Yemen
Expected Council Action
In June, the Security Council will hold its monthly meeting on Yemen. UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg and an official from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) are expected to brief on political, security, and humanitarian developments in the country.
The mandate of the UN Mission to Support the Hodeidah Agreement (UNMHA) expires on 14 July.
Key Recent Developments
On 6 May, US President Donald Trump announced that the US would stop its bombing campaign against the Houthis—a Yemeni rebel group also known as Ansar Allah—which aimed to degrade the group’s capability to attack military and commercial vessels in the Red Sea. Oman later announced that it had mediated a ceasefire between the US and the Houthis, which included a cessation of attacks on ships in the Red Sea and the facilitation of freedom of navigation for international shipping.
In recent months, the Houthis have repeatedly targeted US military assets in the Red Sea and Yemen as part of a wider campaign to attack Israel and disrupt maritime security in the Red Sea—actions they claim are in solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza.
Council resolution 2768 (2025) requests the Secretary-General to issue a monthly report on any new incidents involving Houthi attacks on merchant and commercial vessels in the Red Sea. A 9 May letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council said that the International Maritime Organisation indicated that no new incidents occurred during the reporting period of 10 April through to 9 May. The most recent verified attack against a commercial vessel was in December 2024.
The ceasefire agreement between the US and the Houthis does not extend to Israel, and the Houthis have said that they will continue their operations against Israeli targets until Israel’s military operations in Gaza cease. On 4 May, a Houthi-launched ballistic missile landed near Israel’s Ben Gurion International Airport, injuring eight people and causing temporary flight suspensions. Further ballistic missile and drone attacks against Israel continued throughout May, including after the US-Houthi ceasefire. Since the resumption of hostilities in Gaza on 18 March, Israeli media reports that the Houthis have launched 38 ballistic missiles and at least 10 drones at Israel, several of which were either intercepted or fell short of their targets.
Throughout May, Israel has conducted heavy retaliatory airstrikes on Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen, including on the ports of Hodeidah and as-Salif, on Sanaa International Airport, and on several power plants. Israel has claimed that the ports are being used to transfer Iranian weapons intended for the Houthis. On 16 May, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defence Minister Israel Katz said that the Houthis “will pay a very heavy price” and promised to target the rebel group’s leadership. Following a second airstrike on Sanaa airport on 28 May—which Israel claimed destroyed the Houthis’ last remaining aircraft—Netanyahu accused Iran of being directly responsible for Houthi aggression emanating from Yemen.
Briefing the Council during a 14 May meeting, Grundberg welcomed the ceasefire agreement between the US and the Houthis while highlighting that de-escalation in the Red Sea and the wider region is necessary to resolve Yemen’s ten-year-old conflict and advance a Yemeni-owned peace process. He warned, however, that retaliatory attacks between the Houthis and Israel continue to represent a dangerous escalation. In a press stakeout following the meeting, Grundberg stressed that regional de-escalation—including with regard to the situation in Gaza—is needed if there is to be progress on the peace process in Yemen, as the two “have become increasingly entangled”.
During the Council meeting, Grundberg also stressed that the UN remains unwavering in supporting Yemen’s conflict parties in fulfilling the commitments made in 2023 towards establishing a roadmap for peace. The commitments included a nationwide ceasefire, measures to address economic and humanitarian issues, and the advancement of an inclusive political process. Grundberg recognised, however, that “the mediation environment has changed significantly since late 2023” and that there is a “need for additional guarantees to enable the buy-in of the parties and to ensure the support of the region, and the international community and this Council”.
On 3 May, Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) appointed Salem Saleh Bin Braik as prime minister of Yemen’s internationally recognised government. He replaced Ahmed Awad bin Mubarak, who reportedly resigned after “many difficulties”, including disagreements with PLC Chairman Rashad Al-Alimi over a potential government reshuffle.
Yemen’s economy is on the brink of collapse. During the 14 May Council meeting, Grundberg highlighted how the country’s currency is deteriorating while citizens continue to suffer from severe electricity blackouts, unpaid salaries, and lack of access to basic commodities. At that same meeting, Yemen’s UN representative accused the Houthis of imposing a “systematic economic blockade” by targeting oil terminals leading to the suspension of oil exports, which account for nearly 90 percent of Yemen’s total commodity exports and 80 percent of the total revenues in the State’s general budget. He stressed that this has impacted the government’s ability to provide public services such as electricity and pay public salaries, while also devaluing the national currency.
Also briefing at the Council’s 14 May on Yemen, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Tom Fletcher warned that the humanitarian situation in Yemen is deteriorating, highlighting a myriad of threats faced by the civilian population—particularly children—which include malnutrition, cholera, landmines, lack of access to education and healthcare, and active hostilities. Fletcher emphasised that people in Yemen are dying because of funding cuts to humanitarian aid. According to OCHA, as at 13 May, the 2025 Yemen Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (HNRP) was only nine percent funded. OCHA has published an addendum to the HNRP, which presents the most urgent funding requirements for critical life-saving assistance, totalling $1.42 billion to assist 8.8 million people until the end of the year. On 21 May, the European Union (EU) Commission announced €80 million in humanitarian funding for 2025 to support people in need in Yemen. On 20 May, 116 aid organisations, including ten UN agencies, called for “urgent, collective action” to pull Yemen back from the brink of catastrophe.
Women, Peace and Security
As the Council’s president for May, Greece elected to include a focus on women, peace and security (WPS) at the 14 May Council briefing on Yemen. Prior to the meeting, Denmark, France, Greece, Guyana, Panama, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Sierra Leone, Slovenia, and the UK delivered a joint statement calling for, among other things, women’s participation in ceasefire negotiations and unimpeded delivery of humanitarian aid.
Several participants addressed WPS issues during the meeting. Fletcher said that 9.6 million women and girls in Yemen are in severe need of humanitarian support and warned that funding cuts have left many survivors of gender-based violence without access to healthcare, psychosocial support, and legal aid. Dina El Mamoun, the Yemen Country Director of the NGO Centre for Civilians in Conflict, said that women and girls in Yemen continue to be killed, wounded, displaced, and systematically marginalised. She highlighted that economic collapse is driving more families to resort to early marriage, deepening existing inequalities and depriving girls of their rights and futures. El Mamoun stressed that, even while facing dire circumstances, women in Yemen are at the forefront of humanitarian response efforts, community-based conflict resolution, and peacebuilding initiatives. She noted, however, that despite this work, they continue to be excluded from meaningful participation in peace talks.
Panama condemned the restrictions limiting women’s freedom of movement and access to basic services in areas controlled by the Houthis. Similarly, the “A3 Plus” members (Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Guyana) expressed concern at movement restrictions and arbitrary detention. Denmark and Greece highlighted the importance of women’s participation in peace efforts, while Slovenia stressed that women’s rights should not be negotiable in any future peace and political process. ROK noted that women’s participation in public life, including access to education, is essential for peace and stability in Yemen.
Key Issues and Options
Yemen has been confronted with immense challenges on the political, security, and economic fronts for several years. De-escalating hostilities in Yemen and the Red Sea and relaunching the stalled intra-Yemeni political process remain priorities for the Security Council. The US-Houthi ceasefire represents an opportunity for Council members to support further de-escalation and encourage the parties to resume negotiations towards a nationwide ceasefire and a political settlement.
At the same time, the Council will need to maintain pressure to protect the safety of navigation and shipping in the Red Sea and avoid a resumption of Houthi attacks on merchant ships and global supply chains. Given that the conflict in Gaza has been used by the Houthis as a justification for their attacks in the Red Sea and on Israel, this situation cannot be addressed separately from the broader regional context. This, however, remains a challenge as the Council continues to be divided over whether the two situations are directly linked or not.
One option for the Council would be to issue a presidential statement stressing that there is no military solution to the conflict in Yemen and demanding that the Yemeni parties resume concrete discussions on establishing a roadmap under UN auspices for inclusive peace in the country. The statement could also reiterate provisions from Council resolution 2768, emphasising the need to address the root causes of the attacks in the Red Sea and calling on all member states to adhere to the arms embargo imposed by the 2140 Yemen Sanctions Committee.
Given the increasingly fraught humanitarian context, Council members could also consider holding a public briefing, possibly at high level, focused specifically on Yemen’s humanitarian crisis, which could also allow members the opportunity to highlight the urgent need for bolstering funding pledges.
Council Dynamics
Council members are largely aligned in support of an inclusive intra-Yemeni political process, the need to improve economic and humanitarian conditions in the country, and the need to restore freedom of navigation and security to the Red Sea. Advancing mediation efforts towards a resumption of dialogue and a peace process under UN auspices remains an overarching priority for members.
Nevertheless, Council members have divergent views on the reasons for the protracted political stalemate and insecurity in Yemen. The “A3 plus one” members, as well as China, Pakistan, and Russia, have all stressed that the situation in Yemen and the Red Sea cannot be discussed in isolation from the situation in Gaza, and some have directly blamed Israel for current instability in the region. Russia has also heavily criticised the US military campaign against the Houthis as ineffective, claiming that it only served to degrade Yemen’s already dire humanitarian situation.
On the other hand, the P3 members (France, the UK, and the US) have accused Iran of financially and militarily supporting the Houthis, fostering further regional tensions. The US has taken a hawkish stance against Iranian support of the group, viewing it as the key facilitator of the Houthi movement—which the US has designated as a foreign terrorist organisation. The US has called for the Security Council to respond to “Iranian defiance” of the Council-mandated arms embargo. They have also called for the strengthening of the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM), which inspects ships travelling to Houthi-controlled ports to ensure compliance with the arms embargo against the group.
The UK is the penholder on Yemen.
| Security Council Resolution | |
| 15 January 2025S/RES/2768 | This resolution extended the Secretary-General’s monthly reporting requirement on Houthi attacks on merchant and commercial vessels in the Red Sea. |
| Security Council Meeting Record | |
| 31 May 2025S/PV.9915 | This was a Security Council meeting on Yemen. |
| Security Council Press Statement | |
| 13 February 2025SC/15995 | This was a press statement on Houthi Detention of United Nations, International Non-governmental Organization Workers. |
