Security Council Elections 2025
Security Council Elections 2025
On 3 June, the 79th session of the UN General Assembly is scheduled to hold elections for membership of the Security Council. The five seats available for election in 2025, according to the regular distribution among regions, will be as follows:
- two seats for the African Group (currently held by Algeria and Sierra Leone);
- one seat for the Group of Asia and the Pacific Small Island Developing States (Asia-Pacific Group, currently held by the Republic of Korea);
- one seat for the Latin American and Caribbean Group (GRULAC, currently held by Guyana); and
- one seat for the Eastern European Group (currently held by Slovenia).
The Western European and Others Group (WEOG) is not contesting any seats this year, as its two seats, held by Denmark and Greece through 2026, come up for election every other year. The five new members elected this year will take up their seats on 1 January 2026 and will serve until 31 December 2027.
The 2025 Candidates
Five member states— Bahrain, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Latvia, and Liberia—are currently running for the five available seats. Apart from Latvia, all other candidates have previously served on the Council: Colombia seven times, DRC twice, and Bahrain and Liberia once.
All the regional groups are running uncontested elections this year, known as a “clean slate.” The table below shows the number of seats available by region in the 2025 election, the declared candidate(s), and their prior term(s) on the Council.
Potential Council Dynamics in 2026
The shifting global landscape and continuing political polarisation among the permanent members are expected to continue to shape Council dynamics in 2026. The priorities raised by the candidates in their campaigns, as well as their long-standing interests, help to provide insights into their potential approach to some of the key issues confronting the Council.
Given the long-standing positions of the permanent members— as well as those of the continuing elected members and the incoming members—several agenda items are likely to remain highly contentious, including the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Myanmar, “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”, and Ukraine. African issues that may be difficult include the situations in the DRC and Sudan.
Although it is unclear what course the war in Ukraine will take in 2026, the situation is likely to continue to occupy a significant portion of the Council’s agenda in 2026. Among current candidates, Latvia has a significant interest in the situation in Ukraine, given its geographic proximity to the conflict. From the outset of the war, Latvia has consistently provided Ukraine with broad political, military, financial, development, and humanitarian assistance.
Positions on Ukraine of some of the other incoming members have evolved over time. Shortly after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the General Assembly adopted a resolution on 2 March 2022 titled “Aggression against Ukraine,” receiving support from 141 member states. All current candidates for Council membership in 2026-2027 voted in favour of that resolution. However, more recent votes in the General Assembly have revealed growing divisions among the wider UN membership on this issue. On 24 February 2025, the Ukrainian-EU resolution titled “Advancing a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine” secured just 93 votes in favour, significantly less support than the 2 March 2022 resolution.
Among current candidates, Latvia and Liberia voted in favour of the 2025 resolution, while Bahrain and Colombia abstained, and the DRC did not vote. In 2022, all candidate countries were in broad agreement that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine constituted an act of aggression, as reflected by voting records in the General Assembly. Latvia and Liberia have since maintained a clear stance on this issue, supporting Ukraine’s position. In contrast, the positions of Bahrain, Colombia, and the DRC have seen slight shifts in line with a growing reluctance among Global South countries to take sides in the conflict.
The situation in the Middle East remains volatile and is likely to continue to feature prominently in the Council’s work in 2026. Security Council divisions are not expected to change dramatically over the Israel-Hamas war and its impact on other issues in the Middle East. While many members have condemned Hamas’ 7 October 2023 attack, several have strongly criticised Israel for its alleged violations of international humanitarian law in Gaza. The US has been strongly supportive of Israel throughout the war.
Voting patterns in the General Assembly show that the current candidates have exhibited a range of views with regard to the war in Gaza. While Liberia has traditionally tended to align with the US and Israel on this issue, there appears to have been a slight shift in its position since December 2023. For example, it voted in favour of the 16 December 2024 General Assembly resolution (ES-10/26) demanding a ceasefire in Gaza, as did other incoming members. The DRC has tended to be supportive of resolutions on the humanitarian situation in Gaza and on Palestinian rights. Latvia has also supported humanitarian measures related to the war in Gaza in the General Assembly. In May 2024, Colombia severed ties with Israel over its actions in Gaza. It has been critical of Israel’s actions and supportive of humanitarian and diplomatic efforts to end the conflict. Although Bahrain normalised its relations with Israel after signing the Abraham Accords, it is expected to maintain its strong criticism of Israel’s operation in Gaza in line with the position of the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council.
Next year, with Somalia in the second year of its 2025-2026 tenure, there will be three non-permanent members serving in the Council that are also on its agenda.
The DRC has had a peacekeeping operation in the country since the early sixties, and a sanctions committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004). The UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) is the largest and longest-running UN peacekeeping mission in Africa. In recent years it has faced significant pressure from both the government and local communities due to its perceived failure to effectively address the security situation in eastern DRC. As part of a disengagement plan for a phased and gradual drawdown of MONUSCO, the mission has withdrawn its forces from South Kivu, one of the eastern provinces. However, the security situation deteriorated sharply in early 2025, with the Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23) expanding its territorial control in the eastern regions of the country.
The DRC has a contentious relationship with Rwanda, which it accuses of supporting the M23, while Rwanda blames the DRC for supporting the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), an ethnic Hutu armed group active in eastern DRC that was implicated in the 1994 genocide against the Tutsis in Rwanda. The Group of Experts assisting the 1533 DRC Sanctions Committee has corroborated these assertions in its past reports. In this context, the DRC has been advocating for punitive measures against Rwanda and the M23.
If elected, the DRC is likely to use its membership on the Security Council—alongside its concurrent seat on the African Union Peace and Security Council—to draw greater international attention to the situation in eastern DRC and the broader Great Lakes region.
Colombia has been on the agenda since 2016 following the signing of the 2016 Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace between the government of Colombia and the former rebel group Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP).
From the outset, Colombia’s relationship with the Council has been positive. It requested to be added to the Council’s agenda in 2016, which resulted in the establishment of the UN Mission in Colombia. This mission was succeeded by the UN Verification Mission in Colombia, which is tasked with verifying several aspects related to implementation of the 2016 agreement and is regularly discussed in the Council. Colombia also remains a rare file on the Council’s agenda that enjoys consensus and has largely remained insulated from the difficult dynamics among Council members on other files. Colombia may be able to share its positive experience of hosting a UN mission in discussions on UN peace operations.
As a West African country, Liberia is expected to pay particular attention to West Africa and the Sahel and may choose to focus on the deteriorating security situation in this region. It could replace Sierra Leone as a co-penholder on the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) next year, joining Denmark, the other current co-penholder. In the same vein, the DRC could be the co-penholder on the UN Office for Central Africa (UNOCA), which in recent years has had a Central African country co-pen with the UK.
Both the DRC and Liberia are expected to advance common African positions in line with the decisions of the AU and its Peace and Security Council. In this regard, during their election campaigns, both countries expressed support for “Silencing the Guns in Africa”, the AU’s flagship initiative aimed at ending all wars and conflicts on the continent by 2030. Curbing the proliferation of small arms and light weapons—one of the initiative’s key objectives—has been emphasised by both countries and could feature as a theme during their Council tenures.
Some candidates have emphasised the importance of addressing terrorism and violent extremism. Bahrain has highlighted this issue as one of its priorities, stressing its role in combating the challenges in its region. Colombia may be interested in focusing on a broader set of issues related to transnational crime.
Several of the candidates have indicated that peacekeeping will be one of their priorities. Colombia, the DRC, and Liberia have extensive experience hosting UN peace operations, while Bahrain and Latvia have emphasised the importance of peacekeeping in their candidacies. These members will enter during a period of transition for peacekeeping in light of potential cuts to the peacekeeping budget and the ongoing review of peace operations. They may therefore have an opportunity to share their experiences and express their views on the drawdown, reconfiguration, and termination of UN peace operations during their term.
Additionally, all candidates have expressed interest in supporting peacebuilding efforts. The ongoing peacebuilding architecture review, which is expected to culminate with twin resolutions adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly at the end of 2025, may provide new opportunities for involvement.
Maritime security may receive significant attention from the Council in 2026. Given that this is one of its core priorities, Bahrain is expected to advance discussions in the Council on this issue. As a country with one of the world’s largest ship registries, Liberia has a particular stake in this issue as well. These members could work closely with the continuing elected members—Denmark, Greece, Pakistan, Panama, and Somalia—who also have a strong interest in promoting maritime security issues.
All candidate countries have expressed an interest in advancing Women, Peace and Security (WPS)-related issues. Several, if not all, may sign on to the Shared Commitments on WPS initiative, which started in late 2021. Permanent members France and the UK, the penholder on WPS, can be expected to remain proponents of the agenda. There have been changes to the US position on this agenda since the start of President Donald Trump’s term in January 2025. The US, which signed on to the Shared Commitments on WPS in 2023, has so far not participated in any of the joint stakeouts that the Council members who signed on to this initiative have held to deliver joint statements. The US has also sought to modify some references to the WPS agenda during negotiations in early 2025, with a particular focus on eliminating gender-related language. Russia will probably continue to argue that gender equality is not directly linked to international peace and security and is therefore not within the Council’s purview. China is likely to continue to maintain that the development gap is the most important barrier to women’s empowerment.
There will be a vacancy for one of the co-chair positions of the Informal Expert Group (IEG) on WPS in 2026: current co-chair Sierra Leone will conclude its Council term this December, paving the way for another member to join Denmark as co-chair.
Climate, peace and security ranks high on the priority list for many candidates this year, with most candidate countries emphasising the importance of addressing the nexus between environmental issues and international peace and security. In particular, the DRC, Latvia, and Liberia have expressed strong interest in addressing issues related to natural resource management and its linkages to conflict. While the majority of Council members support Council engagement on this issue, China and Russia continue to express concerns about the climate, peace and security file. The current US administration has reservations about this issue as well.
One member of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency (ACT) Group—Slovenia—will leave the Security Council at the end of 2025. Among the current candidates, only Latvia is a member of the group. Another ACT Group member, Denmark, will continue on the Council in 2026. These two members are likely to take the lead in pushing for improved Security Council working methods, including proposals advocated by the ACT Group.
All incoming members have signed the ACT Group’s Code of Conduct regarding Security Council action against genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes, which calls on all Council members to not vote against any credible draft resolution intended to prevent or halt mass atrocities. In line with ACT’s position on the selection process for the next UN Secretary-General, ACT members on the Council are expected to be supportive of greater transparency and openness in this process.
In 2026, elected members may continue to seek active roles in the Council as penholders or co-penholders, the informal designation of those that take the lead in drafting outcomes and convening meetings or negotiations on particular agenda items, a responsibility most often assumed by one of the P3 (France, the UK, and the US). In recent years, a growing number of elected members have served as co-penholders with a permanent member on various files. Among current elected members, this includes Slovenia with the US on Ukraine political issues, Panama with France on Ukraine humanitarian issues, and Panama with the US on Haiti. Elected members usually hold the pen on the Syria humanitarian file, and some candidate countries may be interested in this role when Denmark (current penholder) leaves the Council at the end of 2026. Several current members are still vying to be penholders on Afghanistan in 2025; next year, depending on how this issue is resolved, there may be an opportunity for one or more of the elected members to serve as a penholder or co-penholder on Afghanistan.
