Libya
Expected Council Action
In June, the Security Council will hold its bimonthly briefing on the situation in Libya. Special Representative and Head of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) Hanna Serwaa Tetteh will brief the Council on recent political, security, and humanitarian developments in the country and the Secretary-General’s latest report on UNSMIL.
Key Recent Developments
The political impasse in Libya continues between the UN-recognised Government of National Unity (GNU), based in Tripoli and led by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Mohammed Dbeibah, with advisory support from the High State Council (HSC), and the eastern-based Government of National Stability (GNS), led by Prime Minister Osama Hamad and backed by the House of Representatives (HoR) and the self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA) under the command of General Khalifa Haftar. The parties remain deadlocked over proposed legislation to hold national elections that would reconcile the country’s divided government. A key point of contention concerns the formation of a unified interim government to organise the elections—a move favoured by the GNS and HoR but opposed by the GNU and some segments of the HSC. The prolonged stalemate between the rival governments—which has persisted since the indefinite postponement of the 2021 elections—is one of the root causes of Libya’s political, security, and economic instability.
On 12 May, fighting erupted between rival militias in Tripoli following the killing of Abdel Ghani al-Kikli, the head of the Stability Support Authority (SSA), an armed group affiliated with Libya’s Presidential Council. Kikli was reportedly killed in a facility operated by the 444 Brigade, a rival militia aligned with Dbeibah.
Although it appears that the SSA quickly stood down, fighting continued between the 444 Brigade and Radaa, another militia that does not support Dbeibah. Radaa was apparently concerned that it would be targeted following Dbeibah’s 13 May announcement declaring an end to “parallel security institutions”—armed groups operating outside of the government’s regular security forces—during a meeting with government security officials. While the GNU announced a ceasefire the same day, clashes continued the following day. The violence, which reportedly drew in fighters from outside the city, took place in densely populated urban areas and resulted in at least eight civilian deaths.
The UN has expressed serious concern about the recent outbreak of violence in Tripoli. In a 15 May statement, UNSMIL condemned the “rapid escalation of violence” and warned that “the situation could quickly spiral out of control.” It urged all parties to ensure the protection of civilians and to “engage without delay in serious, good-faith dialogue to resolve this conflict peacefully,” underscoring the mission’s “readiness to provide its good offices to facilitate dialogue and bring an end to the fighting.”
On 16 May, Tetteh briefed Council members in closed consultations on the situation in Libya following a request by the UK, France, and the US. The following day, Council members adopted a press statement expressing concern over escalating violence and civilian casualties in Tripoli, urging all parties to protect civilians, respect agreed truces, and work towards a permanent ceasefire with accountability for attacks. They also reaffirmed their strong support for an inclusive, Libyan-led political process under UN facilitation, the unification of Libyan institutions, and respect for Libya’s sovereignty and unity.
On 6 May, the Advisory Committee set up by UNSMIL on 4 February to address outstanding issues hindering the holding of elections in Libya completed its mandate and submitted its final report to the mission. The Committee was composed of a diverse group of Libyan personalities, whose selection was based on several criteria, including expertise in legal, constitutional, and electoral issues; the ability to build compromise; and an understanding of the political challenges facing Libya.
The Committee’s report outlined four options regarding conducting elections and ending the transitional phase: holding presidential and legislative elections simultaneously; holding parliamentary elections first, followed by the drafting and adoption of a permanent constitution; adopting a permanent constitution before elections; and establishing a political dialogue committee, based on the Libyan Political Agreement, to finale electoral laws, executive authority, and the permanent constitution.
On 15 May, International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor Karim Asad Ahmad Khan briefed the Council on the ICC’s Libya-related activities. Khan presented his 29th report to the Council, outlining the main developments and steps taken during the reporting period. In his briefing, Khan welcomed Libya’s 12 May declaration formally accepting the jurisdiction of the Court for alleged crimes committed in its territory from 2011 until the end of 2027. The Council referred the situation in Libya to the ICC through the adoption of resolution 1970 on 26 February 2011.
On 29 May, the Council adopted resolution 2780, renewing for six months the authorisation for member states, acting nationally or through regional organisations, to inspect vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya that they have reasonable grounds to believe are violating the arms embargo imposed on the country in resolution 1970.
Key Issues and Options
The key issue for the Council remains supporting political progress towards national elections to unify Libya’s divided government. One of the core objectives for the Council is to help foster common political ground between the country’s rival governments to reach an inclusive agreement on electoral laws, including the possible establishment of a unified interim government to organise the elections.
Another concern for the Council is the fragile security situation, especially after the most recent escalation of violence in Tripoli. Although the violence has now ceased, the UN had warned that it could have spiraled out of control, posing a serious threat to the permanent ceasefire reached in 2020. The underlying issues that led to the violence underscore the need for sustained attention to the political and security dynamics in Libya.
June’s briefing will provide Council members with an opportunity to hear about UNSMIL’s revitalised efforts to facilitate dialogue between Libyan political stakeholders. In this regard, Council members will most likely be interested to hear more from Tetteh about the recently published recommendations of the Advisory Committee.
To demonstrate the Council’s continued support for the mission’s intensified engagement under Tetteh’s leadership, members could consider issuing a press statement expressing support for the Special Representative and the efforts of the Advisory Committee. They could also consider holding a closed Arria-formula meeting with representatives of the rival governments and Tetteh for a frank discussion on potential ways to break the long-standing political impasse.
Council Dynamics
Council members remain united on the need for a Libyan-led, inclusive political process resulting in elections that will help to restore political, security, and economic stability to the country. They also remain broadly supportive of the UN’s mediation role towards this end.
At the most recent briefing in Libya in April, most Council members welcomed the establishment and the work of the Advisory Committee. Russia, however, emphasised that its recommendations should remain technical and serve only to inform the Special Representative. It also stressed the importance of the Committee’s inclusiveness and impartiality. Russia further emphasised that the Council should only become involved once the Committee’s work has been fully socialised among the Libyan people.
More broadly, geopolitical tensions continue to influence Council dynamics on Libya. Several Western members remain concerned about Russia’s growing presence in the eastern part of the country under Haftar’s control, which has reportedly been accelerated by the redeployment of Russian military assets from Syria following the ouster of former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Russia, for its part, routinely blames Libya’s current instability on the NATO-led military intervention in 2011 and accuses Western countries of pursuing economic interests, particularly to exploit Libya’s oil reserves.
The UK is the penholder on Libya.
| Security Council Resolution | |
| 16 January 2025S/RES/2769 | This resolution renewed the mandate of the Panel of Experts of the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee until 15 May 2026 and the authorisation of measures related to the illicit export of petroleum from Libya until 1 May 2026. |
| Security Council Press Statement | |
| 17 May 2025SC/16064 | This was a statement on escalation of violence in Tripoli. |
| Secretary-General’s Report | |
| 11 April 2025S/2025/223 | This was the 120-day report on UNSMIL. |
