July 2025 Monthly Forecast

Posted 30 June 2025
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The Middle East, including the Palestinian Question

Expected Council Action  

In July, the Security Council will hold its quarterly open debate on “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question” (MEPQ).  

Council members may convene additional meetings during the month depending on developments on the ground.  

Key Recent Developments  

The war in Gaza has continued unabated following the expiry of the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas that was in effect from January to March. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), as at 26 June, over 56,000 Palestinians have been killed since the beginning of the conflict in October 2023, the majority of whom have reportedly been women and children. More than 680,000 people have been newly displaced since the end of the ceasefire, with approximately 82 percent of the Gaza Strip now within Israeli-militarised zones or under displacement orders.  

Israel’s decision in early March to prevent the entry of humanitarian aid into Gaza—a tactic to pressure Hamas into releasing the remaining hostages it is holding—has further exacerbated the situation, causing an acute shortage of food, fuel, and medicine. Although Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced in May that Israel would partially restore humanitarian access to allow a “minimum” amount of aid to enter the territory, conditions remain dire as Israeli authorities have allowed only a few UN agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to resume the delivery of aid and have authorised the entry of only very limited types of supplies, according to OCHA. The latest Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) special snapshot—published on 12 May and covering the period between April and September—finds that Gaza faces a critical risk of famine, with the entire population (approximately 2.1 million people) expected to face “crisis” or worse levels of acute food insecurity (classified as IPC Phase 3 or above), including one in five projected to face “catastrophic” levels (IPC Phase 5). The report anticipates that food insecurity, acute malnutrition, and mortality rates would surpass the IPC famine thresholds under the “reasonable worse-case scenario” of a protracted and large-scale military operation and continuation of the humanitarian and commercial blockade, which is “becoming more likely”.  

Meanwhile, Israel and the US have established a new aid delivery mechanism coordinated by a private entity, the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF), which bypasses the existing delivery architecture run by the UN and its humanitarian partners. The GHF has begun delivering aid at designated distribution sites administered by US contractors and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). The UN and its partners are not participating in the mechanism, which they view as a “militarized distribution system” that does not adhere to humanitarian principles and does not replicate the scale or accessibility of existing aid delivery channels. Since the mechanism became operational on 27 May, periodic security incidents involving IDF soldiers and Palestinians seeking aid at GHF sites have resulted in numerous mass casualty events. In a 24 June briefing note, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) said that over 410 people had been killed and 3,000 injured at the distribution points, forcing Palestinians to make “the inhumane choice of either starving to death or risk being killed while trying to get food”. 

On the political track, negotiations between Israel and Hamas on a new ceasefire—mediated by Egypt, Qatar, and the US—remain deadlocked. Hamas continues to push for an agreement that permanently ends the war, while Israel insists that it will only agree to a temporary truce unless Hamas disarms, a demand that the group has resisted.  

Violence has also persisted in the West Bank, where Israel has been conducting what it has described as a large-scale counterterrorism operation since January. The Secretary-General’s most recent quarterly report on the implementation of resolution 2334 of 23 December 2016, which was circulated to Council members on 24 June (S/2025/415), said that the operation has resulted in “a large number of casualties and the extensive destruction of homes and civilian infrastructure, and the continued massive displacement of tens of thousands of Palestinians”. It has also coincided with an increase in settlement expansion, land seizures, and settler violence in the territory, according to the report. Notably, on 28 May, Israeli authorities recognised 22 new settlements, which Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz described as a “strategic move that prevents the establishment of a Palestinian state that would endanger Israel”. A spokesperson for Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas called it a “dangerous escalation”. 

Diplomatic pressure on Israel has mounted in response to these developments. On 20 May, the UK announced that it would suspend free trade negotiations with Israel and impose additional sanctions against West Bank settlers. On 10 June, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, and the UK imposed sanctions on Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich for inciting settler violence against Palestinians in the West Bank. A European Union (EU) report circulated to member states three days later found that Israel was likely in breach of its human rights obligations under the EU-Israel Association Agreement—a pact governing trading and diplomatic relations between the parties—which EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas said could lead to “further measures”. These may include the full or partial suspension of the association agreement.  

The Security Council has convened several times in recent weeks to discuss the situation. On 4 June, the Council voted on a draft resolution initiated by the Council’s ten elected members (E10) that demanded a permanent ceasefire in Gaza; the release of all hostages held by Hamas; and the lifting of all restrictions on the entry of humanitarian aid. The draft text failed to be adopted owing to a US veto. On 16 June, Council members held closed consultations to discuss food insecurity in Gaza, following the circulation of a 2 June white note on the issue by OCHA, submitted in accordance with resolution 2417 of 24 May 2018, which requested the Secretary-General to report swiftly when “the risk of conflict-induced famine and wide-spread food insecurity” occurs. On 30 June, the Council held its regular meeting on the Secretary-General’s most recent quarterly report on the implementation of resolution 2334.

July’s debate will take place following further internationalisation of the Israel-Hamas war and an increasingly volatile regional situation. On 13 June, Israel launched a military offensive against Iran—a supporter of Hamas—that was aimed at dismantling the country’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. It comprised airstrikes against nuclear sites, missile production facilities, government institutions, and other targets across the country. Iran retaliated with a series of ballistic missile and drone strikes against Israel. On 21 June, the US entered the conflict, launching strikes against three Iranian nuclear facilities. Two days later—following Iranian retaliation against a US military base in Qatar—US President Donald Trump announced that Iran and Israel had agreed to a ceasefire. IDF Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir subsequently said in a 24 June statement that “[t]he focus now returns to Gaza, to bring home the hostages and topple Hamas’s rule”. 

The UN High-Level International Conference for the Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine and the Implementation of the Two-State Solution—which was mandated by the General Assembly in December 2024—was scheduled to take place from 17 to 20 June at UN Headquarters in New York. Following the outbreak of hostilities between Iran and Israel, however, France—which will co-chair the event with Saudi Arabia—announced that the conference would be postponed for logistical and security reasons. A new date had not yet been announced at the time of writing.  

On 12 June, the General Assembly resumed its Tenth Emergency Special Session (ESS) on “Illegal Israeli actions in occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory”, following the failure of the Security Council to adopt the 4 June draft resolution due to the US veto. During the ESS, the GA adopted a resolution introduced by Spain that demands that Israel immediately end the blockade in Gaza, open all border crossings, and ensure that aid reaches the Palestinian civilian population throughout Gaza immediately and at scale. The resolution was adopted with 149 votes in favour, 12 against, and 19 abstentions. 

Human Rights-Related Developments 

On 2 and 4 April, the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) adopted three resolutions relating to the OPT, including East Jerusalem. The first resolution (58/2) concerns the human rights situation in the territory and calls on Israel to “end its unlawful presence” and to “immediately lift its blockade of the Gaza Strip as well as all other forms of collective punishment and siege”. The second resolution (58/27) concerns the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and urges all member states to adopt measures as required to promote the realisation of this right and to assist the UN in carrying out the responsibilities entrusted to it by the Charter regarding its implementation. The third resolution (58/28) reaffirms that Israeli settlements in the OPT are illegal under international law and calls on the country to immediately cease all settlement activities and to “put an end to all of the human rights violations linked to the presence of settlements, especially of the right to self-determination and non-discrimination”. 

On 6 May, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel published a report finding that Israeli attacks on educational, religious, and cultural sites in the OPT amount to war crimes and the crime against humanity of extermination.  

Key Issues and Options 

The Council’s continued failure to expedite an end to the war in Gaza and its inability to safeguard the viability of the two-state solution remain fundamental issues undermining the Council’s credibility.  

In the short term, the resumption of a ceasefire in Gaza, the return of hostages, and the restoration of full, safe, and unimpeded humanitarian access remain the Council’s most urgent priorities. Associated concerns are the growing risk of famine in the territory and the lack of accountability for apparent violations of international humanitarian law (IHL). 

The US veto of the E10 draft resolution in June illustrates the polarised dynamics preventing the Council from fulfilling its responsibilities in this regard. As such, members are likely to struggle to agree on other measures that would require consensus or are subject to the veto, such as imposing sanctions against individuals involved in IHL violations, establishing an independent mechanism to investigate such violations, or imposing an arms embargo to prohibit the transfer of arms or munitions that have caused them.   

Other options remain, however. To apply political pressure on Israel to fully restore humanitarian access, Council members could consider conducting another unofficial visiting mission to a Gaza border crossing—similar to the one that then-member United Arab Emirates (UAE) organised to the Rafah crossing in December 2023. Looking further ahead, members could invite a representative of the League of Arab States (LAS) to brief the Council on the status of preparations to implement the plan for Gaza’s long-term reconstruction and governance that the LAS endorsed in March. Additionally, they could take advantage of the additional time granted by the postponement of the high-level conference on the two-state solution to further engage in negotiations among the broader membership in support of an ambitious outcome document outlining concrete commitments toward the realisation of this goal.   

Council Dynamics 

Intractable dynamics have characterised the Council’s response to the war in Gaza, which has been marked by contentious and prolonged negotiations with multiple failed adoptions. Attempts at Council products on this file have clearly shown that it is not possible for the Council to adopt an outcome that the US, Israel’s key ally at the Council, does not largely support.  

In its 4 June explanation of vote on the E10’s draft resolution—the first veto cast by the US on the conflict since Trump returned to office—the US said that the draft was “unacceptable for what it does say…[and] for what it does not say”, citing in particular the text’s failure to condemn Hamas or express support for the GHF. It also criticised the negotiation process, describing the E10-led initiative as “performative” and “harmful” to ongoing ceasefire talks mediated by the US, Egypt, and Qatar. 

All 14 other Council members voted in favour of the draft. Slovenia, which coordinated the negotiations on behalf of the E10, disputed the US’ characterisation of the text and said that it “reflects the consensus shared by all Council members” regarding the need to end the war, return the hostages, and restore humanitarian access. Several members also rejected the notion that the Council’s role should be subordinated to external diplomacy, with Algeria describing the outcome as a “moment of political abdication”. Similarly, Russia said that the draft represented “the bare minimum” for the Council, while China argued that the body’s inability to act had “extinguished the glimmer of hope for the people in Gaza”. Some members—including Denmark, France, and the UK—agreed with the US that the omission of a condemnation of Hamas was a shortcoming but nevertheless considered the resolution a necessary humanitarian measure.  

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UN DOCUMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST, INCLUDING THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION
 
Security Council Resolutions
10 June 2024S/RES/2735 This resolution on the war between Israel and Hamas welcomes the ceasefire proposal announced by US President Joe Biden on 31 May 2024. The resolution was adopted with 14 votes in favour and one abstention (Russia).
25 March 2024S/RES/2728 This resolution demanded an immediate ceasefire for the month of Ramadan leading to a lasting sustainable ceasefire. It also demanded the immediate and unconditional release of all hostages. It was adopted with 14 votes in favour and one abstention (US).
22 December 2023S/RES/2720 This resolution requested the Secretary-General to appoint a Senior Humanitarian and Reconstruction Coordinator tasked with establishing a UN mechanism for accelerating humanitarian consignments to Gaza. It was adopted with 13 votes in favour and two abstentions (Russia and the US).
23 December 2016S/RES/2334 This resolution condemned Israeli settlements and called for immediate steps to prevent violence against civilians, including acts of terror. It was adopted with 14 votes in favour and a US abstention.
Other
4 June 2025S/2025/353 This was a draft resolution on the war between Israel and Hamas that was initiated by the Council’s ten elected members (E10). The draft demanded an immediate, unconditional, and permanent ceasefire in Gaza; the immediate, dignified, and unconditional release of all hostages held by Hamas and other groups; and the immediate and unconditional lifting of all restrictions on the entry of humanitarian aid into the territory. The draft failed to be adopted owing to a veto by the US. The remaining 14 members voted in favour.

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