July 2025 Monthly Forecast

AMERICAS

Haiti

Expected Council Action   

In July, the Security Council is expected to vote on a draft resolution renewing the mandate of the UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) prior to its 15 July expiration. In addition, on 2 July, the Council plans to hold its 90-day briefing on the situation in Haiti. Assistant Secretary-General for Europe, Central Asia and the Americas Miroslav Jenča will brief the Council on recent developments in the country and on the Secretary-General’s latest report on BINUH. Closed consultations are expected to follow the briefing.

The authorisation of the Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission to Haiti ends on 2 October.

Key Recent Developments    

After the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021, Haiti descended into a multidimensional crisis characterised by political deadlock, extreme violence, and dire humanitarian conditions. Armed gangs have overrun an estimated 85 percent of Port-au-Prince, the capital, employing tactics including murder, kidnapping, and sexual violence on the civilian population amid widespread impunity. In recent months, the gangs have expanded their reach beyond the capital, including to parts of the Artibonite and Centre departments.

In a 13 June statement, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) reported that at least 2,680 people were killed between 1 January and 30 May in Haiti. OHCHR also addressed the intensification of “clashes between gangs and so-called self-defence groups”, including an incident on 20 May during which at least 25 people were killed and 10 injured by armed individuals who accused the victims of supporting gangs. The statement further notes that at least 65 people have been summarily executed by police elements.

The situation of children in Haiti remains particularly concerning. According to the Secretary-General’s most recent annual report on children and armed conflict, dated 17 June, 2,269 grave violations were committed in 2024 against 1,373 children in Haiti. (The six grave violations, as determined by the Security Council, are: child recruitment and use, killing and maiming, rape and other forms of sexual violence, attacks on schools and hospitals, abductions, and the denial of humanitarian access.) In a new development, the Viv Ansanm gang coalition (“living together” in Haitian Creole) has been added to the annexes of the Secretary-General’s report, which list parties that have committed grave violations against children.

The Haitian National Police (HNP) and the Kenya-led MSS mission have struggled to make significant headway against the gangs. The MSS continues to face funding uncertainty and a lack of adequate equipment. Deployment levels are far short of the 2,500 officers envisaged in its Concept of Operations, with only around 1,000 personnel on the ground at the time of writing. The HNP also remains understaffed and underequipped.

Haitian authorities have reportedly hired US private military contractors to support a task force operating drones to target gang members. On 20 June, the current head of the Transitional Presidential Council (TPC), Fritz Alphonse Jean, confirmed that the Haitian government and the TPC engaged foreign contractors to support the security forces in fighting the gangs. The deployment of drones to curb violence in Haiti has raised concerns about the legality and effectiveness of their use.

The humanitarian situation remains dire. Approximately 5.7 million people are facing high levels of acute food insecurity, including more than 8,400 experiencing “catastrophic hunger” conditions (Phase 5 of the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification). As at 11 June, nearly 1.3 million people were internally displaced. This represents a 24 percent increase since December 2024 and the highest number of people displaced by violence ever recorded in Haiti, according to the International Organization for Migration. Noting the compounding effects of deportations on Haiti’s humanitarian crisis, the UN Humanitarian Country Team recently expressed deep concern at the “rising number of pregnant and breastfeeding women” deported from the Dominican Republic to Haiti in the context of large-scale expulsions.

Despite the deteriorating humanitarian situation, the humanitarian response remains severely underfunded. As of 24 June, only 8.3 percent of the 2025 UN Humanitarian Response Plan for Haiti was funded. In a recent media briefing, the World Food Programme (WFP) said that, as Haiti enters the Atlantic hurricane season, “a single storm could push millions into a humanitarian catastrophe”. They warned that, unless resources are made available, the WFP will not have the capacity to respond in the immediate aftermath of a disaster.

On the political front, the future of the transition—including the holding of elections—remains uncertain while dynamics in the TPC continue to be marked by internal divisions. The TPC was created pursuant to a March 2024 agreement facilitated by the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the US following a dramatic surge in gang violence in February 2024. According to the 10 April 2024 Decree, which established the TPC, this transitional body will exercise presidential powers until a new president is elected by 7 February 2026. This date marks the expiration of the TPC’s mandate, which, as established by a May 2024 Decree, cannot be extended.

Transitional authorities have also committed to holding a constitutional referendum. The draft of Haiti’s new constitution was made public and presented to the TPC by a steering committee in May. The committee is expected to issue a revised draft after considering feedback from the public on the text.

On 28 May, the ten elected members (E10) of the Security Council requested closed consultations to receive an update on the situation in Haiti and discuss how the Council could respond to the recommendations contained in the Secretary-General’s 24 February letter on options for UN support to Haiti.

In his letter, the Secretary-General said that transforming the MSS mission into a peacekeeping operation was “not assessed as a feasible option”, adding that “[s]uch a transition could be considered once significant progress has been made in substantially reducing gang territorial control”. Instead, he recommended, among other things, the establishment of a UN Support Office to provide logistic and operational support to the MSS mission, such as accommodation, medical capability, and support for mobility and information technology. Regarding BINUH, the Secretary-General suggested focusing on tasks including supporting the Haitian authorities in handling the detention of “high-risk individuals” and enabling the Haitian authorities to implement UN sanctions, “notably the arms embargo”. (For more information, see the brief on Haiti in our April 2025 Monthly Forecast.)

Given that the 28 May consultations did not result in the substantive discussion of the options outlined in the Secretary-General’s letter—primarily due to the lack of clarity regarding the US position on the matter—Panama and the “A3 Plus” members (Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Guyana) requested a follow-up meeting. This second closed consultations meeting was held on 30 June to formally begin deliberations on the Secretary-General’s proposals. The request from Panama and the “A3 Plus” was also prompted by the deteriorating security situation in Haiti and a 19 June letter from Kenya requesting “expeditious consideration” by the Council of the Secretary-General’s letter (S/2025/402). (For background, see our 27 June What’s in Blue story on Haiti.)

On 11 June, the UN Economic and Social Council and the Peacebuilding Commission convened a joint meeting on “Building and Sustaining Peace in Haiti”. The discussion focused on the need for comprehensive approaches to the crisis, strengthening peacebuilding efforts and the importance of inclusive community violence reduction.

On 27 June, the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS) adopted a resolution requesting the OAS Secretary-General to develop an action plan on the OAS’ support to Haitian authorities on issues including security, humanitarian assistance, and elections. The resolution also says that the OAS General Assembly resolves to recognise the organisation’s “strengthened role” in Haiti and urges its member states to intensify diplomatic engagement with the UN Security Council and Secretariat in support of a response to Haiti’s request for increased security assistance and for the consideration of all UN peace and stabilisation options, “including, but not limited to” the UN Secretary-General’s 24 February proposals.

Human Rights-Related Developments

A 28 March UN High Commissioner for Human Rights’ report on Haiti concluded that a key driver of human rights violations and abuses in the country is the “widespread possession of a broad range of trafficked firearms and ammunition by gangs, mainly facilitated by corruption, impunity and poor governance”. Citing expert estimates, the report says that between 270,000 and 500,000 firearms are circulating illegally in the country, with most weapons “in the hands of criminals but also of other private actors, including private security companies”. It calls on the Haitian authorities to strengthen the HNP to better respond to gang violence and urges member states to support the continued deployment of the MSS. The report further calls on member states to follow arms control regulations, adhere to the arms embargo on Haiti, and update the list of individuals and entities subject to Security Council sanctions on the country.

Women, Peace and Security

In a 4 June statement, Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict Pramila Patten expressed grave concern at the “escalating levels of sexual violence being inflicted upon women and girls” in Haiti. The statement says that the “situation has reached a breaking point” with violations “overwhelmingly concentrated in areas under gang control”. It stresses that sexual violence is being used “deliberately and systematically to assert dominance and punish communities”, with survivors often assaulted in their homes or public spaces. It also warns about a “dramatic rise” in the past eight months in documented cases of sexual slavery.

Sanctions-Related Developments

The interim report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti was circulated to the members of the 2653 Committee in March and transmitted to the Security Council on 9 June.

In May, the US designated Viv Ansanm and Gran Grif as foreign terrorist organisations. The International Crisis Group observed that the “designation will likely do little to restore security and could complicate humanitarian operations”, while also noting that US Secretary of State Marco Rubio later said that Washington would not sanction humanitarian organisations forced to pay tolls imposed by gangs.

Key Issues and Options    

The central task for the Security Council in July is to renew BINUH’s mandate. Protecting the mandate’s integrity in the current climate of violence and uncertainty and ensuring that the mission has the resources to carry out its mandated tasks is an important issue for the Council. One option is to extend BINUH’s mandate for one year through a straightforward renewal. In his latest report on the situation in Haiti, which was circulated to Council members on 26 June, the Secretary-General recommended the extension of BINUH’s mandate for another year “with the logistical and security resources needed to operate in the current environment” (S/2025/418).

Responding to the Secretary-General’s 24 February 2024 letter, including addressing how to provide adequate support to the MSS mission, is a further issue that Council members are likely to discuss in July.

Council Dynamics    

Council members are united in their concern about Haiti’s multidimensional crisis and generally agree on the need to tackle escalating gang violence and its impact on civilians. Views also converge on the importance of a Haitian-led political solution that addresses both security and socioeconomic challenges. At the same time, positions have varied among Council members on how to appropriately respond to the security situation in Haiti.

The E10, as well as France and the UK, broadly share the view that the Council should respond to the Secretary-General’s recommendations from February. It seems that, during the 28 May closed consultations, China expressed reservations on some aspects of the Secretary-General’s proposal. While the US currently remains the principal provider of financial support to the MSS mission, at the time of writing, its position on the Secretary-General’s proposal, and more generally, its approach to addressing the security situation in Haiti, remained unclear.

For the past three years, the Security Council has renewed BINUH’s mandate unanimously.

The US and Panama are the co-penholders on Haiti.

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UN DOCUMENTS ON HAITI

Security Council Resolutions
18 October 2024S/RES/2752 This resolution renewed the sanctions regime on Haiti imposed by resolution 2653 of 21 October 2022.
30 September 2024S/RES/2751 This resolution renewed for one year the authorisation for member states to deploy a Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission to Haiti to help re-establish security in the country and build conditions conducive to holding free and fair elections.
12 July 2024S/RES/2743 This resolution renewed BINUH’s mandate for one year, until 15 July 2025.

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