DPRK (North Korea)
Expected Council Action
In May, Council members are scheduled to discuss the 90-day report on the work of the 1718 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Sanctions Committee in closed consultations.
Ordinarily, the Chair of the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee briefs Council members on the report. At the time of writing, the Chair had not been appointed, as Council members were still negotiating this year’s allocation of subsidiary bodies. If the Chair is not appointed by the time the meeting is scheduled to take place, Greece, the president of the Council during May, is expected to brief members on the report in its capacity as president.
Key Recent Developments
Tensions on the Korean peninsula have continued to rise in recent months. On 10 March, Republic of Korea (ROK) officials announced that the DPRK had launched several close-range ballistic missiles into the Yellow Sea from Hwanghae province in the southwestern part of the country. The launches, which were the first ballistic missile tests conducted by the DPRK since 14 January, came shortly after the ROK and the US began their annual “Freedom Shield” military exercise. Since the conclusion of this exercise, the ROK and the US have conducted additional joint military drills in the region, including an operation involving the deployment of long-range B1-B bombers in ROK airspace. In late February, the DPRK fired multiple cruise missiles into the Yellow Sea several days before a nuclear-powered US aircraft carrier arrived in Busan, a port city in southern ROK. On 8 April, ROK troops fired warning shots at a group of DPRK soldiers who had crossed the border between the two countries.
Against this backdrop, the DPRK has continued to show little willingness to take steps towards denuclearisation. In a mid-March statement, the DPRK’s foreign ministry vowed to “steadily update and strengthen” its nuclear capabilities. The statement appeared to be a response to a 14 March joint statement of the foreign ministers of the G7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the US), which demanded “that the DPRK abandon all its nuclear weapons and any other weapons of mass destruction as well as ballistic missile programmes in accordance with all relevant [Security Council] resolutions”. DPRK leader Kim Jong-un and his sister Kim Yo-jong have also made similar remarks reaffirming the DPRK’s commitment to its nuclear weapons programme in recent months.
Since his inauguration, President Trump has made several public statements indicating that he may seek to reestablish dialogue with Kim Jong-un, which he pursued unsuccessfully in his first term. During a 13 March meeting with NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte, Trump expressed an interest in restarting the talks, saying that he has a “great relationship” with Kim Jong-un and calling him a “nuclear power”. On 1 April, Trump told reporters that “there is communication” in response to a question about possible talks with Kim Jong-un. According to media reports, officials in the Trump administration have been undertaking preparatory work for a possible resumption of dialogue with the DPRK.
The DPRK has also continued to bolster its relationship with Russia, including by deploying additional troops to Russia’s Kursk region, where Ukraine launched a cross-border offensive in August 2024, and by supplying Russia with weapons for use against Ukraine. In a 15 April Reuters report highlighting the support provided to Russia by the DPRK, Hugh Griffiths, the former Chair of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee, described the DPRK’s contribution to Russia’s war effort in Ukraine as “strategically vital”. On 21 March, Russian security official Sergei Shoigu met with Kim in Pyongyang, where the pair reportedly discussed the conflict in Ukraine, the relationship between the US and Russia, and the security situation on the Korean Peninsula. In recent days, the DPRK and Russia have publicly acknowledged that DPRK troops had been deployed to Kursk for the first time.
The DPRK also appears to be seeking to strengthen its naval capabilities. On 8 March, state media claimed that the DPRK was building a “nuclear-powered strategic guided missile submarine”. On 26 April, the DPRK unveiled what it described as a “new multipurpose destroyer” saying that it will be available for navy service in early 2026.
Reports of possible sanctions evasion related to the overseas employment of DPRK nationals have also emerged in recent months. On 9 February, Yonhap news agency reported that thousands of DPRK workers were sent to Russia in 2024, citing ROK intelligence sources. On 24 February, the Associated Press reported that a fleet of Chinese fishing vessels used DPRK crews between 2019 and 2024, citing a report published by a London-based non-profit organisation.
On 22 March, the foreign ministers of China, Japan, and the ROK convened in Tokyo for the 11th trilateral foreign ministers’ meeting between the three countries. Following the meeting, ROK Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul told reporters that he had asked Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to help persuade the DPRK to pursue denuclearisation.
On 22 April, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director-General Rafael Grossi reportedly warned that the DPRK’s nuclear programmes have grown “exponentially” and called on the international community to resume high-level diplomacy with the country’s leadership.
Human Rights-Related Developments
On 14 January, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk issued a report on promoting accountability in the DPRK. The report, which covers the period from 1 November 2022 to 31 October 2024, describes the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights’ efforts to promote accountability for human rights violations in the DPRK and examines information gathered on such violations in light of international legal standards. Among other matters, the report recommends that member states take further steps to ensure accountability for gross human rights violations in the DPRK, including through referral by the Security Council of the situation to the International Criminal Court. Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights Nada Al-Nashif presented the report to the Human Rights Council (HRC) on 20 March.
The latest report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK Elizabeth Salmón was issued on 5 February. The report provides an overview of the current human rights situation, the interlinkages among human rights, development and peace and security, and an analysis of the DPRK’s approach to economic, social, and cultural rights and relevant Sustainable Development Goals in relation to the normative content of human rights.
On 3 April, the HRC adopted its annual resolution on the situation of human rights in the DPRK. On 25 March, the HRC adopted the outcome of the Universal Periodic Review on the DPRK.
Key Issues and Options
The DPRK’s ongoing weapons tests, many of which violate Council resolutions, remain a serious concern for the Council. Sanctions evasion is another key issue, as is the overall effectiveness of the sanctions regime, particularly given that the DPRK is widely believed to have continued developing nuclear weapons since the regime was first introduced. The DPRK’s ongoing refusal to participate in denuclearisation dialogue and the humanitarian situation in the country are also problems for the Council. In light of these issues, the Council could adopt a resolution that condemns the DPRK’s ongoing missile tests, urges member states to comply with existing resolutions, and calls on the DPRK to take part in denuclearisation talks. It could also update and strengthen the 1718 DPRK sanctions regime with a view to exerting additional pressure on the DPRK.
The lack of a panel of experts assisting the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee is another major issue. (The previous panel was shut down when Russia vetoed a resolution that would have extended its mandate in March 2024. For more information, see our 22 March 2024 What’s in Blue story). Some members are currently exploring how the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team, which was first announced in October 2024, could assist the Council and the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee. Interested Council members could ask for a briefing on the work of this mechanism, particularly following the inaugural meeting of its steering committee on 19 February. Members could also request a briefing on the implementation of the 1718 DPRK sanctions regime from UN agencies or civil society organisations with relevant expertise.
The deployment of DPRK troops on Russian territory and reports of ongoing arms transfers from the DPRK to Russia have created another major issue for the Council. Council members could choose to hold a meeting to discuss any relevant developments. Given the direct involvement of a permanent member, however, a more substantive response is likely to be difficult.
Council Dynamics
The Council is sharply divided over the DPRK, and this dynamic appears to have worsened as cooperation between the DPRK and Russia has grown. The P3 (France, the UK, and the US) and other like-minded Council members, including the ROK, generally favour using sanctions to help manage the threat posed by the DPRK and regularly call on member states to comply with existing Council resolutions. Many of these members have urged the country to engage in dialogue and abandon its nuclear weapons programme while emphasising that it is responsible for escalating tensions. Some have also called for the Council to show unity and respond to the DPRK’s weapons tests and argue that China and Russia have emboldened the DPRK by blocking Council action on the file. Several of these members have strongly criticised the growing cooperation between the DPRK and Russia, including by highlighting evidence of arms transfers from the DPRK to Russia and noting that these transfers violate Council resolutions.
China and Russia, on the other hand, blame the US and its allies for heightening tensions and have accused the US of not doing enough to incentivise the DPRK to participate in denuclearisation talks. These two members have previously argued that sanctions should be eased because of their impact on the humanitarian situation in the country and have also repeatedly blocked attempts to issue a Council product responding to missile launches carried out by the DPRK in recent years.
The US is the penholder on the DPRK.
| Sanctions Committee Document | |
| 7 March 2024S/2024/215 | This was the final report of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee. |
