Yemen
Expected Council Action
In May, the Security Council will hold its monthly meeting on Yemen. UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg and a representative from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) are expected to brief on political, security, and humanitarian developments in the country.
The mandate of the UN Mission to Support the Hodeidah Agreement (UNMHA) expires on 14 July.
Key Recent Developments
The US continues to conduct near-daily air strikes on military and strategic targets in Yemen controlled by the Houthi rebel group (also known as Ansar Allah). The strikes—which have intensified under President Donald Trump’s administration—are part of a campaign to degrade the Houthis’ capability to conduct attacks on vessels in the Red Sea and on Israel. Since the onset of the war in Gaza in October 2023, the Houthis have launched over 100 attacks on ships in the Red Sea, as well as multiple missile and drone attacks targeting Israeli territory, most of which have been intercepted. The Houthis are part of a coalition dubbed the “Axis of Resistance”, which is supported by Iran and includes Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon, and they claim their attacks are in solidarity with the Palestinian people.
Since 15 March, US strikes have hit targets in Yemen’s capital, Sanaa; the key Red Sea port city of Hodeidah; and the governates of Marib and Saada. According to media reports, the Houthis claim that over 250 people have been killed since the US intensified its airstrike campaign. A 17 April strike on Ras Isa oil port—which the US claimed is an important source of fuel and revenue for the Houthis—reportedly killed over 80 people. On 28 April the Houthis reported dozens killed in US strikes in Sanaa and on a detention centre in Saada, which reportedly killed at least 68 African migrant detainees. In a 27 April press release, US Central Command said that since the start of the campaign it has struck over 800 targets, killing “hundreds of Houthi fighters and numerous Houthi leaders”, leading to a reduction of ballistic missile and drone attacks.
On their part, the Houthis announced that the “continued aggression” will be met with “more counter-attack and attack operations, clashes and confrontations” and said that they had carried out missile attacks on sites in Israel and on US aircraft carriers and Reaper drones. The group has now reportedly launched at least 20 ballistic missile attacks and several drone attacks on Israel since Israeli forces resumed large-scale military operations in Gaza on 18 March, all of which have been intercepted or have fallen short of their intended target.
A 19 April statement attributable to the Spokesperson of the UN Secretary-General expressed grave concern about the US airstrikes on Ras Isa—noting that they also resulted in the injury of five humanitarian workers—and alarm that the strikes have caused significant damage to the port infrastructure and possible oil leaks into the Red Sea. The statement also expressed deep concern about the Houthis’ attacks on Israel and in the Red Sea and called on them to cease such attacks immediately, underscoring the need to fully respect resolution 2768.
On 20 April, Grundberg also issued a statement echoing the Secretary-General’s concern regarding the impact of the strikes on civilians. Grundberg noted that the cycle of attacks between the Houthis and the US “jeopardises peace efforts and risks drawing Yemen further into the regional conflict” and said the attacks “must stop with credible guarantees that protect the Red Sea from becoming a prolonged arena of conflict”.
In closed consultations on 15 April, Grundberg briefed Council members on the latest developments and apparently said that recent escalations have added complexity to the already fraught situation in Yemen, as prospects for peace in the country are being entangled with conflict in the wider region. He also warned that political progress for peace in Yemen should not be conditioned on regional factors and emphasised the need to allow space for dialogue through de-escalation by all parties, stressing that a resumption of attacks on merchant vessels in the Red Sea must also be avoided.
Although the UN-mediated truce of April 2022 continues to hold, progress on the intra-Yemeni political and peace processes remains deadlocked because of the persistent threat of escalation in the Red Sea and regional attacks. In recent weeks, an increasing concern is that the US campaign against the Houthis, including sanctions imposed through its re-designation of the group as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation, is shifting the strategic calculus for the factions of Yemen’s internationally recognised Presidential Leadership Council (PLC). The Wall Street Journal has reported that Yemeni factions are planning ground operations aimed at retaking territory controlled by the Houthis, while a senior PLC military source has reportedly told local media that the Houthis are planting mines around Hodeidah port in anticipation of a ground attack. During the 15 April consultations, Grundberg apparently noted the increased military activity in Yemen and a heightened level of risk; he also stressed, however, that the front lines remain stable.
The Houthis also continue to hold more than 50 UN, non-governmental organisation, civil society, and diplomatic mission personnel in detention, further undermining efforts to advance the Yemeni peace process. In the 19 April statement, the Secretary-General also reiterated his call for the immediate and unconditional release of all UN and other personnel arbitrarily detained by the Houthis.
Briefing the Council during the 15 April Council consultations, OCHA Director Edem Wosornu warned that funding shortfalls are posing huge challenges for the humanitarian response. She apparently informed the Council that OCHA is working on reprioritising the 2025 Yemen Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan and reviewing the humanitarian architecture to better address the situation within the current operational and budgetary constraints.
Key Issues and Options
Yemen is facing immense challenges on the political, security, and economic fronts. Preventing an escalation of hostilities in Yemen and the Red Sea and relaunching the stalled intra-Yemeni political process remain priorities for the Security Council. Should the risks of a resumption of hostilities between Yemeni factions and the Houthis escalate, Council members could consider action that could de-escalate the situation and encourage the parties to resume negotiations for a nationwide ceasefire and an inclusive political settlement. Any resumption of hostilities in Yemen would have grave implications for the already dire humanitarian situation and push the country further away from the peace process.
At the same time, the Council will seek to maintain pressure to protect the safety of navigation and shipping in the Red Sea and avoid a scenario in which the Houthis resume attacks on merchant ships and global supply chains. Given the Houthis’ use of the conflict in Gaza as a justification for their attacks in the Red Sea and on Israel, addressing this situation separately from the broader regional context remains a challenge, especially as the Council is divided over whether the two situations are directly linked or not.
One option for the Council would be to issue a presidential statement stressing that there is no military solution to the conflict in Yemen and demanding that the Yemeni parties resume concrete discussions on establishing a roadmap under UN auspices for inclusive peace in the country. The statement could also reiterate provisions from Council resolution 2768, emphasising the need to address the root causes of the attacks in the Red Sea and calling on all member states to adhere to the arms embargo imposed by the 2140 Yemen Sanctions Committee.
The humanitarian situation in Yemen also continues to be a pressing issue. The US air campaign against the Houthis—including its strikes on Hodeidah and Ras Isa ports, which are critical infrastructure for humanitarian and commercial activities—has raised concerns about its impact on the already dire humanitarian situation in the country. Additionally, the 10 February UN pause on operations and programmes in the Saada governate continues, impacting the UN’s ability to deliver aid to those in need.
In light of the increasingly fraught humanitarian context, Council members could consider holding a public briefing, possibly at high level, focused specifically on Yemen’s humanitarian crisis, which could also allow members the opportunity to highlight the urgent need for bolstering funding pledges.
Council Dynamics
Council members are largely aligned in support of an inclusive intra-Yemeni political process, the need to improve humanitarian conditions in the country, and the need to restore freedom of navigation and security to the Red Sea. Advancing mediation efforts towards a resumption of dialogue and a peace process under UN auspices remains an overarching priority for members.
Nevertheless, Council members have divergent views on what is fuelling the political stalemate and insecurity in Yemen. In Council meetings, Algeria, China, Pakistan, and Russia have stressed that the situation in Yemen and the Red Sea cannot be discussed in isolation from the situation in the occupied Palestinian territory, and some have directly blamed Israel for instability in the region. Russia has also accused the UK and the US of undermining security in Yemen through their retaliatory strikes on the Houthis. On the other hand, the P3 members (France, the UK, and the US) have been critical of Iran’s role in supporting the Houthis, including militarily.
The US has taken an increasingly hawkish stance against Iranian support, viewing it as the key facilitator of the Houthi movement. In the Security Council, the US has also made clear that any resolution of the security situation in the Red Sea must include pushback against Iran’s support to the Houthis. For example, during the 6 March Council meeting on Yemen, it stressed that the Council must respond to Iran’s flagrant violations of Council resolutions through its continued arming of the group.
The UK is the penholder on Yemen.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 15 January 2025S/RES/2768 | This resolution extended the Secretary-General’s monthly reporting requirement on Houthi attacks on merchant and commercial vessels in the Red Sea. |
| Security Council Meeting Records | |
| 6 March 2025S/PV.9873 | This was a Security Council meeting on Yemen. |
| Security Council Press Statements | |
| 13 February 2025SC/15995 | This was a press statement on Houthi Detention of United Nations, International Non-governmental Organization Workers. |
