’s work in 2024 and 2025, please see UN Security Council Affairs Division, “Monthly Highlights of Security Council Practice”, available at: Monthly Highlights of Security Council Practice | Security Council
[3] Four members (China, Pakistan, Russia, and Somalia) continue to maintain a hold on the entire Panel of Experts of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee, and two members (Algeria and France) have a hold on one expert on the Panel, although they are not the same person. One member (Russia) has maintained its hold on the entire Panel of Experts of the 2713 Al-Shabaab Sanctions Committee.
[4] This was resolution 2728 of 25 March 2024. The E10 also collectively penned a draft resolution on Gaza (S/2024/835) that was vetoed by the US on 20 November 2024.
