July 2025 Monthly Forecast

Posted 30 June 2025
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AMERICAS

Colombia

Expected Council Action

In July, the Security Council is expected to receive a briefing from Special Representative and Head of the UN Verification Mission in Colombia Carlos Ruiz Massieu on recent developments in Colombia and the Secretary-General’s latest 90-day report on the mission, which was circulated to Council members on 26 June (S/2025/419).

The verification mission’s mandate expires on 31 October.

Key Recent Developments

The Secretary-General’s report, which covers the period from 27 March to 26 June, states that implementation of the 2016 Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace between the government of Colombia and the former rebel group Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP) “remained uneven, with key challenges unaddressed across the different chapters”. This highlights the need for “an overarching and strategic response, as well as the direct involvement of the signatory parties in oversight and coordination at the highest level”. In this regard, the Secretary-General welcomed the convening on 8 May of the Commission for the Follow-up, Promotion and Verification of the Implementation of the Final Agreement (CSIVI), the main forum for dialogue between the parties on the accord’s implementation. At this meeting, the first held in 2025, the parties jointly defined priorities for the implementation of each chapter of the peace agreement for the remainder of the year.

Violence remains a persistent challenge that affects all aspects of the implementation of the peace agreement. During the period covered by the Secretary-General’s report, the verification mission verified the killing of nine former combatants, bringing to 469 the number of former combatants killed since the signing of the peace agreement. The report notes that such crimes are carried out by illegal armed groups, mostly in municipalities with illegal economies and limited presence of the state. Leading causes behind such attacks are stigmatisation and the targeting of former combatants who assume leadership roles, refuse to be recruited by armed groups, or take part in justice and truth processes.

High levels of violence persisted across several regions in the past months. The north-eastern region of Catatumbo in the Norte de Santander department—which saw in January what the UN described as “the gravest escalation of violence the country has experienced” since the signing of the 2016 agreement—continued to experience clashes between the armed groups the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) and the Estado Mayor de Bloques y Frentes (EMBF), which splintered from the general staff of the dissident group of the former FARC-EP that identifies itself as the Estado Mayor Central Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (EMC). According to Colombia’s Office of the Ombudsperson, 65,000 people were displaced between January and April 2025 due to the violence in Catatumbo, many of whom have yet to return to their homes.

On 10 June, the EMC launched 24 coordinated attacks in the southwestern departments of Cauca and Valle del Cauca, targeting police posts and municipal buildings, among other things. In a 17 June briefing, Deputy Spokesperson for the Secretary-General Farhan Haq noted that eight people were killed and more than 80 injured, including children, due to explosive devices, car and motorcycle bombs, sniper fire, and drones. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) described 10 June as “the most violent day of the year” in Cauca and Valle del Cauca, noting that more than 471,000 people have been impacted by violence in these departments in the first half of the year, accounting for more than a third of the national total.

A 7 June assassination attempt against Senator Miguel Uribe Turbay during a rally in Bogotá raised concerns about a potential spike in political violence as Colombia prepares for congressional and presidential elections in March and May 2026, respectively. Uribe, an opposition politician from the right-wing Centro Democrático party, planned to run in the presidential elections (the official candidate registration period has yet to begin). He was one of the parliamentarians with whom the Council interacted in Bogotá during its 7-11 February 2024 visiting mission to Colombia. At the time of writing, Uribe remained in critical condition; a 15-year-old was charged in connection with the assassination attempt, but it was unclear who ordered the attack. UN Secretary-General António Guterres condemned the assault in a 9 June statement, calling it a “deplorable act of political violence” that must be fully investigated and for perpetrators to be held accountable. Political actors from across the political spectrum in Colombia condemned the attack, with some national and international interlocutors calling on all actors to adopt a “Commitment to a free and peaceful electoral process in Colombia”.

The Secretary-General’s report notes that the government has made efforts to accelerate policies for the implementation of security guarantees. However, progress has been lacking in some areas, such as the promotion of the public policy to dismantle illegal armed groups and criminal organisations, which the National Commission on Security Guarantees (NCSG)—a body established by the agreement—presented in September 2023. According to the report, the NCSG has not been active for almost a year.

In a positive development, on 13 June, the government signed a decree establishing the Comprehensive Protection Programme for former combatants, which was stipulated in the 2016 agreement. This decree includes the creation of the Tripartite Protection and Security Authority as the programme’s governing body at the territorial level, which will entail cooperation between the state and peace signatories, with support from the verification mission. On 10 June, following the assassination attempt against Uribe, Colombian President Gustavo Petro Urrego chaired for the first time during his administration a meeting of the Comprehensive Security System for the Exercise of Politics (SISEP), a body created by the 2016 agreement.

The Special Jurisdiction for Peace (SJP)—the judicial component of the Comprehensive System for Truth, Justice, Reparation, and Non-Repetition established by the 2016 agreement—also continued its work. The SJP scheduled public verification hearings for trials within Case 01 (on hostage-taking, other severe deprivations of liberty and concurrent crimes committed by the FARC-EP) and Case 03 (on killings and forced disappearances presented as combat casualties by state agents) in the Caribbean Coast. These hearings—which constitute the last procedural step before the issuance of restorative sentences—will allow the SJP to evaluate and verify the indictees’ contributions to the truth and to assess the preparedness of state institutions to provide conditions for the implementation of sentences (such as security conditions and financial resources for restorative projects). The public hearings, which were initially scheduled for 9 and 10 July, were postponed to 31 July and 1 August, due to a request by indictees in Case 01. After the completion of these hearings, the issuance of the first restorative sentences by the SJP could be expected during the second half of 2025, according to the Secretary-General’s report.

Human Rights-Related Developments

On 30 April, the UN Committee on Enforced Disappearances (CED) published findings from its 21 November-5 December 2024 visit to Colombia, outlining specific areas of concern and recommendations to assist the government in addressing the issue of enforced disappearances. In a press release, the CED noted that enforced disappearances have persisted after the signing of the 2016 peace agreement and “continue to occur daily, both within the context of armed conflicts and beyond”, estimating between 121,768 and 210,000 cases of disappeared persons in the country. It added that the phenomenon occurs particularly in regions under the control of non-state armed groups and criminal organisations and voiced strong concern about disappearances linked to forced recruitment by such groups and organisations, particularly those targeting children and adolescents. The CED called on Colombia to strengthen its search, investigation, and prosecution mechanisms and stressed the need for a comprehensive state policy to combat the causes of enforced disappearances, among other recommendations.

Following his 13-30 May visit to Colombia, the Independent Expert on protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity, Graeme Reid, acknowledged in a press release the positive steps that the country has taken to protect the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and other gender-diverse (LGBT) persons and its progress in aligning laws, policies, and strategies with international human rights standards. He highlighted that, despite such positive developments, individuals from the LGBT community continue to face ongoing risks and vulnerabilities, including violence, stigma, and unequal socio-economic outcomes. In this regard, Reid underscored that Colombia “must match impressive strategies with resources and implementation” to effectively address discrimination and violence based on sexual orientation and gender identity.

Key Issues and Options

An overarching priority for the Council remains supporting the full implementation of the 2016 peace agreement. Members may wish to continue emphasising the importance of continued focus on that objective in the remainder of Petro’s term, which ends in August 2026.

A key priority for the Council is supporting transitional justice efforts in the country, including the work of SJP. It seems that the SJP’s president, Judge Alejandro Ramelli, is expected to visit New York in July. Council members may use the opportunity to interact with him informally, in order to learn more about the process of handing down restorative sentences and to discuss potential challenges as the Court commences this crucial—and potentially polarising—stage. Members have previously hosted such interactions with SJP representatives at their permanent missions.

The effects of conflict on children in Colombia is another matter of concern. The involvement of a 15-year-old in the attempt on Uribe’s life further highlighted long-standing concerns about the recruitment and use of children by armed groups. According to the Secretary-General’s latest annual report on children and armed conflict, dated 17 June, 450 children were recruited and used in Colombia in 2024, an approximately 70 percent increase compared with 2023, including by former FARC-EP dissident groups (326), the ELN (56), and the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC). The AGC, which recruited and used 39 children, was listed in the annexes to the Secretary-General’s annual report for the first time for committing this grave violation against children.

At the meeting on Colombia in July, some Council members may choose to call on donors to enhance their support for humanitarian efforts in the country, both those focusing on children and for communities more broadly. Humanitarian actors have stressed that needs continue growing in the country while capacities and resources are diminishing. Haq noted in his 17 June briefing that OCHA’s highly prioritised humanitarian response plan for Colombia was less than 16 percent funded, with just $54 million received of the $342 million required, adding that funding shortfalls may leave an estimated 1.4 million people without assistance this year.

Council Dynamics

Council members are generally united in their support for the peace process in Colombia and the verification mission’s work.

It remains to be seen how the approach of the administration of US President Donald Trump to Colombia may affect Council dynamics on the file. A key priority for this administration is curtailing the drug trade from Colombia. A potential indicator of the US’ approach to the country will be its decision, expected by 1 September, on whether to renew Colombia’s certification as a country that has cooperated fully with the US in drug control efforts.

In June, Colombia was elected for a seat on the Security Council in 2026-2027. During its Council campaign, Colombia presented its own experience with inclusive and participatory peace processes as a successful model for countries coming out of conflict and emphasised the role of dialogue and trust-building in this regard.

The UK is the penholder on Colombia.

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UN DOCUMENTS ON COLOMBIA

Security Council Meeting Records
22 April 2025S/PV.9903 This was the Security Council’s latest quarterly meeting on Colombia.

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