Iran
Expected Council Action
In June, the Security Council is expected to convene a briefing on the Secretary-General’s biannual report on the implementation of resolution 2231 of 20 July 2015, which endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran’s nuclear programme. The Council will also receive a report from the Joint Commission, which was established to oversee the implementation of the JCPOA and comprises the current parties to the agreement: China, France, Germany, Russia, the UK, and Iran. Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Rosemary DiCarlo and a representative of the European Union (EU) in its capacity as coordinator of the Joint Commission are expected to brief.
The Council is also supposed to receive the biannual report and briefing from the Council’s 2231 facilitator. This may not take place in June, however, as the position remained vacant at the time of writing due to the delay in the appointment of subsidiary body chairs.
This month’s briefing is the last mandated Council meeting on the Iran non-proliferation issue before the scheduled expiry of the JCPOA and resolution 2231 on 18 October.
Background
The US was originally a signatory to the JCPOA, but US President Donald Trump withdrew the country from the agreement—which he argued was not strict enough—and imposed unilateral sanctions on Iran during his first term (2017-2021). Although Iran formally remained in the JCPOA, it took steps that directly contravened the agreement’s terms, including enriching uranium to levels beyond the JCPOA-mandated limits and removing cameras and monitoring equipment required by the deal.
During the subsequent administration of US President Joseph Biden (2021-2025), the US, Iran, and other parties to the JCPOA began talks to revive the agreement. Those discussions ultimately failed after Iran insisted, as a condition for accepting a deal, that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) close its investigation into traces of enriched uranium that it had discovered at three undeclared sites in Iran in 2019. The US and European parties to the JCPOA objected to this demand, which they viewed as a separate issue related to Iran’s obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In a November 2022 resolution, the IAEA Board of Governors censured Iran and directed it to comply with the IAEA’s investigation. In response, Iran announced that it had started enriching uranium to 60 percent purity, approaching the approximately 90 percent level required to produce a nuclear weapon and well above the 3.67 percent limit imposed by the JCPOA.
Since the collapse of negotiations to revive the JCPOA, Iran has continued to expand its production of highly enriched uranium, and its cooperation with the IAEA has grown increasingly strained. In November 2024, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted another resolution censuring Iran, which referred to the country’s “continued failure” to cooperate with the IAEA and requested the agency to produce a “comprehensive and updated assessment on the possible presence or use of undeclared nuclear material in connection with past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear programme”. The IAEA Board of Governors is expected to receive that report ahead of its June quarterly meeting.
Recent Developments
In its latest publicly available quarterly reports on Iran’s nuclear activities, dated 26 February, the IAEA found that Iran’s stockpile of uranium, enriched to 60 percent purity, had risen significantly during the reporting period, increasing by approximately 50 percent and totalling enough fissile material to produce six nuclear weapons if enriched further. Using stronger language than is typical for these reports, the agency said that the “significantly increased production and accumulation of high enriched uranium by Iran, the only non-nuclear weapon State to produce such nuclear material, is of serious concern”. On 12 March, the Security Council held a private meeting on the IAEA’s findings.
After returning to office earlier this year, Trump initiated bilateral negotiations with Iran aimed at curbing the country’s nuclear programme in exchange for US sanctions relief. Since April, the parties have conducted several rounds of political and technical-level talks in Italy and Oman. The fifth and most recent round took place in Rome on 23 May.
Both parties initially expressed cautious optimism about the prospects of reaching a deal, but their public messaging has since hardened. The key point of contention concerns Iran’s enrichment capabilities. The US demands that Iran dismantle its entire nuclear infrastructure and cease all uranium enrichment, while Iran claims it has a right to enrichment under the NPT and insists on retaining low-level enrichment capability for civilian purposes. Moreover, while certain compromise solutions reportedly under discussion could potentially resolve this impasse, the talks could also be complicated by differing positions on the scope of a potential agreement and whether it would go beyond the ambit of the JCPOA by also imposing restrictions on Iran’s ballistic missile programme and the country’s support to regional proxy groups. On 20 May, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei expressed pessimism about the state of the negotiations, saying that he did not expect them to “reach a conclusion”.
Trump has threatened military action if the parties are not able to reach a deal but has expressed a preference for a diplomatic solution to the issue. In April, he reportedly rejected a plan proposed by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to strike Iranian nuclear facilities—which would have required US military support—opting instead to pursue negotiations. According to recent media reports, the US has obtained intelligence that Israel is currently planning a military operation that it could undertake with or without US backing should the talks fail. Proponents of military action argue that Iran is now uniquely vulnerable to an offensive operation after Israel struck several of its air defence facilities in October 2024, and key Iranian allies such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the al-Assad regime in Syria have been weakened or overthrown.
In response to the reports of a possible Israeli military operation, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi sent a letter dated 22 May to the Security Council, Secretary-General António Guterres, and IAEA Director-General Rafael Mariano Grossi warning that the country would retaliate against any use of force—for which it would also hold the US legally responsible—and calling on the Security Council to take “immediate and effective action in response to these threats”. The letter also said that Iran would implement “special measures” to protect its nuclear material and facilities, which could further complicate the IAEA’s monitoring and verification activities in the country.
Human Rights-Related Developments
On 12 March, Mai Soto, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iran, submitted a report to the General Assembly that notes an extraordinary rise in executions in 2024, with over 900 recorded cases, including the highest number of women executed in the past decade.
On 14 March, the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Iran (FFM) raised alarm at the Government’s continued use of systematic repression to suppress public dissent. The FFM found that two and a half years after the “Woman, Life, Freedom” protests began in September 2022, Iran heightened its use of surveillance, including through State-sponsored vigilantism, further restricting the rights of women and girls, and others demanding human rights.
On 3 April, the Human Rights Council adopted resolution 58/21 on the human rights situation in Iran. Among other recommendations, the resolution condemns widespread violations of human rights and urges Iran to address systematic impunity by establishing a system of accountability consistent with international law.
In a 10 April press release, UN experts expressed concern over Iran’s practice of amputation sentences in cases of theft, in violation of international human rights standards. The development follows a case in which three men were sentenced to finger amputation by Iran’s Supreme Court. The UN experts requested immediate intervention to prevent these punishments and urged Iran to take concrete steps to abolish all forms of corporal punishment in law and practice.
Key Issues and Options
The primary issue for the Security Council is achieving a peaceful resolution to Iran’s nuclear programme that prevents the country from developing nuclear weapons while maintaining its ability to pursue nuclear activities for civilian purposes.
This task is gaining increasing urgency as the JCPOA and resolution 2231 are set to expire in October. At that point, the provisions of resolution 2231 will be terminated and—as stated by the resolution—“the Security Council will have concluded its consideration of the Iranian nuclear issue, and the item “Non-proliferation” will be removed from the list of matters of which the Council is seized”.
One of the provisions of resolution 2231 that will elapse is the “snapback” mechanism under which any party to the JCPOA can notify the Council of significant non-compliance by Iran and thereby trigger the reimposition of UN sanctions that were in place prior to the resolution’s adoption. Once the snapback is triggered, the Council would need to adopt a resolution to continue the termination of sanctions on Iran. If no such resolution is adopted within 30 days—whether because of a veto or failure to secure the necessary votes—the sanctions would be automatically reimposed.
Against this backdrop, Council action will depend on the outcome of the ongoing bilateral negotiations between Iran and the US. If the parties reach an agreement to curb Iran’s nuclear programme in exchange for the lifting of US sanctions, the Council is expected to also maintain the UN sanctions relief provided by resolution 2231. However, since there would be little time to demonstrate compliance with any future agreement before resolution 2231 expires—and JCPOA parties lose the ability to trigger the snapback—the Council may consider adopting a bridging mechanism to temporarily extend the resolution for a certain period of time to allow for implementation and verification of its commitments.
If bilateral negotiations between Iran and the US move forward but require a longer process to reach a final agreement, extending the snapback deadline could also be one component of an interim arrangement to allow negotiations to continue toward a more comprehensive settlement.
Alternatively, if negotiations fail and Iran continues to expand its nuclear programme, the Council could reimpose UN sanctions through the snapback. The European parties to the JCPOA—Germany, France, and the UK, known as the “E3”—have signalled their willingness to take this step, which could be further bolstered if the IAEA’s forthcoming “comprehensive report” on Iran’s nuclear activities confirms that the country is in significant non-compliance with the JCPOA.
Once the Council’s 2231 facilitator is confirmed, they may wish to convene an expert-level discussion about the Council’s role if the snapback is initiated.
Council Dynamics
The Council remains divided on how to address Iran’s nuclear programme. The P3 members—France, the UK, and the US—and their allies remain concerned about Iran’s continued production of highly enriched uranium; the country’s lack of cooperation with the IAEA; and what they consider to be its destabilising support for its proxy groups in the Middle East and for Russia in Ukraine. These members support diplomatic efforts to reach a new agreement but are likely to invoke the snapback if negotiations fail. The US has repeatedly indicated willingness to take military action in that case.
China and Russia, for their part, remain supportive of Iran. Both countries have previously blamed the US for the collapse of the JCPOA, criticising it for withdrawing from the deal and imposing unilateral sanctions against the Iranian regime. At the Council’s 12 March private meeting on Iran, it seems that Russia disputed the E3’s right to invoke the snapback, arguing that the countries’ retention of certain national sanctions against Iran renders them in breach of the JCPOA and therefore unable to trigger the mechanism.
Iran has said that it might exit the NPT if the snapback is activated.
| Security Council Resolution | |
| 20 July 2015S/RES/2231 | This was a resolution that endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Iran. |
| Secretary-General’s Report | |
| 12 December 2024S/2024/896 | This was the Secretary-General’s biannual report on the implementation of resolution 2231. |
