Libya
Expected Council Action
In May, the Security Council is expected to vote on a resolution renewing for one year the authorisation for member states, acting nationally or through regional organisations, to inspect vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya, bound to or from Libya, that they have reasonable grounds to believe are violating the arms embargo. The current authorisation expires on 31 May.
The Council will also receive the biannual briefing of the International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor, Karim Asad Ahmad Khan, on the ICC’s Libya-related activities.
Key Recent Developments
The Security Council last renewed the authorisation for maritime inspections through resolution 2733, adopted on 31 May 2024, in which it requested the Secretary-General to report on the implementation of the measures within six and 11 months of the resolution’s adoption. The first report was published in November 2024 and covered the period from 15 April to 31 October 2024. It described the fragile security situation in the country, marked by clashes among armed groups in Tripoli and western Libya and heightened tensions between western Libyan forces and the Libyan National Army in the southwest. In this context, the report emphasised that the effective and comprehensive implementation of the arms embargo remains essential to reduce violence, support the political process, enhance security, and prevent arms proliferation and illicit transfers by air, land, and sea. At the time of writing, the second report had not been published.
According to the Secretary-General’s November report, the EU naval operation EUNAVFOR Med IRINI (Operation IRINI) remained the only regional arrangement to inspect vessels under the authorisation. During the reporting period, it conducted 2,192 hailings (making contact with other vessels), 70 friendly approaches (consensual visits to vessels that can be carried out without flag state approval and without the use of enforcement measures), and two vessel inspections related to the arms embargo. It attempted but did not carry out two additional inspections—one because the vessel’s flag state refused consent and the other because of the vessel’s brief transit through Egyptian and Libyan waters and short travel in the area of operation. (The authorisation requires good-faith efforts to first obtain the consent of the vessel’s flag state prior to any inspections.) No cargo seizures were reported.
Besides renewing the maritime inspection authorisation, the Council is expected to receive a briefing this month from Khan on the ICC’s activities related to Libya. The Council referred the situation in Libya to the ICC through resolution 1970, which requested biannual updates from the prosecutor. The court has jurisdiction over crimes listed in the Rome Statute committed on Libya’s territory or by its nationals from 15 February 2011 onward. The ICC opened investigations in March 2011 related to alleged crimes against humanity (including murder, imprisonment, torture, persecution, and other inhumane acts) and war crimes (including murder, torture, cruel treatment, and outrages upon personal dignity). There is currently one open case before the court, centred on Saif al-Islam Qaddafi, the son of deposed Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi. On 27 June 2011, the court charged Qaddafi with two counts of alleged crimes against humanity and issued a warrant for his arrest. He remains at large.
In his last Council briefing on 19 November 2024, Khan informed members that Pre-Trial Chamber I unsealed arrest warrants for six individuals from the Al-Kaniyat armed group that the court believes are responsible for Rome Statute crimes committed in Tarhuna. Khan requested the Council’s assistance in ensuring the execution of these warrants, the arrest of these individuals, and their participation in fair, independent, and impartial trials. He also noted that investigations into detention-facility crimes and crimes relating to the 2014-2020 period were progressing and that he anticipated further applications for arrest warrants in the next reporting period.
On 18 January, the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Osama Elmasry Njeem, suspected of crimes against humanity and war crimes in Libya from February 2015 onward. Njeem allegedly oversaw Tripoli prison facilities, where thousands were murdered, tortured, raped, and subjected to sexual violence. On 19 January, Italian authorities arrested Njeem in Turin, Italy. On 21 January, however, the Rome Court of Appeal (an Italian appellate court) ordered his release because of a procedural error. That same day, Italy returned Njeem to Libya, citing security concerns. The ICC claims Italian authorities failed to notify them of any warrant issues. As a result of the incident, Italian prosecutors have launched an investigation into Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and two ministers concerning the repatriation of Njeem to Libya despite the ICC warrant for his arrest.
The political impasse in Libya continues over the holding of national elections that would reconcile the country’s divided government. During the Council’s most recent briefing on the situation in Libya held on 17 April, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) Hanna Tetteh briefed about her consultations with Libyan political, military, security and judicial actors; oversight institutions, political parties, civil society and women leaders; and the diplomatic community since her appointment in February. She also explained how UNSMIL was supporting the Advisory Committee set up in February to address outstanding issues hindering the holding of elections in Libya. The committee is expected to conclude its work by the end of April.
Key Issues and Options
The key issue for the Council in May is to renew the authorisation for maritime inspections off the coast of Libya. From 2016 until 2023, the Council has renewed the authorisation annually through straightforward rollovers. Last year, however, the Council adopted resolution 2733, which provided for an enhanced role of the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee in approving the disposal of seized items. An option for the co-penholders is to propose reauthorisation of maritime inspections for another year with no changes.
An option ahead of the authorisation’s renewal would be for Council members to continue the regular practice of convening an informal interactive dialogue to discuss its implementation with an EU representative.
Regarding the briefing by the ICC Prosecutor, Council members that are party to the ICC could hold a joint press stakeout in connection with the meeting. A longstanding and persistent issue for the Council is how to help foster common ground between Libya’s rival legislatures to agree on electoral laws to unify the country’s divided governments. Council members are likely to continue reiterating their support for a Libyan-led and Libyan-owned political process to resolve the ongoing impasse over the holding of elections, as well as for Tetteh’s efforts in supporting these initiatives.
Council Dynamics
Until 2022, the Council unanimously renewed the maritime inspection authorisation every year. Since then, Russia has abstained on the vote, questioning the viability of the authorisation. It has noted that Operation IRINI has failed to uncover significant arms supply channels and has alleged that the operation conducts its inspections in a selective and non-transparent manner.
During last year’s negotiations on the draft authorisation renewal resolution, Russia proposed language that would strengthen the Council’s oversight; in this regard, by requiring member states acting under the authorisation to obtain the 1970 Committee’s approval prior to disposing of seized materials. China and “A3 plus one” also supported this proposal. These six members abstained during the vote, noting that the co-penholders at the time (France and Malta) did not fully address their concerns. The US and European members of the Council have traditionally been very supportive of Operation IRINI. It is unclear how some of the members who joined in January 2025 will vote on this matter.
Russia has also criticised the work of the ICC. During Khan’s November 2024 Council briefing, Russia said that it did not consider Khan to be an independent prosecutor and saw no benefit in listening to his briefing. Russia described the court as “mired in politicization, double standards and corruption” and having no bearing on the fight against impunity.
Although less forceful in their criticisms, some other Council members have also expressed reservations about the court’s work. China has described it as a violation of the principle of national sovereignty, while African members have long expressed concerns about the court’s perceived disproportionate focus on their continent. Those Council members that are state parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC—currently Denmark, France, Greece, Guyana, Panama, the Republic of Korea, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, and the UK—are generally supportive of the court’s work.
The position of the US, which is not a party to the Rome Statute, has varied depending on the administration. On 6 February, US President Donald Trump issued an executive order imposing sanctions on the ICC and Khan in response to the court’s decision to issue arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant over alleged war crimes in Gaza. The first Trump administration imposed similar sanctions on the ICC in June 2020 because of the ICC’s investigations into alleged war crimes involving US personnel in Afghanistan. The Biden administration later lifted those sanctions.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 16 January 2025S/RES/2769 | This resolution renewed the mandate of the Panel of Experts of the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee until 15 May 2026 and the authorisation of measures related to the illicit export of petroleum from Libya until 1 May 2026. |
| 31 May 2024S/RES/2733 | This resolution renewed for one year the authorisation for member states, acting nationally or through regional organisations, to inspect vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya that they have reasonable grounds to believe are violating the arms embargo. |
| Secretary-General’s Report | |
| 11 April 2025S/2025/223 | This was the 120-day report on UNSMIL. |
