Maritime Security
Expected Council Action
In May, the Security Council will hold an open debate on maritime security under the agenda item “Maintenance of international peace and security”. This will be the signature event of Greece’s May presidency. Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis is expected to chair the meeting. Secretary-General António Guterres, and representatives from a UN agency and the private shipping industry are expected to brief the Council.
Background and Key Recent Developments
The Council has traditionally approached maritime security by focusing on specific geographic hotspots and addressing threats in isolation. A notable exception was its first thematic meeting on maritime security in August 2021, during India’s Council presidency, which sought to frame the issue more holistically by examining the wide-ranging security, economic, and environmental impacts of maritime crime. Following that meeting, the Council adopted a presidential statement, which identified a range of maritime threats—including piracy, armed robbery at sea, terrorist activities exploiting maritime routes, and attacks on shipping, offshore installations, and critical infrastructure—and recognised the importance of international and regional cooperation. It emphasised the need to enhance information-sharing and strengthen national capacities to promote maritime safety and security.
The Council’s initiative in 2021 followed years of efforts—continuing to this day—to address maritime security threats across different regions. In May 2022, the Security Council adopted resolution 2634, spearheaded by Ghana and Norway, to draw attention to the growing threat of piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea following a notable increase in such incidents in 2020. This was the Council’s first resolution on the matter since resolution 2039 of 29 February 2012, which had called on the Gulf of Guinea states to convene a summit and formulate a regional counter-piracy strategy. That initiative served as the catalyst for the development of the “Yaoundé Code of Conduct,” which laid the foundation for the region’s maritime security architecture. On 21 June 2023, the Council held an open briefing at the request of Ghana to underscore the need for sustained regional and international efforts to enhance maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.
In response to the surge in irregular migration across the Mediterranean, the Council adopted resolution 2240 of 9 October 2015, authorising member states, acting nationally or through regional organisations, to inspect and seize vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya suspected of being used for migrant smuggling or human trafficking. The European Union (EU) Naval Force operation in the Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED IRINI) conducted inspections under the authorisation granted by resolution 2240 to counter migrant smuggling until 2024 when France and Malta—the co-penholders on the file—informed Council members that they would not pursue a further renewal. These members apparently maintained that the use of EU aerial assets could sufficiently monitor and address the issue moving forward. Operation IRINI was launched in March 2020 to implement the arms embargo on Libya under resolution 1970 of 26 February 2011, as strengthened by resolution 2292 of 14 June 2016. It continues to implement the arms embargo measures, which are set to expire on 31 May.
The Council has played a central role in addressing the Red Sea crisis, which escalated sharply following the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war on 7 October 2023. Beginning in mid-November 2023, Yemen’s Houthi rebel group launched a series of sophisticated attacks against merchant and commercial ships transiting the Red Sea. These attacks, initially portrayed by the Houthis as retaliation against Israel’s military actions in Gaza, expanded to indiscriminate attacks on vessels from numerous nations, severely disrupting international shipping and global supply chains.
In response, the Council adopted resolution 2722 of 10 January 2024, which, among other things, demanded that the Houthis cease attacks on vessels and acknowledged member states’ right to defend their vessels from attacks, including those that undermine navigational rights and freedoms. The resolution requested the Secretary-General to provide written monthly reports on further Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, a mandate extended by resolution 2768 of 15 January until 15 July. In December 2023, the US announced the formation of an upgraded multinational task force, Operation Prosperity Guardian, which has since conducted retaliatory strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen. On 15 March, the US unilaterally launched a series of precision strikes aimed at restoring freedom of navigation in the region. The EU also established Operation Aspides (EUNAVFOR Aspides), a defensive operation headquartered in Greece that protects and accompanies vessels in the Red Sea.
Sanctions Related Developments
The final report of the Panel of Experts assisting the 2140 Yemen Sanctions Committee, dated 11 October 2024, suggested that the Houthis are exploring options to extend their area of operation and carry out attacks at sea from the Somali coast. According to the report, the Houthis have been reportedly deepening their collaboration with Al-Shabaab—a terrorist group affiliated with Al-Qaida—to that end, including through increased smuggling activities between the two, mostly involving small arms and light weapons. In resolution 2776 of 3 March, which extended the 2713 Al-Shabaab sanctions regime, the Council expressed concern about the flow of weapons and ammunition from Yemen to Somalia and emphasised the importance of preventing Al-Shabaab from developing relationships with “listed groups in the region”.
Key Issues and Options
Maritime security has emerged as an important issue on the Council’s agenda, shaped by the convergence of traditional threats and emerging challenges. Recent escalations in the Red Sea region have exposed the fragility of global maritime trade routes and demonstrated how disruptions at critical choke points can impact international commerce and undermine economic stability. A related issue is the threat from emerging technologies and proliferation of advanced weaponry, including drones and missiles, which has transformed maritime conflict dynamics. In recent years, there has been a notable surge in targeted attacks on critical maritime infrastructure, including port facilities. With the digitisation of ports, vessels, and logistics networks, these systems have become highly susceptible to cyber-attacks. Private companies are affected, facing higher costs for security, rerouting, and insurance, as well as risks to the safety of seafarers and vessels.
A significant issue is organised crime at sea, along with the growing nexus between terrorism and maritime crime. Addressing underlying causes, such as weak governance, poverty, and limited economic opportunities, remains a key challenge in countering these threats, ensuring regional security, and promoting sustainable economic development. Additionally, environmental and climate-related risks are exacerbating maritime insecurity through rising sea levels and the degradation of marine ecosystems. Illegal fishing, pollution, and unsustainable resource exploitation remain significant threats, particularly for vulnerable coastal and island states.
An important issue is how the Council can work with a broad range of actors—including national governments, local authorities, civil society and the private sector—to develop coherent and holistic responses to the threats to maritime security. While the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides the primary international framework for maritime governance, contemporary maritime challenges have prompted the development of new mechanisms and initiatives that bridge traditional divides between civil, military, and private actors. The evolving threat landscape in the maritime domain has underscored the need to enhance situational awareness and strengthen international cooperation to ensure effective maritime governance.
The open debate in May might offer Council members an opportunity to take a more integrated and strategic approach to maritime security, fostering a comprehensive discussion about the interconnected nature of maritime threats and the need for coordinated international responses.
Some members may suggest the need for regular reporting from the Secretary-General on maritime security, moving beyond incident-based updates to comprehensive assessments that identify emerging trends and vulnerabilities. Such reporting could help raise awareness, highlight gaps in existing provisions, and inform early response strategies. To galvanise efforts and keep the Council’s attention on the issue, Council members may consider organising informal briefings to consider adequate responses to contemporary challenges in the maritime domain and invite industry experts to share insights, best practices, and emerging trends that could promote policy coherence.
Council Dynamics
Council members acknowledge that the wide-ranging peace and security threats posed by maritime crime demand coherent and effective multilateral approaches, particularly because of the transnational nature of these challenges. Given that all Council members are littoral states, they have a direct stake in maritime security. Along with Greece, the other elected members for the 2025-26 term—Denmark, Pakistan, Panama, and Somalia—also prioritise the issue. Vessels owned or operated by companies from Denmark, Greece, and Panama have been targeted by Houthi forces in the Red Sea; Pakistan has participated in maritime security operations in the western Indian Ocean; and Somalia has long been engaged in counter-piracy off its coast.
The Council has previously referred to the strengthening of state institutions, economic and social development, and the respect for human rights and the rule of law as necessary conditions for the eradication of piracy and armed robbery at sea. Certain Council members, however, may be reluctant to acknowledge the Council’s role in addressing matters they consider as further removed from maritime security and crime, such as the protection of the marine environment and the depletion of natural resources through illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing.
During the negotiations on the August 2021 presidential statement, China reportedly opposed references to IUU fishing as a threat to maritime security, as well as a request for the Secretary-General to produce a standalone report on maritime security threats. As a result, these references were removed from the final text of the presidential statement.
The US and China differ sharply in their legal interpretations of UNCLOS, particularly regarding the principle of freedom-of-navigation. China, a party to UNCLOS, asserts claims in the South China Sea, which other states view as excessive. The US—despite not being a party to UNCLOS—regards its principles as customary international law and rejects China’s maritime claims. To reinforce its interpretation of navigational rights and freedoms, the US routinely conducts freedom-of-navigation operations in the region using its naval and air forces. As a result, language on maritime security has often been sensitive for China during negotiations on Council products, with China favouring wording that reflects a narrower interpretation of UNCLOS’s scope and universality.
| Security Council Presidential Statements | |
| 9 August 2021S/PRST/2021/15 | This presidential statement reaffirmed that international law, as reflected in UNCLOS, sets out the legal framework applicable to activities in the oceans and encouraged member states to continue building and strengthening their capacities to enhance maritime security, including against piracy and armed robbery at sea, terrorist activities, and transnational organized crime. |
