UNOCA (Central Africa)
Expected Council Action
In June, the Security Council will hold a briefing and consultations on the Secretary-General’s semi-annual report on the UN Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) and the implementation of the UN’s regional strategy to combat the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). Special Representative and Head of UNOCA Abdou Abarry is expected to brief. The mandate of UNOCA expires on 31 August 2027.
Key Recent Developments
On 7 February, an extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) was held in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea. Among other issues, the summit addressed the worsening security situation in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, which has significantly deteriorated since January, as well as other humanitarian crises unfolding across the Central Africa region. Abarry participated in the summit and delivered remarks emphasising the need for an urgent and collective response to the multiple challenges facing the region.
On 12 April, Gabon held a presidential election, marking the end of the transition period following the August 2023 coup that removed President Ali Bongo Ondimba, who had been in power since 2009. The transitional military leader, Brice Oligui Nguema, who led the coup, won the election with 90 percent of the vote, while his main opponent, Alain Claude Bilie-By-Nze, secured only three percent. Bongo and his family were permitted to leave the country and flew to Luanda, following mediation efforts by Angolan President João Lourenço, acting in his capacity as the current Chair of the African Union (AU).
The AU Peace and Security Council, which met on 30 April to consider the situation in Gabon, welcomed the successful conduct of the presidential election and decided to lift Gabon’s suspension from the AU’s activities. The suspension was imposed on 31 August 2023 following the coup, based on the relevant provisions of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. Nguema was officially sworn in on 3 May at an inauguration ceremony, which saw the participation of several African leaders.
Former Prime Minister Succès Masra—who ran against President Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno in last year’s presidential election—was arrested on 16 May for his alleged involvement in recent intercommunal violence in the southwestern province of Logone Occidental, which left 42 people dead, mostly women and children. According to media reports, the violence was triggered by a dispute between ethnic Fulani nomadic herders and local Ngambaye farmers over the demarcation of grazing and farming areas. Masra’s party, Les Transformateurs, has denied any involvement, and his arrest has raised fresh concerns about the shrinking political space in Chad.
In late March, Niger announced its withdrawal from the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), a regional security coalition comprising forces from Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria mandated to combat Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) in the Lake Chad Basin. This decision has raised concerns about the weakening of the region’s counter-terrorism framework and the potential creation of a security vacuum that could be exploited by terrorist groups. In October 2024, a terrorist attack on a military base in Chad’s border region with Nigeria—resulting in the deaths of 40 Chadian soldiers—prompted President Mahamat Idriss Déby to threaten Chad’s possible withdrawal from the MNJTF as well.
On 25 March, Boko Haram reportedly killed at least 20 Cameroonian soldiers in an attack on a military base in the Nigerian border town of Wulgo. In addition to the persistent threat from Boko Haram and ISWAP, Cameroon continues to struggle with violence in its Anglophone northwest and southwest regions, where separatist groups are carrying out frequent ambushes against government forces, further destabilising the security environment. As the country prepares for a presidential election later this year, it faces a tense and volatile political and security landscape. President Paul Biya, who has been in power for 42 years, has not yet officially announced whether he will seek re-election, although he is widely expected to do so.
From 28 to 31 January, Abarry visited northern Nigeria together with Leonardo Santos Simão, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa and the Sahel and Head of the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), as part of their joint efforts to support Lake Chad Basin countries in addressing the threats posed by terrorism. The Special Representatives travelled to Bama, a town in Borno state of Nigeria, to assess humanitarian response efforts. They also participated in the 5th Lake Chad Basin Governors’ Forum that took place in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State, from 29-31 January. The forum was focused on rebuilding the Lake Chad Basin, consolidating gains, and promoting peace, cross-border cooperation, security, and sustainable development.
As part of his UN80 Initiative, announced in March, to streamline the UN’s work and enhance cost-efficiency and effectiveness, the Secretary-General has established a task force to develop proposals for potential structural reforms and programmatic alignment across the UN system. According to a compilation of proposals by the UN80 task force, the UN Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) is among the entities being reviewed for possible mandate consolidation. The task force has identified overlaps between UNOCA’s mandate and those of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). However, as the Secretary-General explained in his briefing to member states on 12 May, any proposals related to mandate reviews will need to go through the intergovernmental process within the UN General Assembly.
Key Issues and Options
The political and security situations in several parts of Central Africa continue to be key concerns for the Council. In June, Council members are likely to be interested in hearing Abarry’s assessment of country-specific situations in the region that are not on the Council’s agenda. The recent election in Gabon and the upcoming election in Cameroon may be of particular interest to Council members.
The continued threat of terrorism in the Lake Chad basin remains a matter of serious concern. The fact that Boko Haram and ISWAP have not only become increasingly adept at using social media to spread extremist ideology and recruit youth, but have also begun employing drones, further heightens these concerns. Council members may be keen to know about the MNJTF’s fate in view of the recent decision by Niger to withdraw from the joint force. A possible option for the Guyanese Council presidency in June is to invite a regional expert to provide analysis and insights into the rapidly shifting regional security and geopolitical dynamics.
A related issue is how to address the root causes of the conflicts in the region. Council members continue to support the Regional Strategy for the Stabilization, Recovery and Resilience of the Boko Haram-affected areas of the Lake Chad Basin, developed by the Lake Chad Basin Commission with the support of the AU, and to call for expediting its implementation. They may also welcome the outcome of the 5th Lake Chad Basin Governors’ Forum.
Council Dynamics
Council members support a holistic regional approach to addressing the peace and security challenges in Central Africa, based on cooperation between UNOCA and the various regional mechanisms. Several members tend to underscore challenges in the region related to political transitions; humanitarian crises, including the rising number of refugees and internally displaced persons; the threats posed by terrorism and violent extremism; and the adverse effects of climate change.
Council members recognise the important role played by the MNJTF in fighting Boko Haram and ISWAP in the Lake Chad Basin. They will likely condemn the recent attack in the region and underscore the need to continue supporting the MNJTF in neutralising these groups.
The UK is the penholder on UNOCA.
| Security Council Presidential Statements | |
| 1 November 2024S/PRST/2024/7 | This statement expressed the Council’s full support for UNOCA. |
| Secretary-General’s Reports | |
| 30 May 2024S/2024/420 | This was the semi-annual report on UNOCA. |
| Security Council Meeting Records | |
| 10 June 2024S/PV.9648 | This was a meeting on the situation in Central Africa. |
